Is gratitude a katastematic or kinetic pleasure?

I am on my phone and have to be brief in this post but aside from my views on the K/ K issue as a whole, it is my understanding that any pleasure which involves starting and stopping (summoning up a memory, or thinking of gratitude or anything else at a particular moment) is considered kinetic because it involves change. This is one of the difficulties of the k/k distinction.

For the record, I have no doubt that Epicurus and all the classical Epicureans made this distinction. Primarily from DL 10.136:

The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."

plus other references in Metrodorus and other texts.

That said, off the top of my head, I agree with Cassius that feelings of gratitude would be a kinetic pleasure.

Quote from burninglights

I'll offer up an example: a guy goes to a football game and cheers with glee when his team scores the touchdown, only to sulk minutes later when the other team scores the touchdown. This is kinetic pleasure: externally generated and (relatively) unstable.

Later he writes gratefully about his fun experience at the game in his journal, which generates a warm glow within that stays with him the rest of the night. This is katastematic pleasure: internally generated and (relatively) stable.

My guess, anyway.

This is where Don't research into the Greek is eventually going to help us out of this cave, in my view, because we are eventually going to latch on to what "kinetic" really includes (almost every kind of mental and physical pleasure) and then it will be easier to decide whether what's left is in fact usefully described as "katastematic."

It has been too long since I read the Gosling & Taylor "The Greeks on Pleasure" but they spilled a *lot* of ink on this issue. The trouble is that *kinetic* does tend to imply "in motion" and *katastematic* implies .... something else.

The distinction you raise in your example between the two types of pleasurable experiences - "touchdowns vs gratefulness" - certainly exists. No one in his right mind would say that they are exactly the same, or that both are not enjoyable.

Part of the problem is that *duration* alone does not appear to be the distinction implied in K/K discussions, nor is duration the deciding factor in which pleasures to value. Epicurus says explicitly we do NOT value exclusively by duration in the letter to Menoeceus as to the food we choose at a banquet and the type of life we should seek. We want the "most pleasant" and not the "longest."

And for someone who might want to assert that duration is the key, I would ask them - What is the magic line between stable and unstable? Does a minute or an hour or a day or a week or a year qualify as "stable"?

You will see in Emily Austin's footnote on this topic that she goes with Gosling & Taylor that this issue may be interesting but not crucial to analysis (I will see if I can find her exact wording).

Definitely there are many types of pleasures, and definitely some last longer than others, and definitely some are mental and some are physical, and definitely some are easier to access than others. All those factors seem indisputably important. But is it correct to overlay the word "kastematic" over some rather than others? That's a much tougher question.

Quote from Cassius

The trouble is that *kinetic* does tend to imply "in motion" and *katastematic* implies ....

Stability.

PS. I should have read further down before replying You raise some interesting points.

Emily Austin, Chapter 4 Footnote 8:

Quote

This is a non-specialist text, so I have chosen not to wade into the dispute about katastematic and kinetic pleasures in the body of the text. A specialist will recognize that I am adopting a view roughly in line with Gosling and Taylor (1982) and Arenson (2019). On my reading, katastematic pleasures are sensory pleasures that issue from confidence in one’s ability to satisfy one’s necessary desires and an awareness of one’s healthy psychological functioning; choice-worthy kinetic pleasures are the various pleasures consistent with maintaining healthy functioning, and those pleasures vary, but do not increase healthy psychological functioning.

You'll note that Dr. Austin is saying that katastematic pleasures are also "sensory," which is in itself a sort of wading into the issue, as many of the writers who advocate katastematic pleasures as better than kinetic either expressly or implicitly take the position that katastematic pleasures are not "sensory" at all.

There's that same problem again -- sensation would appear to go along with kinetic, and yet if katastematic pleasures are non-sensory, as some advocate, then what's the use of something you can't sense? The real problem in my view is that a lot of people want to overaly "absence of pain" as meaning "katastematic pleasure" rather than accepting the repeatedly asserted position that "absence of pain" is just another term for "pleasure" of any type.

And thus you trigger my latest list of cites:

