George Carlin - You have no rights -- reactions?

Quote from camotero

I presume there’s nothing pleasurable in taking part in war, and it could only be if there was some level of sociopathy/psychopathy, but perhaps I’m not seeing something.

Yes this is the place where I think we have to begin. I think the difference here stems from too narrow a definition of "pleasure" -- in my view of Epicurus' teaching, pleasure is EVERYTHING that we find to be desirable, including our attachment to our friends and our family and our "country" and innumerable other things. I think it is dangerous to narrow the definition at all beyond "what we feel to be desirable" and that means that certainly mental constructs and abstractions are pleasurable and desirable too. Remember, the Epicureans held that mental pains and pleasures can be / often are more intense than "physical" ones. We don't have much problem seeing that in terms of visual art and music and dancing, but it also extends to literature and to any and all other forms of abstractions as well. So in sum for this paragraph, I would say that Epicurus was not in any way at war with "abstractions" or with "logic" in general - he was at war with misuse of them for goals other than pleasure, at war with setting them up as ends in themselves, or as mechanisms that supercede feeling.

So absolutely I think that a person can employ Epicurean philosophy not only to die for a friend, as Epicurus specifically included, but also to die for any number of things if we find our value (our pleasure) to be deep enough in that objective.

I would cite two texts in support of this:

First, remember what Torquatus had to say about his ancestors and the way they acted in war:

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"But in certain emergencies and owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of business it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wise man therefore always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, or else he endures pains to avoid worse pains.

This being the theory I hold, why need I be afraid of not being able to reconcile it with the case of the Torquati my ancestors? Your references to them just now were historically correct, and also showed your kind and friendly feeling towards myself; but the same I am not to be bribed by your flattery of my family, and you will not find me a less resolute opponent. Tell me, pray, what explanation do you put upon their actions? Do you really believe that they charged an armed enemy, or treated their children, their own flesh and blood, so cruelly, without a thought for their own interest or advantage? Why, even wild animals do not act in that way; they do not run amok so blindly that we cannot discern any purpose in their movements and their onslaughts.

Can you then suppose that those heroic men performed their famous deeds without any motive at all? What their motive was, I will consider later on: for the present I will confidently assert, that if they had a motive for those undoubtedly glorious exploits, that motive was not a love of virtue in and for itself.—He wrested the necklet from his foe.—Yes, and saved himself from death. But he braved great danger.—Yes, before the eyes of an army.—What did he get by it?—Honor and esteem, the strongest guarantees of security in life.—He sentenced his own son to death.—If from no motive, I am sorry to be the descendant of anyone so savage and inhuman; but if his purpose was by inflicting pain upon himself to establish his authority as a commander, and to tighten the reins of discipline during a very serious war by holding over his army the fear of punishment, then his action aimed at ensuring the safety of his fellow citizens, upon which he knew his own depended.

And this is a principle of wide application. People of your school, and especially yourself, who are so diligent a student of history, have found a favorite field for the display of your eloquence in recalling the stories of brave and famous men of old, and in praising their actions, not on utilitarian grounds, but on account of the splendor of abstract moral worth. But all of this falls to the ground if the principle of selection that I have just mentioned be established,—the principle of forgoing pleasures for the purpose of getting greater pleasures, and enduring, pains for the sake of escaping greater pains.

And I think this issue shows up even better in the correspondence of Cassius and Cicero, which I've included and referenced here, but I want to include some particularly apt parts here, especially Cassius' reply below showing that Cassius saw himself in specifically Epicurean terms:

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Cassius had recently become a follower of the Epicurean school of philosophy.

[15.16] Cicero to Cassius

[Rome, January, 45 B.C.]

L I expect you must be just a little ashamed of yourself now that this is the third letter that has caught you before you have sent me a single leaf or even a line. But I am not pressing you, for I shall look forward to, or rather insist upon, a longer letter. As for myself, if I always had somebody to trust with them, I should send you as many as three an hour. For it somehow happens, that whenever I write anything to you, you seem to be at my very elbow; and that, not by way of visions of images, as your new friends term them, who believe that even mental visions are conjured up by what Catius calls spectres (for let me remind you that Catius the Insubrian, an Epicurean, who died lately, gives the name of spectres to what the famous Gargettian [Epicurus], and long before that Democritus, called images).

2 But, even supposing that the eye can be struck by these spectres because they run up against it quite of their own accord, how the mind can be so struck is more than I can see. It will be your duty to explain to me, when you arrive here safe and sound, whether the spectre of you is at my command to come up as soon as the whim has taken me to think about you - and not only about you, who always occupy my inmost heart, but suppose I begin thinking about the Isle of Britain, will the image of that wing its way to my consciousness?

3 But of this later on. I am only sounding you now to see in what spirit you take it. For if you are angry and annoyed, I shall have more to say, and shall insist upon your being reinstated in that school of philosophy, out of which you have been ousted "by violence and an armed force." In this formula the words "within this year" are not usually added; so even if it is now two or three years since, bewitched by the blandishments of Pleasure, you sent a notice of divorce to Virtue, I am free to act as I like. And yet to whom am I talking? To you, the most gallant gentleman in the world, who, ever since you set foot in the forum, have done nothing but what bears every mark of the most impressive distinction. Why, in that very school you have selected I apprehend there is more vitality than I should have supposed, if only because it has your approval. "How did the whole subject occur to you ?" you will say. Because I had nothing else to write. About politics I can write nothing, for I do not care to write what I feel.

