From The "Golden Mean" to tbe "Summum Bonum" - Useful or Deceptive Frames of Reference?

Quote from Cassius

I have always realized that the word "happiness" and even "pleasure" to a degree are conceptual abstractions.

From my perspective, the big difference between "pleasure" and, say, "virtue" as the goal is that pleasure is first and primarily a biological reality, then the concept is built in that. Virtue as a concept is built in a foundation of sand at the seashore. There's nothing there. It's a concept on a concept. Pleasure and pain, in contrast, in some form are present in all forms of life down to amoebas and tardigrades. Even plants exhibit some aspect of this. Humans move from this biological imperative of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain for survival to extrapolate mental pleasure and pain, to build concepts on top of this imperative, but there is always that sound foundation upon which those concepts point back to.

Quote from Cassius

But it's also obvious that "pleasure" is no different from "hedone" or other words in other languages - it too is a concept for which we have to do some mental processing to identify what we mean when we use it

I would be careful about using phrases like "it too is a concept" in this context. It's maybe better to think of words as labels. All languages label reality in different ways, sometimes dividing it up finer or coarser. I'll have to go back again and read Book XXVIII.

Quote from Cassius

It is totally non-Epicurean to simply and blindly pursue "pleasure" without regard to what the action we engage in ultimately brings to us

Yep. That's the job of the Cyrenaics.

I find this thread discussion to be very enjoyable, and important for a correct understanding of Epicureanism. Without thoroughly understanding these issues it will be difficult to begin to create local Epicurean groups. Also, for reasons that come up in Smoothiekiwi post...

Quote from smoothiekiwi

....biggest problem is to accept that there isn't any sort of abstract ideas flying around- universal norms and ideas. Platonism is so deeply anchored in our society that it's incredibly difficult to let it go....dogmas, absolute "right and wrong"-s etc. Just today, I had a discussion with my brother, who postulated that it's in the nature of each and every person to become better.

Epicureanism exists with it's unique principles and paradigms in the midst of all previous philosophical constructs, and part of the work is sifting through it all to become very clear about what Epicureanism is.

I think it will be difficult to establish local groups. A person must be predisposed to certain traits or habits or predispositions in order to be interested in Epicureanism...and I think that in our given times few people will be drawn toward Epicureanism...but does that mean we should give up? I am still moving forward with hope on this, that it will be possible. And this brings up the question of what sorts of traits/habits/predispositions must be present for a person to be interested in engaging with Epicurean philosophy? (a separate thread for this?).

In the few most recent posts in this thread are important Epicurean ideas, and these ideas need to be collected and put into small books (or zines) which we can give to people that we think possess the traits required for Epicurean philosophy.

Another idea comes up -- the need for "levels" within Epicureanism (a separate thread for this?)

1) "Epicureanism lite" - for people with less time or inclination to study

2) "Epicureanism engaged" - for people who want to put in serious study

3) "Epicurean guardians and guides" - for people who want to maintain the accuracy of the teachings and teach others

Quote from Cassius

I have always realized that the word "happiness" and even "pleasure" to a degree are conceptual abstractions. The word 'happiness' almost definitely is so, and we find "happiness" being used in totally different ways by different people, so much so that it takes fairly elaborate definition-building to be clear what we're talking about.

This is very important to think about. Happiness is always about a "story" that you are telling yourself. And it includes stories about the past and about the future, as well as the present moment. In Epicureanism, it includes ideas about the best way to bring about a happy life, and think we would all be on the same page to say that we know it can't be found in material possessions. But the "stories" we tell ourselve about our level(s) of happiness, are based on experiences that have a feeling tone of either generally pleasureable or generally painful. Of course life is a mix of feelings, but as Epicureans we hold to a goal of mainly pleasureable experiences which we would then label as "happiness".

This morning as I write this, I notice...Oh what a difference a solid good night of sleep makes! As well as a sunny morning with crystal blue skies! But there is still more than these simple pleasures to discover and cultivate in Epicureanism.

Everyone's comments here are so helpful, and for myself I will continue to contemplate these issues of pleasure, pain, happiness, and virtue.

I'll need to go and read DeWitt's "summum bonum fallacy" (Where is that again?), but here's my take. I've ranted in similar themes before.