1. Epicurus PD03 : ”The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once .“
2. Epicurus Letter to Menoeceus : ”By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.“
3. Diogenes Laertius X-34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“
4. On Ends Book One, 30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?
5. On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
6. On Ends Book One, 39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
7. On Ends Book One, 56 : By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.
8. On Ends Book One, 62 : But these doctrines may be stated in a certain manner so as not merely to disarm our criticism, but actually to secure our sanction. For this is the way in which Epicurus represents the wise man as continually happy; he keeps his passions within bounds; about death he is indifferent; he holds true views concerning the eternal gods apart from all dread; he has no hesitation in crossing the boundary of life, if that be the better course. Furnished with these advantages he is continually in a state of pleasure, and there is in truth no moment at which he does not experience more pleasures than pains. For he remembers the past with thankfulness, and the present is so much his own that he is aware of its importance and its agreeableness, nor is he in dependence on the future, but awaits it while enjoying the present; he is also very far removed from those defects of character which I quoted a little time ago, and when he compares the fool’s life with his own, he feels great pleasure. And pains, if any befall him, have never power enough to prevent the wise man from finding more reasons for joy than for vexation.
9. On Ends Book Two, 9 : Cicero: “…[B]ut unless you are extraordinarily obstinate you are bound to admit that 'freedom from pain' does not mean the same thing as 'pleasure.'” Torquatus: “Well but on this point you will find me obstinate, for it is as true as any proposition can be.”
10. On Ends, Book Two, 11: Cicero: Still, I replied, granting that there is nothing better (that point I waive for he moment), surely it does not therefore follow that what I may call the negation of pain is the same thing as pleasure?” Torquatus: “Absolutely the same, indeed the negation of pain is a very intense pleasure, he most intense pleasure possible.”
11. On Ends Book Two, 16 : “This, O Torquatus, is doing violence to one's senses; it is wresting out of our minds the understanding of words with which we are imbued; for who can avoid seeing that these three states exist in the nature of things: first, the state of being in pleasure; secondly, that of being in pain; thirdly, that of being in such a condition as we are at this moment, and you too, I imagine, that is to say, neither in pleasure nor in pain; in such pleasure, I mean, as a man who is at a banquet, or in such pain as a man who is being tortured. What! do you not see a vast multitude of men who are neither rejoicing nor suffering, but in an intermediate state between these two conditions? No, indeed, said he; I say that all men who are free from pain are in pleasure, and in the greatest pleasure too. Do you, then, say that the man who, not being thirsty himself, mingles some wine for another, and the thirsty man who drinks it when mixed, are both enjoying the same pleasure?”

As to how the fact of coexistence of pleasure and pain existing in different parts of experience do no contradict PD03:

1. Epicurus to Idomeneus, Diogenes Laertius: On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could increase them; but I set above them all the gladness of mind at the memory of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your lifelong attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.
2. Lucretius Book 3 line 98: “Thus often the body, which is clear to see, is sick, when, all the same we feel pleasure in some other hidden part; and contrariwise it happens that the reverse often comes to be in turn, when one wretched in mind feels pleasure in all his body; in no other wise than if, when a sick man’s foot is painful, all the while, may be, his head is in no pain. Moreover, when the limbs are given up to soft sleep, and the heavy body lies slack and senseless, yet there is something else in us, which at that very time is stirred in many ways, and admits within itself all the motions of joy and baseless cares of heart.”

Quote from Don

PS. I should have read further down before replying You raise some interesting points.

Another part of the problem is that "stable" implies "good" while "transitory" implies "less good than stable."

But if the word kinetic means anything at all, is it not associated with "motion" or "moveo" / movement in Cicero's wording? Yes you can have motion that is "smooth," and long-lasting, and surely that is a more desirable kind of pleasure than a pleasure that last less long and is more "rough." I would think all of us probably agree that a pleasure that is smooth and longer-lasting is more desirable than a pleasure that is not.

Is that all that is in issue? Then we could just say "a pleasure that is smooth and longer-lasting is more desirable than a pleasure that is not."

Is something else in issue? If it is, then I'm not yet convinced I have a clue as to what that issue is, because it's surely not a distinction between mental vs physical, which is another point on which I think all of us agree. Maybe there is some issue of "confidence" that is "unshakeable" and stays with us for a really long time due to our philosophical conclusions, but if so, again, I'd assert that everyone would be better off being clear about that in one's own language.

Quote from burninglights

Here, he seems to expresses the idea that grateful recollections have played an important role in the old man having 'come to anchor' in life, suggesting again that by way of gratitude one can find peace of mind.

But before I go off to much further on the details, re-reading your original post I presume what you are doing is looking to identify pleasures that are accessible and longer-lasting and looking at ways to cultivate those rather than moment to moment stimulations and excitements. Just thought again I would be clear and say that that is a very desirable search and something to explore and write at length about, no matter what labels we put on it.

Quote from burninglights

But, since I do tend to take the distinction as legitimate, it does make me wonder what, exactly, it means though!

Someone is eventually going to wade through the texts and the scholarly commentaries that parse the vocabularies and give examples of how all these words are used. I tend to think that the Gosling & Taylor book is exhaustive, but there are many many more.

As for here on the forum, I tend to think Don is your man who will eventually do that!

In the meantime I would just advise caution in getting too wedded to a particular position, along the lines of the "waiting" idea in Diogenes Laertius.