[15.19] Cassius to Cicero

[Brundisium, latter half of January, 45 B.C.]

L I hope that you are well. I assure you that on this tour of mine there is nothing that gives me more pleasure to do than to write to you; for I seem to be talking and joking with you face to face. And yet that does not come to pass because of those spectres; and, by way of retaliation for that, in my next letter I shall let loose upon you such a rabble of Stoic boors that you will proclaim Catius a true-born Athenian.

2 I am glad that our friend Pansa was sped on his way by universal goodwill when he left the city in military uniform, and that not only on my own account, but also, most assuredly, on that of all our friends. For I hope that men generally will come to understand how much all the world hates cruelty, and how much it loves integrity and clemency, and that the blessings most eagerly sought and coveted by the bad ultimately find their way to the good. For it is hard to convince men that "the good is to be chosen for its own sake"; but that pleasure and tranquillity of mind is acquired by virtue, justice, and the good is both true and demonstrable. Why, Epicurus himself, from whom all the Catiuses and Amafiniuses in the world, incompetent translators of terms as they are, derive their origin, lays it down that "to live a life of pleasure is impossible without living a life of virtue and justice".

3 Consequently Pansa, who follows pleasure, keeps his hold on virtue, and those also whom you call pleasure-lovers are lovers of what is good and lovers of justice, and cultivate and keep all the virtues. And so Sulla, whose judgment we ought to accept, when he saw that the philosophers were at sixes and sevens, did not investigate the nature of the good, but bought up all the goods there were; and I frankly confess that I bore his death without flinching. Caesar, however, will not let us feel his loss too long; for he has a lot of condemned men to restore to us in his stead, nor will he himself feel the lack of someone to bid at his auctions when once he has cast his eye on Sulla junior.

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In the end the argument goes in the direction Torquatus points -- Epicurean philosophy can be used to justify leading a war, or even executing your own son, in appropriate circumstances. If we think that there are any absolute bright lines at all then we're forgetting the basic premises of the Epicurean system. It is only the circumstances and events and the "feeling" of the individuals involved at the particular time and place that can provide us answers on how to live.

Also I want to add that I think this statement from Cicero is highly relevant:

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...In this formula the words "within this year" are not usually added; so even if it is now two or three years since, bewitched by the blandishments of Pleasure, you sent a notice of divorce to Virtue, I am free to act as I like. And yet to whom am I talking? To you, the most gallant gentleman in the world, who, ever since you set foot in the forum, have done nothing but what bears every mark of the most impressive distinction. Why, in that very school you have selected I apprehend there is more vitality than I should have supposed, if only because it has your approval.And I think that is relevant because it is the mistake that many people make, to underestimate the power of feeling to serve as the guide of life. As a result they make the mistake of underestimating the "vitality" of the school of Epicurean philosophy, because they put aside feeling when they should realize that feeling is in fact the center of everything that makes life worthwhile.

But this is a logical mistake to make if someone thinks that "painlessness" or "absence of pain" or even "immediate bodily pleasure" is the goal of Epicurean philosophy. I think Epicurus was very clear from his deeds and words that such asserts are dramatic misunderstandings, but they will recur so long as people talk about Epicurus in these terms instead of diving deeper into the text to see the underlying role of feeling as the true guide of life rather than virtue/ being good / being holy / being reasonable etc.

As an aside to that last sentence from Cassius, I apply that to the "calculus of pleasure" or "hedonic calculus" as well (to which camotero referred above). To me "calculus" is a poor word choice as it implies an ability to precisely quantify feelings. Maybe "balance" is a word that would work in its place. Because the proper basis of evaluation always comes down to a feeling, regardless of a number on a spreadsheet. (Additionally I mention this partly in reference to a thread on the subject from a few months ago.)

Another aside regarding natural law, religion, power.... I've been reading James Michener's novel Hawaii. It's a bit of a doorstop, weighing in at 1200 plus pages, but it's a great look at the subject through the development of and interaction between various cultures through the melting pot of an island paradise. Immigrants from Bora Bora, China, New England missionaries, whalers, merchants, lepers.... For the most part a good read: I'd recommend it to anyone wanting to examine the last ten PDs through historical fiction.

Quote from camotero

I would only think that freedom and life could be universal rights, if there was any. Property I’m a bit more doubtful about. But I agree with you that these could be achieved from seeking justice, in the Epicurean way. And what I argue is, if they are so evidently effective towards producing more pleasure than pain, why do we have to have an organized body of government to recognize them and enforce them, if we could do it as well. If we understood that the pain that would cost us to defend our fellows' rights to life and freedom is something that could be pragmatically pleasure producing for all in the not so long run, we could easily accept them in the same category of justice, just enforced by everyone, instead of having a judge to determine it.