To my understanding, summum bonum is the Romans' way of translations Greek τέλος into Latin. They're both trying to get at the same thing. Pleasure is the "highest good", the goal, etc. because it is that to which everything else points. It's at the end of the road (τέλος/goal) to which all roads lead. It's the "highest good" because it's at the top of the mountain, Pleasure Point, and the Virtue Trail, the Wisdom Trail, the Name Your Path Trail, all end up trying to get you to pleasure. You are virtuous because it, in the final analysis, brings you pleasure whatever you'll admit it or not. Summum bonum doesn't seem to me to be a value judgment (as in "Pleasure is the best among equals"), it's a difference in kind from other things judged "good." It's the good thing to which all other "good things" point. All other "good things" are instrumental in achieving pleasure. Pleasure itself is not instrumental (other than being a necessary component of well-being/ευδαιμονία/happiness).

Here are my thoughts on Norman DeWitt’s “Epicurus: The Summum Bonum Fallacy” (1950).

Overall, I’m unimpressed with DeWitt’s aim of using a linguistic quirk between Greek and Latin to make a larger philosophical point. Numerous languages get by with no definite article and can convey as complex and nuanced as any language with a definite article: “Linguists believe the common ancestor of the Indo-European languages, Proto-Indo-European, did not have articles. Most of the languages in this family do not have definite or indefinite articles: there is no article in Latin or Sanskrit, nor in some modern Indo-European languages, such as the families of Slavic languages (except for Bulgarian and Macedonian, which are rather distinctive among the Slavic languages in their grammar, and some Northern Russian dialects[7]), Baltic languages and many Indo-Aryan languages. Although Classical Greek had a definite article (which has survived into Modern Greek and which bears strong functional resemblance to the German definite article, which it is related to), the earlier Homeric Greek used this article largely as a pronoun or demonstrative, whereas the earliest known form of Greek known as Mycenaean Greek did not have any articles. Articles developed independently in several language families.” (Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_(…istic_variation )

From all I can see, Latin simply translated Greek τελος into Latin summum bonum as the closest alternative. To compare the two definitions:

Greek: telos: excerpt: “3. Philos., full realization, highest point. ideal” http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…57:entry=te/los

Latin: summum bonum (summus): excerpt: “H.—Of rank or degree, highest, greatest, loftiest, first, supreme, best, utmost, extreme” http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…60:entry=summus

I’m curious about his second paragraph where he says that “Epicurus is on record as assuming that "only Greeks are capable of succeeding in philosophy,"” He cites Usener 226 which comes from Clement of Alexandria’s Miscellanies, I.15. Here’s the full context of that source:

And Plato does not deny that he procured all that is most excellent in philosophy from the barbarians; and he admits that he came into Egypt. Whence, writing in the Phædo that the philosopher can receive aid from all sides, he said: "Great indeed is Greece, O Cebes, in which everywhere there are good men, and many are the races of the barbarians."[128] Thus Plato thinks that some of the barbarians, too, are philosophers. But Epicurus, on the other hand, supposes that only Greeks can philosophise. (1.15.67.1 οὕτως οἴεται ὁ Πλάτων καὶ βαρβάρων φιλοσόφους τινὰς εἶναι, ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἔμπαλιν ὑπολαμ1.15.67.2 βάνει μόνους φιλοσοφῆσαι Ἕλληνας δύνασθαι.) https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ante-Nice…llanies:_Book_1

I wonder if this is also connected to the characteristics of the wise one in Diogenes Laertius (DL) X.117 when he talks about other nations: https://sites.google.com/view/epicurean…lity?authuser=0 DL does not mention Greek or Greeks specifically in that text.

Whether Cicero’s statement that “the Latin language is not only not lacking in copiousness but is actually richer than Greek" is more absurd than DeWitt’s contention that the lack of an article makes Latin somehow deficient is problematic from a scholar like DeWitt. As I said, I don’t find his basic thesis here convincing or compelling.

DeWitt states that "In Greek the practice is to say "the greatest good" and not "the highest good," and to Epicurus "the greatest good" was not pleasure but life itself. In other words, to him the summum bonum was not the telos." This seems to me to be splitting the tiniest of hairs: greatest vs highest. Look at the Greek and Latin definitions above. Both words seem to show up in the definitions of each.

DeWitt also claims that "Epicurus, holding body and soul to be alike corporeal, placed the two on a parity, and one of his definitions of happiness is "a healthy mind in a healthy body."" I had problems with this in his book, Epicurus and His Philosophy, but I can accept that Epicurus held a similar view. But here in this paper, when DeWitt is putting so much stock in the differences between Latin and Greek, he made me laugh out loud when I read the Footnote 8 (emphasis added):

Footnote says 8 ***Not citable in Greek,*** but demonstrable: cf. Horace Carm.i. 31. 17-19; Juvenal x. 356 mens sana in corpore sano (Epicurean context); Petron. 61 bonam mentem bonamque valetudinem.

