Plato's Philebus and the Limit of Pleasure

Based on the above, could the following be correct?

---Plato said that the craving for pleasure has no end, and thus leads to wickedness.

But Epicurus said pleasure is fulfilled and ends all craving, with the removal of all bodily pain and mental distress.

Or:

---Plato said that the craving for pleasure has no end, and thus leads to wickedness.

But Epicurus said the craving for pleasure ends with the removal of all bodily pain and mental distress.

I agree with what is written above, but I also think there is another section on Philiebus which is more on point with the question of "why" the absence of a limit to pleasure was significant to Plato in relation to pleasure. The same argument is asserted with even greater clarity in Seneca, which I quote below too, but to me the essence of the argument is the logical point that if a thing has no limit, then it an always be made better,. The big point comes down to;: Once you admit something has no limit, then you admit it can be made better, and then by definition since it can be made better what you have isn't "the best" or "the highest" possible. To be the "highest good" something must really be the "best possible," and that means (sort of counterintuitively since we consider the word "limit" to be bad) that the best possible must have a "limit." The logical reasoning (which makes sense when you think about the varuous meanings of the word "limit") is that that which has no limit (no "highest point beyond which you can go no further") cannot be "the best."

As Seneca says it very precisely - "“THE ABILITY TO INCREASE IS PROOF THAT A THING IS IMPERFECT.”" In other words, if something belongs to the class which can be increased or decreased, then the quantify of that thing is not "perfect" --

Plato uses Philebus as a patsy, because Philebus misunderstands the implications of how "perfect" and "admitting of more or less" fit together. By admitting that pleasure has no limit, and can always be increased, he loses the argument to Plato. It's a point that tripped up Philebus, and it continues to trip up a lot of people today because they equate the "limit" as being a negative thing - when it seems clear when viewed logically that this use of "limit" is not bad at all - any more than saying that the fact that Mount Everest has a highest tip takes away from the fact that it is the highest mountain in the world (or whatever mountain it is that holds that honor).

That is why in my view it was important for Epicurus to show that pleasure has a limit. Unless we can show what that limit is (when all pain is gone from our life) then we have no limit we can point to, and thus, by Seneca and Socrates' reasoning, "pleasure" cannot be the highest good.

From Philebus:

SOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?

PHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in quantity and degree.

SOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of good. But now — admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite — in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on this point.

PHILEBUS: You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god.

SOCRATES: And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question. …

SOCRATES: And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies but in every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source?

PROTARCHUS: Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source.

SOCRATES: Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the attributes of wisdom; — we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the self-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things?

PROTARCHUS: Such a supposition is quite unreasonable.

SOCRATES: Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?

PROTARCHUS: Most justly.

The same argument in Seneca:

Seneca’s Letters – Book I – Letter XVI: This also is a saying of Epicurus: “If you live according to nature, you will never be poor; if you live according to opinion, you will never be rich.” Nature’s wants are slight; the demands of opinion are boundless. Suppose that the property of many millionaires is heaped up in your possession. Assume that fortune carries you far beyond the limits of a private income, decks you with gold, clothes you in purple, and brings you to such a degree of luxury and wealth that you can bury the earth under your marble floors; that you may not only possess, but tread upon, riches. Add statues, paintings, and whatever any art has devised for the luxury; you will only learn from such things to crave still greater. **Natural desires are limited; but those which spring from false opinion can have no stopping point. The false has no limits. **

Seneca’s Letters – To Lucilius – 66.45: “What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing otherwise that was not perfect to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect.

Joshua, Kalosyni, and anyone else who is willing to get into the details of this discussion in Philebus, I hope you will weigh in because I think it is hard to overstate the significance of this issue.

"Philebus" is reputed to be one of Plato's most mature and important dialogs. It is his "tour-de-force" against Pleasure as the good. And the tip of the spear of his argument by which he defeats the pro-pleasure side is this very argument -- by convincing the pro-pleasure side that pleasure has no limit (it can always be increased or decreased) he persuades Philebus (the pro-pleasure side) to abandon the argument that pleasure is the highest good.

