Posts by Eikadistes

Ellipublish here! Facebook won't let me read it without re-enlisting.

Quote from jcblackmon

I may post a simple version of my argument, if there is interest. Thank you.

Please do!

While none of the Hellenists predicted the wide spectrum of discoveries that the 20th-century uniquely hosted, Epíkouros seems to me to have anticipated more of the contemporary nuances than any other philosopher. One, subtle example I like to use is the question of the "Center of the Universe". Most of us believe that the Heliocentric model is the correct model ... for the Solar System. But at the time, we weren't modeling the Solar System. We were modeling all of the stars, and we put the Sun in the very middle of all of them. Heliocentrism is this regard is false. To my knowledge, only Epíkouros shared the subtle insight that, indeed, "there can be no center to infinity."

I have always seen there to be some level of a conceptual correspondence between isotakheia and Einstein's propositions about the nature and propagation of light, so I would love a general outline of some of these advanced topics in contemporary physics and mathematics.

Also, are you familiar with Einstein's introduction to Diel's German version of De Rerum Natura? His commentary makes me wonder if he found direct inspiration from Epicureans. Per Einstein:

"The work of Lucretius will work its magic on anyone who does not completely wrap himself in the spirit of our time and, in particular, occasionally feels like a spectator of the intellectual attitude of his contemporaries. One sees here how an independent man equipped with lively senses and reasoning, endowed with scientific and speculative curiosity, a man who has not even the faintest notion of the results of today’s science that we are taught in childhood, before we can consciously, much less critically, confront them, imagines the world.

The firm confidence that Lucretius, as a faithful disciple of Democritus and Epicurus, places in the intelligibility, in other words, in the casual connectedness of everything that happens in the world, must make a profound impression. He is firmly convinced, he even believes he can prove, that everything is based on the the regular motion of immutable atoms, ascribing to atoms no qualities other than geometric-mechnaical ones. The sensual qualities warmth, coldenss, color, odor, taste, are to be attributed to the movements of atoms, likewise all phenomena of life. He conceives of the soul and mind as formed from especially light atoms, by assigning (in an inconsistent way) particular qualities of matter to particular characteristics of experience.

He states as the primary objective of his work the liberation of humanity from the slavish fear, induced by religion and superstition, that he sees as nourished and exploited by priests for their own purposes. This certainly is a serious issue for him. Nonetheless, he does seem to have been guided mostly by the need to persuade his readers of the necessity for the atomistic-mechanical worldview, although he dare not say this openly to his much more practically oriented Roman readers. His reverence for Epicurus, Greek culture and language, which he considers greatly superior to Latin culture and language, is altogether moving. It redounds to the glory of the Romans that this could be said to them. Where is the modernnation that holds and expresses such noble sentiments with regard to one of its contemporary nations?

DIels’s verses read so naturally that one forget it is a translation.”

(Einstein, forward to: T. Lucretius Carus, De rerum natura, Vol. 2, Lukrez, Von der Natur, trans. by Hermann Diels, Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1924, pp. via-vib)

Welcome! (And awesome first post!)

Superficially, I'm not sure I like the idea of identifying"fear" as the motivating factor behind preventing preventable death, versus, perhaps, rational avoidance. Then again, we practice avoidance to prevent non-constructive pain, and fear is definitely painful ... but is it constructive? In that regard, fear is a fellow actor on the stage of wisdom, but, playing the role of an antagonist? So I think I hesitate to place "fear" in a positive context. But it is natural, so... I'm not sure.

Regardless, I really enjoyed the approach Professor Austin took in terms of reviewing the response to the fear of death as a thing that can be "politically managed", beyond cultivating impassiveness. Contextualizing civic engagement as an approach to satisfying our natural and necessary desires, I believe, is the right way to discuss the field of politics from an Epicurean perspective, and I'm definitely going to spend some time thinking about modern politics from this view.

