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You can view a modelling of the architecture, which shows it was a stoa:
A good article covering ancient skepticism -- There were two distinct traditions or movements of skeptical thought: Pyrrhonian and Academic.
While ideas that can loosely be called skeptical may be found from very early in Greek philosophy, skepticism as an organized method of thinking in Greco-Roman antiquity appears in the post-Aristotelian period. There are two distinct traditions or movements of skeptical thought: Pyrrhonian and Academic. The hallmark of ancient Greco-Roman skepticism, in both traditions, is suspension of judgement, brought about by the juxtaposition of equally persuasive opposing views on any given question. In the Pyrrhonist version, but not the Academic, this is claimed to have a practical benefit: ataraxia or tranquility. In both traditions, however, skepticism is understood not merely as a topic of theoretical reflection, but as something to be lived. The Pyrrhonian tradition claimed inspiration from Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 BCE), who is usually considered the first Greek skeptic. However, the exact nature of Pyrrho’s thinking is very hard to reconstruct, given the scarcity of the evidence. Pyrrho’s direct influence seems to have been short-lived. But shortly after Pyrrho another skeptical movement arose in the Academy, the school founded by Plato. The first head of the Academy to take the school in a skeptical direction was Arcesilaus of Pitane (316/5–241/0 BCE). Whether Pyrrho was an influence on him is a disputed question. But some aspects of Socrates’ activity, as Plato portrays him, might seem to encourage skepticism, and Arcesilaus is said to have acknowledged this influence. The skeptical Academy lasted for roughly two centuries, its other major figure being Carneades of Cyrene (214–129/8 BCE). By the early 1st century BCE the skepticism of the Academy seems to have moderated considerably, and it was at this point that the Academy itself, as an institution, came to an end. But in reaction to this softening of the skeptical attitude came a new skeptical movement led by Aenesidemus of Cnossos (dates uncertain, but active in the early first century BCE), repudiating the Academy and instead identifying itself with Pyrrho. This later Pyrrhonian movement continued for roughly three centuries. We know the names of a few Pyrrhonists. But the only complete Pyrrhonist works we have are the extensive surviving writings of Sextus Empiricus (probably late 2nd or early 3rd century CE). Because Oxford Bibliographies for Pyrrho of Elis and The Academy already exist, this bibliography is somewhat weighted toward the later Pyrrhonist tradition stemming from Aenesidemus.
It says: "In both traditions, however, skepticism is understood not merely as a topic of theoretical reflection, but as something to be lived."
And this is what would be different from Epicureanism -- as it seems that theoretical reflection is at times contained within Epicureanism?
So, I don't think πενία should be interpreted as abject poverty or living on the edge of starvation and similar scenarios.
Your translation of this brings up a reminder regarding translations. Cassius are we going to assemble a recommended translation at some point on VSs and PDs?
Thanks Don, turns out that we covered this in last night's Zoom (but I had forgotten you had posted your translation on it) and so hoping kochiekoch, TauPhi, Martin, Cassius take note of this thread. (and Onenski also).
Parcus has a connotation of frugality and thriftiness. I can see Epicurus hammering that home, that we don't need great wealth to find pleasure, to be happy.
It reads from this that we can think of the goal of nature is to live a pleasant life -- and this would be more like quiet pleasure rather than over-the-top pleasure (which requires wealth).
It is surprising to me that 67 percent of all Americans believe in heaven - and indicates that many people believe that some aspect of the soul continues on after death.
Using Cassius' new outline on Lucretius we can read about the Epicurean understanding of the soul:
Here is an interesting article:
Excerpt:
Story Highlights
- 74% believe in God, 69% angels, 67% heaven, 59% hell, 58% the devil
- Nearly three in 10 do not believe in hell or the devil
- Belief greatest among frequent churchgoers, Protestants, Republicans
The percentages of Americans who believe in each of five religious entities -- God, angels, heaven, hell and the devil -- have edged downward by three to five percentage points since 2016. Still, majorities believe in each, ranging from a high of 74% believing in God to lows of 59% for hell and 58% for the devil. About two-thirds each believe in angels (69%) and heaven (67%).