And he goes on to cite Latin references for Epicurus’s supposedly Greek idea. That just seems sloppy to me.

DeWitt tries to use DL X.126 to substantiate Epicurus's "reason for placing a higher value upon old age as against youth." I don't see that in 126. Instead, 126 seems to express Epicurus's insistence that one is never too old or too young to practice philosophy.

[126] The wise man does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life. The thought of life is no offence to him, nor is the cessation of life regarded as an evil. And even as men choose of food not merely and simply the larger portion, but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest. And he who admonishes the young to live well and the old to make a good end speaks foolishly, not merely because of the desirableness of life, but because the same exercise at once teaches to live well and to die well. Much worse is he who says that it were good not to be born, but when once one is born to pass with all speed through the gates of Hades.

For those unfamiliar with Maecenas (as I was!), here’s his WP entry: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaius_Maecenas?wprov=sfla1

DeWitt then discusses Vatican Saying 42 which is interesting on a number of levels. First of all, there is not agreement on what the Vatican Saying even says or, if it is correct in its transcription from some earlier texts. Here is the actual line from the early 14th century manuscript containing the Vatican Sayings: Vat.gr.1950.pt.2 https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Vat.gr.1950.pt.2/0257

As written it appears to read: ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως

However, some editors/scholars add to the end: ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀπολύσεως <τοῦ κακοῦ>. (e.g., Saint-Andre: https://monadnock.net/epicurus/vatican-sayings.html , http://wiki.epicurism.info/Vatican_Saying_42/ , and others)

Bailey suggests the reading should be ὁ αὐτὸς χρόνος καὶ γενέσεως τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ απολαύσεως

DeWitt's translation is "The same span of time embraces both beginning and end of the greatest good." I have problems with his use of the word “embraces”. I do not see that within the Greek. The Greek, as it stands, without the added on “evil” is literally something like:

“At the same time, there is both the creation (γενέσεως) of the greatest good and the release/departure (ἀπολύσεως)" That last word is why some scholars advocate for adding on "of the greatest evil" so we would get "release/departure of the greatest evil." But evil isn't in the manuscript.

Bailey's translation is "The greatest blessing is created and enjoyed at the same moment." I have problems with Bailey’s use of “blessing.”

Bailey cites απολαύσεως "having enjoyment of a thing" instead of ἀπολύσεως "release, deliverance from a thing" which the latter is suggested by Usener and evidently accepted by DeWitt since he cites Bailey in his paper. Neither Bailey nor DeWitt make use of the added <τοῦ κακοῦ> “the [greatest] evil” so it’s obviously not needed to make a decent translation. DeWitt’s putting so much stock into this saying to bolster his argument is problematic in that there is so much debate and discrepancy among scholars on VS42. It should be clearly stated that many of the Vatican Sayings, including this one, are without context.

ἀπολύσεως http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…Da%29po%2Flusis

απολαύσεως http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…a%29po%2Flausis

I can see rationalizations for either translation, DeWitt’s or Bailey’s.

So, in the end, I can’t see any reason for DeWitt to maintain that Epicurus had any “highest good” or telos other than pleasure.

Quote from Cassius

The danger to me only comes when we get fixated on the "greatest good" and presume that there is a single answer to that question that fits everyone.

I have to disagree with that characterization. There *is* a single answer for everyone's telos/summum bonum: The "greatest good" for everyone is pleasure.

If I remember correctly from The Greeks on Pleasure, the earlier philosophers were searching for the most pleasant life, not the greatest good.

Having said that, here are some of my notes from the book that might be pertinent (they're scattered throughout the book as shown by the reference numbers):

8.3.1 Eudoxus of Cnidus (via Aristotle): pleasure is the good because:

- all animals, including men, pursue it, and what all pursue is the good

- all animals and men avoid pain as an evil, and what is opposite of an evil, pleasure, must be good

- pleasure is never for the sake of something else: no one ever asks "why enjoy yourself?"

- if pleasure is added to anything it makes it better.

So at least some philosophers were discussing "the good".

11.3.10 Aristotle is saying that to enjoy something is to bring a telos to the doing: to do it to the full.

13.2.4 Telos is not a decisively purpose word like goal, but it equally means completion or perfection. Aristotle often uses it as actualization of natural potential.

FWIW, I tend to think along similar lines as Cassius, that "the greatest good" is more of a philosophical argument carried on by others. In a materialist universe is it even possible to define a greatest good? For Epicurus I think that it's a functional guide as described in the Canon. But I'm wide open to correction on the issue!