Truly, we all live in a city without walls when it comes to the true, universal antagonists of human history, those being disease and natural disasters. We have to find a way to tolerate those things. We're all faced with the death of our parents, and the deaths of friends. We're all faced with infirmity. Someone will suffer our own absence. One, measly volcano popped 70k years ago, and (SLAM) our species dropped below 10,000 individuals. One, tiny mutation occurs in one, little microbe, and (SLAM) 20 million people die. Human beings have (perhaps until the modern era) no capacity to mitigate those events; but on the spectrum of Choice-to-Fate, some threats are more "fate", and some are more "choice". We can't stop volcanic eruptions. Maybe we can learn to re-direct a planet-hungry asteroid? Still, by comparison, we can definitely mitigate political violence and civic unrest (even if our ability to influence it is very, very small: that freedom exists).

And, given that, coherent with the Epicurean project, I think it's correct to be pissed when good law is violated, when friends engage in betrayal, and when children die of political violence. Should we "fear" those things? ... maybe? ... I think I ultimately agree with Professor Austin. I'm not sure if we should, or if we can justify that Epíkouros thought so, but I certainly do fear.

There's a lot here, but what I can say for sure, is that, personally, I fear dying before I have the opportunity to enjoy the same privileges of the rest of my family. I observe my parents' generation, and all of my older cousins, all of them, both educated and uneducated, blue collar and white collar, academic, industrial, commercial, casual, formal ... all of them had kids, bought cars, owned homes, invested in the market, and half of them advanced their economic class. In history books, I learn that they enjoyed several decades of historically-unique social advances. From childhood, I remember my parents enjoying unemployment and supplemental income. In middle management, my dad was afforded a company car, and a company phone, and robust health insurance on top of his competitive salary that only required a general B.A. from WVU in the 70s. All of those people in my life were presented with the opportunity to choose to go to school, or apprentice with a professional, or take a risk investing in a business, or start their own with modest resources. Every one of them could provide the name of a general physician ... because they had one.

All of those things fulfilled their natural and necessary desires. They weren't just privileges, or luxuries. None of those things were pursued for entertainment, or to diversify their pleasures. Those were rungs on the ladder of meeting their ability to gain employment, make money, eat food, and grow. In the modern era, access to education and technology are as much a necessity as food and water. Or maybe not? Maybe that's up for debate? ... you can infer where I stand.

I observe that my role as a civilian, consumer, and taxpayer (which at least used to provide safety) is being re-oriented toward legally-indentured-servitude. We know it now. I'm living it. This isn't speculation. We will not buy a home. I cannot participate in the market. My vote has never counted. Owning a car is about to become a luxury. We will be leasing our next vehicle. I am going without healthcare next year so my wife gets her life-necessary meds. By the way, our insulin just tripled in price. We can no longer save money. We're skipping groceries. My education and experience cannot guarantee employement. The majority of the population is now leasing their living needs, and not from life, but from other individual members of our society who have measurably violated the pact to neither harm nor be harmed among other members of their society. We are being affected by measurably psychopathic personalities who do not recognize our role as moral, human agents. All of this is a violation of pacts that were put in place by my grandparents to preserve our future. I'm pissed, and politically active, because the peaceful pact to neither harm nor be harmed is being politically violated, and nothing less than a political response is appropriate to satisfy my natural and necessary desires. Me do anything less right now seem like Stoic surrender to apathy.

Everyone around me seems surprised that I'm angry. "Trust God" they tell me. "Things have a way of working themselves out" they say. Well, not in Gaza. Not in Kashmir. Not in the projects. Santa Claus tends to prefer neighborhoods with property values. God helps some people win Super Bowls, but gives kids cancer. There are limits to happiness. After all, as Epíkouros observed, "a person cannot become wise with every physical condition, nor in every cultural context" (10.117). Those limits were not set by measles and hurricanes. People did that. People who are our neighbors, who have measurably violated the pacts my grandparents formulated to secure a peaceful society. People are withholding education in a technologically advanced society. People are proliferating our streets with weapons of war. People are responsible for these problems, because of violations.

Fear of being dead, death, and dying is one thing, but fear of losing your life, or losing the life of a friend as a result of betrayal, wrath, or a violation of justice is another thing. Hermarkhos attests that the creation of law, in the first place, is a necessary act for wise people to prevent future harm. So we need to engage law as though it is as real as a rainstorm. Epíkouros explains that society, in the first place, naturally developed because it is advantageous to individuals, so a stable society is part of the prescription Nature provides for humans. Furthermore, he explains that all individuals, in all societies cannot became wise and enjoy pure pleasure, because, if for no other reason, you don't have time to study nature. A variety of severe, physiological conditions eliminate the possibility of uninterrupted pleasure. I think it is fair to propose that ataraxia is an impossibility for anyone living in a warzone right now, and no amount of spiritual rearrangement is going to prevent bombs from continuing to drop, and spiritual confusion is not the problem, the bombs are.

