Episode 234 - Cicero's OTNOTG - 09 - Dealing With Marcus Aurelius And The Canonical Basis For the Epicurean View Of Divinity

Welcome to Episode 234 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com.

For our new listeners, let me remind you of several ground rules for both our podcast and our forum.

First: Our aim is to bring you an accurate presentation of classical Epicurean philosophy as the ancient Epicureans understood it.

Second: We won't be talking about modern political issues in this podcast. How you apply Epicurus in your own life is of course entirely up to you. We call this approach "Not Neo-Epicurean, But Epicurean." Epicurean philosophy is a philosophy of its own, it's not the same as Stoicism, Humanism, Buddhism, Taoism, Atheism, Libertarianism or Marxism - it is unique and must be understood on its own, not in terms of any conventional modern morality.

Third: One of the most important things to keep in mind is that the Epicureans often used words very differently than we do today. To the Epicureans, Gods were not omnipotent or omniscient, so Epicurean references to "Gods" do not mean at all the same thing as in major religions today. In the Epicurean theory of knowledge, all sensations are true, but that does not mean all opinions are true, but that the raw data reported by the senses is reported without the injection of opinion, as the opinion-making process takes place in the mind, where it is subject to mistakes, rather than in the senses. In Epicurean ethics, "Pleasure" refers not ONLY to sensory stimulation, but also to every experience of life which is not felt to be painful. The classical texts show that Epicurus was not focused on luxury, like some people say, but neither did he teach minimalism, as other people say. Epicurus taught that all experiences of life fall under one of two feelings - pleasure and pain - and those feelings -- and not gods, idealism, or virtue - are the guides that Nature gave us by which to live. More than anything else, Epicurus taught that the universe is not supernatural in any way, and that means there's no life after death, and any happiness we'll ever have comes in THIS life, which is why it is so important not to waste time in confusion.

Today we are continuing to review the Epicurean sections of Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," as presented by the Epicurean spokesman Velleius, beginning at the end of Section 10.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will be maintained here.

Today's Text

XVI. Thus far have I been rather exposing the dreams of dotards than giving the opinions of philosophers. Not much more absurd than these are the fables of the poets, who owe all their power of doing harm to the sweetness of their language; who have represented the Gods as enraged with anger and inflamed with lust; who have brought before our eyes their wars, battles, combats, wounds; their hatreds, dissensions, discords, births, deaths, complaints, and lamentations; their indulgences in all kinds of intemperance; their adulteries; their chains; their amours with mortals, and mortals begotten by immortals. To these idle and ridiculous flights of the poets we may add the prodigious stories invented by the Magi, and by the Egyptians also, which were of the same nature, together with the extravagant notions of the multitude at all times, who, from total ignorance of the truth, are always fluctuating in uncertainty.

Now, whoever reflects on the rashness and absurdity of these tenets must inevitably entertain the highest respect and veneration for Epicurus, and perhaps even rank him in the number of those beings who are the subject of this dispute; for he alone first founded the idea of the existence of the Gods on the impression which nature herself hath made on the minds of all men. For what nation, what people are there, who have not, without any learning, a natural idea, or prenotion, of a Deity? Epicurus calls this πρόληψις; that is, an antecedent conception of the fact in the mind, without which nothing can be understood, inquired after, or discoursed on; the force and advantage of which reasoning we receive from that celestial volume of Epicurus concerning the Rule and Judgment of Things.

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There are two "tangents" I'd like to take in this Episode 233 before we get very far into Velleius:

(1) First, I'd like to supplement last week's episode attacking the Stoics by covering some choice quotations from Marcus Aurelius about the gods. Modern Stoics might be tempted to say "You only criticized Zeno and Chryssipus and Cleanthes - I don't care about them - I want to live like a ROMAN EMPEROR." We need some quotes from him to show that the same criticisms apply. Suggestions for quotes from Marcus Aurelius as to Gods, Fate, or Divination would be most appreciated!

(2) Then, before we get into what Velleius says about Propelpsis, let's review the text references to the Canonical Faculties and the ground rules that we would expect to apply to anything that Velleius has to say about how we reason about the gods. Let's recap the general positions about all sensations are true, multiple possibilities, waiting, PDs 23-25, etc. I will post some general notes on those.

I've set up a list of key citations relating to Canonics for easy access when we set the stage for Velleius' discussion of prolepsis. Not that they really answer any questions with certainty, but I think we if keep them in mind when we discuss what Velleius IS asserting we can eliminate a lot of confusion about what he is NOT asserting.