In Athens in the age of Epicurus it therefore seems to me that Epicurus would have viewed the necessity of defeating this argument as almost as important as defeating the argument in favor of supernatural gods, and the argument in favor of reward or punishment after death. Epicurus was a teacher right in the heart of Athenian logic and philosophy, and this logical argument against pleasure had been enshrined as the gold standard by the most important teacher in Greek philosophy.

I also feel sure there are statements of this argument beyond this one in Philebus, and the examples cited above in Seneca. I just haven't had time to find more at this point.

We need more and better examples to illustrate what is in issue, because it is hard to follow given the shades of meaning of the word "limit."

One way is to go back to reneliza 's pink circle model:

In this diagram, the "limit of pleasure" is the edge of each circle. Each circle can contain only so much color, and no more, and the total quantity - the total magnitude - of "pink / pleasure" is the "area" of the circle contained within its edge.

By our definition of pink as containing ALL shades of pink (just like we define pleasure as containing ALL kinds of pleasure) we state that circles 2, 3, and 4 have all reached the LIMIT OF PINK (Pleasure). We may want to superficially quibble that "all shades of pink are not pink!" but we have DEFINED pink as including all shades, so circles 2, 3, and 4 have all reached their limit because they are completely filled with pink.

Circle 1, alone, has not reached the limit of pleasure, because it contains a lot of "white" space (our stand-in here for pain). Circle 1 cannot reach the "limit of pink" until all the white space is filled in with some shade of pink.

And this is one of the huge points: We don't make circle one reach the limit of pleasure simply by getting rid of all the white!!!! We can't replace the white with black or gold or green or any other random color, and we also can't simply make the white "disappear!"

We have to replace all the white (pain) with pink (pleasure) in order to reach the limit of pink/pleasure!

Quote from Cassius

Nature’s wants are slight; the demands of opinion are boundless.

This quote is from post # 5 above -- This would be PD15. And it is expanding on the idea of "limits" on pleasure from a slightly different angle than PD3. In a sense it is a blend of both Plato's and Epicurus' arguments.

I think modern civilization is inseparable from the "demands of opinion" -- the idea that clothing, cars, homes, etc must all look new or well kept. And we recognize classes of people by their appearance and the appearance of their possessions, or by the state of the neighborhoods in which they live. These kinds of pleasures have no limit. You will have to invest time and effort toward these pleasures -- and much more difficult to fulfill for those who do not have enough money to spend -- and in some situations people work long and hard hours to fulfill these pleasures, so that any pleasure gained by this means is negated by the time and stress. And then this points also toward what types of pleasures to pursue, and that "natural" pleasures can be fullfilled and are achievable (thus have a limit) -- and give a longer lasting feeling of fullfillment.

Quote from Kalosyni

And then this points also toward what types of pleasures to pursue, and that "natural" pleasures can be fullfilled and are achievable (thus have a limit) -- and give a longer lasting feeling of fullfillment.

Ok I see this as an area of potential confusion that needs clarity.

I do not think that "can be fulfilled" and "achievable" should be viewed as the heart of the discussion in what is being talked about in PD3 or is the issue in responding to Plato as the basis for designating or not designating Pleasure as the greatest good.

It is not "possessing a limit" that itself makes "pleasure" worthy of being designated as the highest good. As Plato lists in Philebus, many things can have a limit. For example, it appears that Plato would say that all of the "virtues" have a limit because they are "superlatives." (See also the statement from Seneca in the post below.)

Virtue is complete in and of itself, in their view. If you're missing some element of virtue, then you're not really virtuous. For this reasoning look back at "in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and mind?"

He is stating that wisdom and knowledge and "mind" are complete in and of themselves, and therefore they are not rightly placed in the category of things of which you can have less or more. You're either "wise" or you're "not wise" -- he's saying that if you can add more wisdom to someone, then that person was not fully wise in the first place.