I don't know. While I'm afraid I'll never be able to provide my family with the basic living necessities that previous generations have defined as requirements for our society, I think, when I take a breath, and just accept that my life will look more like my great-great grandparents, than anyone living ... I think, then, I calm down, I lose my fear, and I just respond to situations rationally, to the best of my ability, with the hope that I'm learning from my mistakes, and growing, despite failure. In that regard, I'm more motivated by the pleasure of hope and confidence than the fear of death.

I don't really have a point. That was mostly pontificating. Overall, great paper!

I believe that this suggestion only comes once in Book 5 (translated by Munro):

146 Illud item non est ut possis credere, sedes
147 esse deum sanctas in mundi partibus ullis.
148 tenvis enim natura deum longeque remota
149 sensibus ab nostris animi vix mente videtur;

"This too you may not possibly believe, that the holy seats of the gods exist in any parts of the world: the fine nature of the gods far withdrawn from our senses is hardly seen by the thought of the mind..."

Just that much might paint a picture of the gods living in deep space, however...

150 quae quoniam manuum tactum suffugit et ictum,
151 tactile nil nobis quod sit contingere debet;
152 tangere enim non quit quod tangi non licet ipsum.

"...and since it has ever eluded the touch and stroke of the hands, it must touch nothing which is tangible for us; for that cannot touch which does not admit of being touched in turn."

Lucretius, as earlier Epicureans (I'll explain below and provide examples) ties in the notion that the "homes" of the gods are "untroubled", not by physical distance from weather and climate, but through physical disengagement from the bulky, terrestrial particles that comprise terrestrial matter. Epicurean authors always provide the analogy of the tiniest "mental particles".

I think the other stanzas reinforce this interpretation. In Book 2:

646 omnis enim per se divom natura necessest
647 inmortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur
648 semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe;

"For the nature of gods must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together with supreme of repose, far removed and withdrawn from our concerns...".

In this sense, I believe the "removal" of the gods refers to their disposition, not their location.

Here again, in Book 3:

18 ... sedesque quietae,
19 quas neque concutiunt venti nec nubila nimbis
20 aspergunt neque nix acri concreta pruina
21 cana cadens violat semperque innubilus aether
22 integit et large diffuso lumine ridet:

..."their tranquil abodes which neither winds do shake nor clouds drench with rains nor snow congealed by sharp frosts harms with hoary fall: an ever-cloudless ether overcanopies them, and they laugh with light shed largely round" (Ibid.).

I maintain, based on "On the Form of a God" by Dēmētrios of Lakonía, and from fragments by Apollodoros (the "Tyrant of the Garden") that the description of the "tranquil abodes" avoiding weathering by terrestrial forces is a description of the image of their homes in our mind. We would never imagine a perfect being to live in a dark tower, silhouetted by lightning, nor, likewise, imagine a flourishing humanoid in the deep, cold, dark, emptiness of the metakosmios.

Here's how I justify it in my paper:

Quote

Apollódōros the scholarch infers that “the dwellings” of the fearless gods, unruffled by ferocious winds and falling stars “have to be far away from the forces in our world” (Ibid., Col. 9). He stipulates that the security of these “locations” may not be preserved as a result of “distance” so much as a result of physical disengagement “from the hindering factors that clash against each other”. Epíkouros concurs that “it is possible for their nature to exist even with many troubles surrounding it” (On Piety, Col. 3.3-7). For “even if the things which generate” divine images were “as far away as anyone could wish”, the mundane images of people stored in memory would still combine with the preconception of “blessedness” and form the image of gods who “appear” to “transcend” any amount of “intervening distance” (Philódēmos, On Gods III, Col. 9). Memory, itself “transcends” the perils of our perishable plasma through a perpetual replenishment of minute, mental motes, “having changed each time for producing a thought” (On the Form of a God 12). Dēmḗtrios explains that “the memories people retain of” visual impressions were first “received as children” (Ibid., 11), and despite decades of disruption, those representations can be reproduced continuously. Through contemplation, a supplicant summons a memory of blessedness and transforms the mind into a holy menagerie, capable of hosting a variety of divine forms. After extensive consideration, Apollódōros concludes that the “dwellings” of “the gods” must be constructed “from some of their” own, finely-grained “elements”, repurposed through an act of contemplation (On Gods III, Col. 10).