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Now back to researching on Marcus Aurelius on gods/fate/divination. All contributions appreciated.

I checked my old "Comparison Chart With the Stoics" to see what I collected years ago on Stoics and the Gods, and unfortunately I see no Marcus Aurelius. This is what I did collect:

Epictetus - Enchiridion: 31. Be assured that the essential property of piety towards the gods is to form right opinions concerning them, as existing and as governing the universe with goodness and justice. And fix yourself in this resolution, to obey them, and yield to them, and willingly follow them in all events, as produced by the most perfect understanding. For thus you will never find fault with the gods, nor accuse them as neglecting you. And it is not possible for this to be effected any other way than by withdrawing yourself from things not in our own control, and placing good or evil in those only which are. For if you suppose any of the things not in our own control to be either good or evil, when you are disappointed of what you wish, or incur what you would avoid, you must necessarily find fault with and blame the authors. For every animal is naturally formed to fly and abhor things that appear hurtful, and the causes of them; and to pursue and admire those which appear beneficial, and the causes of them. It is impractical, then, that one who supposes himself to be hurt should be happy about the person who, he thinks, hurts him, just as it is impossible to be happy about the hurt itself. Hence, also, a father is reviled by a son, when he does not impart to him the things which he takes to be good; and the supposing empire to be a good made Polynices and Eteocles mutually enemies. On this account the husbandman, the sailor, the merchant, on this account those who lose wives and children, revile the gods. For where interest is, there too is piety placed. So that, whoever is careful to regulate his desires and aversions as he ought, is, by the very same means, carefulof piety likewise. But it is also incumbent on everyone to offer libations and sacrifices and first fruits, conformably to the customs of his country, with purity, and not in a slovenly manner, nor negligently, nor sparingly, nor beyond his ability. 32. When you have recourse to divination, remember that you know not what the event will be, and you come to learn it of the diviner; but of what nature it is you know before you come, at least if you are a philosopher. For if it is among the things not in our own control, it can by no means be either good or evil. Don't, therefore, bring either desire or aversion with you to the diviner (else you will approach him trembling), but first acquire a distinct knowledge that every event is indifferent and nothing to you., of whatever sort it may be, for it will be in your power to make a right use of it, and this no one can hinder;then come with confidence to the gods, as your counselors, and afterwards, when any counsel is given you, remember what counselors you have assumed, and whose advice you will neglect if you disobey. Come to divination, as Socrates prescribed, in cases of which the whole consideration relates to the event, and in which no opportunities are afforded by reason, or any other art, to discover the thing proposed to be learned. When, therefore, it is our duty to share the danger of a friend or of our country, we ought not to consult the oracle whether we will share it with them or not. For, though the diviner should forewarn you that the victims are unfavorable, this means no more than that either death or mutilation or exile is portended. But we have reason within us, and it directs, even with these hazards, to the greater diviner, the Pythian god, who cast out of the temple the person who gave no assistance to his friend while another was murdering him.

Epictetus, Enchiridion: 2. Upon all occasions we ought to have these maxims ready at hand:

"Conduct me, Jove, and you, 0 Destiny, Wherever your decrees have fixed my station." Cleanthes

"I follow cheerfully; and, did I not, Wicked and wretched, I must follow still Whoever yields properly to Fate, is deemed Wise among men, and knows the laws of heaven." Euripides, Frag. 965

And this third: "O Crito, if it thus pleases the gods, thus let it be. Anytus and Melitus may kill me indeed, but hurt me they cannot." Plato's Crito and Apology

Diogenes Laertius, Life of Zeno: 88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is.

Diogenes Laertius, Life of Zeno: The good, it is added, are also worshippers of God; for they have acquaintance with the rites of the gods, and piety is the knowledge of how to serve the gods. Further, they will sacrifice to the gods and they keep themselves pure; for they avoid all acts that are offences against the gods, and the gods think highly of them: for they are holy and just in what concerns the gods. The wise too are the only priests; for they have made sacrifices their study, as also the building of temples, purifications, and all the other matters appertaining to the gods.

Diogenes Laertius, Life of Zeno: And the wise man, they say, will offer prayers, and ask for good things from the gods: so Posidonius in the first book of his treatise On Duties, and Hecato in his third book On Paradoxes.