You posted another reply as I was typing this, but I think this address posts #33 and #35 above...

As I said previously, saying "pleasure is the 'highest good' (summum bonum)" doesn't mean the "best among equally good things"; it means the highest, greatest, loftiest, first, supreme, best, utmost, extreme good thing - the one good thing that stands alone; the good thing to which all other good things points. It is the sum of all good things; the summit of all good things.

I sincerely don't understand the hesitancy in this thread. Or the problem that is trying to be solved when it comes to calling pleasure either the "highest good" or the telos or even the guide. I would say pleasure is called the guide because it's the beacon at the summit to which we are trying to get at. It's the North Star by which we steer all our choices and avoidances. It's the goal and the guide.

All the schools of philosophy in ancient Greece were arguing what was the purpose of a human life, what was it all leading up to, what was it for. I don't think Epicurus was any different in that respect. His revolution was in naming pleasure as that to which life pointed. But not Cyrenaic "sex, drugs, and rock n roll" momentary pleasures strung together - not an endless string of drinking parties and festivals - but something deeper and more long-lasting including being able to describe it as the health of the body and the tranquility of the mind. I think that was his revolution: to define pleasure wide enough for everyone to partake of it as the telos/guide/greatest good/The Good/T'agathon/etc.

I know I don't have to quote chapter and verse to many here, but, for the record, here are some pertinent excerpts (at least from my perspective):

PD25 Εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ προκαταστρέψεις εἴ τε φυγὴν εἴ τε δίωξιν ποιούμενος εἰς ἄλλό τι, οὐκ ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι.

PD25 If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of nature, [pleasure] but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony.

Letter to Menoikeus: "The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, (i.e., the health of both our physical and our mental existence), since this is the goal (τέλος)of a blessed life.

Letter to Menoikeus: "we say pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment, the beginning and end (ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος) of the blessed life."

Letter to Menoikeus: "one who has rationally determined (ἐπιλελογισμένου) the τέλος of one's natural state." [which is pleasure]

Quote from Don

There *is* a single answer for everyone's telos/summum bonum: The "greatest good" for everyone is pleasure.

I don't think that there is one summum bonum for everyone. For some people God is the summum bonum within Christianity and religions (except Buddhism).

Quote from Godfrey

"the greatest good" is more of a philosophical argument carried on by others. In a materialist universe is it even possible to define a greatest good? For Epicurus I think that it's a functional guide as described in the Canon.

Quote from Cassius

Another way of stating the issue:

If you are going to ask the question "What is the greatest good?" The answer is "pleasure."

But you also have to consider "Should you be asking that question?"

I don't think that trying to prove one type of a "greatest good" as being the best will ever be possible, because it is like saying mashed potatoes are better than baked potatoes. They are both ways to satiate hunger, and some people will prefer the taste of mashed potatoes over baked potatoes.

We have a hunger for happiness. But if nothing seems to satisfy us anymore and mild depression takes hold or mild substance abuse causes health problems, then we need some remedies. (btw...severe cases of these should seek professional help).

God may work as a remedy for some, but for those of us for whom "God is dead" we need something else to focus on as our goal and our summum bonum. Also, the abstract idea of finding perfect flourishing as a summun bonum won't work when circumstances within any human life are so messy...we still must live even when we struggle to meet basic human needs of belonging and acceptance. So Epicureanism provides a way to live and seek happiness when "flourishing" is impossible. We don't have to wait till we are flourishing to be happy...we can seek pleasure right away.

Quote from Cassius

Epicurus seemed to be treating this question carefully, which even Torquatus seems to admit when he said that Epicurus denied the necessity to construct a logical argument that pleasure is good

Yes!

Quote from Cassius

If you are going to ask the question "What is the greatest good?" The answer is "pleasure."

But you also have to consider "Should you be asking that question?"

Yes!

Quote from Cassius

We have the word guide which is clear. What is added by calling it "good" or calling pain "evil"?

Yes!

I'm so glad to see this shared out! I couldn't agree more - the "other" philosophers were setting the terms of the discourse. Its like a silly Mad Libs game where Epicurus is kind of forced into filling in the blank, and the only possible Epicurean word that could be suggested is "pleasure", but ...NO! This is a child's game! The "good/greatest good" is just an abstract idea, not a living reality! You're chasing after a ghost!

