Should Epicurean Philosophy Be Made More Accessible?

That's a good article. I especially liked the last line:

Quote from Shermer

The fact that science progresses toward, say, eradicating diseases and landing spacecraft on Mars must mean that our perceptions of reality are growing ever closer to the truth, even if it is with a small “t.”

I think the canonical faculties are there to give us a "true" presentation of what's "out there" in the real world. Epicurus says as much, to me, when he wrote (emphasis added):

Quote from Epicurus

For the presentations which, e.g., are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact.

Those things "with which we come in contact" are the things in the real world which our senses sense. I will say Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett's research augments my understanding on this. We jump from a stick or rope on the ground, thinking it is a snake, because it's easier for our brains to identify "long, thin shape on ground = snake > Run!" than to analyze every instance. Save yourself first; Laugh at false alarm later. That's a nutshell from me. Thanks for posting!

Quote from Kalosyni

Don you gave my post on ethics a confused smilie. Do you think that what I posted about ethics might not be Epicurean, or possibly goes beyond Epicureanism? What part were you confused about?

Oh!! My bad! I didn't see its connection to the specific article right before it. That's the only reason for the confused emoji.

Quote from Kalosyni

The reason I haven't spent much time with Epicurean physics and epistemology is that I am a firm believer in modern science. I think it might be important to contrast Epicurus' ideas with modern scientific understanding.

Parts of Epicurean physics are certainly outdated, but not all by any means, and none of Epicurean epistemology would really fit the "outdated" parts. I think as you read further into it you will find much that you won't otherwise understand as to how the Epicurean Ethics works.

Quote from Kalosyni

So now we must extend this "do no harm" to all people.

And this would be example number one. I am no expert on Kant, but the notion of "extending to all people" sounds like a Kantian categorical imperative, which I would say has no parallel at all in Epicurus, which would be quite the opposite in viewpoint. In Epicurus there is no universal justice, but in fact only local and subjective justice, for example as stated in PD33 and PD34.

While I don't share the extreme conclusions of some about "live unknown" there is a very strong strain of "subjectivism" in Epicurean philosophy where you don't expect everyone to agree with you on everything, and so with those who don't (who can't be made your friends because of it, you don't force them and yourself to live we each, you "separate." PD39

And there is no reason that you would tolerate others doing what you believe to be harmful to yourself, even though they don't agree with it's correctness. Such people you don't "reform," you "restrain," "Yet nevertheless some men indulge without limit their avarice, ambition and love of power, lust, gluttony and those other desires, which ill-gotten gains can never diminish but rather must inflame the more; inasmuch that they appear proper subjects for restraint rather than for reformation.

I think as you read more into these physics and epistemology issues you'll begin to resolve some of your questions about what Epicurus was teaching. Note that I am not saying that you will agree with them, but that you'll begin to understand why they don't lead toward universal ethical values for everyone at all times and all places. Yes, I do think that it is possible to generalize that in most cases pleasure is to be chosen and pain to be avoided, but we don't even do that ALWAYS even in our own cases -- sometimes we choose pain in order to bring more pleasure to us later.

Possibly the big question in all this is "Whose pleasure?" I think you'll eventually find that the "greatest pleasure for the greatest number" might be Utilitarian philosophy, but not consistent with Epicurus.

I am slogging through editing the most recent podcast and I think some of the issues we are discussing here are either the same or the subtext of this podcast episode. There are multiple levels of meaning and application in a lot of these issues, and they fly in the face of common attitudes we've learned or been exposed to in other places. And I dare say that most of us (me included) have very little experience in the Epicurean perspectives, so we make mistakes when trying to build up from the foundation when we think he is going to arrive where we already are -- and so we tend to think that we don't NEED the foundation.

That's a big problem to figure out ways around, but it's one of the reasons why we did the reading of Lucretius and I do think we need to urge everyone to try to go through that for themselves and listen to as many as possible.

Maybe we also need to make a list of "best" episodes since we now have so many, but this issue of how the physics and epistemology relate to the ethics is something that came up over and over in the podcast so there is some good material there especially in the episodes covering the early books where we dealt with these issues for the first time.

