Episode Ninety-Three: Torquatus Leads Us Forward Into Conflict Over Epicurean Ethics

    Quote from Godfrey

    I keep thinking that the only mechanism that Epicurus (not Cicero, the Cow) explicitly provided for ranking, prioritizing or choosing/avoiding was desires. He seems to me to keep saying that "pleasure is pleasure", a pathe. Why else would he repeatedly make the point that if all other things are equal (condensing/accumulation, duration, location in the body and so on) then pleasures would never differ from one another?

    There's no doubt in my mind but that this is a very challenging passage.

    In my mind, the first part of what you are referring to there " pleasure is pleasure" arises from the conjunction of the feeling and the definition - we have many different types of feelings which are knowable to us directly and without rationalization, but our decision to give them a single name ("pleasure") is a conceptual decision.


    As for the hypothetical that if the pleasures could be condensed to fill the whole person then they would never differ from one another I better yield to Don since he is master of the hypotheticals! ;)

    However if I were to go ahead rather than wait for Don on PD09 (PD09. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.) --- I would say that the point most likely is again some conceptual point of contention (probably with Plato) because I believe that Epicurus would say that the individual experiences of pleasure cannot be so intensified, so that observation of the reverse proves something (perhaps indeed the connection of the experience of pleasure with the particular part of the mind or body. I base that in large part on the presumption that it would be a core premise of epicurus that pleasure does not exist "in the air" but is an emergent property of particular living beings.

    As to PD09 I seem to remember DeWitt asserted something about that so his suggestion is probably worth going back and looking up.

    The pleasures are not identical, and that’s where so much confusion can be sown by devious minds ;) I'm thinking that that is a big reason why Epicurus kept pointing out that pleasure is pleasure, a faculty. Rather than argue with Platonists and Academics about what type of pleasure is good, or better or greatest, he made the distinction between pleasure and desire. This was one of his great innovations! "Everyone knows what pleasure is and pursues it, even babies and Cows. If you want to talk to me about what's greater or good-er, talk to me about desires."

    Cassius, I'm suggesting that this is where the opponents won the war, in focusing on ranking pleasures instead of desires. As you know, this separation has been tickling me for a while... I'm not sure if I'm reading it correctly but it seems promising. Plus like so many of Epicurus' ideas, it seems to relate favorably to modern science. Just an added bonus :)

    Despite the different directions that some of these posts may have indicated, I think we can probably all agree that there is a distinct difference between the alternative guides of life offered by Epicurus vs the other Greeks.

    The other Greeks were pointing to gods, or to "virtue," as absolutes which existed outside of the living human, either in heaven or in a realm of ideal forms or some other "external" place.

    I think we would all agree that the "pleasure" to which Epicurus was pointing is not something that exists "in the air" in nature and does not exist apart from actual living beings, which to repeat what I wrote above, I think establishes that pleasure is an emergent property of those atoms and void which are so arranged and situated as to constitute living beings. So "pleasure" has no and can have no absolute existence in itself, it's going to be something ("a feeling" or "experience" or "affect" or whatever) that a living being experiences in the moment as part of its own existence, not something the living being pulls from somewhere else.

    Anyone disagree or wish to tune that better?

    Quote from Godfrey

    The pleasures are not identical, and that’s where so much confusion can be sown by devious minds ;)

    Yes, I agree Godfrey, but I would say that this is one of those areas where once we identify an absurdity (the assertion that all pleasures are identical in every respect) we immediately reject it as having possibly been Epicurus' position and we immediately go elsewhere looking for a proper understanding of his assertions. And I do think that we can find a logical explanation for what Epicurus seems to be saying if we compare what he is saying to Plato in Philebus on a conceptual level.

    However I am not yet with you on the relationship of pleasure and desire.


    Cassius, I'm suggesting that this is where the opponents won the war, in focusing on ranking pleasures instead of desires."

    I do think that pleasures have to be ranked so that we can intelligently choose between them. I guess I would say much the same thing about "desires." Ranking "pleasures" seems to make more sense to me because that is the method by which I would rank my "desires'' if I even thought in terms of ranking desires. My desires flow directly from my evaluation of the possible pleasures and pain, so I am not sure I see the path forward you are suggesting.

    Referring to post #61, that's why I think it's interesting to compare PD03 and PD09.

    PD3 The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress.

    I think we agree that the first sentence is a refutation of the argument that pleasures have no limits. To me, the second sentence is adding specificity: if you have pleasure in your belly there is no pain in your belly. Same for your foot, and perhaps for your mind. So if all pains, throughout your body and mind, are removed, you've reached the limit of pleasure.

