Don for a 2000 year sidestep, does your interest in homeostasis come from reading Dopamine Nation? That book has been on my list for quite a while but I haven't got around to reading it.
Just curious. I don't want to derail this thread! Great research!
Just curious. I don't want to derail this thread!
I sent you a conversation regarding the homeostasis topic so we don't derail 
And thanks! I'm enjoying the research
The closest think that comes to me regarding "homeostasis" is Vatican Saying 11 - "For most people, to be quiet is to be numb and to be active is to be frenzied." And so this is pointing at something which is neither.
Just like katastematic pleasure may be more highly valued for introverts, so too "homeostasis" may be more highly valued for introverts. Introverts are more sensitive to the internal feeling of the body.
Don I don't remember if there is an article or discussion you may have posted some time ago on "homeostasis"? Or if you can post a link to an earlier discussion?
I don't remember if there is an article or discussion you may have posted some time ago on "homeostasis"? Or if you can post a link to an earlier discussion?
I've mentioned it several places. Here's a search:
You'll see me mention Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett and Dr. Anna Lembke in those search results.
Just so there's no confusion, homeostasis is not some idiosyncratic state that might appeal to introverts over extroverts. It is the well-functioning of one's body and mind when everything is in balance.
Here's the biological definition:
As Khan says, homeostasis is "The tendency to maintain a stable, relatively constant internal environment."
Here's a PubMed paper:
"The health and vitality of the organism can be said to be the end result of homeostatic regulation. An understanding of normal physiology is not possible without an appreciation of this concept. Conversely, it follows that disruption of homeostatic mechanisms is what leads to disease, and effective therapy must be directed toward re-establishing these homeostatic conditions."
Homeostasis is not "mindfulness" or some "mystical" state, it is the foundational "health and vitality of the organism."
My take is becoming that this idea of biological homeostasis as the "health and vitality of the organism" is what Epicurus was referring to - generally - as katastematic pleasure. It is the underlying, foundational starting point of physical (aponia) and mental (ataraxia) health. If our body and mind are working properly and we are listening to our "feedback loops" of pleasure/pain, we can better *vary* our pleasure once we've achieved a homeostatic/katastematic foundation.
My two cents is that I agree with the idea that Epicurus found pleasure in life itself and that helps explain his full attitude towards the availability of pleasure all the time.
The closest think that comes to me regarding "homeostasis" is Vatican Saying 11 - "For most people, to be quiet is to be numb and to be active is to be frenzied." And so this is pointing at something which is neither.
Here's some of my own commentary on VS11.
VS11 For most people, to be quiet is to be numb and to be active is to be frenzied.
τῶν πλείστων ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὲν ἡσυχάζον ναρκᾷ, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον λυττᾷ.
So an alternative translation by Don: For the majority of people, to be at rest is to be bored stiff; but to be active is to be raving like a rabid dog.
To me it seems to be saying there needs to be a balance or that stillness is important and that most people don't recognize this. Plus they're just running around to appear important or just simply to do something, they can't be alone with their own thoughts… they're not self-reliant.
Additional note: In light of the current discussion over multiple threads on katastematic and kinetic pleasures, I find the words ἡσυχάζον (hēsykhazōn) and κινούμενον (kinoumenon) VERY indicative of the senses of katastematic and kinetic (in fact, kinoumenon is directly related to that word in Greek). I find their juxtaposition here very interesting.
I also see his "for most people" directly implying "but not for us (Epicureans)". He is setting up a contrast with the masses against the Epicureans, and, from my reading here, the Epicureans *value* ἡσυχάζον and κινούμενον and the Epicureans do NOT see them as numbness and "raving like a rabid dog," respectively.
In fact, hesykhias shows up in a PD14.
PD14 . “Although security on a human level is achieved up to a point by a power to resist and by prosperity, the security afforded by inner peace and withdrawing from the crowd is the purest.” White (2021)
Τῆς ἀσφαλείας τῆς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γενομένης μέχρι τινὸς δυνάμει τινὶ ἐξερειστικῇ καὶ εὐπορίᾳ εἰλικρινεστάτη γίνεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας καὶ ἐκχωρήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀσφάλεια.