Although it is a generally good practice to do no harm, there is no universal imperative to do so. This doesn’t mean everyone needs to be hostile to everyone, but nature tells us that violence is a very significant part of reality. We may not wish to do harm, however humankind follows no unified ideology and the evidence explicitly shows that humans harm each other every moment of the day. The Epicurean has to be ready for anything to preserve the individual’s freedom and pursuit of pleasure…and that may mean a show of force or even as a last resort a violent interaction.

Violence does not bring about pleasure, but is necessary to preserve the ability to continue experiencing pleasure. As with everything prudent judgement is critical. Being too heavy handed with an adversary may backfire on you and cause you to have ill repute or likewise being too passive will cause other adversaries to perceive weakness. So it becomes a perpetual cycle of maintaining vigilance and evaluating risks.

Quote from Matt

there is no universal imperative to do so

Yes that is the issue. For there to be a universal imperative there would need to be some kind of enforcing mechanism, some kind of "authority figure" with the authority and the right to set such a standard.

Of course in practice the vast majority of people have the same "sense" that pain is bad and pleasure is good, and there is a general baseline revulsion to pain in most people (we can leave out the psychopaths and ascribe that to clinical issues). So we largely get to the same place that most of us have an understanding that inflicting pain on others is undesirable MOST of the time, but we all can (or should) be able to quickly identify cases where even the most emphatic person can see that some infliction of pain (restraint or pain to someone who is about to murder innocent people) has such beneficial results that we are willing to do that.

There's a wide spectrum of views on these subjects among most people who I would consider normal, and the number of people who have no regard to others' pain is probably about the same small number who would never admit any exceptions to the infliction of pain -- both positions run smack into the reality of the pain that we would face if we tried to implement them in reality.

I have to slightly disagree or provide an alternative perspective on the last few posts. PD31, to me, states that the "justice of nature (What is naturally just)" is that agreement "to not harm each other nor to not be harmed oneself." I don't know if that's "universal" (probably not since the agreements aren't universal... but theoretically could be with international organizations and treaties).

PD31 Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιόν ἐστι σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι.

Looking at Nate's compilation may be helpful, but for now, here's my translation:

"The justice of nature (What is naturally just) is an agreement of interests to not harm each other nor to not be harmed oneself." right, lawful, just, τὸ δίκαιον right, opp. to τὸ ἄδικονσῠ́μβολον n (genitive σῠμβόλου); second declension

• a sign or token by which one infers a thing
• a pledge or pawn, on which money was advanced
• in pl. tallies
• at Athens, a ticket, counter
• a permit or licence to reside, given to aliens
• n Eccl. the distinctive mark of Christians, a confession of faith, a creed
• in legal phrase, σύμβολα were covenants between two states for protection of commerce

συμφέρον n (plural συμφέροντα)

• interest, rights (business connection with material advantage)

Βλάπτω III. after Hom. to damage, hurt, mar, opp. to wilful wrong (ἀδικεῖν), Aesch., etc.αλλήλους reciprocal or reflexive pronoun

• each other, one another

Yes there is definitely a lack of consensus on how to interpret those PDs so it is good for you to add that perspective. And in addition to what you have raised, there are the questions that arise from the changed circumstances that Epicurus starts talking about, because the conclusion that one would think would be obvious (that the breaking of a contract is unjust) does not seem to be nearly so obvious at all. In fact I would argue that Epicurus makes it so easy to justify breaking a contract that if "harm or be harmed" were held by some to be a universal standard of some kind, he's almost taking pains to show that even that is not universal.

So there's the issue that even if one were to suggest that all justice should be considered to revolve around contracts not to harm or be harmed, it appears that there is no injustice in breaking those contracts very readily.

Lots to unwind in the issue of Justice and this is definitely an area not to pin oneself down to a particular position to quickly.

I think a lot of this has to do with the compartmentalization of all violent actions in nature in general (including all forms human violence and natural violence which exists in all forms in nature) and our perception that there is a higher abstract idea that certain forms of violence are considered legal and illegal within contractual agreements. For example the types of violent actions outlined in the US Law of Armed Conflict and the more “universal” Geneva Convention show us there are more regional ideas of what is considered “lawful” acts and “illegal” acts. However, as with any agreement like these particular ones, they apply only to those parties willing to agree to the terms and there are a great number of parties who do not recognize these compacts. Confounding any sort of universal agreements. Navigating this is difficult from 21,000 feet looking down, but on the ground dealing with individual acts of violence and self-preservation it becomes a matter of instinct and the circumstances of the moment. An Epicurean should feel no concern about self defense or self preservation.