Quote from EdGenX

Good morning!! I'm very interested in the science of the Epicurean philosophy and would love to learn a little Latin as well. I live in the Bible belt of America, North Carolina so superstition is strong down here.

Florida, here. I feel you.

Also, prepare to learn some ancient Greek because we'll bombard you with it.

Welcome!

Happy Thanksgiving! Have a toast to the health of the belly.

Quote from Cassius

I'm totally good with the pleasures of the stomach, but the thrust of many of these quotes makes the belly appear to be more important than any other part of the body

Well, it might be.

I was just thinking about this the other day. I was asking myself, "If I had to take a basic math test, would I score better with a stomach virus? Or with heartbreak?" I'm not sure if the answer would be the same for everyone, but I decided that I could manage with heartbreak (or turmoil better). With a stomach virus, I'd feel incapable of mustering the focus to apply critical thought. With heartbreak, through extreme focus, I can make the numbers make sense. I was thinking back to when I took the SATs, and I do well on those kind of tests, and I was a psychiatric mess when I took it. But when, back in the day, I'd suffer a hangover, I could barely focus on my name, let alone algebra.

I'm also thinking in terms of the value of digestive processes versus intellectual faculties for growing organisms. Depressive thoughts can mislead you, but a stomach ache is as honest as your eyes. It will never give you severe pain without a concerning, physical cause. Sometimes the mind hypes itself up. At that, we have the Epicurean Doctrine about the infinite desires of the mind, because, without a sharp intellect, the mind doesn't self-regulate. But the stomach won't let you trick yourself. You can't just shove something down that makes you sick the way you can repress bad memories ... well, maybe to a degree, but I think you see what I mean, in general.

Quote from Don

WHO owns the hardware

I'm eagerly anticipating evidence.

"And therefore, [when] this [proposition is] definitely, in fact, [unconfirmed, then] one must withhold a judgment, so that neither is the criteria [of the kanṓn] being confuted against the [self-evident] clarity [of nature], nor is the [evidence] being neglected [so that] similarly everything [that] is [otherwise capable of] being validated is [now] being confounded." (Ep. Her. 10.52)

Quote from Kalosyni

Quote from Cassius

I have anticipated you Fortune and I have entrenched myself against all your secret attacks. I have not and will not give myself up as captive to you or to any other circumstance. When it is time for me to go, I will spit contempt upon those who vainly cling to life, and I will leave life crying aloud in glorious triumph that I have lived well.

I also want to say that the "spitting contempt" part just doesn't make sense from an Epicurean standpoint - at least in my mind. The Epicurean would be too busy either: enjoying a last taste of something pleasurable, or busy remembering an event that was one of the best moments of life.

The original manuscript shows the verb προσπτύσαντες (prosptúsantes, or “embracing“) as opposed to the nearly-identical verb προπτύσαντες (proptúsantes, or “spitting on“). Metródōros either means to “embrace the great inevitability” or “spit upon great fear“. I'm with you in preferring the former.

Quote from Robert

The fact that Epicurus influenced thinkers as divergent as Jefferson and Marx blows my mind.

No doubt! Once I saw a few Lucretian callbacks in Shakespeare, I began compiling a list of other writers who make explicit or indirect mention of either Epicurean Philosophy or De Rerum Natura (usually the latter, having been received from Latin): Bacon, Bergson, Byron, Chaucer, de Bergerac, Darwin, Deleuze, Descartes, Diderot, d’Holbach, Dryden, Einstein, Erasmus, Frederick II, Freud, Gassendi, Goethe, Halley, Hitchens, Hobbes, Horace, Hume, Kant, La Mettrie, Leo X, Locke, Lovecraft, Machiavelli, Milton, Montaigne, Newton, Nietzsche, Pope, Rousseau, Sagan, Santayana, Shakespeare, Spenser, Spinoza, Stevenson, Tennyson, Thomsen, Virgil, Voltaire, Whitman, and Wordsworth.