Hi Everyone,
Next Monday is the first Monday of September, and we will be having another Epicurean Philosophy Happy Hour.
I'd like to start with some social discussion such as "How was your summer?" and "Did you go on any vacations?" or "What was a memorable summertime event or experience?" - since we know that the mental pleasure of memory is greatly enhanced by telling others about our happy memories. And then after that open it up to Epicurean philosophy topics.
Everyone, please RSVP here in this thread if you think that you will likely be attending -- It's Labor Day, and can imagine that some of you may have some holiday plans and so may not be able to attend...so an RSVP will help us out. 
(Feel free to bring a beverage of some kind to sip on during the Zoom).
Asclepiades welcome to the forum
2. The description of Epicurus as quite a despotic figure with a strong will to dominate feeble minded and expand his influence by any means necessary, including missionary work.
The origin of this is from Martha Nussbaum?
(2) the issue of "dogmatism" vs "skepticism" in Epicurus is definitely there, and dedicated skeptics are definitely going to have a problem with Epicurus.
When reading and studying the Epicurean maxims, there are two ways to "listen" to them:
1) as if they were a kind of "ultimatum" and "absolute" (this is an incorrect way in my opinion).
-or-
2) something to contemplate and to apply as needed in the manner of a "medicine" or a therapeutic -- for example, "death is nothing to us" is not some kind of "absolute truth" but a way of thinking after applying reason...and likewise for other maxims.
1. A frequent parallel or comparison with Christianity
I do not like this aspect of DeWitt myself, and I know that there are others here on the forum who also feel the same way.
I have been reading the book very slowly and I suddenly realised that if this had been my first introduction to the philosophy of Epicurus, I might have given it a pass
I personally think that it is intermediate/advanced reading, because it seems to me that you need to know a little bit already (and it's for people who have time for reading long and "wordy" explanations).
As a study method, I personally think sticking with studying and discussing the extant texts is the best way to go for both beginning and intermediate students of Epicurus.
The following are a collection of all the Principle Doctrines and Vatican Sayings on Friendship:
(For reference puposes on the discussion of developing friendship).
PD27: Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is the possession of friendship.
PD28: The same knowledge that makes one confident that nothing dreadful is eternal or long-lasting also recognizes, in the face of these limited evils, the security afforded by friendship.
VS23: Every friendship is worth choosing for its own sake, though it takes its origin from the benefits.
VS28: We must not approve either those who are always ready for friendship, or those who hang back, but for friendship’s sake we must run risks.
VS34: It is not so much our friends' help that helps us, as it is the confidence of their help.
VS39: He is no friend who is continually asking for help, nor he who never associates help with friendship. For the former barters kindly feeling for a practical return, and the latter destroys the hope of good in the future.
VS52: Friendship dances around the world, bidding us all to awaken to the recognition of happiness.
VS56: The wise man feels no more pain, when being tortured himself than when his friend is tortured.
VS57: On occasion a man will die for his friend, for if he betrays his friend, his whole life will be confounded by distrust and completely upset.
VS66: Let us show our feeling for our lost friends, not by lamentation, but by meditation.
VS78: The truly noble man busies himself chiefly with wisdom and friendship, of which the one is an understandable good but the other is immortal.
Latest change on the order of the forum sub-sections - The Epicurean lifestyle and self-improvement folder no longer has its own separate section - It has now been moved under Ethics.
This alternate translation of VS 15:
15. We value our characters as our own personal possessions, whether they are good and envied by men or not. We must regard our neighbours’ characters thus too, if they are respectable. - Inwood & Gerson translation.
(Source)
I was contemplating respect and what causes the loss of respect, which then points to what is needed to maintain respect. Virtues help us maintain respect and maintain good connections with others, and we develop and maintain them because they lead to greater pleasure and less pain. They are practical and down-to-earth, and we don't develop them to prove we are "good".
