Episode 216 - Cicero's On Ends - Book Two - Part 23 - Why Does Epicurus Say Length Of Time Does Not Contribute To Pleasure?

Welcome to Episode 216 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Book Two of Cicero's On Ends, which is largely devoted Cicero's attack on Epicurean Philosophy. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition. Check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

This week pick up after devoting an episode to Happiness to where the discussion continued in Book 2 at the very end of Section XXVII, continuing into Section XXVIII:

REID EDITION

XXVII. ... On bodily pleasure (I will add mental, if you like, on the understanding that it also springs, as you believe, from the body) depends the life of happiness. Well, who can guarantee the wise man that this pleasure will be permanent? For the circumstances that give rise to pleasures are not within the control of the wise man, since your happiness is not dependent on wisdom herself, but on the objects which wisdom procures with a view to pleasure. Now all such objects are external to us, and what is external is in the power of chance. Thus fortune becomes lady paramount over happiness, though Epicurus says she to a small extent only crosses the path of the wise man.

XXVIII. Come, you will say to me, these are small matters. The wise man is enriched by nature herself, whose wealth, as Epicurus has taught us, is easily procured. His statements are good, and I do not attack them, but they are inconsistent with each other. He declares that no less pleasure is derived from the poorest sustenance, or rather from the most despicable kinds of food and dink, than from the most recherché dishes of the banquet. If he declared that it made no difference to happiness what kind of food he lived on, I should yield him the point and even applaud him ; for he would be asserting the strict truth, and I listen when Socrates, who holds pleasure in no esteem, affirms that hunger is the proper seasoning for food, and thirst for drink. But to one who, judging of everything by pleasure, lives like Gallonius, but talks like the old Piso Frugi, I do not listen, nor do I believe that he says what he thinks. He announced that nature’s wealth is easily procurable, because nature is satisfied with little. This would be true, if you did not value pleasure so highly. The pleasure, he says, that is obtained from the cheapest things is not inferior to that which is got from the most costly. To say this is to be destitute not merely of intelligence, but even of a palate. Truly those who disregard pleasure itself are free to say that they do not prefer a sturgeon ‘to a sprat; but he who places his supreme good in pleasure must judge of everything by sense and not by reason, and must say that those things are best which are most tasty. But let that pass; let us suppose he acquires the intensest pleasures not merely at small cost, but at no cost at all, so far as I am concerned; let the pleasure given by the cress which the Persians used to eat, as Xenophon writes, be no less than that afforded by the banquets of Syracuse, which are severely blamed by Plato; let the acquisition of pleasure be as easy, I say, as you make it out to be; still what are we to say about pain? Its agonies are so great that a life surrounded by. them cannot be happy, if only pain is the greatest of evils. Why, Metrodorus himself, who is almost a second Epicurus, sketches happiness almost in these words; a well regulated condition of body, accompanied by the assurance that it will continue so. Can any one possibly be assured as to the state of this body of his, I do not say in a year’s time, but by the time evening comes? Pain then, that is to say the greatest of evils, will always be an object of dread, even though it be not present, for it may present itself at any moment. How then can the dread of the greatest possible evil consort with the life of happiness? Someone tells me: Epicurus imparts to us a scheme which will enable us to pay no heed to pain. To begin with, the thing is in itself ridiculous, that no attention should be given to the greatest of evils. But pray what is his scheme? The greatest pain, he says, is short. First, what do you mean by short? Next, what by the greatest pain? May the greatest pain not continue for some days? Look to it, that it may. not continue some months even! Unless possibly you refer to the kind of pain which is fatal as soon as it seizes any one. Who dreads such pain as that? I wish rather you would alleviate that other sort, under which I saw that most excellent and most cultivated gentleman, my friend Gnaeus Octavius, son of Marcus, wasting away, and not on one occasion only or for a short time, but often and over quite a long period. What tortures did he endure, ye eternal gods, when all his limbs seemed on fire! Yet for all that we did not regard him as wretched, but only as distressed, for pain was not to him the greatest of evils. But he would have been wretched, if he had been immersed in pleasures, while his life was scandalous and wicked.

Today Cicero hit the panel with one of the toughest questions in Epicurean philosophy, summarized in one way as: "If a life of pleasure is the good, why isn't a longer life of pleasure better than a shorter life of pleasure?"

We struggled through some initial thoughts, which I will get edited and posted as soon as I can. However this question will be extended throughout the next several episodes, so we will have an opportunity to grapple with this key issue.