My understanding is that an organized body of government is necessary to enforce what we're calling "human rights" because there's no other option. We, as individuals, can see the value in freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, etc., but, we, as individuals alone, have no power to enforce them. These rights only exist as a shared consensus or contract among individuals that we as a society value them and, as such, expect our government to uphold them, enforce them, and adhere to them. Outside of that agreed-upon framework, these concepts do not exist. They are just words. Breath upon the air. Ink on a page. Breath that can be dissipated in the wind. Pages that can be burned. Holders of those concepts that can be silenced, imprisoned, or killed.

I think this is similar to what Cassius is saying about the original Cassius. If we believe these ideas give us pleasure, and by extension allow our society to let us pursue our pleasure, then we must defend the society or government that allows us the freedom to pursue our pleasure against those who would institute a form of government that would curtail our pleasure. As you said, another option would be to flee. But, if one feels there nowhere to flee, then possibly fight is the only other option. Cassius can speak for himself (and I need to read that Sedley article before I can think about endorsing this idea), but I think that's his position.

And, so, I see this as an example of your "enforced by everyone." Everyone has a stake in a stable society that allows everyone to pursue their pleasure. Judges don't determine this. The social contract is agreed upon by the members of a community (sometimes the size of countries, the UN tries to make it the world). Ideally, the government is there, as representing the will of the people. Judges reflect the agreed upon view of justice.

As I said, I struggle with this. This relative, contextual view is a natural outcome of accepting that all is atoms and void but I'm not saying it's easy to truly accept it after years of thinking about ideas like universal human rights or natural rights. I have definite ideas of ideas I hold dear and feel everyone should endorse, but Epicurus has made me question the origin of these ideas while I may continue to see their value.

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From Don:

The Epicureans saw something like justice to be a contract among people to live without being harmed and to not harm others.

Don

But, how is justice not the same as the other constructs ? It is equally idealistic. There’s no physical justice in nature that you can see or grab, the same as the other constructs. If the problem is the name (natural, universal, etc.), because they are made to sound as if a supernatural authority is or should be enforcing them, well, let’s jot use that name. But the constructs listed under those unfortunate names are as useful for pleasure as justice. So we should clarify that it’s not the non-existing quality of those constructs what impedes them to be put on par with justice, but rather the fact that their grouping name sounds woo-woo. Of course they don’t exist. But of course we should try to make them valid amongst us and have as many people as possible recognize them as well , and dogmatically, as good (which I guess is the whole reason they gave them said names). Or why is justice the only one that can pass the cut? Is it not? (I truly don’t know)

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From Don:

I would say that there are some things that promote people living together but I don't want to go down a Utilitarian rabbit hole.

by the way. The calculus of pleasure, which is something I’ve come to identify as very epicurean... sounds very utilitarian to me. Could someone elaborate on what are some big differences between utilitarianism and epicurean philosophy?

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The calculus of pleasure, which is something I’ve come to identify as very epicurean... sounds very utilitarian to me. Could someone elaborate on what are some big differences between utilitarianism and epicurean philosophy?

Very pertinent question! To perhaps over simplify, utilitarianism was an effort to further develop Epicureanism in an attempt to encompass the greatest good for the greatest number of people. This involved reconsidering both pleasure and justice. The main proponents were John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham. This topic has been discussed elsewhere in the forum; you might find reading those discussions to be helpful.

Where utilitarianism seeks the greatest good for the greatest number, an Epicurean seeks personal pleasure as the guide and goal of a good life and understands justice as an agreement between people, all of whom are pursuing their own pleasures; the agreement leading to security and safety. The problem with utilitarianism is in determining exactly what IS the greatest good for the greatest number. Who decides that? What are the criteria? Do some people end up with more "good" than others? Why? Also one person's good may be another person's evil (which is quite evident in an election year!). Utilitarianism involves a great deal of tabulation and calculation in an attempt to answer these and other questions; Epicureanism justice involves negotiation between the interested parties.

I'm actually not aware that there's any mention by Epicurus of a hedonic calculus per se. He says that some pleasures can lead to greater pains (and vice versa), and discusses natural, necessary and vain desires. But these don't involve calculation so much as evaluation using the sensations, prolepses and feelings. I think you're right in thinking that a calculus of pleasure is utilitarian, Mathitis Kipouros. I'm not sure how it came to be associated with Epicureanism, but to me it seems like an attempt to bring an excess of reason into the consideration of pleasure, while utilitarianism to me is an unsuccessful attempt to elaborate on Epicurus' understanding of both pleasure and justice.

Quote from camotero

But, how is justice not the same as the other constructs ? It is equally idealistic. There’s no physical justice in nature that you can see or grab, the same as the other constructs.

I am becoming more and more convinced that we are born with a prolepsis or anticipation of justice - or call it a basic sense of fairness. I've been watching a Netflix documentary series on research on babies and their development, psychological and physical. In experiment after experiment, it can be shown that babies can distinguish between what we would call fair play - or what is just - and what is not. It is fascinating! I've also seen documentaries that show other animals having similar behaviors that strongly suggest that sense of justice and fair play is innate in them as well. My understanding is then that that sense of justice is a naturally-occurring, inborn mental faculty that can be developed as we mature. It actually exists in nature in the way our brains are wired. We expand, codify, ignore, misuse, and corrupt that innate faculty as adults, but nature and evolution has given us the ability to distinguish justice from injustice at a fundamental level and to act accordingly if we so choose. So, in that sense "justice" exists in nature as differentiated from concepts such as freedom or liberty. That's why a statement such as "That doesn't feel right" (as in someone being mistreated or "having their rights withheld") can have validity, both in common language and in an Epicurean Canonical sense.

