References to Epicurus' Attitude Toward The "Place of the Sciences And Liberal Arts"

There's a LOT to digest here and I greatly appreciate everyone's thoughts on this topic. I plan to respond in more detail, but I had to say that this line from Elayne 's post made me smile and nod my head in agreement!

Quote from Elayne

I have for years said the atheists should not celebrate a Day of Reason. They should have a Day of Evidence.

Well said!

I should have been more specific, Cassius, about where I disagree with Lucretius' procedures. I was thinking about the section we covered last week, with the smooth, rough, or hooked atoms.

I am not so much concerned that his conclusions turned out to be incorrect as I am about how he arrived at them, through reason and analogy. Rather than this being a case of experimental error or a mistake in understanding an observation, it was a method problem. It's a great example of how reason is fraught with error.

I wouldn't have minded if he said it might be that way. But that's not how it was presented. And even in that time, I would have distrusted someone who used imagination to arrive at part of their case about the nature of things. It wouldn't have allayed my fears, because it wasn't arrived at with sound methodology, and you don't have to be a physicist to know the difference between observations and imagination/ reasoning by analogy.

I think it's important to confront problems like this, because it could make the philosophy less credible to someone who notices how Lucretius arrived at his assertions. And then to say this does no damage at all to the solid structure of the philosophy, because we can remove all the pieces arrived at by imagination/analogy and still reach the same conclusions.

Oh, dear. I did say I was going to respond. I'm going back and listening again to make sure I remember correctly. I'm about 1/2 way through again. Here are some initial thoughts:

I think I'm coming around to the idea that investigation... observation, if you will... of phenomena doesn't have to stop if you're Epicurean. I'm still not sure if I'm onboard with Epicurus and the classical Epicureans being advocates of "science" since science as a method or discipline didn't exist yet. I'm uneasy about imposing anachronistic definitions onto ancient terms, texts, and ideas. That said, Epicurus's φυσιολογίας "physiologias" or the study of Nature/what is natural would imply he wanted an accurate or realistic understanding of natural processes and phenomena. My jury is still out on the implications of this.

I do want to address the conversation in the podcast on truth or Truth with a capital T. I have to disagree with Elayne and others that everyone knows what Truth is. In a quotidian sense, people can understand what true vs false is. "2+2=4" is true. I can count things. "The Earth is flat" is not true but some people will assert that it is true. For them, that statement is true and in some ways Truth. Other people "know" God is real and intercedes in their life and that's True. They would say others who don't believe God is Truth are mistaken (at least). All of humanity does not have a prolepsis of Truth. That would make life easier. Maybe in the most rudimentary sense of true vs false, but I don't think that rises to the level of prolepsis. People know what THEY know is Truth but those other people over there don't know Truth. Unless I've misconstrued the conversation, I think the concept of Truth is much more elusive than some on the panel tried to make it out to be.

PS It appeared to me that Truth was being described as more of a Platonic ideal than as an Epicurean prolepsis in the podcast.

I'll do my best

I'm also reading Philodemus' "On Methods of Inference" and the commentary that you recommended. This does seem to bear directly on the issue at hand, so thanks for that suggestion.

From A Few Days in Athens:

Quote

"But what is a truth?" said Theon.

"It is pertinently asked. A truth I consider to be an ascertained fact; which truth would be changed into an error, the moment the fact, on which it rested, was disproved."

Wouldn't this be the prolepsis? In a universe of atoms and void there is no Truth, only truths.

Continuing the quotation above:

Quote

"I see, then, no fixed basis for truth." "

It surely has the most fixed of all — the nature of things. And it is only an imperfect insight into that nature, which occasions all our erroneous conclusions, whether in physics or morals."

"But where, if we discard the gods, and their will, as engraven on our hearts, are our guides in the search after truth ?" "

Our senses and our faculties as developed in and by the exercise of our senses, are the only guides with which I am acquainted. And I do not see why, even admitting a belief in the gods, and in a superintending providence, the senses should not be viewed as the guides, provided by them, for our direction and instruction. But here is the evil attendant on an ungrounded belief, whatever be its nature. The moment we take one thing for granted, we take other things for granted: we are started in a wrong road, and it is seldom that we can gain the right one, until we have trodden back our steps to the starting place. I know but of one thing that a philosopher should take for granted; and that only because he is forced to it by an irresistible impulse of his nature; and because, without doing so, neither truth nor falsehood could exist for him. He must take for granted the evidence of his senses; in other words, he must believe in the existence of things, as they exist to his senses. I know of no other existence, and can therefore believe in no other: although, reasoning from analogy, I may imagine other existences to be.

Quote from Godfrey

Wouldn't this be the prolepsis? In a universe of atoms and void there is no Truth, only truths.

Thanks for that quote, Godfrey ! I would say no, that's not the prolepsis (or a prolepsis), but let me explain.

This was actually the point I was originally trying to make. "The Truth" with a capital T and scare quotes doesn't exist. That seems to me to be a Platonic ideal that has no relation to the real world. I would agree with your quote in that the only things we have are true facts as ascertained by observation and evidence. That way, we don't get into arguments about my Truth vs your Truth. What do the observations say are true facts. Otherwise, we're arguing about internal mental constructs that may or may not be connected to things able to be perceived. If someone believes the existence of God is Truth, can that be observed? Can that be factually ascertained? No? Then it's not a true fact but empty opinion.

I also don't think this recognition of a true fact rises to the level of a prolepsis. Either things correspond to observable phenomena as ascertained by our senses or extensions of our senses (e.g., telescopes, microscopes, instruments, etc.) or they don't. I know the prolepses are a hot topic and I won't go into my (current) understanding of them; but, in summary, I don't think we need to fall back on a prolepsis to determine if an observable fact is true or not. It either corresponds to our observations or it doesn't.

I hope that fleshes out my understanding a little, but I remain open to to reading others takes on this!

I suppose I may be weaseling my way out of providing more of my current understanding of Epicurean prolepses. I'll try to be brief but also put my opinions out there.

First, I thought this article was interesting in drawing distinctions between Stoic and Epicurean prolepsis.

Now, for me, prolepses are engaged at the instinctual level. Research has shown that animals and babies already have a sense of fairness and "justice" if you will. Check these links here, here, and here to start. And we know Epicurus looked to animals and children for confirmation of the basic tenets.

So, my understanding is that prolepses could be thought of as instinctual or innate, inborn faculties that "grasp" more abstract phenomena like justice and our sensations grasp more concrete phenomena like sights, sounds, tactile sensations, etc.

That's why I don't think we need a prolepsis of Truth. Something either agrees with our sensations or it doesn't. I don't think that's the same as recognizing whether something is just or not and hence needing a prolepsis.

Now I understand better what you wrote previously, Don. Thanks for elaborating!

Regarding prolepseis and what was discussed in the podcast: if I understood her correctly, Elayne was comparing truth with, say, sweetness, as something that doesn't need definition. To me that's not correct, and I would consider it to be a prolepsis. Just as everyone can have a different idea as to what is just, so everyone can have a different idea as to what is true. But the prolepsis, at least as I understand it, is the germ of the idea. Little children have a general sense of what is fair and just, and they also have a general sense of truth. This is different from knowledge of specific concepts of truth and justice, which are only developed with time, experience and input from the senses and feelings. A child can see something and through their feelings, mediated by their prolepseis, have a sense as to whether that something is just, true or whatnot. This precedes conceptualizing about "what is truth" and the like.

At least that's how I currently understand it!