Post #19 might relate to our previous discussions about circumplexes in some fashion, but as I ended up confused as to the exact definition of a circumplex, I'm not sure if it illustrates what one is or what one isn't
Episode Ninety-Three: Torquatus Leads Us Forward Into Conflict Over Epicurean Ethics
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Good discussion; dealing with Cicero brings up lots of issues!
The foray into mathematics brought to mind a tangentially relevant sci-fi short story, "The Story of Your Life" by Ted Chiang. It concerns an alien first contact and the efforts to understand the alien linguistics and physics, and deftly illustrates possible ramifications of different worldviews. The physics comparison begins with two different ways of approaching the optical problem of a stick apparently bending in water, which I seem to recall from Epicurean texts or a forum post at some point.
The story was made into the movie Arrival a few years ago. I'm sure the treatment in the original story is much more relevant here though.
But that's quite a long way from Cicero. Keep up the good work!
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I am pretty sure the bent stick is in the form of a bent oar in the discussion of illusions that just precedes the longer discussion of images. I always forget whether that is book four or five....
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I would like to offer these lines from the Letter to Menoikeus in support of my contention that Epicurus was saying the same thing as "Torquatus" when it comes to the "highest good" (my emphasis added):
QuoteThis is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and the end of a completely happy life. For we recognize it as the primary and innate good, we honor it in everything we accept or reject, and we achieve it if we judge every good thing by the standard of how that thing affects us. And because this is the primary and inborn good, we do not choose every pleasure...
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος λέγομεν εἶναι τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν. ταύτην γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης καταρχόμεθα πάσης αἱρέσεως καὶ φυγῆς, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην καταντῶμεν ὡς κανόνι τῷ πάθει πᾶν ἀγαθὸν κρίνοντες. καὶ ἐπεὶ πρῶτον ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο καὶ σύμφυτον, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ οὐ πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν αἱρούμεθα...
πρῶτον
πρῶτος
first
earliest
foremost, most prominentπρῶτον ἀγαθὸν = first, highest, superior, foremost good thing
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Yes that is definitely key material!
How do you interpret the "this" in "And because this is the primary and inborn good, we do not choose every pleasure...?
If we substitute "pleasure" there we get "And because pleasure is the primary and inborn good we do not choose every pleasure...."
Are we not left with the same question as to how to distinguish between which pleasures to choose, and is not "pleasure" as used here a very high-level term encompassing many particulars? I don't see how that conclusion can be avoided unless we take the position that "the feeling of pleasure" is exactly the same in every respect in every experience that we find pleasing. And in case the answer to that question doesn't seem immediately clear, don't pleasures vary at least in how long they last? (And I would assert that it is clear that pleasures vary in many other ways as well.)
And in fact even in this passage it's clear that we are sometimes even selecting a temporary pain when a "greater pleasure" comes from having endured that pain.
So aren't we left with the clear conclusion that some pleasures are greater (and some are lesser) than others? And if so, the question to "what is the highest pleasure?" is not answered simply by saying "pleasure"? Is it?
Quote"And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided. Yet by a scale of comparison and by the consideration of advantages and disadvantages we must form our judgment on all these matters. For the good on certain occasions we treat as bad, and conversely the bad as good. And again independence of desire we think a great good — not that we may at all times enjoy but a few things, but that, if we do not possess many, we may enjoy the few in the genuine persuasion that those have the sweetest pleasure in luxury who least need it, and that all that is natural is easy to be obtained, but that which is superfluous is hard."
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How do you interpret the "this" in "And because this is the primary and inborn good, we do not choose every pleasure...?
If we substitute "pleasure" there we get "And because pleasure is the primary and inborn good we do not choose every pleasure...."Right. This = pleasure (overall).