Here is the heart of CIcero's argument:

But I shall be reminded (as you said yourself) that Epicurus will not admit that continuance of time contributes anything to happiness, or that less pleasure is realized in a short period of time than if the pleasure were eternal. These statements are most inconsistent ; for while he places his supreme good in pleasure, he refuses to allow that pleasure can reach a greater height in a life of boundless extent, than in one limited and moderate in length. He who places good entirely in virtue can say that happiness is consummated by the consummation of virtue, since he denies that time brings additions to his supreme good; but when a man supposes that happiness is caused by pleasure, how are his doctrines to be reconciled, if he means to affirm that pleasure is not heightened by duration? In that case, neither is pain. Or, though all the most enduring pains are also the most wretched, does length of time not render pleasure more enviable? What reason then has Epicurus for calling a god, as he does, both happy and eternal? If you take away his eternity, Jupiter will be not a whit happier than Epicurus, since both of them are in the enjoyment of the supreme good, which is pleasure.

I don't want to raise any expectations that this is going to be a particularly "good" episode, but I do think it will cover some "important topics."

Two of them deserve threads of their own:

Thread

If We Agree For The Sake of Argument That "The Perfect Should Not Be The Enemy of The Good," then let's ask "What *Should* We Consider To Be The Proper Relationship Between The Perfect And The Good?"

This thread is to discuss the question in the title.

It seems to me that this aphorism, which most of us seem to agree is a good one, needs to be followed up with more explanation of what exactly *is* the proper way for us to view the "perfect" in relationship to "the good?"

Let's also presume that we don't immediately jump to the reductionist "there is no perfect" and "there is no good," although that may be a perfectly reasonable option that we can include in the discussion.

Presuming we are…

Cassius

February 26, 2024 at 4:43 PM

Post

RE: Given The Stress That Many Greek Philosophers' Placed On "Virtue" or a perfect view of "The Good" As The Ultimate Goal, To What Extent Would An Epicurus Have Considered That Approach An "Unnatural and Unnecessary Desire?"

[…]

Yes that is exactly the direction I would take this. And to the extent that Epicurus might have been saying this in the context of deep philosophical discussion, such as the letter to Menoeceus, rather than in the context of a "here's how you should choose your career" discussion, then the target of these comments might have been at least as much his philosophical opponents as it was those who couldn't control their urges for sex or food.

Cassius

February 26, 2024 at 6:45 PM

This is a shorter note: Around the 36 minute mark will appear Joshua explaining the origin of "discretion is the better part of valor." I never thought of that in an Epicurean context before, but now that I do think about it, it's the kind of comment that goes right to the Epicurean perspective on the proper use of any virtue.

We don't discuss it for long, and Joshua makes the point that Falstaff wasn't necessarily right in a way that would apply to all circumstances, but it's interesting to think about how the quote applies to the contextual analysis of virtue.

Referring over to the new thread on the perfect not being the enemy of the good, especially as to a comment Pacatus made, I wish I could put a slightly different spin on my comments in the episode in particular and on some of my past comments on "idealism" in general.

As some are pointing out there, an "ideal" can certainly have a beneficial use, so it's going to be necessary to be clear what we mean in attacking "idealism." Some people already refer to the Epicurean view of the gods as an "idealist" view, and even though i think Epicurus held his gods to be real too, I've always tried to maintain that in addition to their reality, they serve as an example of an "ideal" life that helps us target ours.

So part of the issue with "idealism" that needs stressing is that there's nothing wrong with having and using "ideals," but you darn better be sure that you generate your ideals through the sensations, anticipations, and feelings, and that you don't let your "syllogistic logic" run unrestrained and create totally "unreal" ideals that are *in fact* the enemy of "the good."

The point in the episode i am referring to is where I say that the error of plato et al was in idealizing virtue as an absolute form in another dimension. That's the part I think is the heart of the issue, not that they are "idealizing virtue" by generating a realistic picture, that would in fact be useful, as Epicurus does, but that they are departing from the senses, anticipations, and feeling by creating an abstracted incorrect ideal that is unreal and can never be real and is in fact harmful to the realistic ideal (a direct parallel to what the crowd does in creating false anticipations of the gods.)

Gonna be out soon later tonight, but one comment first - as sometimes is the case you may need a dictionary for some of Joshua's comments -- unless you are familiar with the word "mickle" already!

Episode 216 of the Lucretius Today Podcast Is Now Available. Today we address an important but frequently questioned doctrine of Epicurus - Why did he seem to say that length of time does not contribute to pleasure? (PD19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure.)

Quote from Titus

In this episode I learnt that I don't have to listen to the approximately 200 episodes I've missed so far to experience the maximum of this pleasurable podcast

You don't have to listen to the old episodes to experience "maximum pleasure" from the podcast, but since he who counsels the old man to make a good end is foolish ... because of the desirability of life, and also because ... much worse still is the man who says it is good not to be born but ‘once born make haste to pass the gates of Death’.... it will be pleasant and desirable also if you end up having the time to listen to the previous 200!