Quote from DaveT

Eikadistes Yes, thank you. I understand your reply, but can you address my use of the Internet description of divine simulacra:

Quote from DaveT

"Ancient Philosophy (Epicureanism): In Epicurean philosophy, "divine simulacra" (or eidola) were believed to be fine atomic emanations that constantly stream from the "quasi-bodies" of the gods and strike human perception. Perceiving these simulacra was a way for humans to form a concept (prolepsis) of the gods, who were seen as models of perfect happiness and imperturbability, but who did not actively intervene in human affairs."

I respectfully believe that the original quote creates a misconception about the nature of "divine simulacra" by mistakenly equating the words "eidola" with "divine images": eidola are not necessarily "divine", most are just the mundane images we see throughout the day with our eyes. I have not found "eidola" to be exclusively linked with "god images" in the original texts, so far as εἴδωλᾰ (eídōla) is employed by Epíkouros in the Epistle to Herodotos, as well as the context in which eídōla are discussed by Philódēmos in his treatise On Piety , as well as the way that Lucretius fluidly employs simulacra throughout De Rerum Natura (I'll cite each Lucretius' examples).

We inherit simulacra from Lucretius, who employed it as an approximation for the Greek eídōla. It is translated by H. A. J. Munro (whom I consider to be reliable) as "images" (1.1060, 2.24, 3.433, 6.420), "representations" (2.110), "mimicry" (2.324) and "idols" (1.123, 5.62, 5.308, 6.80). Lucretius also compares the concept of simulacra as "representations" against imago or "pictures" (2.112). Munro personally inflects simulacra as "idols" instead of "images" when referring to the "pictures of the gods", however, both divine images ("of the gods") and non-divine images (of normal stuff) are constituted of simulacra as is preserved in the language that Lucretius uses.

He pays particular attention to these the visual-mental act of forming internal images in Book Four of De Rerum Natura, using declensions of the word simulacra several dozen times. A number of scholars have found it helpful to loosely equate the "films" of the "images" (eídōla and simulacra) with the contemporary concept of photons, generally speaking, the physical particles of light that we perceive. These particles (eídōla or simulacra), as the authors describe in high resolution, physically travel from an external body, through the air, and collide with our eyes, creating an impulse that travels through a perceptual relay, creating an internal cascade that yields an internal representation that is apprehensible by the human intellect, experienced by the "mind's eye".

These stanzas in Book Four corresponds with notions expressed by Epíkouros in the Epistle to Herodotos (10.46-51). Lucretius means to faithfully represent Epíkouros' teachings in Latin verse, so his neologisms and descriptions of the fact that "things open to sight many emit bodies" corresponds with the Hegemon describing that the "impinging [of images occurs] on account of a certain thing from the outside[that enables] us to observe and to consider" (10.49). In each case, the authors consistently explain that the images that human beings reproduce as visual representations in the mind are limited to real forms that have been physically observed in nature. For example, a culture cannot create the myth of a centaur without having some knowledge of a horse.

It is important to mention that in both Ep. Her. (49-51) and DRN 4, the authors do not discuss the formation of "divine" images, or delineate them as images originating from a special class of beings. Philódēmos, however, provides a high resolution description in On Piety, and compares the formation of "numerically-distinct" images that reflect a "singular", body in one's external environment versus "sublimated" streams of "compatible" images that form in the imagination from a variety of visual inspirations. Philódēmos explicitly categorizes "the images of the gods" as being the latter, images formed in the imagination from a variety of sources. By contrast Epíkouros and Lucretius only ever refer to the eídola and simulacra of everyday objects like architecture and animals. Our conception of "the form of a god" or "the gods" is necessarily conditioned by the visible particles that have previously emanated from human forms, whether those forms are the bodies of our friends, statues of the gods, or drawings of superheroes.

Given this, I want to (respectfully) caution against translators who interpret the "the images of the gods" as "a special class of 'god' particles that originate from 'god'-bodies that exist as animal-beings in a specially-privileged 'god'-biome in outer space that physically exists 'external' of the human mind". I want to caution against translators who interpret "images traveling through space" to mean "...through the vacuum of deep, outer space" rather than simply "...traveling from a Google Search page, through the two feet in front of your computer screen, into your eyeball."

