Interpretations of PD 10 Discussion

just to muse on while I am thinking about it, it comes to mind to consider pleasures of touch.

You can compare for example warm and cold, rough and smooth. But each of those feelings may be either pleasurable or painful depending on conditions, I would think, and even degrees of smoothness ( for example) are not necessarily more or less pleasing (I would not think).

It may in fact not be possible to do much more than describe types of pleasure and what we feel about them in terms of personal preference at various times, but those descriptions may never translate into any form of "scale of pleasure" in general.

That may or may not be the case, but either way I can see the position we take on that being highly relevant to general discussions about pleasure.

I don't see that discussed very much and I am not sure why. Seems like an important point, even if the point is "it can't be done."

It may be that resistance to grappling squarely with the total individual relativity of "pleasure" is related to the concern that doing so would open the door too wide to the "unrestrained hedonism" analysis that so many fear (but which Epicurus embraces with so much fearlessness in defining the greatest good as simply pleasure).

Yes those other translations are a reminder that there is *something* in addition to time that Epicurus is considering, bit it does not jump out at me with clarity what that something is. It's almost like he is talking about how much of the body and mind is engaged in that pleasure as it is occurring.

Now saying that, it might seem logical to conclude that Epicurus is saying that pleasures that grip both the mind and the body are more "intense" than those that grip only one of the two.

Yes I would say unrestrained hedonism in the sense that there is nothing other than pain that restrains pleasure, and that there is no other consideration higher than pleasure ( taking these terms very broadly).

So yes there is the restraint of pain, but that I think is including in the calculus of pleasure.

So unrestrained in the sense that the calculus of pleasure has no higher consideration to which it must yield.

So maybe the proper term would be "unrestrained calculus of pleasure."

In thinking about that wording the question has not occurred to me:. Does "hedonism" as a term consider pain?

That's why I don't like to use the term because I don't think there is any "authority" that can answer that question as to what "hedonism" means.

Epicurus doesn't seem to have used a term like that so I suspect we should stay away from it too.

"I would offer the "rational calculus of pleasure" or "wise calculus of pleasure" i.e., phronēsis in the pursuit of pleasure"

The wording needs to be extremely precise so as not to imply that some intrinsic good is needed in addition to pleasure or else Plato will hang you from the nearest tree as he did Philebus.

And this is likely also the reason why "reason" is not part of the canon of truth.

And why Epicurus himself did not state the goal of life as "reasoned pursuit of pleasure."

Which is not to say that reason is not important but that it is subservient to pleasure and not an independent goal.

Maybe something that is unstated, like being alive.

We wouldn't say the living pursuit of pleasure even though being alive is a prerequisite.

"The goal of life is pleasure; one of the tools we use to get to that goal is practical wisdom using reason to make our choices and rejections."

I think that is exactly correct from our point of view.

Of course to really stick it to the Stoics et al. and cut off their retreat, it would be good to make clear that "reason" in that formulation does not mean some absolute standard, but in ethics (which is what we are talking about) the only considerations in the balance are pleasure and pain. Otherwise they will look to that "reason" word to inject all sorts of other considerations.

I think our discussion is what it ultimately comes down to, and the way to temper the shock value is to emphasize the vast scope of the terms pleasure and pain. Our concerns for our fellow men and art and science and all that fall under pleasure and pain too. We take pleasure generally both in knowledge and in being kind and compassionate to others, and we generally take pain in the pain of others. It's simply a matter of being clear eyed that these traits are not universally the same, and if anyone is going to prevent violation of these "norms of feeling" it has to be us humans and not supernatural gods or universal forms, which don't exist.

And that if we're going to do any of that to support a worldview based on pleasure and pain, we'd better not waste time because life is short and there are no second chances.

I see that perspective as both liberating and as radically motivating as any religious or academic wishful thinking could ever be.

Quote from Cassius

Yes those other translations are a reminder that there is *something* in addition to time that Epicurus is considering, bit it does not jump out at me with clarity what that something is. It's almost like he is talking about how much of the body and mind is engaged in that pleasure as it is occurring.

That sounds right. Makridis calls it "space and duration". The word "accumulation" makes more sense to me than "condensed" but I can't comment on the correct Greek. So he seems to be saying that IF for example the pleasure in your belly could accumulate to fill your entire body and mind, or the pleasure of learning could accumulate to fill your entire body and mind, and IF each of these would last for the same amount of time, then there would be no difference between the two. But as Hicks points out, this is not the case.

Is this a convoluted way of saying that pleasures differ from one another, but that you can't rank them? PD 9, 10 and 11 are all structured similarly in setting up "if-then" scenarios, and each one implies that the "if" scenario is not the way things are.

Quote from Godfrey

Is this a convoluted way of saying that pleasures differ from one another, but that you can't rank them?

That is a very tempting thought Godfrey that deserves some close consideration.

I can't help but think that this question of "ranking pleasures" must have occurred to Epicurus too, and thus would have found its way into the principal Doctrines.

So:

1. Is Godfrey's suggestion correct?

2. What is accomplished by stating this in so convoluted a form? Because I would assert Epicurus must have had a reason for everything he did, especially in writing the Principal Doctrines the way they are.

Haven't we discussed previously that Epicurus argued against ranking pleasures? Or was he just arguing against pleasure being unlimited? Either way, he must have been familiar with the Platonic/Aristotlean exercise of ranking pleasures.

PDs 9, 10 and 11 look to me to be similar to PDs 19, 20 and 21 in that they could have been originally written as a single paragraph. As one works through the paragraph, one gets a view of EP which begins with pleasure and leads back to astronomical phenomena and death. This "clump" of PDs then is a very concise overview!

Also, it's possible that the convoluted if-then wording is a jab at Platonic dialogue: rather than leading the reader down a primrose path as Plato does, he makes us work to think through what he's saying. Plato poses questions and answers them for us, assuming that we will accept his answers. If we don't accept his answers (as most of us on this forum don't) then his arguments fall apart. The structure of 9-10-11 might be designed to prompt us to reason things out for ourselves.

Finally, if the PDs were intended to be memorized, it would probably take more mental engagement to memorize a statement in this form as opposed to something more rote like "pleasures are different but can't be ranked". Although this in particular doesn't seem very convincing.

Quote from Godfrey

he must have been familiar with the Platonic/Aristotlean exercise of ranking pleasures.

Godfrey of course you would expect that we would ask for a reference for those exercises!