    PD9 If every pleasure were condensed and were present at the same time and in the whole of one's nature or its primary parts, then the pleasures would never differ from one another.

    I'm reading this as building on the second sentence of PD03. These acknowledge that you can have pleasure in your stomach, or your foot or your mind or wherever. If the pleasure in your foot filled your whole body and mind for one minute, it would be no different than if the pleasure in your belly filled your body and mind for one minute. So, pleasure is pleasure, which is part of a faculty of pathe.

    I actually prefer the Hicks 1925 translation of PD09 as it uses "accumulate" rather than "condense". I'm not sure which is more accurate, but I find accumulate to be more illustrative.

    I definitely think that one of the undercurrents of our discussion here is this:

    My comments are based on a presumption that Epicurus is going back and forth, as the occasion demands, using the word "pleasure" in both a high-level conceptual sense at times, but also at other times strictly as a feelings, with times when his usage almost is intersecting. So I think we have to be flexible in our application of the definition to the context.

    I get the impression that some of the comments in this thread are arising from seeing "pleasure" strictly and always as a "feeling" without any conceptual overlay or usage at any time. So we may have disagreement on that point,

    But the "multiple definitions according to context" approach (which is very similar to the way DeWitt explains "all sensations are true") may be the issue that we need to address more directly.

    I would say that "all sensations are true" cannot be understood unless we step back and realize that "true" can mean both "absolutely true" but at other times mean "reported honestly."

    Using the same approach, I would say that "pleasure' can (1) sometimes mean "a positive feeling'" but (2) at other times mean " a concept in which the goal of life is defined as positive feelings, in distinction from other goals such as piety or rationality or virtue,"

    Quote from Godfrey

    PD3 The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress.

    I think we are cross-posting so the flow of our comments may not quite work -- so sorry for that confusion!

    The point i want to make by quoting PD3 is to reply to your comment about the second sentence, where you say "To me, the second sentence is adding specificity: if you have pleasure in your belly there is no pain in your belly. Same for your foot, and perhaps for your mind. So if all pains, throughout your body and mind, are removed, you've reached the limit of pleasure."

    I think you are right as to the "add specificity" conclusion, which I interpret to mean as "the second sentence bolsters the conclusion of the first sentence by looking at the question from another angle."

    But the reason I write this is to ask this: Whenever we say that "the feelings are two, pleasure and pain" and that they don't coexist at the same time, is that not significantly a conceptual assertion? What if someone asserted that Epicurus could have chosen to define the feelings as four (mental pleasure, mental pain, bodily pleasure, bodily pain)? And that a mental pleasure of appreciating an artwork can coexist in time (but not in "place") with a pain in my toe that i felt while I was looking at the artwork?

    Would you say that such a person who used four categories was "wrong?"

    Does Nature herself create a concept called "pleasure" by which we should understand ALL pleasures to be included? What would you say is the intersection between human nature and the words we use to describe it?

    Quote from Cassius

    I do think that pleasures have to be ranked so that we can intelligently choose between them. I guess I would say much the same thing about "desires." Ranking "pleasures" seems to make more sense to me because that is the method by which I would rank my "desires'' if I even thought in terms of ranking desires. My desires flow directly from my evaluation of the possible pleasures and pain, so I am not sure I see the path forward you are suggesting.

    Keeping in mind that much of what we have of Epicurus comes from sources that are to some undetermined degree hostile, I'm doing the exercise of looking more closely at the texts that are generally agreed to be by Epicurus himself. And also keeping in mind that he stated that we need to be clear on what we mean by particular words. (I think I'm channeling Scalia, god forbid!)

    Quote from Godfrey

    (I think I'm channeling Scalia, god forbid!)

    (Godfrey thereby establishes himself as an "Originalist" or "Original Intent" Epicurean!)

    All politics aside, that's pretty much what I mean with the "classical Epicurean" description in the "Not-NeoEpicurean" statement and the podcast introduction.

    It's highly useful, and just intellectually honest, to try to first figure out what they believed originally before we consider our own freelancing additions, and always good to clearly mark those as freelancing ;)

    One interesting thing there is that Jefferson due to his Epicurean viewpoints probably was not himself an "original intent" kind of guy, except in the way that I think Epicurus would himself be today -- he'd separate the things that don't change (no supernatural gods, no life after death, no absolute virtue, key role of pleasure) but always insist that the way to implement them is contextual and therefore relative to time and place and many other circumstances.