And found an article, and here is an excerpt:
Respect forms an integral pillar in the foundation of any relationship, whether personal or professional. Without respect, trust crumbles, and connections fade. Therefore, understanding and maintaining a level of care becomes essential for personal growth, career advancement, and overall happiness. Sadly, certain habits can erode this critical value, leading to an undesirable loss of respect.
The article continues with a list of habits which erode the respect of others.
- Dishonesty: Honesty remains an irreplaceable cornerstone in building respect. However, repeated acts of dishonesty, such as lying or withholding the truth, can fast-track you to losing respect. Not only does it breed mistrust, but it also questions one’s integrity, making others hesitant to rely on or confide in you.
- Unreliability: Promises made must be promises kept. By not honoring commitments or missing deadlines, you paint a picture of someone others can’t depend on. Inconsistency undermines trust and signals that you lack respect for others’ time, resources, or feelings.
- Interrupting Others: Respectful communication includes active listening. Consistently interrupting or talking over others disregards their perspective and makes them feel unimportant. Show respect by allowing others to express their thoughts without intrusion.
- Negativity and Constant Complaining: While everyone has bad days, a continuous stream of negativity or complaining can drain the energy of those around you. It displays a lack of adaptability and resilience, which can result in diminished respect over time.
- Being Judgmental: Respect includes accepting and appreciating others’ differences. By being overly critical or dismissive of others’ views or lifestyles, you lack understanding and open-mindedness, resulting in a loss of respect.
- Disrespecting Others’ Time: Punctuality signifies respect for others’ time. Habitual lateness, extended response times, or frequent rescheduling can imply that you view your time as more valuable than others.
- Gossiping: Spreading rumors or discussing others’ private matters creates an atmosphere of mistrust. Gossiping shows a lack of respect for the privacy of others, ultimately leading to diminished care for the gossiper.
- Being Arrogant or Overly Proud: Confidence is attractive, but arrogance is off-putting. A lack of humility, exaggerated self-importance, or an inability to accept constructive criticism can decrease the respect others have for you.
- Ignoring or Dismissing Others’ Feelings: Empathy is crucial in human interactions. Ignoring or dismissing others’ feelings shows a lack of understanding and compassion, eroding respect.
- Being Manipulative or Using People: Utilizing others for personal gain without considering their feelings or interests displays a lack of empathy and respect, resulting in a similar lack of respect for you.
- Not Taking Responsibility for Your Actions: Avoiding accountability or blaming others for your mistakes sends the message that you lack maturity and integrity. Taking responsibility, on the other hand, earns respect and builds trust.
Another possible cause of the decline: neoplatonism
... the Roman religious revolution preceded Constantine the Great’s rule, and it was not primarily about Christianity.
Historians’ estimates for the number of Christians during Constantine’s reign vary, but they tend to hover between less than 5% to 10% of the population at the most. The Christians up to this point had been a heavily persecuted group, particularly under Emperor Diocletian. If Constantine’s support of the Christian religion was a pragmatic choice, it cannot have been because Christianity was suddenly the largest religion.
It is popularly believed that Christianity spread primarily amongst the poor, the enslaved, and women first before it caught on with the Roman aristocracy. Jesus’ belief that the downtrodden should be cared for was part of its appeal to various groups of disenfranchised people.
On the other hand, while the Christian religion was probably not yet massive, mystery cults and foreign religions were replacing traditional pantheism with lightning speed.
This was due in part to a philosophical movement called Neoplatonism. From the 3rd century onwards, this school of philosophy basically went unchallenged and supplanted all others. Traditional philosophical education for the aristocratic population of the late Roman Empire would often entail studying at the feet of one of the many Neoplatonist philosophers.
This school is very important for understanding late Roman culture and religion. Its system of philosophy taught that, even if there are other Godlike beings, there is primarily one single all-encompassing ineffable Godhead, which is connected to the divine intellect. They were also concerned with the status of the soul of man in a divine hierarchy. These ideas were, in effect, a religious interpretation of Plato.