Diogenes Laertius, Life of Zeno: The deity, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting nothing evil, taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he is not of human shape. He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the father of all, both in general and in that particular part of him which is all-pervading, and which is called many names according to its various powers. They give the name Dia (Δία) because all things are due to (διά) him; Zeus (Ζῆνα) in so far as he is the cause of life (ζῆν) or pervades all life; the name Athena is given, because the ruling part of the divinity extends to the aether; the name Hera marks its extension to the air; he is called Hephaestus since it spreads to the creative fire; Poseidon, since it stretches to the sea; Demeter, since it reaches to the earth. Similarly men have given the deity his other titles, fastening, as best they can, on some one or other of his peculiar attributes.

As to Marcus Aurelius, this post by the traditionalist Stoic Chris Fisher summarizes some key points:

As Mark Forstater wrote in his insightful book The Spiritual Teachings of Marcus Aurelius:

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Until the time of Neoplatonism, Stoicism was the most highly spiritualised form of philosophy in ancient Greece and Rome. It was so spiritualised that it is as accurate to call it a religion as a philosophy.^[5]

As Henry Sedgewick points out in his biography of Marcus Aurelius, the traditional religions did not provide what he was looking for,

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Marcus was seeking a religion, as I have said, but there was none at hand that he could accept. The old Roman religion was a mere series of ceremonies, with nothing sacred except lingering patriotic sentiment, and withal marred by superstitions, such as those at Lanuvium. Foreign religions were no better. Syrian priests, like mountebanks, trundled images of the Magna Mater about the countryside, hoping to wheedle peasants out of their pennies; the worshippers of the Egyptian gods offered sensuous exaltation, and mysteries that disregarded reason. Christianity, as we understand it, was utterly unknown to him. He was compelled to look for religion in philosophy; for there only, as he thought, and perhaps thought truly, could a man, without doing wrong to his reason, find spiritual help to enable him to do his duty and keep his soul pure.^[6]

Marcus did not find consolation in the rituals of traditional religions or the mediation of priests. He was looking for psychological strength and consolation which could allow him to keep his mind pure in trying times and under troublesome circumstances. Marcus discovered the personal religious practice he was looking for within the deeply spiritual philosophy of Stoicism.^[7] As a result, his life became an example of the power of Stoicism in a person’s inner life. Sedgewick argues,

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Marcus Aurelius is not a prodigy among men, unheralded by what has come before; on the contrary he is the ripe product of the spiritual movement that expressed itself in the Stoic philosophy, or rather, as it had then become, the Stoic religion.^[8]

As can be seen in his Meditations, Marcus followed the Stoic path and became his own priest, in service to the gods,

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For such a man, who no longer postpones his endeavour to take his place among the best, is indeed a priest and servant of the gods, behaving rightly towards the deity stationed within him, so ensuring that the mortal being remains unpolluted by pleasures, invulnerable to every pain, untouched by any wrong, unconscious of any evil, a wrestler in the greatest contest of all… (Meditations 3.4.3)

In Meditations 3.16, Marcus draws upon the importance of the divine while discussing four models of human behavior.

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Body, soul, intellect: for the body, sense-impressions; for the soul, impulses; for the intellect, judgements. To receive impressions by means of images is something that we share even with cattle; and to be drawn this way and that by the puppet-strings of impulse, we share with wild beasts, with catamites, and with a Phalaris or a Nero; and to have the intellect as a guide towards what appear to be duties is something that we share with those who do not believe in the gods, with those who betray their country, with those who will do anything whatever behind locked doors. If you share everything else with those whom I have just mentioned, there remains the special characteristic of a good person, namely, to love and welcome all that happens to him and is spun for him as his fate, and not to defile the guardian-spirit seated within his breast, nor to trouble it with a host of fancies, but to preserve it in cheerful serenity, following God in an orderly fashion, never uttering a word that is contrary to the truth nor performing an action that is contrary to justice.