+ ἡσυχίας (hesykhias) "peace; silence, stillness"
+ + ἐκχορεύω (ekkhoreuo) "to break out (ἐκ-) of the chorus (χορεύω)"
I find reading the ἡσυχάζον in VS11 in light of the ἡσυχίας in PD14 , and vice versa, to be intriguing.
Thanks for that compilation Don !
One can take pleasure in being in a state one can describe as being "undisturbed" or in a state one can describe as "pain-free." I simply don't accept that ataraxia and aponia are not "sensed."
I tend to agree with this statement. I think it's a slippery slope from "not sensed" to "neutral state". But I would say that it's a different quality of pleasure: quieter, more subtle.
I would say that it's a different quality of pleasure: quieter, more subtle
ἡσυχία (hēsykhia) "Stillness, rest, quiet" (see my other post where Epicurus uses this exact word).
Trivia: Hesychia was also "In Greek mythology, either the daemon personification of silence, a handmaiden of the god of sleep, Hypnos; or a mortal daughter of Thespius."
For the record, however, there is no doubt that Epicurus divided up pleasures into at least 2 different but related kinds. No matter what, we have to account for:
Unfortunately i cannot agree even with this statement. There is not doubt that Diogenes Laertius makes the assertion that that K/K distinction was significant to Epicurus, but there is strong reason to believe that Diogenes Laertius is wrong. And to "account for" the references that are cited is exactly what Gosling and Taylor and Nikolsky go through in great detail. The issue is not whether DL said what he said, but whether DL was right in saying it, and that's the crux of the problem.
We also know that for example Epicurus divided things into "natural and necessary," and that that distinction was significant to be recorded several places very clearly, including the principal doctrines, the letter to Menoeceus, and the vatican sayings
Whatever Epicurus may have thought about K/K, those thoughts were not significant enough to make it into those key documents. Here again, references to ataraxia and aponia are not admitted to be relevant to any kind of K/K distinction. The K/K distinction simply does not appear when the key aspect of pleasure as the good is discussed in the main places where pleasure is addressed.
And the reason why this is worth getting to the bottom of is what we see happening here - what is hardly more than a footnote in DL assumes significance out of all proportion to anything else, and comes to be seized on so as to take the place of the core original point about pleasure in the first place.
That's a large part of the reason Cicero seized on it -- to use as a battering ram to make the whole discussion of pleasure seem nonsensical.
This is probably a good place to repeat and repost the "abstract" from Nikolsky's article, which very clearly and succinctly states the issue in two short paragaphs:
The real issue here comes down to whether
(1) the term "Pleasure" as the goal of life needs to be replaced with "katastematic pleasure" as Wikipedia's commentators would do, or
(2) the term "Pleasure" as the goal of life is perfectly adequate, but needs to be stated clearly to include ALL pleasurable aspects of life of any kind, mental or physical, resting or active, necessary or unnecessary, or any other categories one wants to come up with.
It's when the categories (which allow us to focus on certain aspects of pleasure that allow us to focus on what is important to us at a particular moment) take over the entire discussion that the cart gets before the horse. I think this is directly analogous to the issue with "virtue" -- so long as we understand "virtue" in its proper role of a thing which is valuable for producing pleasure, then "virtue" is a valuable thing to talk about. It's when 'virtue" becomes the goal in and of itself that the problem arises.
Here, 'katastematic pleasure," which is at most a single category of the much wider term "pleasure" threatens to take over the whole field, and crowds out a proper understanding that it is just one among many pleasures, not by any means the ultimate or highest or only significant pleasure to aim for.
Unfortunately i cannot agree even with this statement.
It sincerely confuses me as to how you or anyone can say that. It's not Diogenes Laertius (DL) "asserting" this or even paraphrasing it. He's quoting Epicurus's On Choices and Metrodorus's Timocrates. I'll go back and read Gosling and Taylor and Nikolsky, of course, to refresh my memory of their arguments, but the ancient booktitles are there, and I think *that* has to be accounted for. If we start saying, "Oh, Epicurus didn't really write that in a book with that title!" we're on a Skeptical slippery slope as to what few ancient texts we have. The flip side of this is Cicero and his whole creation of the characters Villeius and Torquatus and being able to take creative liberties with their dialogue. Yes, we can be a little more skeptical and critical of his work. But DL makes a point of basically saying, "I'm not making this up. Here are their exact words from these books."
