On "Desires" And Their Relationship To Pleasure

I don't think I agree with that, but let me talk this out.

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Say I have a headache. An aspirin might remove the pain, in which case you could say that the resulting pleasure is a byproduct. Or a pleasant nap in the shade might remove the pain, where you could consider pleasure to be the active principle.

Is the decision to take the aspirin pleasurable? Does pleasure precede the removal of the pain in this way? Then when the headache is gone, is that a stable pleasure?

Yes, the nap is a pleasurable activity. Does that fall then into the kinetic pleasures.

Epicurus did seem to differentiate among kinds of pleasures: joy, merriment, ataraxia, aponia, the pleasures from eating bread and water if you're hungry, etc. BUT they are all pleasure, none better than others. And we decide on pleasures to pursue by their consequences.

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Or say I'm depressed. I could take a pill, which might remove the pain, with pleasure as a byproduct. Or I could actively pursue activities meaningful to me, pleasure being the active principle.

Same here. Is the decision to take the pill pleasurable? According to Epicurus, it has to be pleasure or pain. Every action has to elicit a reaction either painful or pleasurable. He didn't leave any middle ground.

Thoughts?

I think you're on the right track to say that there are all sorts of types of pleasures, and some occur with the removal of pain, and some occur when we shift our attention from one pleasure to another.

As I understand it a classic example of a pleasure that is not a removal of pain or want is that of smelling a rose. The smell does not necessarily remove a pain, and we weren't "in lack of a good smell" before smelling it. Our attention turned from one pleasure to another without any removal or displacement of any sort of pain.

Again I think we generously acknowledge that there are all sorts of pleasures, without ever flipping all this on it's head by saying that the goal is "absence of pain." The goal is technically only "absence of pain" from a very very limited perspective - when we are talking about the total quantity of human experience and we're observing that we want the totality of experience to be pleasure(s) with as little pain(s) as possible (preferably, but perhaps not practically for a human, zero).

Quote from Godfrey

I would react that using pleasure as the active principle is certainly more empowering and, well, pleasurable.

I absolutely agree with that and would say it is so blindingly obvious as to not need saying, except that we are confronted with a real life situation (in which there are apparently as many as there are professional philosophers) in which we DO have to say it.

Hmmm...

I don't think so. Let me talk through the headache scenario to see where I end up:

Headache - pain

Desire to remove that pain - pleasure in anticipating the removal; kinetic pleasure?

Desire to locate and take medication - same pleasure continues

Taking medication - kinetic pleasure similar to eating to alleviate hunger.

Removal of pain - stable pleasure

There is no neutral state according to Epicurus. We must be experiencing or feeling either pleasure or pain.

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I guess you could call that a pleasure of anticipation but I would just call it a desire to remove pain: an avoidance of pain.

Ah! But isn't the "desire to remove pain" a pleasure? You are in pain and have a pleasant desire to alleviate that pain. The desire and anticipation of relief is pleasurable. I know that's not the usual way to think about it! But I'm wondering - viewing it through an Epicurean lens - if that desire can't be considered a pleasure since Epicurus says "You have to tell me if your reaction to that desire itself is pleasure or pain. Why are you pursuing it? Because the consequence of that desire leads to more pleasure than pain."

I think I agree 🙂

I'm trying to wrap my brain around your last statement:

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It's not the desire itself that's a pleasure or pain, it's your reactions to it and to the consequences of it.

I definitely agree that desires are neither good nor bad, but I'm trying to decide if that means that I don't think they're pleasurable or painful.

We have a desire, what you're calling an impulse. What comprises a desire/impulse? It has to be a cognitive event or an act of reason. Right? We have to think about the desire. But we have a reaction to that rational act, a pre-rational reaction that is pleasurable or painful through our canonical faculty of the pathē/feelings. So, if I read you correctly: the thought or desire itself - the cognitive rational impulse brought into being by our material brain's function - cannot itself be a pleasure. But that impulse provokes a reaction in our reflexive pre-rational faculty.

So then...Is there such a thing as "a pleasure" or is it always "an experience of pleasure" or "a pleasant experience." Same for pain. Does pain exist as an entity or can it only be a painful experience. Pain cannot exit y outside of experience. Or can it. Is pain a thing? Is pleasure a thing? It can these two only be experienced?

