Posts by Don

Quote from Cassius

whether desire is separable from pain or pleasure or both.

Desire cannot be separable from pain or pleasure because we have feelings about everything that happens to us. While we are alive, we always FEEL pleasure or pain in varying degrees. BUT is it right to say "Desire IS painful?" I'm not so sure...but...hmmm...I'm not sure.

Quote from Godfrey

Is desire really only a function of the mind? Isn't it often physical... maybe even primarily physical? It ultimately has to be as everything is physical, even the mind.

I agree that everything is physical, or material if you will. I'm not sure what you mean by "physical" in this sense. Do you mean you can "feel" desire in the sense that a particular desire "makes your heart ache" or desiring something so hard you become sick to your stomach wanting it?

Quote from Godfrey

not conflate desires with pleasures.

Completely, 100% agree with this!!

Quote from Godfrey

desires are not feelings and therefore not pains. Pleasure/pain is one biological function, desire is another.

My only hesitation with this wording is that we can feel pain or pleasure ABOUT a desire? But I completely agree that we need to remember the natural/necessary/etc. categorization is about desire NOT pleasure.

Quote from Godfrey

So I gather that the pleasure/pain network is separate from wanting (desire), but that they are integrally intertwined. This makes sense in light of our difficulty in determining whether desire is pain. It also reinforces the idea of desires not being the same as pleasure/pain when considered in regard to the categories of desires.

That does seem instructive, and I'd generally agree with your conclusions.

Quote from Joshua

Does the same hold for grief, sorrow, guilt, shame, fear, despair, etc?

Is happiness always pleasureable?

Interesting questions. I would say we feel pain in relation to those emotions, by definition... however, if someone is feeling the - let's say - "pain of fear" in a haunted house ride at an amusement park, are they feeling pain or pleasure? They expect to feel fear and yet they seek it out as a form of pleasure.

I would have to say that "happiness" is always pleasurable, especially if we're going to equate that with "eudaimonia": Reflect on what brings happiness, because if you have that you have everything, but if not you will do everything to attain it. (letter to Menoikeus) (Digression: ( just realized that he's not actually saying "we will do anything to have happiness." He's saying we will do everything to have what brings happiness. Slightly different emphasis.)

My mind goes back and forth, but one question and direction that hit me was...(I'm going to a little stream of consciousness here, so bear with me as I think through this, admittedly a little haphazardly)...

Is All Desire Painful? If one answers it is, doesn't Epicurus call us to avoid pain? I realize that sometimes we choose pain for a greater pleasure. However, if we are going to maintain that something as basic to human nature as "desire" (epithymia) is ALWAYS painful - and we know its painful - isn't that a rationalization that we should limit desires to ONLY those that are natural and necessary? If ALL desires at ALL times are painful, why would we want to engage in activity that is guaranteed to bring us pain? Note, I'm not endorsing this rationalization. But if we maintain that "desire = pain" someone could make this argument.

I know we have to have a feeling about everything in our lives while we're living. We live. We feel. I've done this before to try to get our fixation off of one English word. Here are the 19 headwords for ἐπῐθῡμῐ́ᾱ in Woodhouse, S. C. (1910) English–Greek Dictionary: A Vocabulary of the Attic Language‎:

appetite idem, page 35.
aspiration idem, page 45.
bent idem, page 74.
caprice idem, page 112.
concupiscence idem, page 156.
craving idem, page 182.
desire idem, page 215.
hunger idem, page 410.
inclination idem, page 428.
itch idem, page 461.
longing idem, page 498.
lust idem, page 505.
passion idem, page 597.
predilection idem, page 634.
proneness idem, page 653.
vagary idem, page 942.
want idem, page 961.
whim idem, page 976.
wish idem, page 983.

If we begin to say desire is different from aspiration or wish, I don't know whether we can do that and keep to the spirit of the texts we have. That comb might be too fine. I'm thinking specifically of Epicurus' desire to plan for his community's and his friends' futures in his will. Did that aspiration/wish/desire bring him pleasure or pain? Was it painful to aspire/desire a good future for his friends and school?

Digression...

Note in VS21, Epicurus only talks of necessary, natural, and harmful desires. There's no talk of unnecessary or empty. Only desires which are harmful. Is he lumping "unnecessary" and "empty" together? I don't think so. I think his categorization (with doing absolutely no research into academic papers, etc.! so that caveat) categorization of desires was a work in progress. The slightly different wording in Menoikeus, the Principal Doctrines, the Vatican Sayings, show that he revisited this idea for quite some time and we see that reflected in the various ways of talking about desires.