Quote from camotero

So we should clarify that it’s not the non-existing quality of those constructs what impedes them to be put on par with justice, but rather the fact that their grouping name sounds woo-woo. Of course they don’t exist. But of course we should try to make them valid amongst us and have as many people as possible recognize them as well , and dogmatically, as good (which I guess is the whole reason they gave them said names). Or why is justice the only one that can pass the cut? Is it not? (I truly don’t know)

You raise very good points, and I'd like to say again that I appreciate your willingness to engage these topics. Thinking through the implications of all this, I'm not saying I have any more clarity yet for myself, but going through the process and reading other's perspective has been very helpful.

When you say "make them valid amongst us and have as many people as possible recognize them as well , and dogmatically, as good" I think that's where you'll get push-back. When we start labeling something as good in and of itself are we starting to elevate that concept to an ideal in the sense of Plato's Ideal Forms?

Please don't misunderstand me. I personally DO think that there are certain behaviors that lead to pleasure for people in general (to put an Epicurean spin on it): Don't kill; Treat everyone equitably; Allow everyone to live in peace; and some other "universal rights" that feel right and accord with my inborn sense of fairness and justice. The codification of these behaviors into a social contract is what makes them real. We *know* there are no God-given rights. We as humans have to do the hard work of agreeing how we are going to live in a society and how we are going to treat each other and how we are going to enforce peace and safety for members of our community. Using words to declare there are universal rights doesn't mean anything unless there's teeth behind those words. The UN Declaration (which really needs to clean up its masculine pronouns) hasn't done anything to advance the universality of the "rights" it declares. By declaring dogmatically that these rights are good doesn't increase anyone's pleasure unless it's to just feel good by holding those beliefs. Do we want to have an impact or not? What is the limit to the impact we can have? I think that's what Epicurus gets at when talking about our own pleasure and judging the limits on our time and abilities. And everyone is going to have different answers to that.

Lots of good material in the recent posts and rather than just "like" I want to emphasize:

(1) Dons post #23 is exactly on point in explaining the direction I think is implicit in Epicurus. This is not something easy to do because I like presumably everyone here has been brought up in a "natural rights / human rights" environment that talks as if these are self-evidently true. Yes most of us agree that these are desirable, and that they bring us pleasure, and therefore we should "fight" for them as appropriate, but the starting point for the analysis is that the things that bring us pleasure frequently require action on our part to obtain, and they are not handed to us free by god or nature - they require effort. So I strongly think we *should* pursue these things, and I think Cassius Longinus is an example of doing that. We aren't always going to be successful, and we have to make our decisions in the full context of our circumstances, but we don't need fictional gods or fictional myths to justify these actions - we need to ground them in what is real -- which is our "feelings" about them (pleasure and pain).

(2) In post 24 I think Camotero is raising issues that need further discussion. If the issue he is raising is why "justice" gets special treatment as an abstraction, I think he is on the right track of implying that it should not. I think we need to articulate better that "abstractions" are not by nature bad or inappropriate - they are very useful tools for pleasure and they can also cause great pain. So we need to be careful in implying that abstractions are somehow something to be avoided. This is as in many other cases, so long as we observe the limits of what they are capable of, they are important tools. It is when we elevate them to ends in themselves, not under the supervision of pleasure and pain, they they become loose-cannon monsters. We probably need to discuss this further if Camotero will elaborate on his question.

(3) In post 26 I think Don does a good job of dealing with the problems of utilitarianism. The main issue comes down to the problems of "greatest good for greatest number" as he observes. Of course being a utilitarian can bring great pleasure and happiness to the utilitarians who agree on the things to pursue, the problem is that those who don't agree cannot be expected to go along and give up their own views of pleasure and pain. Which is not to say that utilitarianism is any worse than any other form of government, but only to say that you have to examine the specific implementation and judge it according to the results in that context. We can probably generalize from the PD's and other texts that the greatest happiness of the greatest number would result from each of those involved achieving the most pleasure and the least pain for themselves and their friends, but that doesn't end up producing a real-world rule that can be used to make specific day to day decisions. This is the point that is exactly opposite to that made by Cicero in his "true law is right reason in accord with nature,..." where he says that such law is the same in Athens and Rome and the same for all people at all times, all places, etc, and that it is enforced by god.

(4) Don's post 27 does an excellent job summarizing the practical result, so Camotero if you have specific questions or concerns about what is said in that one, that's a good place to pull out quotes and ask.

All this is VERY helpful and absolutely within the scope of things that are proper for this forum. This is not partisan politics or the type of "careerism" that I think Epicurus was mainly warning against. This is basic-level theory that in my mind is closely akin to the observation that friendship is among the most important tools for achieving happiness. Practical reality is that we are social animals and we need to understand the implications of that in an atomist universe.