I have a feeling that I'm meeting you by the rabbit hole in left field

Hmm...

I *think* there has to be a rational aspect in this. The use of the words desire, craving, urge, etc. strike me as cognitive experiences. That's why Epicurus can say desires are the result of groundless beliefs or not.

One has a belief - a thought in your mind - that is either based on truth or not, based on whether we accept the truth of our sensations and mental perceptions or not.

That belief then leads to a desire. "I believe i need that." "I want that." I think this can even be subconscious - you just feel like you need something. Or you're hungry. That's a more immediate desire based on your sensation of an empty stomach.

Epicureans then weigh what happens if the consequence of that desire, urge, impulse, is achieved or it is not. In the case of hunger, you'll want to satisfy that desire... But how? And are you actually hungry (paying attention to Sensations) or are you emotionally or stress eating. I can be guilty of that! Not applying my Epicurean practices.

Those considered consequences elicit a pleasurable or painful reaction or feeling.

We then make a choice to pursue that desire or to flee from it based on that feeling.

Non-Epicureans don't weigh consequences necessarily. If they see a pleasurable experience arising from that desire, they follow it. No matter if it leads to pain down the road or not.

And just so you know, I'm basically going full stream of consciousness here. You all are just along for the ride 🙂

PS I got the Alice reference

I think it's important to remember what word Epicurus used to refer to "desire" επιθυμία epithumia. From LSJ:

ἐπιθυ_μ-ία , Ion. -ιη, ἡ,A. [select] desire, yearning, “ἐ. ἐκτελέσαι” Hdt.1.32; ἐπιθυμίᾳ by passion, opp. προνοίᾳ, Th.6.13: generally, appetite, Pl.Cra.419d, etc.; αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐ. Id.Phd.82c; esp. sexual desire, lust, Democr.234 (pl.), Pl.Phdr.232b, etc.; αἱ πρὸς τοὺς παῖδας ἐ. X.Lac.2.14.
2. [select] . c. gen., longing after a thing, desire of or for it, ὕδατος, τοῦ πιεῖν, Th.2.52, 7.84, etc.; “τοῦ πλέονος” Democr. 224; “τῆς τιμωρίας” Antipho 2.1.7; “τῆς μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν πολιτείας” And.2.10; “τῆς παρθενίας” Pl.Cra.406b; “εἰς ἐ. τινὸς ἐλθεῖν” Id.Criti.113d; ἐν ἐ. “τινὸς εἶναι” Id.Prt.318a, Tht.143e; “γεγονέναι” Id.Lg.841c; εἰς ἐ. τινὸς “ἀφικέσθαι θεάσασθαι” Id.Ti.19b; “ἐ. τινὸς ἐμβαλεῖν τινί” X.Cyr.1.1.5; ἐ. ἐμποιεῖν ἔς τινα an inclination towards . ., Th.4.81.
II. [select] . = ἐπιθύμημα, object of desire, ἐπιθυμίας τυχεῖν Thalesap.Stob.3.1.172, cf. Lync. ap. Ath.7.295a; ἀνδρὸς ἐ., of woman, Secund.Sent.8; πενήτων ἐ., of sleep, prob. in ib.13.

As for me I agree that as used in English the word "desire" definitely implies something different than a "pleasure." I see the contrast being that between a fully formed mental concept (desire) vs an automatic "feeling" (Pleasure).

I say "in English" because Don's list of greek words has me concerned about being too broad!

Quote from Godfrey

Are we in agreement that desires are distinct from pleasures?

Yes!

I'm still wrestling with the word pleasure. This may be pedantic or semantic but, I don't think "a pleasure" is a thing. This strikes me as somewhat Platonic as if there's Pleasure out there. We can construct a sentence as " Pleasure is X." But I think pleasures have to be directly associated with an action, whether that's an external action (eating ice cream) or internal action (satiety after eating). More specifically, pleasure is only our reaction to an action.

Quote from Godfrey

As to desires v impulses, I'm thinking that that might be going too far down the rabbit hole to be useful. What's important regarding desires is evaluating them as to whether or not to pursue them. In order to do that we must be cognitively aware of them which is the point at which they become useful.