VS21. Nature must be persuaded (πειστέον), not overpowered (βιαστέον). And we will persuade nature by fulfilling the necessary desires, and the natural desires too if they cause no harm, but sharply rejecting the harmful desires. (Saint-Andre translation w/slight variation)

VS21. οὐ βιαστέον τὴν φύσιν ἀλλὰ πειστέον· πείσομεν δὲ τὰς ἀναγκαίας ἐπιθυμίας ἐκπληροῦντες, τάς τε φυσικὰς ἂν μὴ βλάπτωσι, τὰς δὲ βλαβερὰς πικρῶς ἐλέγχοντες.

πειστέον = win oversomeone to an act or course of actione sp. by speech or entreaty, oft. opp. compulsion or deception

NOTE the order in VS21: We are instructed to fulfill the NECESSARY desires and then the NATURAL desires " if they cause no harm" (ἂν μὴ βλάπτωσι). That "harm" is used throughout the latter PDs: PD31 (to not harm one another or be harmed), PD32 (With regard to those animals that do not have the power of making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed... making a covenant to not harm one another or be harmed.), PD33 (Justice ...is always a compact to not harm one another or be harmed), PD35 (an agreement to not harm one another or be harmed ).

I would also add that, from the letter to Menoikeus, the "unnecessary" desires are encompassed within the natural desires in VS21: "among the natural desires some are natural and necessary whereas others are merely natural"

Quick thought: desire is not a feeling. Desire is a function of the mind. We can have a feeling about a desire. But desires are cognitive.

Not sure if that helps. Placing here for later.

I love the pig woodcut design as artwork. Epicurus' bust is great as artwork.

But you have to hand it to the major religions for having easy to spot, easy to draw symbols:

☦️☪️☯️☸️🔯🕉️✡️✝️🪯

That's what we're looking for.

Getting people to agree and use it, that's a whole other kettle of fish.

There are things like the leaping piglet silhouette, Eikadistes ' 20er moon, graphic representations of the Epicurus bust, etc. But for sheer basic graphic symbols, ya gotta hand it to the cross, crescent, Star of David, et al.

This is a good example of nothing ever goes away on the Internet I had completely forgotten about this thread from 4 years ago!

Honestly, I still think the idea has some merit. One issue is that, having the Epicurean community being so fragmented and decentralized, it would be difficult for any one image to catch on and be accepted. I remain skeptical of the ΤΦ mashup used elsewhere. It's an interesting graphic image, but tetrapharmakos is technically one word.

The symbol above? The Epicurean Atom?

And, yes, Cassius remains correct, the widespread symbol in the ancient world that we know of was the image of Epicurus in stone, on cups, on rings, etc.

Quote from Cassius

I would ask, "In Epicurean theory, is ANYTHING in life (even desire) always pleasurable except pleasure, or is anything always painful except pain?"

There is no pain or pleasure apart from the two feelings. I'm not saying you are intentionally, but your phrasing makes it sound like there is some abstract absolute thing called "pain" and "pleasure." There is no pleasure apart from the feeling of pleasure; there is no pain apart from the feeling of pain. When a person is experiencing something painful, there is pain. When there is no painful feeling, there is pleasure. When a person is experiencing a pleasurable feeling, there is pleasure. Saying something like "except pain" paints the wrong picture. It's similar to saying "When I'm dead..." There is NO "I" when death is present. Likewise, there is no "pain" without someone experiencing a painful feeling.

I'd also add that there is no "desire" without someone desiring something.

As to "Is All Desire Painful?"... What happens if we expand it: "Is every desire accompanied by painful feelings?" since as I said, there is no standalone "pain" without a person feeling painful feelings.

If we look at some expanded synonyms or definitions that encompass the connotations of desire (epithymia; verb epithymeo) "set one's heart upon a thing, long for, covet, desire" there is definitely a perceived lack of something that someone wants to acquire. However, there is also the idea of aspiring to something, wanting to achieve something. In that case, is it a pleasant feeling to feel you are working toward a positive goal??

I don't know if my ramblings help the discussion, but this is an interesting question. I can see how the split happened in the discussion!

Quote from Rolf

Quote from Don

don't think there are unnatural but necessary desires (per Epicurus' categories).