Quote from JJElbert

By resting their best philosophical case on natural rights, the American Founders (to take the earlier example) left open the door to every manner of specious argument. The condition of the African slave? Natural. They'd be worse off without us. The disenfranchisement of women? Natural. They are the weaker sex. The racial partition of society? Natural. What right do we have to intermix what God at Babel hath set apart? The prohibition of homosexual sex and marriage? Natural. Two men, after all, cannot procreate.

Thanks for your reply Joshua . I particularly like the ponit about the Enlightenment Rebels. But this paragraph here I need to delve deeper into, because I think it's an evidence of the confusion that I'm arguing against. All these arguments you talk about here, are manipulations via mis interpretations and wrongful use of rhetoric to advance some macabre interests. And thus, we can confirm once again that the name for these rights is a misfortune, since it can so easily be misused to reinforce these cases. But it is analogue to saying that some stupid stuff the Republicans or Democrats say is actually what Republicanism or Democracy is about. It's not. But my argument is that there are other concepts, like justice, which is just a concept, that unfortunately have been misappropriated before by groups in power, but that we would be benefitted from recognizing in the same category as justice. Again, life and freedome. Of course justice. Education I think is a big one.

Quote from Cassius

You didn't see that warning did you? Because if you did, or people see it elsewhere, I need to work harder to turn it off.

I didn't see any warnings, Cassius .

Quote from Cassius

in my view of Epicurus' teaching, pleasure is EVERYTHING that we find to be desirable, including our attachment to our friends and our family and our "country" and innumerable other things. I think it is dangerous to narrow the definition at all beyond "what we feel to be desirable" and that means that certainly mental constructs and abstractions are pleasurable and desirable too.

This is clarifying for me. I think I can agree with this definition. Is this an interpretation of yours Cassius or is it shared by others in this group? Is there evidence among the texts that this is a definition that aligns with Epicurean Philosophy without the risk to becoming too intangible? As you know, I'm a novice in these topics, so even though it's intuitively clear to me that it can all be sensational pleasure, I do try to see how one situation or another would translate into actual sensational pleasure, in the shortest - or more probablly succesfful time frame - to regard it as good or bad (hence my argument against the war, and C. Longinus logic for going at it).

Quote from Cassius

Epicureans held that mental pains and pleasures can be / often are more intense than "physical" ones. We don't have much problem seeing that in terms of visual art and music and dancing, but it also extends to literature and to any and all other forms of abstractions as well.

And these, I think, sort of reinforce my point about pleasure having to be actually felt, because if we leave it at them just being something that happens in the mind, we're one inch away from falling into idealizations again. And I remember, from what I learned in DeWitt, that even such abstract stuff as humor or fear at the end get translated into things we feel, because there are atoms in our body moving from one place to another that allow us to feel the effect of these abstractions on us. So, from my understanding so far, yes, everything has to end in something physical, to be real. Literature and music produce emotions in us, that are atoms (molecules if you will) that make them real. What other "pleasures of the mind" can we think of to see if they hold up to this test? Can you tell me of some pleasures of the mind that stay just there, as mental constructions and as such "are pleasant" without producing an effect in our bodies?

Quote from Cassius

So absolutely I think that a person can employ Epicurean philosophy not only to die for a friend, as Epicurus specifically included, but also to die for any number of things if we find our value (our pleasure) to be deep enough in that objective.

So far into my studies, I don´t see this. I know we shouldn't fear death, because if we're dead we won't feel pain, but following your line of thought Cassius where you point out that painlessness is not the objective, death only achieve painlessness, but deprives us from keeping feeling pleasures, so I don't see any scenario where, absent of terrible pain, it would be desirable to get into a scenario of certain death for someone, anyone; I know this doesn't sound romantic at all... but aren't we the pragmatists? Thinking of going towards certain death for someone else, seems to me the most idealistic thing. On the other hand, if death is not certain, and you could do a calculus of putting yourself at certain risk of death, like, let's say, donating a kidney, to help someone you love and that will bring you more pleasure afterwards, well yes, I think it's something worth doing. Since I'm no oracle, to me, there are situations that are better to be regarded as certainly conducive to death, like war, and some that are not. When you enlist to fight, if you havent' come to terms with the possibility of dying, you're fooling yourself. So for me, it's a no, from the outset. Keeping in the pragmatist line, why is your loved one exposed to this danger that could hurt him so bad and probably end your life? Isn't it a consequence of their life choices? And also... if they're the ones to go, we are certain they're not suffering anymore, and we know, that our pain of losing them won't be eternal, and if it's goint to be long, it's not going to be very intense.

I want to clarify that for argument's sake I'm taking postures that are actually rather extremist for me.

Quote from camotero

But my argument is that there are other concepts, like justice, which is just a concept, that unfortunately have been misappropriated before by groups in power, but that we would be benefitted from recognizing in the same category as justice. Again, life and freedome. Of course justice. Education I think is a big one.

I think one of the issues is trying to encapsulate these "rights" in one word: the right to "freedom," the right to "education," the right to "health care," the right to "life." What does that mean? How can Janis Joplin sing "Freedom's just another word for nothing left to lose" and we can understand what that means.