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[i]n Meditations 2.12-13, Marcus juxtaposes the persons who “hold fast to the guardian-spirit within” with those whose sole focus is on intellectual pursuits:

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Consider too how a human being makes contact with God, and through what part of himself, and how that part of him must be disposed if he is to do so. There is nothing more pitiable than the person who makes the circuit of everything and, as the poet says, ‘searches into the depths of the earth’, and tries to read the secrets of his neighbour’s soul, yet fails to perceive that it is enough to hold fast to the guardian-spirit within him and serve it single-mindedly; and this service is to keep it pure from passion and irresponsibility and dissatisfaction with anything that comes from gods or human beings. For what comes from the gods is worthy of reverence because of their goodness, and what comes from human beings should be dear to us because we share a common nature…

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Providence or Atoms

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But perhaps you are discontented with what is allotted to you from the whole? Then call to mind the alternative, ‘either providence or atoms’ and all the proofs that the universe should be regarded as a kind of constitutional state. (Meditations 4.3.5)

Marcus Aurelius understood and accepted the Stoic worldview, which includes a rationally ordered and providential cosmos. Additionally, Marcus relied on the Stoic theory of psychology, which asserts that our emotions are connected to our value judgments. Therefore, he understood how one’s accepted worldview could affect their judgments of events in the world. In his Meditations, Marcus links acceptance of a providential worldview to a ‘cheerful mind’ (2.3) and sees a call to action within it (2.4). Again, in Meditations 4.3.5, he suggests our resentment of the circumstance of our lives is the result of denying providence.^[11] As Dragona-Monachou makes clear,

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Divine providence is a firm belief of Marcus Aurelius’s. He declares: “The gods exist and have concern for human affairs” (2, 11, 3). The “whole divine economy is pervaded by providence” (2, 3, 1). He considers “life not worth living unless there exist providential gods” (2, 11, 2), and believes that the existence of providential gods is a by far more plausible and acceptable alternative to atoms, chance or confusion (4, 3, 3; 4, 27; 9, 9; 7, 19, etc.).^[12]

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Even though the meaning of some of Marcus’ “providence or atoms” passages appear unclear when considered individually, few scholars doubt Marcus’ commitment to providence. As Pierre Hadot writes,

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Whatever modern historians may claim, the dilemma “either providence or chance,” when used by Seneca or by Marcus Aurelius, does not signify either the renunciation of Stoic physical theories or an eclectic attitude which refuses to decide between Epicureanism and Stoicism. In fact, we can see that Marcus has already made his choice between Epicureanism and Stoicism, by the very way in which he describes the Epicurean model with a variety of pejorative terms…^[14]

While addressing a common question, “How much of a Stoic is Marcus Aurelius in the Meditations?” Christopher Gill writes,

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On the one hand, apart from his explicit allegiance to Stoicism (e.g., I 7– 8), the dominating themes are strongly Stoic and there are clear signs of the influence of Epictetus’ ethical programme. On the other hand, the style is idiosyncratic, with strong Heraclitean, Cynic, and Platonic colouring… Most puzzling of all, despite his frequent adoption of a cosmic perspective on ethical life, he sometimes expresses indifference about which worldview is correct: the Stoic providential one or the Epicurean view that the universe is a fortuitous collection of atoms…The ‘providence or atoms’ theme is more puzzling, though in some passages the question seems more open than in others. But it may be important that Marcus acknowledges, in Meditations I 17, that he has not himself actuallycompleted the three-part Stoic curriculum (including logic and physics) that would yield the cosmic understanding he seeks to apply to his own life. Hence, the Stoic worldview has to be, in this respect, taken on trust (though Marcus overwhelmingly does take it on trust) – a fact perhaps acknowledged in his use of the ‘providence or atoms’ theme.^[15]

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After pointing out that Marcus leaves the competing hypotheses of several “unresolved issues in Stoic physics” open, David Sedley writes:

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His unexpected openness to Epicurean physics as an alternative to the Stoic model reads as if it were an extension of this same policy, despite the obvious difference that he is palpably committed to the truth of Stoicism and hence the falsity of Epicureanism.^[20]

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As David Sedley notes in his chapter titled Marcus Aurelius on Physics, in A Companion to Marcus Aurelius:

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In reminding himself to apply physical thinking to every idea he entertains, Marcus captures a vital aspect of his meditations. The question what part physics plays in Stoic ethics has been a frequent subject of modern debate. In Marcus we may find no theoretical answer to that question, but we get to see, worked out in practice, his recognition that reflection on how the cosmos functions is an absolutely integral part of the Stoic moral life. Throughout his reflections on human values, he can be seen constantly turning to the cosmos as a concept to think with.