Small things like the loss of manuscripts could have had an effect:
Though less famous than the purported burning of the Library of Alexandria, the great fire that tore through central Rome in 192 CE resulted in a similarly profound loss for ancient Greek and Roman scholarship. The true cost of this fire became clear to historians in 2005, when a text believed lost for centuries was unexpectedly rediscovered in a Greek monastery. Titled “On Consolation from Grief” and written in the aftermath of the blaze by Galen—court physician to several Roman emperors—the work does more than chronicle an unfortunate accident.
For many if not most modern American Christians, their beliefs about the Christian god are in fact one of their greatest sources of comfort and not distress (burninglights)
Ditto for an afterlife: there are people, not limited to Christians, who take great comfort in their belief in an afterlife.
It occurs to me that the comforting aspects of Epicureanism could have gotten lost as time went on.
Is it only in Lucretius that we see the metaphor of honey on the rim of wormwood? And I would say that this is a subjective evaluation anyway -- and it puts a dark twist on things that isn't needed.
Perhaps Epicurus originally had a much more comforting message in his emphasis in friendship - PD29 and in feeling secure - PD 39. But as time went on this somehow got overshadowed, and at the time of Horace there is the emphasis on pleasure itself ("Epicuri de grege porcus") more than the requisites of a pleasurable life. Subtle things like these two issues could lead to Epicureanism becoming less useful and less helpful. It could be that the "big picture" understanding was lost, and that also contributed to the decline.
A small possible cause for decline...if Epicurus wrote in Greek but eventually Latin took over? We don't know if all of his scrolls were translated into Latin? Also, the use of pamplets was popular in Epicurus' time, but perhaps that dropped away at some point?
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucius_Ca…s_(consul_58_BC)
Next week for our final episode of our podcast series on Norman DeWitt's book we what to close with a discussion on the reasons the Epicurean movement crested around the time of Lucretius and began a long decline. We also want to cover the obstacles to the resurgence of an organized Epicurean movement in the intervening years up through today.
There are probably many causes of each, and we would like to know your thoughts so we can consider including them in the final episode.
Break-out of the items from the above section:
1. Injuries are done among men either because of hatred, envy, or contempt, all which the wise man overcomes by reason
2. When once a man has attained wisdom he no longer has any contrary tendency to it, nor does he willingly pretend that he has. He will be more deeply moved by feelings than others, but this will not prove to be an obstacle to wisdom.
3. A man cannot become wise in every kind of physical constitution, or in every nation.
4. Even if the wise man were to be put to torture, he would still be happy.
5. The wise man shows gratitude, and constantly speaks well of his friends whether they present or absent.
6. The wise man will not groan and howl when he is put to the torture.
7. The wise man will not have intercourse with any woman whom the laws forbid, as Diogenes says, in his epitome of the Ethical Maxims of Epicurus.
8. The wise man will not punish his servants, but will rather pity them and forgive any that are deserving.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy had a good section on Philodemus and Canonics:
2.2.5.2 Canonics
Epicurus was perhaps the originator of the Hellenistic debates over the nature and existence of a ‘criterion of truth’, which allows us to separate true from doubtful or false beliefs. This debate, conducted by both philosophers and medical writers, also concerned methods of proof and sign-inference to extend knowledge beyond our immediate perceptions (overview in Allen 2001).
The final portion of On Signs III is all we have of the work, the full title of which was apparently On Phenomena and Sign-inferences (sêmeiôseôn). It comprises four sections (labeled here §§1–4, followed by column and line numbers from DeLacy and DeLacy 1978) and reports the ways in which three Epicureans responded to criticisms of their theory of sign-inference. First is Philodemus’ teacher, Zeno (§1, §2); then Demetrius Laco (§3, xxviii 13–xxix 19), whose interest in proof is known from Sextus (M 8.348); and finally another, unnamed, colleague (§4, xxix 20–xxxviii 22). The authors of the initial criticisms are unknown, but probably include the Dionysius who is named as author of replies to the Epicurean rebuttals of the first round of criticisms (§1, vii 5–viii 21; Zeno’s replies occupy viii 21–ix 26), and he may be a Stoic or Peripatetic. On the other hand, the method favored by the opponents, EM or the elimination mode (anaskeuê, which is not the same as contraposition, as scholars used to think), is not positively attested as Stoic.