The Epicurus Wiki does a good job of providing commentary on this section, as well as the Letter as a whole:
http://wiki.epicurism.info/Menoeceus_130-131/
Epicurus defined pleasure (after a fashion) in the section directly previous to those I quoted before:
Quotehealth of the body and the serenity of the soul — since that is the goal of a completely happy life. Our every action is done so that we will not be in pain or fear. As soon as we achieve this, the soul is released from every storm, since an animal has no other need and must seek nothing else to complete the goodness of body and soul. Thus we need pleasure only when we are in pain caused by its absence; but when we are not in pain then we have no need of pleasure.
To provide some inline commentary of my own in ( ) below:
Because pleasure (writ large) is the primary and inborn good, we do not choose every (activity that provides the feeling of) pleasure. Instead, we pass up many pleasures when we will gain more of what we need (i.e., pleasure) from doing so. And we consider many pains to be better than pleasures, if we experience a greater pleasure for a long time from having endured those pains.
So every pleasure is a good thing because its nature is favorable to us, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen — just as every pain is a bad thing, yet not every pain is always to be shunned. It is proper to make all these decisions through measuring things side by side and looking at both the advantages and disadvantages, for sometimes we treat a good thing as bad and a bad thing as good.
The underlined section again reinforces why pleasure is the standard. We use it to make decisions, measuring our options side by side, looking at advantages and disadvantages between them, in relation to whether they will bring pleasure now or in the future.
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Are we not left with the same question as to how to distinguish between which pleasures to choose
I don't think so.
Pleasure - encompassing the health of the body and "serenity" of the mind throughout one's life - is the standard by which to make choices of which desires to pursue or reject.
We choose those activities/things that bring pleasure now if they will not bring greater pain as a result, or we choose pains (my go-to example of exercise) *for now* only if they will bring greater pleasure in the future.
So aren't we left with the clear conclusion that some pleasures are greater (and some are lesser) than others?
No. Some pleasures experienced in the moment will lead to more pain in the end (ex., drinking all night long when you have to be at work the following morning). That doesn't mean the pleasure of intoxication doesn't feel pleasurable in the moment. It's just maybe not a good choice. That doesn't mean the pleasure is greater or lesser. It means it's not choice-worthy judged by the standard.
And if so, the question to "what is the highest pleasure?" is not answered simply by saying "pleasure"? Is it?
Yes, it is. But you're asking the wrong question.
It makes no sense to ask "what is the highest pleasure?" because, by definition according to Epicurus, all pleasures are good. The "highest pleasure" is never used to them best of my knowledge. Pleasure is the highest good thing.
Pleasure is the highest good thing when compared to virtue, wisdom, justice, etc., because all good things are judged by the standard of whether they bring pleasure.
What pleasure to pursue is judged by whether it will bring more pleasure or lead to pain.
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. That doesn't mean the pleasure of intoxication doesn't feel pleasurable in the moment. It's just maybe not a good choice. That doesn't mean the pleasure is greater or lesser.
We're at an impasse for the moment due to the flat way you make this observation (that there is no greater or lesser pleaure), but I am confident that we will break through it over time.
My position at the moment remains that philosophically "all pleasure is good" and "all goods are good," but that from the "perspective of real life," "some things that are good are better than others" and therefore "some pleasures are more pleasing (greater) than others."
And when I refer to "from the perspective of real life" this is one of those areas where I think there is no satisfactory way for words to capture the full depth of "better" or "more pleasing" other than to broadly indicate that there are degrees. In an analogy to mathematics I would say that words can model real life just like math can model real life, but they are not equivalent and cannot capture the complete issue. I cannot measure or fully understand the difference in pleasure that, for example, Martin may get from vanilla ice cream than I do.
Therefore also I would say that "pleasure is the (highest) good" is a perfectly appropriate way to respond to "holiness is the (highest) good" or "rationality is the (highest) good."
But as another example, I would also so that "pleasure is the good" is not what Torquatus (and we can assume he as an Epicurean par excellance for this analogy) would say to his army as he was directing his son to be executed for disobeying orders.
Torquatus might later deliver a philosophy lesson in which he explained that what he was doing was for the sake of pleasure, yes, but he would not likely choose to describe his analysis in that way at the moment that he was requiring his orders be carried out. He would more likely remind his men and his son of the relative differences in the various pleasures and pains of life and rank them (with the safety of his country as a higher pleasure than the safety of his son) as explanation for what he was doing.