And part of the reason I advise that caution is that if someone gets too caught up in the wording, that focus could tend to distract away from more common sense analysis you are trying to pursue. I think you are right in your direction, and that's all there is too it. On the other hand, *many* people seem to have decided to themselves: "Epicureans were constantly dropping the name "katastematic" as a synonym for "absence of pain," and so therefore I will set my sights on "katastematic pleasure" as "absence of pain," and I'll write the whole world of kinetic pleasure out of the equation."

"Absence of pain" is the key to the analysis. If you conclude that "absence of pain" means "pleasure" then you will conclude that "absence of pain" can refer to **any** kind of pleasure, meaning **any** kind of mental or physical activity which is not painful. And that opens up the full spectrum of non-painful human activity as being desirable, which is a great deal more liberating than thinking that you need to go back to graduate school and learn detailed Greek vocabulary before you can understand Epicurus.

If you conclude that absence of pain means "katastematic pleasure," then I think you lose the benefit of what is being said on very face of the quotes I included above. You then turn against not only what Cicero's Epicurean speaker insists on repeatedly, but you turn against Epicurus himself "By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.") and what Diogenes Laertius said that Epicurus valued "both" types of pleasure.

If you suspend this analysis until you get a graduate degree to unwind the Greek, you'll lose appreciation for the pleasure-maximizing viewpoint that "if I am not in pain I am in pleasure," and you'll constantly go looking for something else (probably through asceticism).

To repeat I am not saying that you personally are running afoul of that problem, but I would wager a lot of money that many of the commentaries are doing exactly that, and that is what leads to a lot of confusion.

Quote from burninglights

But I also wanna feel the most pleasure from the least effort

That describes me precisely!

We have two methods of working toward a pleasant life which can be found in the extant texts of Epicurus: 1) working with the categories of desires and 2) working with intensity, location and duration of individual pleasures. Considering the lack of clarity of k/k pleasures, both of these methods seem, to me, to be more directly useful than trying to sort out the k/k debate (although Don may not agree with that, and I respect his thinking on the matter!).

Each of these two methods is geared toward helping us feel the most pleasure with the least effort.

When using intensity, location and duration to consider individual pleasures there is no hierarchy among these three that I'm aware of. We use our own evaluations, for our own particular situation.

The kinetic/katastematic distinction, from my perspective, was most helpful in distinguishing the Epicurus's school from the Cyrenaics. It established the Garden as embracing ALL pleasure as the good, not just the kinetic of the Cyrenaics.

Quote from Don

The kinetic/katastematic distinction, from my perspective, was most helpful in distinguishing the Epicurus's school from the Cyrenaics. It established the Garden as embracing ALL pleasure as the good, not just the kinetic of the Cyrenaics.

This sounds very sound to me. The thing to be careful about is, not to go in the opposite direction and even begin to embrace katastematic for the sake of reaching a "nirvana-like state of ataraxia".

Quote from Titus

The thing to be careful about is, not to go in the opposite direction and even begin to embrace katastematic for the sake of reaching a "nirvana-like state of ataraxia".

That's the way I see it, and I also see no reason at all to ever associate "katastematic" with "a nirvana-like state of ataraxia." But I think that's exactly what a lot of people outside this forum are doing.

Quote from burninglights

So I go to the shop of the best basket weaver in town. He's not in, but there's a pile of wicker on the floor and a note that reads, "there's warp and there's woof." I have no idea that means, but I'm pretty sure it's gonna be helpful in some way.

As you know and agree, Don has a list of citations supporting his position. If you have not read it, you can read the Boris Nikolsky article on this website which builds on the Gosling & Taylor analysis and takes a different position. All I can tell you is to read the articles to the extent you are interested and form your own opinion. In the end, I would suggest the best approach is to look at the reality of what is in the wicker basket, and what you can feel for yourself in your own mind and body, and label according to the reality you can observe.

Here's my take on kinetic/katastematic pleasures. I don't give any guarantees whether this is a sound take but you can take my take as a takeaway and feed your thoughts with it, if you wish burninglights.

Katastematic pleasure is an embedded phenomenon in a sensory processing unit. In other words, everything that is alive, has senses and a brain (or the corresponding organ) capable of translating sensory inputs into experiences, is equipped with katastematic pleasure at birth. This pleasure is, simply put, background noise to life.

As such, katastematic pleasure has nothing to do with intensity, location and duration. These can be descriptors of kinetic pleasures. If one really wants to apply these descriptors to human katastematic pleasure, they would look something like this:

intensity: subjective and unquantifiable

location: somewhere between one's ears

duration: lifespan

If a person has difficulties recognizing this background noise as a pleasure, or worse mistakes it for pain, their quality of life suffers and their lives turn into never-ending battle against ghosts that are not on there.

Kinetic pleasures are everything else, including gratitude you were wondering about.