I posted this following quote over in another recent thread but it also belongs here. I am strongly dissatisfied with how hard it seems to be to balance this time issue in many of our discussions. Yes, it's not necessary to live a longer time in order to experience "complete pleasure," because once you are complete it never gets more complete. But if life is desirable, as Epicurus also says, then "living" contains a time element, and so a longer pleasant life is still more desirable than a shorter pleasant life, even though the pleasure never gets more "complete," it only varies.

Both are true - the pleasure never gets more complete, but a longer time is also desirable. This language in Menoeceus needs to be parsed closely: "And just as with food he does not seek simply the larger share and nothing else, but rather the most pleasant, so he seeks to enjoy not the longest period of time, but the most pleasant." I will leave it to the Greek experts to expound on the Greek, but to be consistent with the rest of what he is saying it seems to me that Epicurus has to be saying that both points are true -- length of time experiencing pleasure is in fact an aspect of experiencing pleasure (it is one among many, but the three primary are time, intensity, and part of the organism involved, per PD09), but another aspect of experiencing pleasure is that once you experience "complete" pleasure then pleasure never gets more "complete."

We're seeing in many discussions strong implication that length of time is not relevant to pleasure at all, and to me that would be like saying that manner of death or time of death is not relevant at all. That's patently not true - it is preferable to die a painless death rather than painful death, and it is preferable to live a longer happy life than a shorter happy life.

The need to work further on expressing this better, including finding the sources that explain the warped Stoic view that Lucian is ridiculing here, and this is a much more important issue than many that we often discuss.

Quote from Lucian's Hermotimus

Lycinus. You must be of good cheer and keep a stout heart; gaze at the end of your climb and the Happiness at the top, and remember that he is working with you. What prospect does he hold out? when are you to be up? does he think you will be on the top next year—by the Great Mysteries, or the Panathenaea, say?

Hermotimus. Too soon, Lycinus.

Lycinus. By next Olympiad, then?

Hermotimus. All too short a time, even that, for habituation to Virtue and attainment of Happiness.

Lycinus. Say two Olympiads, then, for an outside estimate. You may fairly be found guilty of laziness, if you cannot get it done by then; the time would allow you three return trips from the Pillars of Heracles to India, with a margin for exploring the tribes on the way instead of sailing straight and never stopping. How much higher and more slippery, pray, is the peak on which your Virtue dwells than that Aornos crag which Alexander stormed in a few days?

Hermotimus. There is no resemblance, Lycinus; this is not a thing, as you conceive it, to be compassed and captured quickly, though ten thousand Alexanders were to assault it; in that case, the sealers would have been legion. As it is, a good number begin the climb with great confidence, and do make progress, some very little indeed, others more; but when they get half-way, they find endless difficulties and discomforts, lose heart, and turn back, panting, dripping, and exhausted. But those who endure to the end reach the top, to be blessed thenceforth with wondrous days, looking down from their height upon the ants which are the rest of mankind.

Lycinus. Dear me, what tiny things you make us out—not so big as the Pygmies even, but positively groveling on the face of the earth. I quite understand it; your thoughts are up aloft already. And we, the common men that walk the earth, shall mingle you with the Gods in our prayers; for you are translated above the clouds, and gone up whither you have so long striven.

Hermotimus. If but that ascent might be, Lycinus! but it is far yet.

Lycinus. But you have never told me how far, in terms of time.

Hermotimus. No; for I know not precisely myself. My guess is that it will not be more than twenty years; by that time I shall surely be on the summit.

Lycinus. Mercy upon us, you take long views!

Hermotimus. Ay; but, as the toil, so is the reward.

Lycinus. That may be; but about these twenty years—have you your master's promise that you will live so long? Is he prophet as well as philosopher? Or is it a soothsayer or Chaldean expert that you trust? Such things are known to them, I understand. You would never, of course, if there were any uncertainty of your life's lasting to the Virtue-point, slave and toil night and day like this; why, just as you were close to the top, your fate might come upon you, lay hold of you by the heel, and lug you down with your hopes unfulfilled.

Hermotimus. God forbid! these are words of ill omen, Lycinus; may life be granted me, that I may grow wise, and have if it be but one day of Happiness!

Lycinus. For all these toils will you be content with your one day?

Hermotimus. Content? Yes, or with the briefest moment of it.

Lycinus. But is there indeed Happiness up there—and worth all the pains? How can you tell? You have never been up yourself.

Hermotimus. I trust my master's word; and he knows well; is he not on the topmost height?

Lycinus. Oh, do tell me what he says about it; what is Happiness like? wealth, glory, pleasures incomparable?

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Quote from Godfrey

So one's goal is to prudently maximize one's pleasure, which is limited by one's lifespan. Cicero's argument is about the larger issue of materialism v idealism.