I also think justice, or more specifically the sense of justice/fairness, is a different thing in that we can have a visceral reaction to injustice or unfairness as I mentioned in #27 above.

In many ways, I don't think asserting "rights" in the abstract or ideal is adequate. I think that instead we need to advocate specific behaviors or policies that promote pleasure or happiness or eudaimonia or a pleasurable life - however you want to characterize it. As members of a community, we should choose other members of our community who find their pleasure in choosing to serve in government that will uphold and vote for those behaviors and policies that we feel will provide for our pleasure and keep society - as we envision it - safe, secure, and allow the "pursuit of happiness." As more people find themselves safe and secure enough to pursue their pleasure, the more safe and secure society as a whole will be. From my perspective, that is why policies and laws that put concrete reality to these abstract "rights" is a better path than simply asserting their being universal.

Quote from camotero

I think I can agree with this definition. Is this an interpretation of yours Cassius or is it shared by others in this group? Is there evidence among the texts that this is a definition that aligns with Epicurean Philosophy without the risk to becoming too intangible?

There are probably several texts that can be used in support of this point, but one of the clearest is where DIogenes Laertius says "The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined." That's Bailey, but I think we've discussed recently that most translators use "feelings." That means EVERYTHING we feel, from whatever source, mental or bodily, is either pleasure or pain.

There is also Torquatus' characterization of Epicurus:

"Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, be thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature. What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?

Also From Torquatus:

(1)The Ends of Goods and Evils themselves, that is, pleasure and pain, are not open to mistake; where people go wrong is in not knowing what things are productive of pleasure and pain.

(2) Again, we aver that mental pleasures and pains arise out of bodily ones (and therefore I allow your contention that any Epicureans who think otherwise put themselves out of court; and I am aware that many do, though not those who can speak with authority); but although men do experience mental pleasure that is agreeable and mental pain that is annoying, yet both of these we assert arise out of and are based upon bodily sensations.

(3) Yet we maintain that this does not preclude mental pleasures and pains from being much more intense than those of the body; since the body can feel only what is present to it at the moment, whereas the mind is also cognizant of the past and of the future. For granting that pain of body is equally painful, yet our sensation of pain can be enormously increased by the belief that some evil of unlimited magnitude and duration threatens to befall us hereafter. And the same consideration may be transferred to pleasure: a pleasure is greater if not accompanied by any apprehension of evil. This therefore clearly appears, that intense mental pleasure or distress contributes more to our happiness or misery than a bodily pleasure or pain of equal duration.

Quote from camotero

So, from my understanding so far, yes, everything has to end in something physical, to be real. Literature and music produce emotions in us, that are atoms (molecules if you will) that make them real. What other "pleasures of the mind" can we think of to see if they hold up to this test? Can you tell me of some pleasures of the mind that stay just there, as mental constructions and as such "are pleasant" without producing an effect in our bodies?

I think you are probably trying to separate out mental and bodily pleasures in a way that would contradict the position just stated in the above quotations. If one feels pleasure it can be from any source, mental or bodily, and this I think is playing in to your resistance to the saying that the wise man will on occasion die for a friend, which is something that can be extended very far into war, etc. If in our own personal calculatons/feelings we would feel so awful if our friend died when we could have attempted to do something about it, then for some number of people such a result would mean such agonizing pain for the rest of their lives that they would rather die. That's the comparison that each person has to make for themselves, weighing the result of each action in terms of total future pain and pleasure (and this again is a situation where I think duration - length of time - is only one of the factors involved).

Quote from Cassius

remember what Torquatus had to say about his ancestors and the way they acted in war:

At the outset, it all sounds like mental gymnastics to justify otherwise avoidable atrocities. But, what I'm gathering is, that within the framework of EP, anything is justifiable, as long as you were true to your sensations and feelings?

Quote from Cassius

But this is a logical mistake to make if someone thinks that "painlessness" or "absence of pain" or even "immediate bodily pleasure" is the goal of Epicurean philosophy. I think Epicurus was very clear from his deeds and words that such asserts are dramatic misunderstandings, but they will recur so long as people talk about Epicurus in these terms instead of diving deeper into the text to see the underlying role of feeling as the true guide of life rather than virtue/ being good / being holy / being reasonable etc.

It could very well be that I'm experiencing a resistance now to assimilate the relativity that is allowed for in EP. I sort of can recognize this. There's in me still a desire for a philosophy that allows for, and is conducive to, things being simpler, easier, more peaceful. But I realize, I may be falling for an idealization.

Could someone explain better what's the role that virtue plays in EP, and how does it play it? From all these readings I'm getting a greater importance is put on virtue than I initially thought there would be in EP.

Thanks

Also, I realize, that the decision between living a life of public action, activism, etc, or a more recluse or retired life, is highly correlated to personality, which comes down to what, according to your wiring, produces you more pleasure, and produces a better result at the hedonistic balance (i liked the term Godfrey ). What I'm getting is, none is wrong, none is better than the other, if lived using the criteria. If not lived using the criteria, it's just a missed chance to live a more rational, conscious existence, controlled experience. Interesting

Quote from Godfrey

great look at the subject through the development of and interaction between various cultures through the melting pot of an island paradise. Immigrants from Bora Bora, China, New England missionaries, whalers, merchants, lepers....