Whatever Epicurus may have thought about K/K, those thoughts were not significant enough to make it into those key documents.
To that, I'd say "Bingo!" According to On Choices and other quoted material, Epicurus used the words katastematic and kinetic. Yes, I will continue to "assert" that. But *maybe* they weren't central to his philosophy because THEY'RE BOTH PLEASURES. He didn't see the need to belabor the point. He didn't put them in a hierarchy. He recognized that, sure, there are different kinds of pleasure. In fact, there are two general "species." But his philosophy stood on the assertion that PLEASURE is the Good to which everything else points. He then needed to demonstrate *how* to live pleasurably by making choices and rejections, etc. My take on the On Choices quote from Epicurus is (and I'll go ciceronian and put dialogue in his mouth):
Epicurus: "Sure, I'll agree with the general idea that there are katastematic and kinetic pleasures, but the important thing is that they're *both* pleasurable! You also have two hands. Do you lift heavy stones with only one hand? Of course not! In the same way, to have a pleasurable life you need to consider all pleasures as available to you, and choose among all pleasures prudently, making choices and rejections among them. There is a time for stillness, there is a time for dancing."
It's not Epicurus saying katastematic pleasures are the *only* Good or the *only* Telos, it's the ancient and modern commentators trying to paint him into a Platonic or Aristotlean corner. I'm seeing this through a Princess Bride lens with Epicurus saying to his critics and the academics on the word "katastematic": "I don't think it means what you think it means."
what is hardly more than a footnote in DL assumes significance out of all proportion to anything else, and comes to be seized on so as to take the place of the core original point about pleasure in the first place.
Oh my, look at that. I think we might actually agree on that point.
In fact, let me copy the relevant passage from DLX.136 (emphasis added
He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest (καταστηματικὴν), but only that which consists in motion (κινήσει). Epicurus admits both ; also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the Ethical End, and in the first book of his work On Human Life and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are : "Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest." The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice (and Avoidance) are : "Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity."
So, what is DL "asserting" here?
There's no hierarchy asserted here. And the passage goes out of its way to say BOTH kinetic and katastematic pleasures are *included* in the Epicurean definition of pleasure in contrast to the Cyrenaics. And it cites *six* works that specifically make this point.
That's the kind of thing that needs to be accounted for: What's actually stated in the text.
PS. I should have also added that in addition to katastematic and kinetic pleasures, DL writes that Epicurus includes BOTH "pleasure of mind as well as of body." The Cyrenaics only included physical pleasure. So, those textual citations that DL cites appear to emphasize Epicurus included ALL pleasures: katastematic and kinetic, mental and physical, etc.
PPS. I'm wondering if Epicurus equated katastematic with mental and kinetic with physical? I'm not advocating that (yet), just raising the question.
To that, I'd say "Bingo!" According to On Choices and other quoted material, Epicurus used the words katastematic and kinetic. Yes, I will continue to "assert" that. But *maybe* they weren't central to his philosophy because THEY'RE BOTH PLEASURES. He didn't see the need to belabor the point. He didn't put them in a hierarchy. He recognized that, sure, there are different kinds of pleasure. In fact, there are two general "species." But his philosophy stood on the assertion that PLEASURE is the Good to which everything else points. He then needed to demonstrate *how* to live pleasurably by making choices and rejections, etc. My take on the On Choices quote from Epicurus is (and I'll go ciceronian and put dialogue in his mouth):
Epicurus: "Sure, I'll agree with the general idea that there are katastematic and kinetic pleasures, but the important thing is that they're *both* pleasurable! You also have two hands. Do you lift heavy stones with only one hand? Of course not! In the same way, to have a pleasurable life you need to consider all pleasures as available to you, and choose among all pleasures prudently, making choices and rejections among them. There is a time for stillness, there is a time for dancing."
This is where you and i completely agree. The issue is not the direction you are going, the issue is that the direction the "Wikipedia Worldview" of Epicurus is going, which (if accepted) would make Epicurean philosophy completely unacceptable to most of the world, especially (in Cicero's words) "the Senate" and "the Camp."