Marcus’ cosmos or world is recognizably and indeed technically Stoic. It is a single, finite, cohesive organism, surrounded by void. Partly as a consequence, it is entirely self-contained and cohesive in its functioning, internally governed by the inexorable sequence of causes known as ‘fate’. So far as its underlying constitution is concerned, it is composed out of two ultimate items, of which one is a pliable material substrate, and the other, acting upon this, a single intelligent divine causal power, sometimes identified with its ‘seminal reason’ (spermatikos logos).^[22]

Many moderns question the necessity of providence for the practice of Stoicism. To do so, they must modify Stoicism in ways that remove one of its most potent psychological tools—a trust that all events in nature, even those we would typically judge as bad, have a purpose and serve the good of the whole. This trust and the attitude of gratitude that springs from it are expressed beautifully by Marcus in one of my favorite passages.

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Everything suits me that suits your designs, O my universe. Nothing is too early or too late for me that is in your own good time. All is fruit for me that your seasons bring, O nature. All proceeds from you, all subsists in you, and to you all things return. (Meditations 4.23)

It is simply not possible to make sense of passages like this apart from Marcus’ absolute and unequivocal trust in the providential nature of the cosmos. These are not the words of a begrudging acceptance of life’s events. Marcus exhibits something far more perceptive than a bear and forbear attitude toward events that were not up to him. No, he is expressing a profound trust that every event in Nature has a purpose. Marcus didn’t need to remind himself about the detailed, technical, philosophical arguments for providence in his journal; he lived it every day of his life, and that was proof enough for him.

We had a very good discussion of prolepsis in our Wednesday Zoom tonight and one thing (of several) that come from it is that I definitely think part of the ground work we want to lay is to refer to the case of Centaurs, discussed in Lucretius, and observe that Lucretius said both (1) that the images of the centaur do strike our minds, but also (2) centaurs do not and cannot exist.

I think that gives us some important leads to follow as to what is involved in the faculty of prolepsis, and how we have to distinguish the fact that prolepses are true in the sense of "honestly reported" but not true to the facts in the sense of the conclusion "centaurs exist."

Book 4:732 (Bailey)

[722] Come now, let me tell you what things stir the mind, and learn in a few words whence come the things which come into the understanding.

[724] First of all I say this, that many idols of things wander about in many ways in all directions on every side, fine idols, which easily become linked with one another in the air, when they come across one another’s path, like spider’s web and gold leaf. For indeed these idols are far finer in their texture than those which fill the eyes and arouse sight, since these pierce through the pores of the body and awake the fine nature of the mind within, and arouse its sensation.

[732] And so we see Centaurs and the limbs of Scyllas, and the dog-faces of Cerberus and idols of those who have met death, and whose bones are held in the embrace of earth; since idols of every kind are borne everywhere, some which are created of their own accord even in the air, some which depart in each case from diverse things, and those again which are made and put together from the shapes of these. For in truth the image of the Centaur comes not from a living thing, since there never was the nature of such a living creature, but when by chance the images of man and horse have met, they cling together readily at once, as we have said ere now, because of their subtle nature and fine fabric. All other things of this kind are fashioned in the same way. And when they move nimbly with exceeding lightness, as I have shown ere now, any one such subtle image stirs their mind; for the mind is fine and of itself wondrous nimble.

[749] That these things come to pass as I tell, you may easily learn from this. Inasmuch as the one is like the other, what we see with the mind, and what we see with the eyes, they must needs be created in like manner.

[752] Now, therefore, since I have shown that I see a lion maybe, by means of idols, which severally stir the eyes, we may know that the mind is moved in like manner, in that it sees a lion and all else neither more nor less than the eyes, except that it sees finer idols.

[757] And when sleep has relaxed the limbs, the understanding of the mind is for no other cause awake, but that these same idols stir our minds then, as when we are awake, insomuch that we seem surely to behold even one who has quitted life, and is holden by death and the earth. This nature constrains to come to pass just because all the senses of the body are checked and at rest throughout the limbs, nor can they refute the falsehood by true facts. Moreover, the memory lies at rest, and is torpid in slumber, nor does it argue against us that he, whom the understanding believes that it beholds alive, has long ago won to death and doom.

[768] For the rest, it is not wonderful that the idols should move and toss their arms and their other limbs in rhythmic time. For it comes to pass that the image in sleep seems to do this; inasmuch as when the first image passes away and then another comes to birth in a different posture, the former seems then to have changed its gesture. And indeed we must suppose that this comes to pass in quick process: so great is the speed, so great the store of things, so great, in any one instant that we can perceive, the abundance of the little parts of images, whereby the supply may be continued.