I was initially going to respond point by point to the comments posted in this thread. That, however, was going to take more work than I was willing to put in, but ya'll may recognize where I'm responding to specific points made elsewhere. We may end up breaking this out into a separate thread at some point as it seems we've strayed far from discussing Aristotle's golden mean. That being said, since I promised I'd have more to say, here is my further contribution to this thread.

As I understand it, the major points of contention under discussion include:

- What is actually meant by summum bonum vs telos.

- Can we ask the question "Is there really one "greatest good?"?

- Is there one "greatest good" for everyone?

Feel free to respond if anyone sees there are more. Here are my responses to those three for now:

As I've said, my understanding is that "summum bonum" is simply the Romans' attempt at translating the Greek word τελος [telos] into Latin. I see this as a reasonable attempt. The telos is the goal, end-point, fulfillment, the end, the highest point, etc. The summum bonum is the highest, greatest, supreme "good." I reject DeWitt's contention that Epicurus said "'the greatest good' was not pleasure but life itself." Of course we can only experience pleasure while alive by definition - by Epicurus's definition even: there is no sensation in death. That being said, living is simply a prerequisite for the practice of philosophy itself.

But let's leave summum bonum for the side for a moment since Epicurus didn't speak or write in Latin. The wording he used was "we say pleasure is the telos" (Letter to Menoikeus) and referred to pleasure as "the good" in one fragment that was in Epicurus's work "On the Telos":

"I know not how I can conceive the good, if I withdraw the pleasures of taste, and withdraw the pleasures of love, and withdraw the pleasures of hearing, and withdraw the pleasurable emotions caused to sight by beautiful form."

In this fragment, he specifically refers to pleasure as ταγαθον [tagathon] "the good", the same word used in the 3rd line of the Tetrapharmakos: "And the good is easily obtained" again equating "the good" with "pleasure."

This *exact* word - ταγαθον [tagathon] - was also used by Aristotle: https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…%3a1999.01.0053

τἀγαθόν οὗ πάντ᾽ ἐφίεται "the Good is That at which all things aim." (Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1094a)

Epicurus is not shying away from a fight by using Aristotle's own word to define what The Good - ταγαθον - is. Epicurus is meeting Aristotle on the philosophical field of battle and throwing down the gauntlet of pleasure. "You want to know what The Good is? That at which all things aim? It's pleasure."

It seems to me that Epicurus clearly equates pleasure with "the good" and with the telos - the goal/fulfillment/purpose/end - of a human life. And "the good" ταγαθον is "The Good", the good at which all other good things aim as in other goods are only instrumental to ταγαθον The Good which is pleasure according to Epicurus.

That's why I contend that there is such a thing as a telos or "the good" (ταγαθον). Because Epicurus taught that. There is something that can be called "the good" and it is the telos of a human life. Pleasure is both the goal and the guide *in that* pleasure is the north star by which we guide our own small boat. Pleasure isn't a guide *in* the boat, it's the "guiding light" the beacon to which we steer. If we get off course, we steer back towards the "guide".

This is exactly why I also contend that, yes, there is one telos, one good, The Good, for everyone. We are all humans. Humans - as natural animals - are human before they are Christian or Buddhist or Muslim or Humanist or any other creed or religion. However, the more I think about it, we are also - in many respects and by some definition - Epicureans in that humans, in our natural state, will steer themselves toward pleasure and recede from pain. Just because someone wants to see "God" as their guide, the reason they want to please God is because this brings them pleasure. They could just cut out the middle-man (or middle-deity, as the case may be) and seek pleasure for itself. So, while there are multiple ways to experience pleasure - pleasant forms, pleasant tastes, the joys of sexual passion, pleasant sounds, etc. - it is pleasure writ large which is the telos - The Good - of every human life whether they admit that to themselves or not.

Quote from Scott

The "good/greatest good" is just an abstract idea, not a living reality!

I have to disagree. The Good (ταγαθον) is nothing more than "that to which all things aim." It couldn't be more concrete. Why do people do what they do? To seek pleasure. They can lie to themselves and say they're being virtuous or being responsible or being selfless or being [fill in the blank].... but they're all aiming at pleasure. The feelings are two. Either you're feeling pain or you're feeling pleasure. Pleasure *is* The Good, the Goal, the Guide. All other motives are instrumental in seeking pleasure whether people admit it to themselves or not. They can tie themselves into linguistic and psychological pretzels to convince themselves that they aren't aiming at pleasure - because most/all/many cultures have convinced people that pleasure is bad! Epicurus was one of the only - or maybe the only - person to stand up and tell people that they were fooling themselves... and just to embrace the pursuit of pleasure honestly, rationally, and wisely.