I think this is a helpful direction, Godfrey, but I think it will need further explanation to be clearly understandable.

Is Epicurus in fact saying that a longer life is not more pleasant than a shorter life, or is he only comparing the limited human span (whatever it is ) to an unlimited span? Cicero is arguing that Epicurus said that length of time adds nothing to pleasure. Did Epicurus in fact say that? If that is the case, then the position applies to no matter how long or short that the human life is, not just that it is "limited." If complete pleasure can be experienced the first day we are born, and nothing more is needed and we are indifferent to living longer, than we should say so explicitly. I do not think that is what Epicurus meant.

As to materialism vs idealism, I suppose I am not sure that materialism is the opposite of idealism. Maybe it's the opposite of spiritualism or supernaturalism, but is "idealism" the same thing as those two? Were the Stoics really that obtuse as to think that there is something called "virtue" that if grasped only for a moment is all that one needs to be satisfied? It seems they said so, but I don't think we can clearly discuss what they were saying without more reference material / citations that establish what they were thinking.

As we asked in the episode, is it not clear to anyone that it would be "better" to be virtuous for a year than for a day? Maybe the question is defining "better," but if some limited or special definition of "better" is the issue, then we need to know what that is so that we can see if Epicurus was applying that same definition to pleasure.

This is a good time to try to hash through some of these questions so we can add a substantive entry to the FAQ and/or other places on the website, because I don't think we are anywhere close to a persuasive explanation of what Epicurus was really saying.

Of course I invite anyone to propose a full statement reconciling these issues including the contrast with the Stoics!

Quote from Godfrey

is in many ways a matter of materialism v idealism.

Another point:

While I personally am quick to throw around the "materialism" vs "idealism" contrast, I think we need to be clear what it means. Epicurus doesn't hold that things need to be "material" in order to be felt -- he says mental feelings are stronger than physical ones. So "idealism" can certainly cause pleasure and pain, I would presume, and that makes idealism at least as "real" as dreams in that idealism can affect us.

This gets blurry as well in asking "are we talking about concepts vs things that have a material existence?

I think we need to be clear in what respect saying that something is "idealism" means something. "Capitalism" and "communism" may not exist as independent entities, but they do exist as "concepts" or "ideals," and a lot of tears have been shed over "capitalism" and "communism" just the same, so they are certainly "real" in that they can cause pain or pleasure.

Clue from Cicero in Section XXVIII:

The pleasure, he says, that is obtained from the cheapest things is not inferior to that which is got from the most costly. To say this is to be destitute not merely of intelligence, but even of a palate. Truly those who disregard pleasure itself are free to say that they do not prefer a sturgeon to a sprat; but he who places his supreme good in pleasure must judge of everything by sense and not by reason, and must say that those things are best which are most tasty.

Godfrey I agree with all your conclusions in Post 16, but I also have to say that ....

Quote from Godfrey

Simply put, to my understanding the longer life of pleasure is more pleasant than the shorter life of pleasure.

... with which I also agree, would appear to most people to contradict PD19 (PD19. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than limited time, if one measures, by reason, the limits of pleasure) unless we clearly explain why that contradiction does not exist in a way that normal people can grasp.

I think there are ways to do that, but those ways are going to -- as you say and as I agree - make clear that living a longer life of pleasure is better than a shorter life of pleasure, and that's going to conflict with a lot of modern orthodox interpretation. He who isn't satisfied with enough will never be satisfied! ... It doesn't matter to me if I die today! And all that....

Before I go further I looked back at Torquatus' initial presentation of the ethics and this is really the only part I see that touches on PD19 at all:

Quote from On Ends Book One

[38] Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.

I think we can productively ask why Torquatus's summary of Epicurean ethics *apparently* does not contain more explanation of this -- or maybe it does and we are just not seeing it. Rather than concluding that Cicero stacked the table and just omitted the explanation, I think we can infer that Cicero's interpretation of PD19 as meaning that time doesn't matter - which is probably the interpretation that prevails in Epicurean circles today -- is where the error lies.

Torquatus never says that time doesn't matter, and the common senses position is that time DOES matter. Maybe the (limited) point being made is that the experience doesn't get any "better" -- but that word "better" is where the devil resides in the details. I think we should look to the argument people seem to be making about virtue being complete in itself for a clue as to how pleasure can be complete in itself.

It would be perverse to interpret Epicurus as saying that it doesn't "matter" to us how long we live, and yet that interpretation prevails.

It seems clear that "the highest degree of pleasure" as stated by Torquatus in interpreting the "no greater degree" in PD19 is being given a limited technical meaning that is absolutely not intended to wipe out a common sense understanding that a longer life of pleasure is generally going to be preferred to a shorter life of pleasure.

I will run the current state of the discussion past the Zoom group tonight and we can assemble the circular firing squads again after that