[777] And in these matters many questions are asked, and there are many things we must make clear, if we wish to set forth the truth plainly.

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So the image of a Centaur is real, and reported honestly to us through the faculty that receives images, and yet we do not conclude simply from perceiving an image of a Centaur that Centaurs are real, because we have all sorts of other observations that through deductive reasoning establish to us, and lead us to conclude, that Centaurs cannot exist, and thus that the images of Centaurs we received were not generated by real Centaurs.

An obvious question arises: If we are to conclude that the gods exist and are blessed and imperishable, it would seem that those conclusions must be based on more observations, and more deductive reasoning, and not simply on the receipt of images. Images constitute real evidence, since they are canonical, and yet we override that evidence by comparing it to other evidence and deem the image evidence insufficient to conclude "centaurs exist in reality."

In the case of gods, what additional observations and reasoning provide the impetus to conclude that gods are blessed and imperishable? We'll no doubt want to look at what else Velleius says for that evidence, including isonomia and infinity and the examples of deductive reasoning that Velleius gives.

One additional thing I'd like to memorialize from the Wednesday Zoom: Bryan pointed out something that I think boils down to close to this (Bryan can correct me if better way to say it):

All of us are constantly being bombarded from all directions at all times with all sorts of sensations, with all sorts of feelings, and also with all sorts of "images."

For the moment we may (or may not) want to consider the essence of all of these bombardments as movements of atoms that touch us / impact us in different ways. The three canonical faculties are our inborn ability to perceive movement or presence of atoms which constitute light (sight), sound (hearing), odors (smell), touch, or in the case of images - arrangements of atoms in films which are essentially filmy "shapes" which retain to greater or lesser degree the shapes of their source.

We can take or leave that last paragraph, because the essential point being made right now is that we're constantly being bombarded from the outside with all sorts of atomic impacts.

I take Bryan's point to be that "something' within us must constitute a faculty of selectively focusing our attention and pointing us towards identifying what is significant to us and what is not. Whatever that mechanism is, whether that's a description of a "faculty of prolepsis" or a description of something else, such a process *is* going on within us, and such a faculty is born with us at birth, and such ability does in fact get sharper over time as we process multiple experiences over time.

Perhaps an analogy is that pleasure and pain are essentially our *reactions* to events as they occur. Our genetics are etched to operate in a way that predisposes us to particularize what happens to us and to find some events more pleasurable (and painful) than others.

Similarly each of our five senses are etched to operate in a way that disposes us to distinguish between the things that impact our senses and to relay that reaction to the brain for further processing. it should not be a stretch to think that there would be a faculty that disposes our mind to distinguish between the images that impact our senses and to find some more significant than others, and to relay that to the brain for further processing. Only after the brain receives these inputs and starts processing them into "opinions" is "truth" or "error" a relevant consideration. An exercise of the operation of the eyes and ears and nose is never "right" or "wrong;" the a feeling of pleasure and pain is never "right" or "wrong," and likewise on that analogy an exercise of of the faculty of prolepsis is never "right" or "wrong." (I take it that Tau Phi is emphatically in agreement with the importance of emphasizing that truth or error does not exist in the faculties, but in the conclusions/opinions of the mind.)

Perhaps describing the action of the faculty we are talking about as one of selective focusing of attention is a little more neutral than the "pattern-recognition" term that we also discussed. "Recognizing a pattern" maybe rings a little to close to "recognizing an idea." I think most of us are disposed to reject "innate ideas" for maybe the same reason that Lucretius thought it was a good argument to say that the gods could not have created the universe because even the gods would have had no pattern by which to go.

On the other hand, it seems most of accept without hesitation that we are programmed at birth to find some things pleasurable and some things painful in varying degrees, so certain forms of "programming" as related to the operation of a faculty of prolepsis in selectively focusing images doesn't seem to be out of line with Epicurus' approach.

One of the Nietzsche quotes from Beyond Good and Evil that we included in the last episode (Gutenberg edition, translated by Helen Zimmern ) Chapter 1, section 9 -

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... Is not living valuing, preferring, being unjust, being limited, endeavouring to be different? ..... while you pretend to read with rapture the canon of your law in Nature, you want something quite the contrary, you extraordinary stage-players and self-deluders! In your pride you wish to dictate your morals and ideals to Nature, to Nature herself, and to incorporate them therein; you insist that it shall be Nature “according to the Stoa,” and would like everything to be made after your own image, as a vast, eternal glorification and generalism of Stoicism!