Ah sorry, I meant natural but unnecessary

Sorry as well for my assumption.

That said, Cassius and my comments about the number of categories is always a good topic.

Quote from Cassius

Yes Don it's time to reinforce that and confirm that we count to three rather than four. I seem to remember Cicero questioning this in On Ends, and perhapes Aulus Gellius defends Epicurus, on the same point:

1 - Natural and Necessary

2 - Natural but not Necessary

3 - Necessary but not Natural ???????

4 - Neither Natural Nor Necessary

If you have Cicero's citation handy, that would be handy.

That's one reason I like natural, necessary, and empty.

Epicurus' categories are not a strict permutation of the words un-natural and un/necessary.

Quote from Cassius

those desires which don't bring pain - if unfulfilled - are "empty."

In part (or in full?), empty desires, from my perspective, are those that cannot - by definition - ever be satisfied. I want more money, I want more power, and so on. I'd be curious for others' examples. Power and money have their place. Philodemus talks about "natural wealth." But greed - without limits - can never be satisfied. That's an empty - think bottomless - desire.

Quote from Rolf

We should probably rarely, if ever, sacrifice natural necessary desires for unnatural necessary ones, when keeping long term pleasure in mind.

I don't think there are unnatural but necessary desires (per Epicurus' categories).

Quote from Bryan

I think you want U423, and so for the rest.

Exactly! Thanks, Bryan ! I was switching back and forth between VS and Fragments. (Corrected above now)

Selected Fragments, by Epicurus

This one has the Greek and English side by side.

And

Epicurus: Fragments - translation (3)

423. What brings unsurpassed joy is the removal of a great evil; and this is the nature of the good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about chattering emptily. [note] τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν ἀνυπέρβλητον γῆθος τὸ πάραυτα πεφυγμένον μέγα κακόν· καὶ αὕτη φύσις ἀγαθοῦ, ἄν τις ὀρθῶς ἐπιβάλῃ. ἔπειτα σταθῇ, καὶ μὴ κενῶς περιπατῇ περὶ θρυλῶν.

***

[ U423 ]

Plutarch, That Epicurus actually makes a pleasant life impossible, 7, p. 1091A: Not only is the basis that they assume for the pleasurable life untrustworthy and insecure, it is quite trivial and paltry as well, inasmuch as their "thing delighted" – their good – is an escape from ills, and they say that they can conceive of no other, and indeed that our nature has no place at all in which to put its good except the place left when its evil is expelled. … Epicurus too makes a similar statement to the effect that the good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflection and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: "That which produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the nature of good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about {a jibe at the Peripatetics}, prating meaninglessly about the good."

Ibid., 8, p. 1091E: Thus Epicurus, and Metrodorus too, suppose {that the middle is the summit and the end} when they take the position that escape from ill is the reality and upper limit of the good.

SIDEBAR: In looking at the Vatican Sayings above, I made the following delightful discovery.

Quote

U471. ...through their greed fall into ever-changing desires. ...καὶ εἰς πολυτρόπους ἐπιθυμίας ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἐμπίπτουσιν.

The word translated here as "ever-changing" is πολυτρόπους (polytropous).

My delightful discovery part is that πολυτρόπος is the first word used to describe Odysseus in the first line in Homer's Odyssey: ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, ὃς μάλα πολλὰ "Sing to me, O Muse, of the man of twists and turns,..."

πολυτρόπος has a myriad of interpretations, which is appropriate. It is literally formed of πολυ (poly) "many" + τρόπος (trópos) "a turn, direction, course, way; a way, manner, fashion; of persons, a way of life, habit, custom"

So, in VS471 the πολυτρόπους ἐπιθυμίας " 'polytropic' desires " conveys the meaning of desires that are ever-turning, always changing direction, taking many courses or directions. To me, it conveys a sense of never being satisfied, always changing ones mind as to what they want, and so on.

I can hear the objections like "We shouldn't just be satisfied. What happens to ambition?" and so on. I simply point to VS35. Don't ruin the things you have by wanting what you don't have, but realize that they too are things you once did wish for.

I'm going to push back hard on this line. Yes, it's the same word but with different connotations.

The Void is empty. Yes, it allows for movement by atoms, but the important thing is that it's empty. It's the emptiness that allows the unimpeded movement.

Empty beliefs, metaphorically, are devoid of any substance. There's nothing that supports them. They arise not from philosophical understanding but from misunderstanding or disregard of the goal of life.