I think it is really important to consider Philódēmos' delineation of images into the two categories of things that truly correspond with singular, unitary, external objects versus things that only exist as constructions within the human imagination (which is not to lessen the value of their existence as "real" things, just not things that "truly" correspond with singular, unitary objects, independent of the mind). Without considering Philódēmos, I think translators inductively project the manner in which normal images (like a horse) form onto the ways in which "divine" images form, as though the gods are like horses, but in a god barn, somewhere on a god farm, beyond our universe.

I mean all of this as respectfully as I am a total amateur when it comes to linguistics.

Quote from DaveT

And then can you address my question earlier, if divine simulacra stream from those "quasi-bodies" of the gods (in the quote above) does Epicurus consider that the simulacra comes from the gods.?

"Quasi-bodies" comes from Cicero's character Velleius — Cassius , here's an example of where I think Cicero is misleading us into an exaggerated conception without explicitly making a "false" statements. When it comes to this topic, I personally want to avoid Cicero's input, and focus strictly on what Epíkouros and Philódēmos have to say about the formation of internal images. The notion of "quasi-bodies", here again, makes it sound like "the gods" are space ghosts made of aether, and that their simulacra are traveling from deep space like x-rays from a quasar. From my humble understanding, the "quasi-bodies" of Velleius should properly refer to "the physical representation that is being physically stored in our physical, human memory" and, further, that this intellectual representation in memory was formed by seeing mundane people in everyday life. Men may think of Aphrodite as having those features that appeal to their subjective sense of arousal based on their experiences with women whom they have found to be attractive. The gods are pristine physical specimens (as per cultural standards of beauty) — the men are ripped like body builders, the women are soft and voluptuous (...here again, with everyone, I want to emphasize, context aside, that we treat Marvel superheroes eerily similarly with the way gods were depicted).

In summation, based on the above sources, I want to suggest that thinking of simulacra as "emanating from external gods" only makes sense in terms of observing stone statues, or in terms of retrieving visual constructions from memory. I don't think the gods are space radios.

Quote from DaveT

And if Epicurus does consider it so, if the gods are indeed influencing mankind's actions in a passive sort of way, isn't this opposite from being indifferent, as I thought Epicurus declared?

While I want to reinforce, as Diogénes writes, that Epíkouros "only" saw the gods as being "apprehensible" through a directed act of "contemplation" by the "intellect" (10.139), even if we are to consider "the gods" to be a class of space ghosts who broadcast dreams through radio waves ... one way of the other, "the gods'" are indifferent and unconcerned with our happiness. The "indifference" of the gods is part of their definition. They are untroubled. They have no stress, no concern, no anxiety, no fear of death, and, therefore, no bio-chemical compulsion to stick out their necks to protect temporary, fragile, extra-terrestrial forms of life (in this case, us, Earthlings). They have so many better things to do than straighten out American healthcare (for example), or ensure that human life is improved through a proliferation of universal, scientific literacy, or mitigate the impact of climate change ... regardless of whether they are space ghosts or comic books.

(I really want to emphasize the "reality" of fictional super-people. The "spirit of Christmas" is a total, mythic fabrication ... that has a measurable, socio-economic impact on our culture. The "spirit of Christmas" is indifferent to its socio-economic impact, as are the images of the gods).

I hope this helps! I'm also throwing a few of my own ideas out there for general consideration. Cicero is an exceptional source, but also, a biased one. He was a laywer... he had an agenda, and that agenda was not to produce a neutral, historical survey of competing thoughts. He meant to discredit his opponents by tearing holes in their arguments. It behooved him to exxagerate.

That's awesome! Very cool idea.

Quote from DaveT

but focusing on the definition from the Internet on Epicureanism, I'm wondering if his philosophy considers that the simulacra comes from the gods. And then if the gods are indeed influencing mankind's actions in a passive sort of way, isn't this opposite from being indifferent, as I thought Epicurus declared?

"Superman" positively inspired generations of kids, even if he only existed in 64 colors.

"Lady Liberty" continues to wield a torch for many, even if she's fixed in bronze.