This brought thoughts about the definition of justice. And what missionaries usually do, trying to impose their worldview unto others'. Perhaps justice is an innate ability, that gets forced out of us somehow, to intuitively recognize that the other ones have their feelings too, as we do, and these are based on their and our specific culture/upbringing/personality and we can be happier letting them be with them, and procuring we're left to be with ours as well?

Quote from Don

If we believe these ideas give us pleasure, and by extension allow our society to let us pursue our pleasure, then we must defend the society or government that allows us the freedom to pursue our pleasure against those who would institute a form of government that would curtail our pleasure.

I was about to argue in favor of freedom being an absolute need for pleasure... but I guess it's not either. Perhaps there could be a scenario where our freedom could be curtailed in order for some other basic pleasure be continued (either immediately or later on)? And, judging it by the prolepsis of justice, defined as I did lines above, it wouldn't be unjust to have your freedom curtailed in that scenario as long as the government that reduces said freedom is making sure you're pleasures are taken into account? And as such, it also makes sense to curtail the freedom of those who are unjust (those who don't care for allowing the others experience and live by their sensations/feelings, or outright impede it).

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This brought thoughts about the definition of justice. And what missionaries usually do, trying to impose their worldview unto others'....

In this case the missionaries were absolutely convinced of the truth of their beliefs and actions. They considered the locals to be heathen savages. The only inkling of respect they had for them was that, if they converted, they (the locals) would be rewarded in heaven; otherwise they would rot in hell for eternity. This is a pretty good illustration of justice: by dramatizing the evils of an idealized conception of justice, Michener leaves it up to the reader's prolepsis of justice to reach a conclusion as to what might actually be just in this situation.

Quote from Don

We expand, codify, ignore, misuse, and corrupt that innate faculty as adults, but nature and evolution has given us the ability to distinguish justice from injustice at a fundamental level and to act accordingly if we so choose.

I would argue also that having a "Justice System" to resolve issues for us, helps to the atrophy of our justice-recognition-organ, because it makes it external, and sometimes overly complicated to discern. One contribution of Epicureanism to humanity could be to rehabilitate this faculty, organ, of recognizing when justice is or isn't being served/practiced.

Quote from Don

I am becoming more and more convinced that we are born with a prolepsis or anticipation of justice - or call it a basic sense of fairness. I've been watching a Netflix documentary series on research on babies and their development, psychological and physical. In experiment after experiment, it can be shown that babies can distinguish between what we would call fair play - or what is just - and what is not.

I don't know if you guys are familiar with Noam Chomsky, but regardles of his political activism, he has some very interesting and down to earth theories about language, one of them being that our ability for language is too a prolepsis. This was the first time I had heard about this concept (of anticipations).

Quote from Don

When you say "make them valid amongst us and have as many people as possible recognize them as well , and dogmatically, as good" I think that's where you'll get push-back. When we start labeling something as good in and of itself are we starting to elevate that concept to an ideal in the sense of Plato's Ideal Forms?

Yes, I guess you're right. I realized this after reading the other responses and crafting my own.

Quote from Don

By declaring dogmatically that these rights are good doesn't increase anyone's pleasure unless it's to just feel good by holding those beliefs.

Yes, and thus it could even be detrimental. Because of a false sense of achievement that such statements can produce.

Quote from Cassius

Yes most of us agree that these are desirable, and that they bring us pleasure, and therefore we should "fight" for them as appropriate, but the starting point for the analysis is that the things that bring us pleasure frequently require action on our part to obtain, and they are not handed to us free by god or nature - they require effort.

Yes. In line with my comment above, once again one could suspect of machiavellic intentions behind all this promotion of them.

Quote from Cassius

If the issue he is raising is why "justice" gets special treatment as an abstraction

Yes, this is what I was implying. I am now entertaining the possibility that the abstraction of justice, as I tried to define it above, and not as I used to understand it before, could have great potential to be effective as a suplementary criterion of the sensations and the feelings.

Quote from Cassius

the problem is that those who don't agree cannot be expected to go along and give up their own views of pleasure and pain.

There, again, it could be said that it can become unjust, because these utilitarian wouldn't be taking into account our sensations and feelings about it, and just trying to create an absolute solution for every case.

Quote from Cassius

We can probably generalize from the PD's and other texts that the greatest happiness of the greatest number would result from each of those involved achieving the most pleasure and the least pain for themselves and their friends, but that doesn't end up producing a real-world rule that can be used to make specific day to day decisions.

Are any of you guys familiar with Anarchism? Not in the definition of disorder and damage to private property, but rather in it's definition that any form of hierarchy (thus, government) is only justified as long as it proves itself useful to the ones it rules over; and if such proof can't be found, it should be dismantled and changed for one that does; this would perhaps imply many different and probably more local types of governments, rather that ones that encompass large geographic areas and populations that can be very different. Again, Chomsky has some stuff to say about this.