I'll let Epicurus take it from here...

U116. I summon you to unceasing joy and not to empty and trifling virtues, which destroy your confidence in the fruits of what you have. ἐγὼ δʼ ἐφʼ ἡδονὰς συνεχεῖς παρακαλῶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπʼ ἀρετὰς κενὰς καὶ ματαίας καὶ ταραχώδεις ἐχούσας τῶν καρπῶν ἐλπίδας.

U202. He who follows nature and not groundless opinions is completely self-reliant. With regard to what is enough by nature, everything he owns is a source of wealth; whereas with regard to unlimited desires, even the greatest wealth is poverty. ὁ οὖν τῇ φύσει παρακολουθῶν καὶ μὴ ταῖς κεναῖς δόξαις ἐν πᾶσιν αὐτάρκης· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ τῇ φύσει ἀρκοῦν πᾶσα κτῆσίς ἐστι πλοῦτος, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἀορίστους ὀρέξεις καὶ ὁ μέγιστος πλοῦτός ἐστι πενία.

U221. A philosopher's words are empty if they do not heal the suffering of mankind. For just as medicine is useless if it does not remove sickness from the body, so philosophy is useless if it does not remove suffering from the soul. κενὸς ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου λόγος, ὑφʼ οὗ μηδὲν πάθος ἀνθρώπου θεραπεύεται· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς οὐδὲν ὄφελος μὴ τὰς νόσους τῶν σωμάτων ἐκβαλλούσης, οὕτως οὐδὲ φιλοσοφίας, εἰ μὴ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκβάλλει πάθος.

U422. We need pleasure when in pain because of its absence; but when we are not experiencing such pain, and are perceiving stably, then there is no need for pleasure. For it is not the needs of nature which, from outside us, create harm, but desire driven by groundless opinions. τότε χρείαν ἔχομεν τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι αὐτὴν ἀλγῶμεν· ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο μὴ πάσχωμεν ἐν αἰσθήσει καθεστῶτες, τότε οὐδεμία χρεία τῆς ἡδονῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἡ τῆς φύσεως ἔνδεια τὴν ἀδικίαν ποιεῖ ἔξωθεν, ἀλλʼ ἡ περὶ τὰς κενὰς δόξας ὄρεξις.

U423. What brings unsurpassed joy is the removal of a great evil; and this is the nature of the good, if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about chattering emptily. τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν ἀνυπέρβλητον γῆθος τὸ πάραυτα πεφυγμένον μέγα κακόν· καὶ αὕτη φύσις ἀγαθοῦ, ἄν τις ὀρθῶς ἐπιβάλῃ. ἔπειτα σταθῇ, καὶ μὴ κενῶς περιπατῇ περὶ θρυλῶν.

U471. It is rare to find a man who is poor with regard to the aims of nature and rich in groundless desires. For a fool is never satisfied with what he has, but instead is distressed about what he doesn't have. Just as those who are feverish through the evil of their sickness are always thirsty and desiring the opposite of what they should, so those whose souls are in a bad condition are always poor in everything and through their greed fall into ever-changing desires. σπάνιόν γε εὑρεῖν ἄνθρωπον <πένητα> πρὸς τὸ τῆς φύσεως τέλος καὶ πλούσιον πρὸς τὰς κενὰς δόξας. οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἷς ἔχει ἀρκεῖται, μᾶλλον δὲ οἷς οὐκ ἔχει ὀδυνᾶται. ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ πυρέττοντες διὰ κακοήθειαν τῆς νόσου ἀεὶ διψῶσι καὶ τῶν ἐναντιωτάτων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς ἔχοντες διακειμένην πένονται πάντων ἀεὶ καὶ εἰς πολυτρόπους ἐπιθυμίας ὑπὸ λαιμαργίας ἐμπίπτουσιν.

U485. Unhappiness is caused by fears, or by endless and empty desires; but he who is able to rein these in creates for himself a blissful understanding. ἢ γὰρ διὰ φόβον τις κακοδαιμονεῖ ἢ διʼ ἀόριστον καὶ κενὴν ἐπιθυμίαν· ἅ τις χαλινῶν δύναται τὸν μακάριον ἑαυτῷ περιποιῆσαι λογισμόν.