Both the EM and the Epicurean similarity mode (SM) of sign-inference move to the non-evident from the evident. We do not know how the opponents defined what is evident, but the SM starts from empirical generalisations that have been, in their turn, built up from individual observations, and, ultimately, from perceptions and feelings, these being two of the standard Epicurean criteria. The experiences of others (if reliable), accessed through research (historia), as well as things proved earlier, may also furnish suitable starting-points for the construction (sunthesis) of inferential transitions (metabaseis) to the non-evident. All this empirical input is most often referred to as ‘things hereabouts’ (ta par’ hêmin), and it stands in opposition both to perceptible things outside our experience, e.g., from living things here to those in chilly ‘Britain, if any’ (§1, v 35–6), and also to those that are in principle imperceptible, as from moving things hereabouts to atoms moving in the void.
Epicurus himself had appealed to what is evident to provide positive ‘attestation’ (epimarturêsis) of true beliefs about perceptibles ‘hereabouts’, and ‘contestation’ (antimarturêsis) of false beliefs about theoretical items such as atoms, and about extremely distant perceptible objects; always provided it is explanatorily adequate, lack of evidence of any kind against a theoretical belief is sufficient grounds for taking it to be true, (Ep. Herodot. 80, Ep. Pythocles 86–88; each such belief will constitute a true explanation of this type of phenomenon in one or other of the infinite number of world-systems in the universe). In On Signs, in contrast, what phenomena ‘conflict’ (antipiptein, makhesthai) with, if they do, are empirical generalizations, which are thereby falsified (e.g., §1, xvii 28–xviii 16). Thus while Epicurus argues that the non-existence of void is contested by the phenomenon of movement, these Epicureans argue that nothing evident contests the local generalization that moving things hereabouts all move through empty spaces.
Such localized empirical generalizations are produced by the Epicureans’ method of ‘applied reasoning’ (epilogismos), i.e., reasoning applied to experience: similarities (homoiotêtes) and differences among things in our experience are collected and scrutinized so as to identify properties belonging to all, or all observed, local members of some kind or group without exception. These properties can then safely be projected, by sign-inference, to all or any other members of the kind, as, for example, it is inferred that mortality belongs to all human beings everywhere (e.g., §4, xxxiii 24–32)—a type of sign-inference that the Epicureans claim is simply not captured by the EM (e.g., §1, xvii 8–11). While local generalizations are all constructed by the detection of similarities, in the case of imperceptibles property-projection will rather be by analogy (§4, xxxvii 24–xxxviii 8, the DeLacys’ unfortunate translation of homoiotês as ‘analogy’ notwithstanding): atoms, e.g., are analogous, but not identical, to macroscopic bodies in their property of solidity.
Epilogismos must be conducted with due diligence and caution (e.g., §3, xxix 1–4), but this seems an inadequate defense against the possibility raised by their opponents that counter-examples to generalizations—unique individuals or rare species—may always exist undiscovered. More convincing is the response that, since freaks and rarities were discovered empirically, to project the existence of such things into unknown realms is simply to apply the SM (e.g., §3, xxviii 29–37). While this does not prove that the EM is superfluous, it does raise another unsettled question, whether all these Epicureans believe that there is only one mode of sign-inference, the SM, or two (as suggested by Zeno in §1, e.g., xii 2–31). It is probably helpful to see this problem in light of a basic disagreement that emerges in On Signs between the Epicureans and their opponents: that the Epicureans are mainly concerned, not with arriving, somehow or other, at true beliefs, but with how we can be certain that our beliefs are true, experience being the only secure foundation for any property-projection. Sign-inferences here and in other sources often take the form of a conditional (sunêmmenon), such as: ‘If there is smoke, there is fire’, or a para-conditional (parasunêmmenon), such as ‘Since there is smoke, there is fire’ (equivalent to a conditional plus its antecedent), and the EM is built around a criterion of truth for conditionals: the antecedent must be ‘eliminated’, or negated, simply by the ‘elimination’ of the consequent (§1, xii 1–14). In the void/movement case, then, if movement is a sign of void, elimination of void thereby eliminates movement, and the inference seems to be valid by the EM.