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My position at the moment remains that philosophically "all pleasure is good" and "all goods are good," but that from the "perspective of real life," "some things that are good are better than others" and therefore "some pleasures are more pleasing (greater) than others."
I get the impression that this is a word game rabbit hole you're falling into.
I'll suggest step one is to begin using "good thing" when were talking about activities. There is no capital-G Platonic Good, and I think using words like "all goods" starts to imply there is Good. As Epicurus said, "I spit on the good/noble/kalos of it doesn't bring pleasure."
Let me look at each of your statements:
philosophically "all pleasure is good"
I would say, practically, "everything that elicits a pleasurable response is good."
Why? Because pleasure is a positive feeling.
"all goods are good,"
All good things are good things. That's just a tautology, so that's like saying "things that are positive are positive." Things are only good, according to Epicurus, inasmuch as they bring pleasure. That's why it's the standard.
"some things that are good are better than others"
Again, good things are only good inasmuch as they bring pleasure. You seem to be trying to make a value judgment among "good things" as well as "things that bring pleasure". That doesn't strike me as Epicurean. It's all contextual. For things that bring pleasure, do they bring more pain in the end or lead to the health of the body and the serenity of the mind, in other words, a pleasurable life. Among "good things" like wisdom, acting justly, etc, is not being "better". It's being the one good thing toward which all other candidates for good things point or lead. According to Epicurus, *that* good thing that is at the "end of the rainbow" let's say, is a pleasure-filled life. All other goods are judged by whether they bring that about. Otherwise, they're spit upon.
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Oops, forgot the last statement:
"some pleasures are more pleasing (greater) than others."
No. All things which bring pleasure are good, a priori (I think I'm using that right).
It's not a matter of being "more pleasing" or "greater."
The criteria is whether the thing that brings pleasureable feelings does so with a minimum of pain attached. If it does, weigh that in your consideration of the choice to pursue it.
Getting into greater or lesser pleasurable activities seems to me to be going down the kinetic/katastematic rabbit hole. I think those distinctions are simply a way to look at different pleasurable things and are not value judgements. Better/worse, greater/lesser seems to be trying to put value judgments on them. The pleasures of the profligate are not lesser, worse pleasures. They are simply not choice-worthy if one wants to lead a pleasure-filled life.
I'll leave Torquatus and his son for when we get to that section.
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You seem to be trying to make a value judgment among "good things" as well as "things that bring pleasure".
Not a value judgement, but a judgment that I prefer some pleasures to others.
some pleasures are more pleasing (greater) than others."
No. All things which bring pleasure are good, a priori (I think I'm using that right).All I can say there is that for myself, some things are more pleasant than others. I think that's where we are going to have to agree to disagree until we can break this impasse.
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Let me ask this:
Why are they "more pleasurable" to you?
What does "more pleasurable" mean to you?
btw: I'm not arguing against feeling that some activities are subjectively more pleasurable than others. But that doesn't make them "better" or "greater" or "higher." So, I want to read what you mean when you use the words "more pleasurable."
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FYI: I'm not trying to be argumentive However, I honestly think your answer to those questions may move us along in the conversation.
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What does "more pleasurable" mean to you?
For example, I occasionally eat candy.
All candy to me, to the extent it is sweet, involves some degree of pleasure. However I can and do easily rank which candies I like most (find to be the most pleasant).
For example I have in front of me a bag of "Soft Caramel Candies" from "Lidl" (the grocery store). The bag says ("Caramel, Banana, Coffee, Vanilla, Mint, and Chocolate."
After I open the bag I can easily rank them in order of the pleasure they will give me, so I place them in line in this order (the most pleasant first): Chocolate, Caramel, Vanilla, Banana, Mint, Coffee
And I eat them in order, with clearly diminishing pleasure, til I get to the last of the coffee.
So I have no problem considering the flavor, intensity, texture (some are softer than others), staying power (some dissolve faster than others) all of which let me easily categorize them as greater or lesser pleasures.