So long as we identify "the gods" as images ("simulacra", "eidola"), those images, like any other symbols, have measurable impacts on our physical lives. The image of Jesus Christ, itself, is a huge influence to billions of people. "Jesus" doesn't need to "truly" exist to have influence.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Eikadistes

Cicero is speaking through Velleius, and using him as a literary tool, ultimately to persuade his audience to his cause, not necessarily provide an objective survey of history. So, I think that anything that the character Velleius proposes in Cicero's narrative needs to be referenced against the established doctrines set by Epíkouros and preserved by Philódēmos. There are a few things Cicero records that are surprising, so I read him cautiously.

Eikadistes I agree with this general concern, but as of yet I have not (to my memory) run into anything spoken by Velleius that I have found reason to question as being in actual or potential conflict with any other authoritative texts. Have you seen anything in particular to question from that section? If any occur to you over time and you remember this thread I hope you'll point them out so we can include those caveats in future discussions.

I'm with you there. I think my primary criticism is with the authenticity of the characters' arguments rather than the coherence of the arguments. Overwhelmingly, I like what he has to say. For example, his characterization of mythic gods as "world-builders" who may have suffered from ennui, or found themselves alone in an infinite dungeon of darkness, reminds me of the critical tone Diogenes takes against the cartoonish depictions of "god". I particularly like this critical approach.

I wonder, however, if these observations reflect statements made by Epíkouros, himself, anywhere in On Nature or another text, or whether these are comical inferences (though coherent) made by a later admirer? Or else, here again, are the amusing examples described by Velleius poetic devices employed by Cicero to shape his character and enliven his text for readers? I think a sympathetic reader would find Velleius to be an enjoyable character, and I would personally wish for this likable depiction to reflects a real, likable personality from history. Though, I could also see how an opponent might find Velleius to be disrespectful or mocking, in which case, the characterizing of Velleius as mocking by his opponents (if that's how you read it) might have been Cicero's way to discredit his opponent by associating their philosophy with jarring behavior.

For example, with his discussion of the composition of the "blood" of deities — that seems (to me) like it may have been a point of fascination with Cicero, or his readers, but I'm not sure that the Epicurean philosophers had interest in the topic of "god blood". I haven't found discussion of "god blood" in any of the Hellenistic texts. This could potentially be a strawman argument to make Epicureans seem like they represent their positions in a ... cartoonish (?) way. Velleius at a point seems unable to further elaborate upon his argument, and resorts to justification by authority (which is not one of the three criteria of knowledge): "Though these distinctions were more acutely devised and more artfully expressed by Epicurus than any common capacity can comprehend". Or, I may be treating the characterization unfairly. I'm just suspicious of it as a literary tool or a rhetorical tactic.

I've been thinking about it kind of like this: imagine one philosopher shows another the spatter from someone getting shot in a video game. They point at the screen and ask, "what's happened?" The other person probably wouldn't say, "oh, well our eyes are observing the images generated on the LCD screen from optical output rendered in a computer..." — they'd say, "That's a kill streak. So bloody..." Now, of course, they wouldn't mean, warm, sticky, real blood from a human animal in need of immediate medical intervention, they'd just mean "the comic violence that just happened on-screen". ... now, imagine that you personally walk into a room, expecting to hold a symposium with two friends with opposing philosophies, and the topic of conversation is a heated discussion over ... the "reality" of the cartoon blood ... and both sides are passionately engaged in the argument ... well, I might roll my eyes and wonder "Is this the caliber of thought I'm dealing with?"

If I'm Cicero, and I want to convince undecided voters that the attractive, rational, Epicurean position is false, I might try to associate the position with figures who gets caught up on ideas like "god blood". That's not to say it's incoherent. I think a huge part of Epicurean theology was to demonstrate that the images of the mind are all "real", just not necessarily "true". Breaking down, however, god bodies into amalgamations of organs, and not eidola, seems like it could be a kind of red herring or else a sort of scarecrow from Cicero. ... or not, but, I'm suspicious.

It's an exceptional resource. It also may not be the best resource for new students.

As an academic text, The Handbook is organized as a collection of essays from respected scholars. In total (in over 800 pages), they present a synoptic view of Epicurean Philosophy; in particular, each focuses on a specific topic; some of those topics are much more narrow in scope than other overviews. Sometimes, the topics covered express interpretative disagreements in contemporary scholarship; in these cases, a background in the philosophy may be assumed by the author.