    So I guess even in Epicurean terms we freelance according to our circumstances based on the original intent understanding of the key and unchanging observations. (The wording of that could be improved!)

    Now I'm cross-posting... usually I'm 2 or 3 hours behind in the discussion ;)

    Quote from Cassius

    Does Nature herself create a concept called "pleasure" by which we should understand ALL pleasures to be included? What would you say is the intersection between human nature and the words we use to describe it?

    Nature does not create a concept called "pleasure". The end of the cascade for this question, though, leads to Scepticism. All philosophies are mental models. Epicurus proposed a mental model to describe how he perceived and understood the world, and I find that model to be the best that I've come across. His model relies on faculties of sensation, feeling and anticipations and has been built upon to form the basis of modern science. The combination of Epicurus' model and modern science, to me, is the best description that we have of the universe in which we live and how to live in this universe. The persistent lack of evidence of a providential universe indicates, to me, that "Nature" has no mental models. With this in mind, pleasure is an observed, emergent phenomenon of organic life.

    It's my understanding that for clarity of discussion Epicurus was very explicit, in Greek, of the meaning of "pleasure". Over the millennia and through various languages and various intentions, that word "pleasure" has taken on a life of its own. Kind of like the word "Epicurean" :/

    Quote from Cassius

    My comments are based on a presumption that Epicurus is going back and forth, as the occasion demands, using the word "pleasure" in both a high-level conceptual sense at times, but also at other times strictly as a feelings, with times when his usage almost is intersecting.

    I'm not sure about Epicurus, but his opponents definitely were and eventually his followers had to. Hence our quandary.

    Quote from Godfrey

    It's my understanding that for clarity of discussion Epicurus was very explicit, in Greek, of the meaning of "pleasure".

    For the sake of readers who come by later in this thread (and because I am not entirely sure myself to what you refer) could you state what you refer to there of his being explicit in greek as to the meaning of "pleasure."

    Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus:

    Quote

    37... First, Herodotus, we need to have grasped what is denoted by our words, [1] so that by referring to what they denote we can make decisions about the objects of opinion, investigation, or puzzlement and [2] so that all of these things will not remain undecided, [as they would] if we tried to give an infinitely long demonstration, and [3] so that our words will not be empty. 38. For it is necessary that we look to the primary conception corresponding to each word and that it stand in no need of demonstration, if, that is, we are going to have something to which we can refer the object of search or puzzlement and opinion.

    This doesn't refer specifically to "pleasure" but to his use of words. "Pleasure" being such a central idea, however, could be understood to be covered by this passage.

    Quote from Cassius

    I do think that pleasures have to be ranked so that we can intelligently choose between them.

    No, no, no. I thought we had agreed on this one. We choose by applying whether a specific pleasurable activity leads to a more pleasurable life. We don't need to consult a list or ranking or hierarchy. We should not "rank" pleasurable activities in the abstract. There is no absolute hierarchy for all time of pleasures even for the individual.

    All we can say is right here, right now, this activity option before me would lead to a more pleasurable life, therefore, at this time, I will choose to engage in this. This activity which I desire to engage in in the future may be pleasurable in that future moment, but will in the end bring more pain into my life. Therefore, I reject it. I reject that anyone can sit down, go through a list of let's say 100 pleasures and rank them and adhere to that list for all time at every moment throughout their life. What is choice-worthy is contextual, dependent on circumstances, and what is choice-worthy now may not be when circumstances are similar in the future.

    Quote from Cassius

    I would say that this is one of those areas where once we identify an absurdity (the assertion that all pleasures are identical in every respect) we immediately reject it as having possibly been Epicurus' position and we immediately go elsewhere looking for a proper understanding of his assertions.

    That was my point in an earlier post. Epicurus is saying in PD09 "If X were the case, then Y" but he's asserting a counterfactual. PD09 has to do with the impossibility of equating all the possible pleasureable activities in which humans can engage. They're all distinct, but similar in that they bring pleasure. They can't be condensed etc however. There are many pleasures which we can desire and these desires must be chosen or rejected based on measuring them against the criteria of whether those desires fulfilled will lead to a more pleasurable life or not. Not measured against a hierarchy somewhere.

    I've also come to think that PD09 is directly related to PD10. That's another counterfactual "If X were the case, then Y." PD09 establishes there are myriad pleasures. PD10 established those pleasures enjoyed by the profligate ARE pleasurable but not necessarily choice-worthy because they don't dispel fears of death, etc., and do not lead to a more pleasureable life.