For me, my entire career has been dealing with the philosophy of mutually assured destruction and the consequences of parties breaking agreements and treaties. I usually have a lot of time to think about this stuff because I’m immersed in it daily.

We're probably straying from the title of this thread, but ..

I find it interesting that the word used for "harm" is βλάπτω (blaptō):

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, βλάπτω

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, βλάπτω

βλάπτω does NOT seem to convey willful harm just harm. Willful, unjust harm seems to be ἀδικεῖν which itself is connected to the meaning "unjust"

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ἀδι^κέω

No conclusions, just food for thought.

But not a direct synonym for pain?

Unless that word is more etymologically helpful then "harm" is going to be just as ephemeral as "Justice" itself.

Pain means something we can understand clearly, but "harm"?

Quote from Cassius

But not a direct synonym for pain?

Unless that word is more etymologically helpful then "harm" is going to be just as ephemeral as "Justice" itself.

Pain means something we can understand clearly, but "harm"?

Pain doesn't even enter into it, and there's no clear etymology for βλάπτω. It is definitely not connected to "feel pain" or "cause pain" or anything similar. It conveys hindering, damaging hurting, robbing, etc. "Natural justice is an agreement not to hurt or to be hurt."

This is also one of the PDs that, from my perspective, is better read as part of a paragraph with the following ones, not as some stand-alone aphorism.

From Nate's compilation:

“Natural justice is a covenant of what is suitable for leading men to avoid injuring onanother, and being injured.” Yonge (1853)

“Natural justice is a contract of expediency, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another.” Hicks (1910)

“Natural justice is a symbol or expression of expediency, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another.” Hicks (1925)

“The justice which arises from nature is a pledge of mutual advantage to restrain men from harming one another and save them from being harmed.” Bailey (1926)

“The justice of Nature is a covenant of advantage to the end that men shall not injure one another nor be injured.” De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy (1954)

“Natural justice is a compact resulting from expediency by which men seek to prevent one man from injuring others and to protect him from being injured by them.” Geer (1964)

“Nature's justice is a guarantee of utility with a view to not harming one another and not being harmed.” Long, The Hellenistic Philosophers 125 (1987)

“Natural justice is a pledge guaranteeing mutual advantage, to prevent one from harming others and to keep oneself from being harmed.” O'Connor (1993)

“The justice of nature is a pledge of reciprocal usefulness, [i.e.,] neither to harm one another nor be harmed.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“Natural justice is the advantage conferred by mutual agreements not to infict nor allow harm.” Anderson (2004)

“Natural justice is an expression of the <natural> interest <everyone has> and consists in both: a) not causing harm to others, and b) not suffering harm for oneself.” Makridis (2005)

“Natural justice is a covenant for mutual beneft, to not harm one another or be harmed.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“The justice that seeks nature's goal is a utilitarian pledge of men not to harm each other or be harmed.” Strodach (2012)

“Natural justice is a pledge of the advantage associated with preventing men from harming or being harmed by one another.” Mensch (2018)

“Nature's justice is a token [or pledge] of something that promotes not harming one another or being harmed.” White (2021)

Kalosyni it sounds to me like you are right to be struggling with some of the core issues of Epicurus, and you will want to keep struggling with these core issues until you decide whether you find his "medicine" worthwhile or not.

I recall that you said that you have not read Lucretius. When you do, you will find that one of his most-repeated analogies is to the taking of wormwood as a medicine, which restores health, but is bitter to the taste.

For example:

Quote

For that too is seen to be not without good reason; but even as healers, when they essay to give loathsome wormwood to children, first touch the rim all round the cup with the sweet golden moisture of honey, so that the unwitting age of children may be beguiled as far as the lips, and meanwhile may drink the bitter draught of wormwood, and though charmed may not be harmed, but rather by such means may be restored and come to health; so now, since this philosophy full often seems too bitter to those who have not tasted it, and the multitude shrinks back away from it, I have desired to set forth to you my reasoning in the sweet-tongued song of the muses, and as though to touch it with the pleasant honey of poetry, if perchance I might avail by such means to keep your mind set upon my verses, while you come to see the whole nature of things, what is its shape and figure.