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Okay, we're getting somewhere (and you're making me hungry for Peanut M&Ms... My go-to confection )
So, we've established:
Eating "Soft Caramel Candies" gives Cassius pleasure.
I would also say:
Thinking about eating "Soft Caramel Candies" gives Cassius pleasure.
And,
Thinking about eating Chocolate "Soft Caramel Candies" gives Cassius more pleasure than thinking about eating Coffee "Soft Caramel Candies".
Let's just take those two for now.
What does having "more pleasure" mean?
I know you can categorize them, put them in order, etc. You say
I have no problem considering the flavor, intensity, texture (some are softer than others), staying power (some dissolve faster than others) all of which let me easily categorize them as greater or lesser pleasures.
Those are all aspects of the experience of eating or anticipating eating the candy.
But what do you mean when you say or think: This gives me "more pleasure"?
This is a "greater" pleasure?
This is a "lesser" pleasure?
Is it the duration of the pleasure?
Is it a memory that wells up in relation to chocolate vs coffee?
I would suggest you're not actually describing a greater or lesser "pleasure" but something else.
The pleasurable feeling itself may be long and intense, it may be short and almost unnoticeable, it may need delayed, it may be immediate. You have a different emotional reaction to each of those experiences. You enjoy each one differently. Just like you can have different reactions to different mental or sensual (of the sense) activities which produce pleasure. The pleasure experienced is a good thing. The pleasure brings you joy. But the pleasurable feeling is the guide as to whether you'll pursue the choice to eat them.
On the other hand, if someone held you at gunpoint and made you eat 100 bags of Chocolate "Soft Caramel Candies", that would no longer be pleasurable. You may even grow to dislike the Chocolate "Soft Caramel Candies" because of painful memories. The pleasure of eating the candy is not inherent in the candy itself. The feeling is entirely contextual and subjective. So, there's no absolute greater or lesser value to the pleasure derived from the candy that is valid for every circumstance.
And yes I realize I'm using a hypothetical.
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I definitely agree that there is no absolute way to rank them "objectively" - meaning between people.
But each individual can and does rank them moment by moment, and the particular experiences involved are readily evaluatable in terms of greater or lesser pleasure -- at least that is how I see it.
We agree there is no "absolute ranking" but we are apparently disagreeing on whether it is possible for any individual or group of individuals to perceive the experience of pleasure as greater or lesser, and to that I would say "surely so."
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it is possible for any individual or group of individuals to perceive the experience of pleasure as greater or lesser, and to that I would say "surely so."
Ah! But does even your own personal perception of the experience hold for every situation? Here I go with the hypotheticals again
If someone were to wake you in the middle of
the night and ask if you wanted a chocolate candy, would it be as pleasurable as if you were at leisure in the backyard with an open bag?
If you were sick with a stomach ache, would the thought of eating the chocolate candy be as pleasurable?
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No each of those situations would have their unique aspects, but I would have no trouble ranking the respective pleasures and choosing between them as greater or lesser pleasures.
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No each of those situations would have their unique aspects, but I would have no trouble ranking the respective pleasures and choosing between them as greater or lesser pleasures.
Oh, I'm not asking you to rank them. Just the chocolate one. Would you have the same thought of pleasure imagining eating - or take the same pleasure in eating - as you would at sitting at leisure in the yard?
What if, at leisure, and there was no chocolate available, only caramel (one step down on your "ranking")? Would the pleasure you derive match or be qualitatively less than if you had chocolate?
I've gone as far as I care to at this point so I'll stop this, because my aversion to hypotheticals is beginning to pain me, too.
My contention is that there is no absolute standard by which to measure your "greater" and "lesser" so it's all contextual to the individual experience whether for the individual or across individuals.
The only standard is living a pleasurable life writ large as to whether to pursue or reject a given pleasurable activity. Talk of "greater" or "lesser pleasures" is counterproductive in my opinion. The only decision that matters is the one in front of you at any given time.
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LOL. We really need someone else to weigh in on this dialogue. I think we've got a log jam!
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