    Quote from Don

    No, no, no. I thought we had agreed on this one. We choose by applying whether a specific pleasurable activity leads to a more pleasurable life. We don't need to consult a list or ranking or hierarchy. We should not "rank" pleasurable activities in the abstract. There is no absolute hierarchy for all time of pleasures even for the individual.

    All we can say is right here, right now, this activity option before me would lead to a more pleasurable life, therefore, at this time, I will choose to engage in this. This activity which I desire to engage in in the future may be pleasurable in that future moment, but will in the end bring more pain into my life. Therefore, I reject it. I reject that anyone can sit down, go through a list of let's say 100 pleasures and rank them and adhere to that list for all time at every moment throughout their life. What is choice-worthy is contextual, dependent on circumstances, and what is choice-worthy now may not be when circumstances are similar in the future.

    It is very interesting to me how when we spoke on the podcast we seemed to more easily agree that we were on the same page, but in putting the positions down in writing we seem to find agreement harder.

    To me, you could have started out that passage as Yes Yes Yes rather than no no no because I see us in total agreement, especially when we identify that you are saying two different things here: "I reject (1) that anyone can sit down, go through a list of let's say 100 pleasures and rank them and (2) adhere to that list for all time at every moment throughout their life.

    As to point 2 you are certainly correct correct - the ranking will change from day to day, hour to hour, decision to decision. But as to point 1 you certainly *can* rank the possible pleasures as you predict them as of any given moment, because that is how you make every decision, looking forward in time to what will happen to you if you make one choice or another.

    Don you seem to be requiring that a "ranking" be made against an absolute outside standard. I too reject that, but i consider that my personal ordering of preferences as to which pleasures are greater "to me" to be a proper use of the word "ranking." There is no outside absolute all-time list that can tell us how much pleasure an activity will generate across the board and all the time -- that is why "Utilitarianism" as referenced in a nearby thread must fail. Epicurus was not a Utilitarian and i think would reject that for exactly the reason you are arguing.

    Maybe you would prefer to use another word than "ranking" because you think all rankings require an outside standard, but that would again be a definitional choice on which to be clear and it's not my understanding that the word "ranking" and the "process of ranking' must require an absolute standard - it seems to me the word can be used properly referring only to our own individual standard that is in fact contextual, as you say, and changes even within us over time and circumstance.

    Maybe I should reiterate on one important point: I completely agree with you Don that there is no absolute unchanging standard by which we can rank pleasures for all people and all time and place - or even with total confidence for we ourselves in the future. From moment to moment we do make that assessment, but that is why we reject "Utilitarianism" because as a political system it is impossible to come up with an absolute standard which applies to everyone at all times and all places.

    That's why I totally agree with your comments to Kalosyni above that Epicurus was not a "Utilitarian" politically. That's an extremely important point that we've made here on the forum several times in the past and need to continue making every time that issue comes up. "Was Epicurus an Utilitarian?" is a very legitimate and natural question to ask, but it's very foundational that the answer is "No.'

    It's kind of like explaining why Epicurus did not see himself as an atheist even though he rejected the existence of supernatural gods. He meant what he said and he said what he meant. He believed in "gods" but he rejected the definition of "gods" asserted by the establishment.

    As you (Don) indicated above, the factors that K. listed Bentham as considering are in fact relevant considerations about pleasures to keep in mind in making practical decisions about actions to take. But those considerations do not cross the line into quantifiable absolutes that can (or should) be looked upon as allowing us to say "for all times and all places we will prioritize chocolate ice cream factories over vanilla ice cream factories." To do so would be as perverse as listening to Epicurus talk plainly about Epicurean gods but still at the same time insisting that he means them to be supernatural. He is making very plain statements about the nature of gods as non-supernatural and pleasure as a feeling which varies by context, and it is essential to absorb those lessons or we've learned nothing.

    As a general and final observation for this post, it seems to me that we can with some ease point to certain experiences and with clarity call them "pleasures" or "pains," because in pointing we are pointing at particular people at particular times undergoing particular experiences. But when we sit back and speak or write "pleasure in general" or simply refer to "pleasure in the abstract" (and i do think that is a valid exercise) we are moving from a "pointing" exercise to a "definitional" exercise (inherently a "word game") and we have to be much more careful.

    Quote from Cassius

    It is very interesting to me how when we spoke on the podcast we seemed to more easily agree that we were on the same page, but in putting the positions down in writing we seem to find agreement harder.