And as Lucretius also said in a longer quote worth repeating here:

Quote

Herein I have one fear, lest perchance you think that you are starting on the principles of some unholy reasoning, and setting foot upon the path of sin. Nay, but on the other hand, again and again our foe, religion, has given birth to deeds sinful and unholy. Even as at Aulis the chosen chieftains of the Danai, the first of all the host, foully stained with the blood of Iphianassa the altar of the Virgin of the Cross-Roads. For as soon as the band braided about her virgin locks streamed from her either cheek in equal lengths, as soon as she saw her sorrowing sire stand at the altar’s side, and near him the attendants hiding their knives, and her countrymen shedding tears at the sight of her, tongue-tied with terror, sinking on her knees she fell to earth. Nor could it avail the luckless maid at such a time that she first had given the name of father to the king. For seized by men’s hands, all trembling was she led to the altars, not that, when the ancient rite of sacrifice was fulfilled, she might be escorted by the clear cry of ‘Hymen’, but in the very moment of marriage, a pure victim she might foully fall, sorrowing beneath a father’s slaughtering stroke, that a happy and hallowed starting might be granted to the fleet. Such evil deeds could religion prompt.

[102] You yourself sometime vanquished by the fearsome threats of the seer’s sayings, will seek to desert from us. Nay indeed, how many a dream may they even now conjure up before you, which might avail to overthrow your schemes of life, and confound in fear all your fortunes.

And justly so: for if men could see that there is a fixed limit to their sorrows, then with some reason they might have the strength to stand against the scruples of religion, and the threats of seers. As it is there is no means, no power to withstand, since everlasting is the punishment they must fear in death. For they know not what is the nature of the soul, whether it is born or else finds its way into them at their birth, and again whether it is torn apart by death and perishes with us, or goes to see the shades of Orcus and his waste pools, or by the gods’ will implants itself in other breasts, as our own Ennius sang, who first bore down from pleasant Helicon the wreath of deathless leaves, to win bright fame among the tribes of Italian peoples. And yet despite this, Ennius sets forth in the discourse of his immortal verse that there is besides a realm of Acheron, where neither our souls nor bodies endure, but as it were images pale in wondrous wise; and thence he tells that the form of Homer, ever green and fresh, rose to him, and began to shed salt tears, and in converse to reveal the nature of things.

Quote from Kalosyni

If this is what this online forum advocates

Yes I do find that Matt's summaries on these points are accurate to what many of us advocate as true, but that's because we are here because we agree with what Epicurus wrote. A lot of what he wrote and taught are very different from what most people are taught nowadays, and in the end each person has to decide what they think is true.

There are lots of subtleties in all these points which make it important not to jump to conclusions too fast. Be sure that you take all the time necessary to be sure you understand the implications before you accept them. There's no rush and there are many people here who are happy to talk about these things!

My only comment is that it seems that you are interpreting very generalized and theoretical statements as somehow hostile to you personally…which is somewhat confusing, since nothing in my above statement should create “fear” or “trouble” in your mind. My statement is purely general (not directed at any particular entity) and certainly not meant to trouble anyone in the forum.

But obviously if you feel somehow uncomfortable discussing practical aspects of the philosophy that apply to a myriad of life situations, you must do whatever you must do to pursue your pleasure.

Kalosyni , I'll write up a response to your post soon. I, too, see a place for ataraxia "tranquility" but I'm still, as I said elsewhere, seeing a better translation of it as "biological homeostasis," balance in body (aponia) and mind (ataraxia).

I find it also interesting that δίκαιος, usually translated as "justice," also has a basic connotation of balance: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…:entry=di/kaios then expanding to what is right/legal... To me, what maintains balance in society which blends right into the connotation of keeping to a contract or agreement.

I think I need to emphasize, from my understanding, that balance, homeostasis, equanimity is NOT numbness or lack of feeling or similar ideas. It's proper functioning of the body, society, etc.

Random thoughts on a New Year's morning. More later.