Quote from Cassius

All this is VERY helpful and absolutely within the scope of things that are proper for this forum. This is not partisan politics or the type of "careerism" that I think Epicurus was mainly warning against. This is basic-level theory that in my mind is closely akin to the observation that friendship is among the most important tools for achieving happiness. Practical reality is that we are social animals and we need to understand the implications of that in an atomist universe.

Quote from camotero

Could someone explain better what's the role that virtue plays in EP, and how does it play it? From all these readings I'm getting a greater importance is put on virtue than I initially thought there would be in EP.

I'll give it a go.

It's not that virtue isn't important, but virtue can be instrumental to our pleasure. We can get pleasure from being virtuous. Whereas the Stoics would say virtue itself is the goal, Epicureans would say you are virtuous because being virtuous gives you pleasure... Therefore there actual goal is pleasure.

We also have to be careful as to what we're calling virtue. A virtue like courage, according to Epicurus, is completely contextual. There is no such thing as "courage."

Let me pull a couple texts here as examples:

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Principal Doctrine 5. It is not possible to live a joyous life without the traits of wisdom, morality, and justice; and it is impossible to live with wisdom, morality, and justice without living joyously. When one of these is lacking, it is impossible to live a joyous life.

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The school holds that sins are not all equal ; that health is in some cases a good, in others a thing indifferent ; that courage is not a natural gift but comes from calculation of expediency

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From Cicero: 15 49 "The same account will be found to hold good of Courage. The performance of labours, the undergoing of pains, are not in themselves attractive, nor are endurance, industry, watchfulness, nor yet that much lauded virtue, perseverance, nor even courage; but we aim at these virtues in order to live without anxiety and fear and so far as possible to be free from pain of mind and body. The fear of death plays havoc with the calm and even tenor of life, and to bow the head to pain and bear it abjectly and feebly is a pitiable thing; such weakness has caused many men to betray their parents or their friends, some their country, and very many utterly to ruin themselves. So on the other hand a strong and lofty spirit is entirely free from anxiety and sorrow. It makes light of death, for the dead are only as they were before they were born. It is schooled to encounter pain by recollecting that pains of great severity are ended by death, and slight ones have frequent intervals of respite; while those of medium intensity lie within our own control: we can bear them if they are endurable, or if they are not, we may serenely quit life's theatre, when the play has ceased to please us. These considerations prove p55 that timidity and cowardice are not blamed, nor courage and endurance praised, on their own account; the former are rejected because they beget pain, the latter coveted because they beget pleasure.

And

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Vatican Saying 70. Beauty (kalos καλός) and virtue and such are worthy of honor, if they bring joy; but if not then bid them farewell!

Lots more good discussion. Here are a couple of comments:

Quote from camotero

otherwise avoidable atrocities

Quote from camotero

justify otherwise avoidable atrocities. But, what I'm gathering is, that within the framework of EP, anything is justifiable, as long as you were true to your sensations and feelings?

It's key to realize that "atrocity" is a relative term. What is an atrocity to one person (flying a plane into the world trade center) is an act of highly pleasurable "patriotism" to others. It's key to see that there is no universal definition of "atrocity" any more than there is of "virtue." That doesn't mean that those terms are not useful, and that we should not consider things to be atrocious or virtuous, but the issue is that we have to understand that these things are so from OUR point of view, and not necessarily from the rest of the universe's point of view.

I wouldn't quite say that "being true to your sensations and feelings" is exactly the way to say it -- the point is just that the sensations and feelings of individuals are the only factors in play by which to judge anything as "good" or "bad," and that's just the way living beings operate.

Quote from camotero

From all these readings I'm getting a greater importance is put on virtue than I initially thought there would be in EP.

But it is critically important to see that "virtue" too is totally relative toward whatever goal is chosen. In Epicurean philosophy the goal is more pleasure/less pain so that is the ultimate standard according to which an action is virtuous or foolhardy.

Quote from camotero

if lived using the criteria. If not lived using the criteria, it's just a missed chance to live a more rational, conscious existence, controlled experience. Interesting

Again the goal is not to live a "more rational, conscious existence, controlled experience." The goal is judged entirely by whether it in practice results in more pleasure less pain. Certainly the rational pursuit of that goal is generally going to be more successful than the irrational pursuit of it, but it is critically important never to confuse the end with the means.

Quote from camotero

Perhaps there could be a scenario where our freedom could be curtailed in order for some other basic pleasure be continued (either immediately or later on)?

Absolutely yes. Just like the Romans had dictators when war made it necessary as one example, but the bottom line is the conditions dictate the appropriate response, and even though freedom is generally highly valuable for pleasure, there are going to be times when practicality requires group action inconsistent with "normal" freedoms. PLEASURE is the goal, not freedom.

Quote from Don

It's not that virtue isn't important, but virtue can be instrumental to our pleasure.

I flagged this due to the word "can." I think a reading of the Torquatus section that Don is quoting from shows that for a thing to be virtuous it has to be in fact instrumental toward pleasure, otherwise it is foolishness, because the only legitimate goal is pleasurable living, not "glory" or "duty" or anything else that might tend toward an absolutist view of what is virtuous in any situation.