Toward A Better Understanding of Epicurean Justice And Injustice (With Examples of "Just" and "Unjust")

Wow! This is a long interesting thread.

I’m just going to comment on the latter part of “doing no harm”.

In my opinion the doing of harm relates to intention. But purely the intention of harming someone outside of personal self-defense or preservation. As in assaulting or murdering an innocent person, defrauding them, slandering them...basically hurting the other for the sake of it or for your own benefit.

Any act of self defense and the intention of defending yourself would fall outside the realm of doing harm, since defending yourself or a loved one is a “natural” act that is in accord with nature. So having a .38 in your nightstand and training to use it is intentional to DO HARM, but since the intention is based in self-defense and that act is natural it would seem to be entirely just.

Yes I agree that parsing the meaning of "harm" by looking to see what words Epicurus used is an important part of this discussion.

Reading Matt's post #101 brings to mind PD14 and how that might relate to this discussion. I'm not sure how that might be, just putting it out there

Yes I DEFINITELY think it's relevant. Two notes:

(1) I edited Godfrey's post to put a link to make PD14 a link to the text.

(2) And that reminds me that it would be very easy to add the PD's into the "lexicon" feature so that every time someone rights PDXX the text is converted into a link into that exact text. That would be a neat use of the Lexicon that had escaped me! I'll test that out and we'll see.

Yes that does sound interesting. I gather "legal positivism" refers generally to the view that laws are created by people and not thought to be "natural law" or "absolute" so that would seem right to me, as would the view that justice is an integral part of the philosophy.

On re-reading this whole thread, I have some (possibly disjointed) thoughts:

1. Maybe we should allow all the meaning possibilities of δίκαιος, and allow our translation/understanding to rest on context (such as “justice” or “civilized behavior” or …). The same for the concept of justice itself: it is not synonymous with broader terms such as “rightness” or “moral” (which I generally take in a social context, as opposed to ethics – but sometimes they are treated as synonymous). And I think the appropriate limits of that term, in line with Epicurean philosophy, are well-delineated here.
2. Along the lines of Cassius reference to “malum in se” (or “bonum in se”), I think there can be some provisional Epicurean affirmation of something like those notions (excluding idealisms such as Plato’s or Kant’s). And I suggest appeal can be made to prolepsis.
3. We have talked about prolepsis as an innate ability for pattern recognition. But I think that is too narrow. I have used “intuition” – as “a. the power or faculty of attaining to direct knowledge or cognition without evident rational thought and inference; and b. immediate apprehension or cognition.” (Merriam-Webster)
4. Although that faculty will vary individually, I take it as an innate hereditary ability across humanity – as much as the other criteria for knowledge: sensation and feeling. Perhaps evolutionarily. And I think there are broadly common (though not absolute or universal) prolepseis (which themselves may give rise to pathe) including moral questions – e.g., the raping of an infant. Even in a group that had no “justice compact” regarding that behavior. And I don’t think that is strictly a matter of an individual’s proclivity for pleasure or choice-worthiness.
5. Therefore, prolepsis could provide a natural foundation for some common perspectives on what people might think of as “malum in se” or “bonum in se” – without any appeal to idealisms. Universal/absolute? No. But a broad generality based on a commonly evolved faculty.

All of this really came in a rush of mental “hypertexting,” so might not be so carefully laid out …

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Aside: There was some discussion about how broad a community/society might be appropriate to consider – e.g. the polis, the nation, etc. I would suggest that, in our highly connected modern world, the old Stoic idea of kosmopolites is not totally out of bounds: trying to hide out with your select group of friends – or even a metaphorically walled-in nation state – may not, ultimately, offer all that much security. And I’m not much into being a bread-and-water-in-a-cave survivalist.

Don

From Aioz and Boeri:

“The normative or regulative function of the Epicurean political model is embodied in the preconception of the just.”

[I’m nearly ¼ through the book. So, much more to wade through.]

I have finished Aioz and Boeri’s Theory and Practice in Epicurean Political Philosophy: Security, Justice and Tranquility. These are my personal thoughts:

Despite the extensive lacunae in the received Epicurean literature; despite the anti-Epicurean slanders of such as Cicero, Plutarch and Epictetus; and despite those slanders having been accepted by many modern scholars – even those sympathetic to Epicurean philosophy, even those attracted to it – despite all that, there is an identifiable, if bare-bones and subject-to-personal-adaptation, foundation for socio-political activity in Epicureanism based on social compacts against harm, with considerations of justice and equity.

And, for me, that brings some “peace of mind” (ataraxia). Here’s why –

It made me realize that there is a cogent philosophical, socio-ethical counter to (a) Platonic illusionism, (b) Stoic virtue-flogging, (c) divine-command superstition and (d) perhaps especially in my case, Kantian duty-mongering (his metaphysics of morality) other than the “moral noncognitivism” that I briefly embraced.

My socio-political activities now are much reduced, compared to my years before retreat-to-the-country retirement – or subsequent late-life move back to more urban environs – mostly voting and occasional voice. I can look back on those years without thinking they are wedded to delusive aberrations vis-a-vis Epicureanism. Or reflecting an unrecognized moral noncognitivism. Although I certainly didn’t know it at the time, they seem perfectly in accord with Epicurean notions of social justice/equity – rooted, perhaps in prolepsis, but also subject to rational analysis.

And, as I say, that brings me some peace of mind.

I recommend Aioz and Boeri unreservedly (though it is a bit of a scholarly slog).

Thank you for bearing with me …

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LATE ADDENDUM: I want to add that, far from any criticism (express or implied) for those who choose lathe bios and general escape from the political vicissitudes and social turmoils, I heartily affirm that choice. It has been mine for much of my post-middle-age life – and mostly still is. I am not anti-social, but do live much of the time as a quasi-recluse.