Agreed!

Here's my perspective, as of this writing. Let's call it a work in progress:

The canonical faculties are Sensations, Mental Perceptions (or Prolepses), and Feelings (of Pleasure/Pain).

I want to say I read this elsewhere on the forum so bear with me:

We sense something in the real world either through our physical senses (smelling, tasting, touching, etc.) OR our mental Perceptions (thinking) THEN this elicits a reaction of pleasure or pain.

So, in light of this, I think a desire is a mental perception to which we have a pleasurable or painful reaction. But what are desires like? Or made of?

One selection where Epicurus talks about desires is:

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...keep in mind that some desires are natural whereas others are groundless; that among the natural desires some are natural and necessary whereas others are merely natural; and that among the necessary desires some are necessary for happiness, some for physical health, and some for life itself.

Necessary desires are required for different reasons. And also...

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PD 11: If we had never been molested by alarms at celestial and atmospheric phenomena, nor by the misgiving that death somehow affects us, nor by neglect of the proper limits of pains and desires, we should have had no need to study natural science.

Here we are told we need to learn the limits of both pains and desires. I would say that pains are limited to short if severe, bearable if long; desires are limited to natural and necessary. Not that we can limit them, but that we need to learn the limits of them. But Epicurus also wrote:

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VS 135. If you want to be wealthy, Pythocles, don't increase your riches but reduce your desires.

Seneca also uses this. In light of the last quote, it would seem to mean "be aware of the limits of his desires" although the original just says "take away desires." Concentrate on natural and necessary ones.

So, we've seen desires paired with pains. Now this:

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VS 203. Insofar as you forget nature, you will find yourself in trouble and create for yourself endless fears and desires.

From this, we have to ask ourselves what are the similarities between fears and desires? Among pains, fears, desires? Can fears be groundless or empty like desires? Or natural? Or have limits? What allowed the comparison? Could fears be the mirror of desires? One attracts, the other repels? Could these be the mental parallel of the feelings of pain and pleasure? Fear and desire?

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485. Unhappiness (kakodaimonia - the opposite of eudaimonia) is caused by fears, or by endless and empty desires; but he who is able to rein these in creates for himself a blissful understanding.

So, kakodaimonia can be caused both by fears and desires... So there is a common effect those two can have. So fear and desire, but not any desires - only endless, empty ones. And here it says one can "rein in" both fears and endless, empty desires. What does it mean to "rein" them in? Does that again refer to understanding limits or something else? It would seem to follow that eudaimonia/happiness can be caused by the opposite of fears (?) and limited (not endless) desires based on true Philosophy (not empty ones). And happiness is part of a pleasurable life.

A common thread seems to be limits. Pains are limited. Desires are limited. But fears and desires can be unlimited... But that's not a positive thing. Are some fears justified or based in true perceptions and sensations? And we know Epicurus talks about the limits of pleasure. Is Epicurean philosophy at its root understanding all natural limits? That wouldn't be a goal but a means to maximizing pleasure.

My reason for laying all this out is to see what desires are akin to in Epicurus's writings to see what similarities we can find and how they relate to the Canon, pleasure, and other parts of the philosophy.

I think that one real issue in discussing "limits" is that in English there is a connotation to "to limit" means "to reduce." And of course in discussing limits of pleasure, there is an inference that we draw from use of this term in discussing desires and pleasures that it would be a good thing for "pleasure" to necessarily be "reduced" -- and I don' think that was the intent of Epicurus at all.

FIrst of all, "reduce" and "limit" aren't necessarily the same thing.

We've been distinguishing desires from pleasures, and it certainly makes more sense to "Reduce" desires than it does to "reduce" pleasure. In fact the supposed reason to reduce desire in the advice of Epicurus is in fact to **increase** pleasure.

We're making very useful observations about limits and their importance, but as we do so I think the elephant in the room that must be avoided is implying that by using the concept of limits (and I think limits are a concept) we not accept the stoic desire to see limits of pleasure or limits of desire as being chains that tie us down from experiencing the type of full pleasurable life that might otherwise be possible.