Unfortunately this discussion in Philebus is very complex and does not seem to be nearly as clear as it should be. In the part I quoted above I left out a long tangent that ends in this way:

and

I don't think we can adequately deal with this whole issue until we get a clear grasp of this argument, and I will be the first to admit that I don't have as good as grasp of it as I would like.

But what does seem clear to me is that we aren't yet talking about "individual pleasures" and we aren't at the level of being concerned with dividing up natural and necessary pleasures and choosing between them,

In this argument we are still at the basic level of whether "PLEASURE" can qualify as the highest good, as against VIRTUE, or PIETY or something like that.

And if we get ahead of ourselves and take this "limit" argument and derive from it that we should somehow "limit our pleasure" in life by means of the choices we make, then I think that's the straight road to asceticism, which is exactly where we DON"T want to end up if "Pleasure" is in fact the goal of life.

Unfortunately as best I can tell Seneca does a much more clear job of stating this issue than does Plato/Socrates. Here is a very clear statement, but even this statement indicates that we need to be careful what we mean by "limitless", because apparently "Limitless" also can be viewed as a definite quantity. It appears that "the ability to increase or decrease," or "the ability to have more or less" is the real problem they are identifying, and so we have to be careful with any definition of "pleasure" that indicates we can have more or less of it.

It appears to me that this is all highly abstract, and not directly related to the choice of particular pleasures on a moment to moment basis. The question of which pleasures should be chosen comes next, AFTER we first identify "pleasure" as the ultimate greatest good / goal / guide (rather than virtue or god or reason).

If we step too quickly from the question (1) What is the greatest good? to the question (2) How should I pursue pleasure? then we're likely to miss the answer to question one entirely, and get confused if we use the answer to question one as the answer to question two. They are two separate questions which the Platonic logical argument (to which Epicurus is responding) is addressing separately.

Quote

but virtue itself does not become less or greater.^[4] For the Supreme Good cannot diminish, nor may virtue retrograde; rather is it transformed, now into one quality and now into another, shaping itself according to the part which it is to play. 8. Whatever it has touched it brings into likeness with itself, and dyes with its own colour. It adorns our actions, our friendships, and sometimes entire households which it has entered and set in order. Whatever it has handled it forthwith makes lovable, notable, admirable.

Therefore the power and the greatness of virtue cannot rise to greater heights, because increase is denied to that which is superlatively great. You will find nothing straighter than the straight, nothing truer than the truth, and nothing more temperate than that which is temperate. 9. Every virtue is limitless; for limits depend upon definite measurements. Constancy cannot advance further, any more than fidelity, or truthfulness, or loyalty. What can be added to that which is perfect? Nothing otherwise that was not perfect to which something has been added. Nor can anything be added to virtue, either, for if anything can be added thereto, it must have contained a defect. Honour, also, permits of no addition; for it is honourable because of the very qualities which I have mentioned.^[5] What then? Do you think that propriety, justice, lawfulness, do not also belong to the same type, and that they are kept within fixed limits? The ability to increase is proof that a thing is still imperfect.

This is not a long dialog and this statement is pretty close to the start so it is easy to get the full context by starting at the beginning:

Moral letters to Lucilius/Letter 66 - Wikisource, the free online library

Here are two brief Wikipedia articles that I think are highly relevant because they go to the core of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. What I am suggesting is that if this central issue ("the good" / "the form of the good") was among the most important things that Aristotle and Plato were arguing about, we would expect that Epicurus too would weigh in on the topic of "the good" very early in the Principal Doctrines. Unless and until refuted Plato and Aristotle's position that the most important thing in life to us is "the good" we would never expect to proceed further away from what Plato and Aristotle taught. The first step in the analysis has to be establishing that this "form of the good" is not to be looked to as the ultimate standard. You don't even begin to discuss "types of pleasures" or "which pleasures to choose" until you first establish that pleasures itself is the goal.