U486. Pain does not consist in being deprived of things, but rather in bearing the avoidable distress caused by groundless opinion. οὐκ ἀπορεῖν τούτων πόνος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ φέρειν μᾶλλον τὸν ἀνόνητον ἐκ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν πόνον.

FWIW, For my own review and for anyone else curious, I'm going to review the words Epicurus used in his categorization of desires:

"Desire" ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ epithymia : desire, yearning; craving, want, wish

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἐπιθυ_μ-ία

"Natural" ΦΥΣΙΚΟΣ physikos: natural, produced or caused by nature, inborn, native

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, φυ^σικός

"Necessary" ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΣ anangkaios : necessary; necessary (physically or morally); indispensable (NOTE: That last connotation puts a little different spin on "necessary")

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀναγκ-αῖος

"Empty" ΚΕΝΟΣ kenos : empty, fruitless, void; vain, pretentious (NOTE: this is the same word Epicurus uses in "atoms and void" Think of empty space, no ground. Beliefs or desires that are kenos have nothing valid underpinning them or supporting them. They're a house built on sand to bring in a biblical metaphor.)

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, κενός

So, it seems like there are:

• Natural desires
• Natural and necessary desires
• Natural and not necessary desires
• Empty desires (neither natural nor necessary?)

I think a corollary of this is that we have to ask what is our motivation for our desires. We have to look from where desires arise.

Take for example, running for political office. Is the motivation for that desire grounded in right belief or arising from empty vain belief? Is the motivation to work for more safety and security for one's community (and hence oneself) or to amass power to self-aggrandize or use power to manipulate others (which would/should make you always fearful of reprisal or other harm)?

Quote from Cassius

If so (and i think it's yes) what does that do to the attempt to make the categories into a hard and fast list?

There can be no "hard and fast" list of any of the myriad desires because it's (like much of Epicurus' philosophy) all very contextual. Granted, there are some desires that can be labeled necessary: The desire to breathe, the desire to eat, etc. BUT even there consider this:

We ALL have the desire to breathe. What happens when this desire occurs if you're trying to hide from someone who wants to kill you? You're holding your breath to remain undetected. The desire to breath is overidden by the context of your desire to remain hidden and safe. I realize that's an extreme example, but I think it illustrates the point.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE: Bryan or Eikadistes or anyone good with ancient Greek - PLEASE feel free to check my grammar etc in the Letter to Menoikeus. If I'm missing something, this post just missed the mark! Thanks!

One thing that struck me tonight was the rest of that section in the letter to Menoikeus that discusses the categories of desires. Here's my translation (emphasis added - see commentary below the quote):

Quote

(127) ... on the one hand, there are the natural desires; on the other, the 'empty, fruitless, or vain ones.' And of the natural ones, on the one hand, are the necessary ones; on the other, the ones which are only natural; then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia; then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those necessary for life itself. [128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, that is for our physical and our mental existence, since this is the goal of a blessed life. For the sake of this, we do everything in order to neither be in bodily or mental pain nor to be in fear or dread; and so, when once this has come into being around us, it sets free all of the calamity, distress, and suffering of the mind, seeing that the living being has no need to go in search of something that is lacking for the good of our mental and physical existence. For it is then that we need pleasure, if we were to be in pain from the pleasure not being present; but if we were to not be in pain, we no longer desire or beg for pleasure. And this is why we say pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment of the blessed life. [129] Because we perceived pleasure as a fundamental good and common to our nature, and so, as a result of this, we begin every choice and rejection against this, judging every good thing by the standard of how that pleasure affects us or how we react to considering experiencing that pleasure. And because pleasure is the fundamental and inborn good, this is why not every pleasure is seized and we pass by many pleasures when greater unpleasant things were to result for us as a result: and we think many pains better than pleasures whenever greater pleasure were to follow for a longer time by patiently abiding the pain. [130] So, all pleasure, through its nature, belongs to us as a good; however, not all are elected; and just as all pains are entirely evil by their nature, so not all are always to be shunned.It is proper when judging these things to consider what is advantageous and what is not advantageous for you; in other words, what the consequences will be. We consult the consequences of our actions; because, on the one hand, pleasure over time can lead to pain; and on the other hand, pain can lead to pleasure.