Surely the faculty of pleasure and pain is an example of programming that disposes us to value or prefer some things over others. It might not be too much of a stretch to analogize prolepsis very broadly as involving a disposition of the mind to value or prefer or focus on some images other than others, without which faculty we would never be able to focus on or distinguish any images in particular as different from any of the other myriads of images that constantly bombard us.

If post #7 is largely or partly correct, one more focused way to state the takeaway might be:

You're making a distinction there Bryan that I want to be sure I understand. To be clear about my own view:

1 - I think that Epicurus thought that a solid case exists that the type of gods he is talking about not only serve a very useful purpose to reverence, but also that such beings do exist somewhere in the universe. So I think he would say that his evidence and argument mean that the statement "gods exist somewhere in the universe and are blessed and imperishable" is a true opinion. (I know some disagree with that, but that's my personal view.)

2 - I think however that I would not describe "gods exist somewhere in the universe and are blessed and imperishable" as a "sense." I would describe "gods exist somewhere in the universe and are blessed and imperishable" as statement or proposition or an opinion that I have adopted based significantly in part on the operation of a "sense" that assists me in the process of organizing the evidence and that "tells" me, in reaction to the opinion, that the opinion seems valid. Maybe here I might describe that at least in part as a "sense of confidence" that I sometimes have about opinions that are surely true, vs. a much less confident feeling I have when an opinion is on shaky ground. Talking about this reminds me that somewhere in the distant past of the forum there were comments made by some to the effect that a "sense of confidence" might be a part of the prolepsis picture.

3 - I think most of us agree that pleasure and pain are highly analogous to a "sense," in that we say we "feel good" or "feel bad" and the "feel" in that sentence seems naturally to associate with feeling smooth or rough or seeing color or hearing sound. But I still think to bring any clarity to this we would have to be more specific about "what" a faculty of prolepsis "processes" as its function. And the closer we get to saying that prolepses processes "ideas" such as "guilt" - such as to say that "feeling guilty comes only after a real and automatic sense of guilt" - then the further that intrudes into the conceptual reasoning process where true and false apply. In the case of justice or guilt, I'd be more apt to say that the prolepses is processing the "relationships" (possibly the relationships of the atoms in the images that we are processing), and that it is then the feeling of pleasure and pain that comes into play to assess whether we find the particular relationship agreeable or not.

So what I am looking for a position on is whether "gods exist and are blessed and imperishable" *IS ITSELF* a prolepsis, or - from the point of view of Epicurus - whether it is a "true opinion that has been formed taking into account the operation of the proleptic faculty and other things as well."

I'm trying to focus on that because I can't see it proper to say that the eyes "flat out tell me" that "I see a bird" or that the ears "flat out tell me" that "I hear music" or that pleasure tells me that "I am eating honey." In turn I cannot see it proper to say that a prolepsis "flat out tells me" that "a god is imperishable" or any other statement that amounts to a "proposition." Each of those underlined statements seem to me to be "propositions" that are formed in the mind after the use of inputs from all three of the categories of faculties, including prolepsis, rather than conclusions of those faculties themselves.

Can you clarify further?

I think we are at least 99% together, maybe more, except possibly for this:

Quote from Bryan

In some circumstances you may sense many trees around you, at other times you may sense guilt from the circumstances, at other times you may sense the gods.

It sounds like you're talking about some kind of "intuition" or "intuitive sense," and I am open to that wording at least in part because I think that's the direction DeWitt goes.

But I am having a hard time getting a grip on how to explain "intuition" in clear terms. Is it the difference between Windows95 and Windows 11 in terms of much more advanced processing power, or is it the difference between a computer with a keyboard vs a computer with lots of additional peripheral input devices, or what kind of analogy or explanation can be given to "intuition?"

Bryan would you agree or disagree with saying that the difficulty of prolepsis operates on "images?"

And do you see any connection between the Centaur / image example in Lucretius and prolepsis?

Quote from Bryan

We smell and see the film that comes from our meal, for example.

Ok now *there* is another potential issue. I thought that "images" are received directly by the mind, without going through the eyes, and that the "images" technically speaking are not visible or otherwise detectable by the five senses. Is that not the implication of the discussion in Book 4 of Lucretius, and the implication of what Cicero says to Cassius about the mind selecting images as involved in thinking of someone who is not present?