Stoic Objections to Epicurean Doctrine on Infinity of The Universe

In contrast to the issues about infinity of the universe based on modern physics, the original issues involved in infinity theory involved important logical and ethical issues. This thread is not to address the physics arguments, but to address the arguments of the Stoics and others who thought that the Epicurean argument on infinity of the universe was insufficient. I don't have time to go through this right now but the attached article came across my email, and I see it is written by someone whose thesis is that the Stoic argument was superior. Over time I'd like to develop in this thread some discussion on potential responses to these Stoic-based arguments.

Yes he's using a Stoic argument here:

i haven't had time to read the paper yet and probably won't in the near future, so with that caveat I have two preliminary comments:

I suspect you are correct Don and he is distorting the doctrine. Sounds like an extreme variation the "all sensations are true" argument which Dewitt deals with, applied to attack the idea that we should not eliminate possibilities until there is evidence on which to do so.

Also, I think this article and the background probably helps show how the infinite universe argument was not so much a "knowledge for the sake of knowledge" debate as it was an example of logical fencing, originating with the Platonists et al, who were using their logic to persuade others toward a theocentric universe model. Given that playing field the Epicurean position was probably always intended more as an antidote to theism than anything else.

I think we are seeing a thread here that the real crux of many matters is this "methods of inference" question, turning on the question of what is the proper perspective to take when the evidence of our senses seems to us to be insufficient to establish the level of certainty we would prefer.

In such cases do we allow ourselves to follow "logic contrary to some evidence and to the experience here we can refer to by analogy" or do we "wait" and in the meantime accept that multiple possibilities may be true.

If in fact the Epicureans said "are true" rather than "may be true" (and I question that) then this must have been another example of a nonstandard definition of the word "true" just like they used "god" in a way that to us seems nonstandard.

We should not judge the Epicureans according to our own technology or according to our own definitions.

So when you say you can't rule out his thesis, what do you see his thesis being?

Because yes this seems valid to be a valid approach to me: "Epicurus does say all the alternatives are possible or permissible or allowed" ... when you qualify that these possibilities have some evidence to support them, even evidence by analogy, and you qualify that the particular alternative does not have evidence against it to disqualify it.

OK yes something like that is what I too gather the thesis to be, but I definitely reject that as what Epicurus was saying, and I really don't think its even close as a reasonable construction.

I think it is clear that Epicurus is telling us how to approach issues where evidence is lacking (hold reasonable possibilities as "possible"rather than picking among them when there is insufficient evidence to do so). He is certainly not saying that all things are possible as that is specifically ruled out by the limitations in the way that atoms can combine, and this is stated in several ways in Lucretius and I think other places as well.

so it was that the lively force of his mind won its way, and he passed on far beyond the fiery walls of the world, and in mind and spirit traversed the boundless whole; whence in victory he brings us tidings what can come to be and what cannot, yea and in what way each thing has its power limited, and its deepset boundary-stone. And so religion in revenge is cast beneath men’s feet and trampled, and victory raises us to heaven.

This is the kind of exploration of this argument that I think is most useful. I agree with you Don that from my quick reading he seems to be alleging that Epicurus held that "all possible options possible, they actually exist in all possible infinite cosmos." This may be the first time we have discussed this here on this forum, but I think I have seen this before and in fact I think it is probably the argument that we'll run into frequently as soon as we seek out and discuss more often the general approach. So I think it will be very good for us to pick this apart and line up the responses, including not just that quote but a series of others that are even more specific that all things cannot combine in all "possible" ways. If I recall correctly too there is a "conceivability" aspect to this as well.

But at any rate, we have to very carefully articulate these issues about how to treat "possibilities." Otherwise this will always be a hurdle that will be thrown in front of us, and I think the best (or at least one of first) responses is simply to hunt out and marshal the sources which say that this is not so.

Another reference, this one from Lucretius Book 2 (Bailey). This is one of the most specific that I remember:

And yet we must not think that all particles can be linked together in all ways, for you would see monsters created everywhere, forms coming to being half man, half beast, and sometimes tall branches growing out from a living body, and many limbs of land-beasts linked with beasts of the sea, and nature too throughout the lands, that are the parents of all things, feeding Chimaeras breathing flame from their noisome mouths. But it is clear to see that none of these things comes to be, since we see that all things are born of fixed seeds and a fixed parent, and can, as they grow, preserve their kind. You may be sure that that must needs come to pass by a fixed law. For its own proper particles separate from every kind of food and pass within into the limbs of everything, and are there linked on and bring about the suitable movements. But, on the other hand, we see nature cast out alien matter on to the ground, and many things with bodies unseen flee from the body, driven by blows, which could not be linked to any part nor within feel the lively motions in harmony with the body and imitate them. But lest by chance you should think that living things alone are bound by these laws, the same condition sets a limit to all things. For even as all things begotten are in their whole nature unlike one to the other, so it must needs be that each is made of first-beginnings of a different shape; not that but a few are endowed with a like form, but that they are not all alike the same one with another. Moreover, since the seeds are different, there must needs be a difference in their spaces, passages, fastenings, weights, blows, meetings, movements, which not only sunder living things, but part earth and the whole sea, and hold all the sky away from the earth.