What struck me this evening was what immediately follows the categorization. To review the categories (as I understand them) spelled out in this letter are:

1. natural desires (φυσικαί physikai)
   1. desires that are both necessary and natural (καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ ἀναγκαῖαι)
      1. necessary desires for eudaimonia
      2. necessary desires for the freedom from disturbance for the body
      3. necessary desires for life itself
   2. desires which are only natural (αἱ φυσικαὶ μόνον hai physikai monon)
2. empty, fruitless, or vain desires (κεναί kenai)

The word "unnecessary" doesn't seem to be used in the letter. Now, the sentiment does show up in VS20 (which is also nearly the same as PD29). If we look at VS20 there are interesting issues in the manuscript:

Post

VS20 source in Vat.gr.1950

epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/3912/

https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.1950.pt.2/0256

402v

I'm skeptical now to say that VS20 = PD29 since we've seen some discrepancies in a one-to-one duplication of VS's and PD's.

The transcription of this VS/PD appears to run here:

τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ καὶ epicureanfriends.com/wcf/attachment/3913/ ἀναγκαῖαι, δὲ αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμαι.

or as it appears to be...

τῶν…

Don

July 8, 2023 at 9:46 PM

The manuscript appears to run:

τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ καὶ μέν οὔκ ἀναγκαῖαι, δὲ αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμαι.

Of the desires, on the one hand, there are the natural and necessary; then the natural ones and the not necessary ones; then the not natural and not necessary arising from empty belief.

VS20's categories seem to be able to be listed like this:

1. the natural and necessary desires
2. the natural and not necessary desires
3. not natural and not necessary desires arising from empty belief

But I've gotten off on a TANGENT!!

My point (egads, I'm easily distracted) is what came after the categories in the letter to Menoikeus:

[128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, that is for our physical and our mental existence, since this is the goal of a blessed life.

This takes me back to Cassius 's idea to categorize all desires into (four) categories. I'm not sure there are four, but his point is well taken.

Plus, the phrase that stands out for me in the letter is: The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection.

This steady contemplation is ἀπλανὴς "not wandering, steady, fixed" θεωρία "consideration, theory, speculation; contemplation". This word θεωρία shows up in the characteristics of the sage in Diogenes Laertius, Book X.120: The sage will also enjoy themselves more than others in contemplation, speculation, and theorizing.

Epicurus is calling Menoikeus to consider every desire in light of these categories he just laid out. So, in keeping with Cassius 's idea, we should be able to categorize every desire we have into natural, necessary, or empty. If we go by VS20, every desire should be natural and necessary, natural but not necessary, or empty. We can ask the question of every desire at any given moment "Will this desire lead to pleasure?" and "How much struggle will I need to fulfill this desire?" and "Is the pain of struggle worth pursuing this desire?" And similar questions. That *steady contemplation* is what is important and why this categorization is a TOOL and not an EDICT. Epicurus isn't *telling* us what desires to fulfill. He's instructing us to APPLY his tools and assess what each desire offers in the way of the goal of pleasure (whether that pleasure is sensory, or memory, or any other type of pleasurable outcome).

Quote from Kalosyni

"What is my goal in life?" -- I would add more such as well-being, satisfaction, peace of mind, and pleasant abiding...in addition to pleasure (enjoyment) and happiness.

I would tend to concur with you, Kalosyni . My only tangent or adjacent thought on that is that all those (well-being, satisfaction, peace of mind (ataraxia?), and pleasant abiding) are, in fact, ALL pleasure per "absence of pain = pleasure" and "the feelings are two." So, the "goal of life" is pleasure, writ large.

The problem that enters in is that there are so many ways to define pleasure above the "pleasure/pain" dichotomy. I think that's why Epicurus can write (paraphrased) "the health of the body and the tranquility of the mind is the goal (telos) of a blessed life" and "pleasure is the goal (telos)" and "if indeed eudaimonia is present, we have everything; if eudaimonia is not present, we do anything to have eudaimonia."

Quote from Cassius

One thing I will say about it is that it strikes me that there is a connection between thinking it is a good idea to (1) categorize all feelings into two categories and (2) categorize all desires into four categories.

Another insightful idea! You are on a roll, my friend! I like that direction.

Quote from Cassius

The only way it would make sense to conclude that you would never pursue anything other than natural and necessary desires would be to believe that as a matter of natural law or some other necessity or flat guarantee, that pursuing anything other than natural and necessary desires is guaranteed to lead to more pain than pleasure

That is very insightful and something I've certainly never thought of! Well done.

Quote from Cassius

Don .... and anyone else fluent in Greek

I appreciate the vote of confidence!!