If we take the wider view of pleasure on which both you and I agree, then these difficulties dissolve and Epicurean philosophy is seen to be completely and vitally relevant to everyone in every aspect of life, including "the Senate and the camp."
That's the kind of thing that needs to be accounted for: What's actually stated in the text.
And I grant you it takes effort to get through the lengthy and detailed discussions in Gosling and Taylor and Nikolsky but they WILL help on this issue.
And I grant you it takes effort to get through the lengthy and detailed discussions in Gosling and Taylor and Nikolsky but they WILL help on this issue.
Before I dig into them again:
A) Do they accept that Epicurus used the terms katastematic and kinetic, but those terms have been given undue importance by ancient and modern commentators?
B) Do they assert that Epicurus never used the words?
If B, I have strong objections to that argument.
1 - Unfortunately there is really no way for me to summarize their argument satisfactorily, because they dive deep into all the specific cites you are raising above. Butt I think the general answers are:
A -- YES - that is their ultimate position
B -- NO - In fact their chapter is right after the main chapter on Epicurus.
2 - Despite what might appear to some that this discussion is distracting or unnecessary, I realized in recording the podcast this morning that pursuing the details on difficult topics can be very motivational. I think DEWitt makes the comment that Epicurean philosophy flourished while it was the topic of controversy, and died away when people stopped arguing about it. "Arguing about it" is a very important part of keeping it alive / bringing it back.
In fact Don I suspect that after you read them you are going to conclude that their conclusions actually are consistent with yours.
The issue is much more on the level of "perspective" than it is on the details of ways that pleasure can be usefully discussed.
My best estimate of why this issue is significant is that:
- some people focus on the subject as a matter of considering details of types of pleasure, which is useful in itself, yes, but
- some people are focusing on the "polemical" aspect of the debate, in certain aspects of the details can be taken out of context to make it appear that Epicurus was being inconsistent, illogical, impractical, and useless. That's what Cicero was doing in general - attacking Epicurus - and so from the perspective of starting with the basics before moving into the details, these people see that these details can be used as a way to undermine the big picture. The examples from wikipedia are what we face today but it's interesting to note that Nikolsky published his paper in 2001 and thought it accurate to say:
"Practically every modern survey of the Epicurean conception of pleasure begins by saying that Epicurus' concept of pleasure was twofold: in the opinion of researchers, Epicurus distinguished two kinds of pleasure — a `static' pleasure or a pleasure 'in a state of rest' and a 'kinetic' pleasure or a pleasure 'in motion.'"
And G&T Published in 1981 and saw the same issue then.
The problem stretches much further back than that too.
I had a chance to re-read the G&T and Nikolsky articles over the last 24 hours and one comment that I think is worth making is this:
It is DEFINITELY important to Epicurus to have a sweeping definition of pleasure that includes basically any feeling of any kind that a person feels in any way. That means not only the "exuberant" activities like "sex, drugs, and rock and roll" but also all feels which are conscious in any way of the "smooth functioning" of the organism. This i take to be the meaning of Torquatus' example as to why the hand needs nothing more, because it is not in pain -- it is smoothly functioning, which is itself pleasurable.
It's this wide scope and sweep of the word "pleasure" that is important, because it is fundamental objection to Pleasure as the guide goal to observe that we don't always have the ability to pursue "sex, drugs, and rock and roll." Sometimes in life about all we can do, or should do, is calmly sit still and reflect on things that are mentally pleasurable to think about.
Those "quiet times" have to fall under the term "pleasure" in order for "pleasure" to be available to everyone everywhere except in the most extremely difficult of conditions -- and in those, where no pleasure of any kind is available or to be hoped for, that's where you can "exit the stage when the play ceases to please us.
But what I read in G&T and Nikolsky is pointing up that Epicurus' primary objective was to establish "Pleasure' as the guide/goal, and for that reason he (legitimately) wanted to include each and every and all experience of smooth functioning as under the umbrella of pleasure.
It's therefore a mistake polemically to deprecate any kind of pleasure, "static" or "active", because each have the place and time and appropriateness in life and an appreciation for ALL of them, working together as team, that's necessary in order to uphold "Pleasure" as the ultimate end rather than "virtue" or "godliness" or the other competitors for the title of "highest good."