I think that students may struggle with the presentation — for example, depending on the author, and the author's voice, they may, or may not assume that you already know ancient Greek, or may or may not employ non-standard, in-text citations, or may over-use academic jargon, so I anticipate that some of the essays might strike new readers as being (understandably) obfusticating. Some of the topics are tangential, and inter-disciplinary, so I think of The Handbook as more of a supplement.

Still, each essay is filled with great information. The book is expansive, and the authors, as one would expect of academics, provide voluminous support for their analyses. You'll also find a wealth of peripheral, historical information as it relates to non-Epicureans, and modern philsophers.

It's also chunky enough that it stands up on its own on a bookshelf.

Quote from Matteng

Hi,

How do you see the Stoic theory/ view of the passions/ pathei/apatheia/ eupathei and hoe differ it in the Epicurean view ? I know Philodemus did there much.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stoic_passions

As far as I know, each tradition's evaluation of "desire" and "passion" contradict.

For Epicureans, "feeling", itself, is one of the principle criteria of knowledge. We accept that the "affective sympathies" we feel are as informative as the colors we see. As Epíkouros writes, wise people will feel anger at injustice, and will experience pain upon being tortured. In each case, the lack of anger, or pain would make us numb and passive. We would feel apathy and indifference.

Meanwhile, "apathy" and "indifference" are preferred by those who see emotions, themselves, as deviant ripples the disrupt the pure, unblemished surface of the clear pond that is the mind. I think we'll find other parallels to many contemplative traditions that view pleasant emotions with suspicion, and privilege a sort of pure, neutral state to fun and laughter.

Quote from Matteng

When I understood Philodemus right, I think the Epicurean view would only match with the Stoic view when the Emotion

1) has harmful consequences ( pleasure then is not choiceworthy for example )
2) is irrational, based on empty believe
3) is based on unnecessary desire

I think you're on-point, there. Anger with harmful consequences, irrational anger, or anger based on unnecessary desires marks the line over which we are recommended not the cross, in which anger metastasizes into wrath or rage, as Philódēmos reinforces in On Anger.

Quote from Martin

There seems to be a mix-up of two different usages of "irrational":
The usage in the quote seems to indicate that "irrational" is something "bad", against reason, to be avoided.
The other usage is neutral and refers to sensations, emotions, feelings being fundamentally, by definition, irrational, in contrast to something we have obtained with reasoning.

This is a great point, and just to demonstrate the fluidity of the usage, Diogénēs' records Epíkouros as having employed the word ἄλογός (alogós), or "irrational" to refer to sensation:

“'For every' [Epíkouros] affirms 'sensation is irrational and moved by no single memory...'" (10.31)

In the Epistle to Herodotos, the Hegemon uses another declension of that same word ἀλόγῳ (alógoi) to refer to the veracity beliefs that are incoherent, foolish, or absurd:

"...[the study of nature] will banish anything irrational..." (10.81)

Quote from DaveT

How could Cicero know so much detail of the views of so many Greek thinkers on the divinities he referred to in this narrative?

Cicero, himself, visited the Athenian Garden under the leadership of Zḗnōn of Sidon, a scholarch who instructed Philódēmos — Philódēmos, himself, was a contemporary of Cicero. Many of Cicero's texts are responses to contemporary philosophical opponents with whom he was actively corresponding (not Philódēmos in this case, but other contemporaries, and Roman inheritors of the Hellenistic traditions). He lived at a unique, cultural intersection of professional law and national politics, so his relations were diverse and his resources were expansive. He was in the thick of it.

As a general observation, however, I think we should take caution against receiving Velleius at his word, because Velleius isn't always speaking — Cicero is speaking through Velleius, and using him as a literary tool, ultimately to persuade his audience to his cause, not necessarily provide an objective survey of history. So, I think that anything that the character Velleius proposes in Cicero's narrative needs to be referenced against the established doctrines set by Epíkouros and preserved by Philódēmos. There are a few things Cicero records that are surprising, so I read him cautiously.

As far as the dialogue is represented Cassius , great video! The text provides a wealth of attestation that reinforces existing opinions and the presentation exhibits it clearly; it also reliably provides a critique that accurately represents the criticism from Epicurean opponents.