How do you do that in a single document (which as we discuss a lot, was not numbered in the original version)?

To me, we can look for that logical process is what we see in the PD's. The first point to establish is the proof that, if accepted, allows you to reject the view that there are no supernatural gods and that the gods do not and cannot punish you after death. You start with that first because everyone, even Plato and Aristotle, essentially point to religion and supernatural gods as the source of everything. And you don't just say "The gods don't exist and there is no life after death" because you're a philosopher and you're listing out proofs (logical arguments) not just raw assertions.

And then the second point that you establish, in order of importance after disposing of the supernatural claims, is you provide the proof that there is no logical argument against considering "Pleasure" to be the good. And you do that by directly addressing the most potent logical argument against pleasure, which is that (in Platonic terms) "since pleasure has no limit it is in the class of the more or less and therefore is not a superlative and cannot be considered to be the highest or best." And I see that as the reason for the otherwise convoluted wording "The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful." All the rest of PD3 and PD4 as to pleasure and pain are subsidiary corollaries that address Platonic logical arguments against making "Pleasure" the highest good.

Seen this way PD01 through PD04 are not primarily therapeutic advice (though they do have that effect for those who are able to absorb them). They are primarily logical positions intended as cannonballs fired against the opposing philosophical positions that ruled Epicurus' world and still rule ours today.

Wikipedia:

1 - The Form of the Good Interestingly I see the shortest blurb on wikipedia about that is "Superlative Concept in the Philosophy of Plato."

The first references that are seen in The Republic to the Form of the Good are within the conversation between Glaucon and Socrates (454 c–d). When he is trying to answer such difficult questions pertaining to the definition of justice, Plato identifies that we should not "introduce every form of difference and sameness in nature" instead we must focus on "the one form of sameness and difference that was relevant to the particular ways of life themselves" which is the form of the Good. This form is the basis for understanding all other forms, it is what allows us to understand everything else. Through the conversation between Socrates and Glaucon (508 a–c), Plato analogizes the form of the Good with the sun as it is what allows us to see things. Here, Plato describes how the sun allows for sight. But he makes a very important distinction, "sun is not sight" but it is "the cause of sight itself." As the sun is in the visible realm, the form of Good is in the intelligible realm. It is "what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower". It is not only the "cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge". Plato identifies how the form of the Good allows for the cognizance to understand such difficult concepts as justice. He identifies knowledge and truth as important, but through Socrates (508d–e) says, "good is yet more prized". He then proceeds to explain "although the good is not being" it is "superior to it in rank and power", it is what "provides for knowledge and truth" (508e)

The discussion surrounding this article implies that this "form of the good" is maybe the single central concept of Platonism. Amusing fact: "There is an ancient anecdotal tradition that Plato gave a public lecture entitled "On the Good" which so confused the audience that most walked out. At the end of the lecture Plato said to those hearers who remained: 'The Good is the One."

The article also points out Aristotle's criticism: " Aristotle discusses the Forms of Good in critical terms several times in both of his major surviving ethical works, the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle argues that Plato's Form of the Good does not apply to the physical world, for Plato does not assign "goodness" to anything in the existing world. Because Plato's Form of the Good does not explain events in the physical world, humans have no reason to believe that the Form of the Good exists and the Form of the Good is thereby irrelevant to human ethics"

2. The Summum Bonum We have discussed this recently in our review of Torquatus. This article lays the phrase at the foot of Cicero: "Summum bonum is a Latin expression meaning the highest or ultimate good, which was introduced by the Roman philosopher Cicero^[1][2] to denote the fundamental principle on which some system of ethics is based — that is, the aim of actions, which, if consistently pursued, will lead to the best possible life. Since Cicero, the expression has acquired a secondary meaning as the essence or ultimate metaphysical principle of Goodness itself, or what Plato called the Form of the Good. These two meanings do not necessarily coincide. For example, Epicurean and Cyrenaic philosophers claimed that the 'good life' consistently aimed for pleasure, without suggesting that pleasure constituted the meaning or essence of Goodness outside the ethical sphere. In De finibus, Cicero explains and compares the ethical systems of several schools of Greek philosophy, including Stoicism, Epicureanism, Aristotelianism and Platonism, based on how each defines the ethical summum bonum differently."