    Honestly, the time delay in writing and the inability to actually have a conversation might be part of it.

    Plus I let my passions get the better of me on that post. I'm gonna give a little mea culpa on that one.

    Quote from Cassius

    Maybe you would prefer to use another word than "ranking" because you think all rankings require an outside standard, but that would again be a definitional choice on which to be clear and it's not my understanding that the word "ranking" and the "process of ranking' must require an absolute standard - it seems to me the word can be used properly referring only to our own individual standard that is in fact contextual, as you say, and changes even within us over time and circumstance.

    Okay, yes yes. I think we are understanding the word "rank" in two different senses. That's seems to be the crux of my issue. Not that rank doesn't have the two senses but we're let's say talking past each other. That's the issue with posting rather than talking! That could have been resolved in a back and forth in two minutes rather than multiple posts over a week.

    To me the word "rank" is a fixed order. I got no problem with "comparing" two or more options on the fly with the caveat of comparing them again later. So if you use "rank" I'm going to substitute "compare."

    So, with reading your thoughtful, methodical post above it seems we ARE in agreement. Whew! LOL! Thank you for your patience!!

    Quote from Godfrey

    Over the millennia and through various languages and various intentions, that word "pleasure" has taken on a life of its own. Kind of like the word "Epicurean"

    I would agree. Pleasure, especially in Christian theology, seems to have become equated with sin and vice. Suffering and pain would be rewarded in the afterlife, unless you ended up in the Bad Place or even Purgatory where you had to be purged and purified of your sin. Did/do they use the word "pleasure" even to refer to the Good Place? Or talk around it with words like bliss or rejoicing or something?

    Quote from Godfrey

    PD03, PD09 and PD10 are all interesting in that they are providing counterfactual arguments (I think "absurdities" is too strong of a word) while at the same time adding clarity and details to those looking for it.

    Hmm. I not sure PD03 is counterfactual as much as it is an unattainable goal (unless you're a god!). If a person was exclusively experiencing no pain in their body or mind anywhere, they would, by definition, be experiencing nothing but pleasure. Once that state (again only attainable by a god) is reached, pleasure cannot be "increased" but simply varied.

    I freely admit I may be using "unattainable goal" to mean the same thing as Godfrey's "counterfactual" like the rank/compare debate I just had with Cassius.

    I'm using Nathan's compilation again for reference here:

    ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δʼἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθʼὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, ουκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον.

    “The limit of great pleasures is the removal of everything which can give pain. And where pleasure is, as long as it lasts, that which gives pain, or that which feels pain, or both of them, are absent.” Yonge (1853)

    “The magnitude of pleasures is limited by the removal of all pain. Wherever there is pleasure, so long as it is present, there is no pain either of body or of mind or both.” Hicks (1910)

    “The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain. When pleasure is present, so long as it is uninterrupted, there is no pain either of body or of mind or of both together.” (Hicks 1925)

    “The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body nor of mind, nor of both at once.” Bailey (1926)

    “The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. And wherever the experience of pleasure is present, so long as it prevails, there is no pain or distress or acombination of them.” (De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 226, 241; 1954)

    “The removal of all that causes pain marks the boundary of pleasure. Wherever pleasure is present and as long as it continues, there is neither suffering nor grieving nor both togethers.” Geer (1964)

    “The removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, pain or distress or their combination is absent.” (Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 115; 1987)

    “The limit of the extent of pleasure is the removal of all pain. Wherever pleasure is present, for however long a time, there can be no pain or grief, or both of these.” O'Connor (1993)

    “The removal of all feeling of pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

    “Pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain. When such pleasure is present, for as long as it lasts, there is no cause of physical nor mental pain present – nor of both together.” Anderson (2004)

    “Pleasure has its <upper> limit in the removal of everything that produces pain. For, wherever that which produces pleasure resides, for as long as it abides, there can be nothing that produces pain, grief, or both.” Makridis (2005)

    “The limit of enjoyment is the removal of all pains. Wherever and for however long pleasure is present, there is neither bodily pain nor mental distress.” Saint-Andre (2008)

    “The quantitative limit of pleasure is the elimination of all feelings of pain. Wherever the pleasurable state exists, there is neither bodily pain nor mental pain nor both together, so long as the state continues.” Strodach (2012)

    “The limit of pleasure is reached with the removal of all pain. Whenever pleasure is present, and for however long, there is neither pain nor grief nor any combination of the two.” Mensch (2018)

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