But the author of §4, at any rate, insists that it is only because we have observed that moving things hereabouts, despite other differences, all share the property of moving through empty spaces, that we affirm that the same thing holds without exception in non-evident places too (xxxv 36–xxxvi 7). The full form of this sign-inference would therefore run: “Since moving things hereabouts all move through empty space, all moving things move through empty spaces; and since all moving things move through empty space, and there are moving things, there is such a thing as empty space”. But if assurance (diabebaiôsis) that the conclusion is true is produced in all cases by experience of similar cases (xxxvii 31–35), whether a sign is similar to what it signifies—as with the revelation that all human beings are mortal by their being so hereabouts—or it is not, as with movement’s being a sign of void (xxxi 1–7), then there will indeed be only one mode of sign-inference, and the EM, which does not proceed in this way, will be excluded.
A second major disagreement is that the Epicureans apparently claimed that SM sign-inferences had a ‘necessitating’ (anankastikos) character, which their opponents denied (e.g., §1, iv 5–37; §2, xxvi 25–6). There has been modern debate over whether the Epicureans meant that the premisses of SM sign-inferences necessitate their conclusions, as in deductive arguments (Barnes 1988: 107–111), or that SM sign-inferences are ‘cogent’ and ‘demand assent’ and may be thought of as inductive arguments, which antiquity called epagôgê and in which the premisses do not necessitate the conclusions (Long 1988: 136–40).
Perhaps, however, the important point is rather that SM sign-inference is concerned with the relation between an individual object and its properties, a relation of metaphysical necessity (e.g., §1, viii 32–6; §4, xxxiii 35, xxxv 22–9). It is these necessary properties that epilogismos seeks to identify (e.g., §1, xvii 3–11; §4, xxxv 4–31) and that sign-inference should project: they help constitute the nature of a thing (cf. §1, xv 11–12; §3, xxiv 6–8). When he rebuts the opponents’ objection that SM sign-inferences are not necessitating, therefore, Zeno adduces the kind of property from which a sign-inference should proceed. Thus whatever necessity an SM sign-inference has comes from the metaphysical necessity of a property-property pairing, which is expressed in a qua truth: “For when we say that, since those hereabouts are such, those in the unknown realm are also such, insofar as those hereabouts are such, in this way we believe that something unknown is conjoined with them. For example: since humans hereabouts, qua humans, are mortal, then if there are humans anywhere, they too are mortal” (§4, xxxiii 24–32). Each of the four senses of ‘qua’ discussed in the next lines joins properties with the force of necessity and is used in sign-inferences (xxxiii 24–29).
The Epicureans are epistemological realists who postulate that we naturally form conceptions corresponding to types of object and property in our experience. The metaphysical necessity of property-property pairing explains why the best test of a conditional or of a particular sign is that it is inconceivable that the antecedent exists and the consequent does not (§4, xxxiii 1–7), why someone making a sign-inference on the basis of the evident “locks away in inconceivability” the proposition that things hereabouts are such, but things elsewhere are not such (§1, xv 37–39).
As with On Signs, what remains of a badly damaged treatise on the senses attributed to Philodemus (PHerc. 19/698, ed. Monet 1996) takes the Epicurean theory of perception, with its description of the atomic basis of the senses and their irrationality, as a background against which to discuss developments of the theory due to the confrontation with opponents, in this instance Stoics and Aristotelians. Of special concern are: the unity of sensation (I-VIII) and the ‘common sense’ (XX-XXVII) as opposed to the particular objects of each sense (XXVIII-XXIX); and the rejection of Stoic ‘grasping’ (katalêpsis) once one admits the Epicurean theory of ‘affection’ (pathos), which includes both perceiving and perceiving that one is perceiving (IX-XVII).