So it seems we need to keep in mind these two approaches, with regard to certain PDs:

1) logical postions against opposing philosophical schools

2) therapeutic interpretations

Yes I think that both perspectives are involved and important:

Epicurus would not have taken the philosophical position in support of pleasure that he took unless his position was provable as true by observing the real world practical benefit.

And at the same time:

Epicurus would have rejected the real world practical benefit of pleasure (just as we sometime choose pain over pleasure) if he had been philosophically convinced that a greater benefit were achievable either now or after death by following supernatural religion or "virtue" or "rationalism."

You've got to have both perspectives because they go together and reinforce each other.

One without the other is much more vulnerable to attack. Together they withstand both "practical" and "philosophical" attack.

I woke up this morning thinking about this passage from Lucretius Book One which provides an example of why the philosophical perspective is so important. Without a sound understanding of philosophy you can't withstand the constant assault from false religion and false worldviews:

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102] But still I fear your caution will dispute the maxims I lay down, who all your life have trembled at the poets' frightful tales. Alas! I could even now invent such dreams as would pervert the steadiest rules of reason, and make your fortunes tremble to the bottom. No wonder! But if Men were once convinced that death was the sure end of all their pains, they might with reason, then, resist the force of all Religion, and contemn the threats of poets. Now, we have no sense, no power, to strive against prejudice, because we fear a scene of endless torments after death.

In that selection you could insert in place of the underlined part these observations from the first five PDs and then understand them as providing us "the reasoning/power to strive against prejudice" and thus refute the major religious/philosophical positions that are the enemies of Epicureanism:

1 - "that perfect gods would not care to interfere in our affairs and thus we need not be concerned about them" (PD1)

2 - "that anything we cannot sense is irrelevant to us and thus the state of being dead can cause us no harm or good" (PD2)

3- "that Pleasure can be complete when it fills out experience, and thus we don't always need more" (PD3)

4- "that pain is never so potent that it can blot out all pleasure for the rest of our lives, so pleasure can be continuous and is always available as a guide to action" (PD4)

5- "that a life of true virtue IS a life of pleasure, and thus virtue is not its own reward." (PD5)

Thank you Cassius, I like this list!

I would personally rephrase # 2

Quote

2 - "that anything we cannot sense is irrelevant to us and thus the state of being dead can cause us no harm or good" (PD2)

Consciousness depends on the body, without consciousness we cannot sense or even think, and thus the state of being dead can cause us no harm or good.

To me, this looks like another endorsement for the Tetrapharmakos as a *very* abridged summary of the philosophy since that is just an abridgement of PD1 through PD4. Just sayin'

Quote from Cassius

3- "that Pleasure can be complete when it fills out experience, and thus we don't always need more" (PD3)

There are certain pleasures in which one must take care -- PD3 ought to be combined with PD8 -- especially when eating dessert -- because the bad result doesn't come till later on, after you have eaten too much. At a family gathering today, the adults knew how to apply reason with regard to limiting the quantity of dessert, but my great-nephews and great niece wanted to have third helpings of dessert -- their mom had to tell them they had already had enough.

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...sugar also triggers the mesocorticolimbic system, known as the “reward pathway,” in the brain. When we consume sugar, the prefrontal cortex, amygdala, ventral-tegmental area, and nucleus accumbens are stimulated, releasing dopamine. After sugar triggers this system, we’re left craving more, because these parts of the brain are responsible for behavior reinforcement, pleasure-seeking, and addiction, according to a study published in Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews in 2019.

For more on sugar, read this.