Do Pigs Value Katastematic Pleasure? ( Summer 2022 K / K Discussion)

Quote from Don

"Iron sharpens iron" as the saying goes. Keep the questions coming!

Yes thank you Don - that is the key attitude and exactly the right frame of mind to bring to this discussion,

The current "mainstream' discussion of K/K issues strikes me as the opposite of iron - it's like jelly or worse - and something that people assert to be as important as this - to take the place of pleasure itself in the discussion of Epicurus - very much needs to be sharpened down to a fine point so that it can be placed in proper perspective.

I think we're generally in agreement except for this part....

Quote from Don

Furthermore, wherever Epicurus is writing about calm, freedom from pain or trouble in body or mind, remembering or anticipating pleasure, etc. that he's writing about katastematic pleasure whether the word gets used or not.

...because I see no evidence in the core Epicurean texts that the Epicureans got around to mentioning the word "katastematic" except at best in rare instances. The idea that "absence of pain" equals katastematic pleasure seems to be an unwanted assumption. When the focus on life is pleasure, and you crowd out pains by replacing them with pleasures of all types, then there is no need to be concerned about what would happen if you attempted to bury yourself in a sensory deprivation chamber and somehow drained yourself if pains without replacing those pains with some form of mental or physical activity.

Cicero is attempting to go back to Plato's argument that pleasure cannot be continuous by insisting that if you aren't being stimulated in some way then you aren't experiencing pleasure. The very example he gives - of engaging in philosophic debate - has no need to be considered a hard case or a neutral state, because the mind is engaged in intense activity on an important subject - just like we are now - and we are experiencing a definite type of pleasure in hunting down the answers, even if there is much effort involved.

To me this argument from Cicero makes clear the problem in the whole "absence of pain" and "katastematic pleasure issue.". It is much more direct to consider all mental and physical consciousness of life to be pleasurable unless it involves significant pain, and thereby you never have to quibble about some "fancy pleasure" state that seems exotic and esoteric.

The discussion continues to convince me that the whole issue arises due to the desire of the anti-Epicureans to find a way to hijack Epicurus' focus on pleasure because they will not accept that pleasure as commonly understood is in fact desirable. They want to substitute their own "virtue-approved" definition for pleasure.

Epicurus had a clear and important reason for his sweeping definition of pleasure - to show how pleasure of some kind (including situations that seem to involve only calm reflection) is always available to be referenced as the guide of life. His enemies took this sweeping definition and decided to elevate the calm reflection part (which they consider themselves to be kings of) as the ultimate goal. They did this by taking Epicurus' accurate observation - that when you have filled your life full of pleasure you cannot add any more because you are full - and took it out of context to adopt the "absence of pain" part as if it were something in itself, which it is not.

It is essential and important to explain to people that Pleasure in life comes through any kind of positive mental or physical activity that you don't find painful, including calm reflection. The contrast is made vivid by comparing it with the nothingness of availability of feeling after death. That part I think we are all agreed on.

But is it necessary to explain as a part of core Epicurean teaching the difference between kinetic and katastematic? The core texts don't, and even Torquatus himself, in his main narrative explaining Epicurean ethics, does not so much as mention the issue. It is only when it is used as an attack point by Cicero that Torquatus may address it at all. Lucretius and Philodemus, devoted advocates of the core, are also silent on it.

The value I am seeing in this conversation is that it is reinforcing to me that the entire katastematic/ kinetic discussion needs to be ejected from presentations of core Epicurean philosophy. Its main use going forward into the future in the presentation of an Epicurean curriculum should be to teach advanced students how the argument was used over the last two thousand years to relegate Epicurus into the corner of being a philosopher for nursing homes, and which thereby ejected from the largest part of normal healthy life. In that context the discussion is absolutely essential.

If one forces Hercules to spend every moment of his life clipping his toenails then even the physical strength and mental a acuity of a Hercules becomes absolutely neutered. There is no better way to sap the vitality from Epicurus as a savior of mankind than to force him to spin around endlessly in a word game like a dog chasing its own tale. I fully believe that Cicero saw just that opportunity, and his example has been followed ever since. No Epicurus in the camp, no Epicurus in the Senate, and no Epicurus anywhere in real human life.

An excerpt from “Epicureans, Earlier Atomists, and Cyrenaics” by Stefano Maso:

“According to Epicurus this is happiness, technically the katastematic pleasure:

the well-established condition or state of the body in which pleasure does not change (On

the Goal, fr. 22.3 Arrighetti).

[...]

It is crucial to note that natural but non-necessary desires are based on the varying of the

perceptual experience.

These various forms of desire are precisely what enable Epicurus to develop a conception

of pleasure that distinguishes between kinetic pleasure [kata kinêsin hêdonê] and static or

katastematic pleasure [katastêmatikê hêdonê]. The kind of pleasure that varies constitutes

the explicit foundation of Cyrenaic thought: Cyrenaics do not admit katastematic pleasure.

By contrast, Epicurus accepts both kinds of pleasure and assures his readers that freedom

from disturbance [ataraxia] and absence of pain [aponia] are static pleasure; but joy

[chara] and delight [euphrosunê] are regarded as kinetic activities (DL 10.137).

It seems as though the unbridled physical enjoyment of pleasure constitutes the heart of

the Cyrenaics’ hedonistic ethics. The pursuit of pleasure thus translates, in their view, into

the experiencing of a pleasure that varies in terms of both quality and intensity. The corollary

to this is that, precisely because there is no limit to the quality and intensity of

pleasure, the pleasure of the Cyrenaics proves disappointing, since it endlessly defers the

possibility of satisfaction.

According to the Cyrenaics, we can distinguish three states: one in which we are in pain,

and which is like a storm at sea; a second one in which we experience pleasure, and which

is like a gentle swell—for pleasure is a smooth movement; and a third, intermediate state in

which we feel neither pain nor pleasure, and which is like a flat calm (PE 14.18.32 = IVB5

Giannantoni). Man seems to perceive these three states alone; moreover, from the Cyrenaics’

perspective, it is pointless to carry the enquiry any further, for example by searching

for the cause of these different states.

By contrast—and evidently in polemical opposition to the Cyrenaics—the Epicureans

believe that pleasure is pleasure, and pain is pain and that there can be no intermediate state

between them. Pleasure is found where there is and for as long as there is no pain, just as

pain is found where there is no pleasure and as long as there is no pleasure: the removal of

all pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures (KD 3–4; LS 21C). Moreover, every

pleasure qua pleasure is good, and every pain qua pain is bad (Ep. Men. 129; LS 21B3).

But how is it possible to deny the existence of an intermediate state, a state that everyday

human experience seems to entail? Why does Epicurus choose to go down this route?

We can try to answer by relying on the interpretation Cicero gives us of the controversy

between Democritus, Cyrenaics and Epicureans. While this interpretation clearly derives

from doxographical contributions, there is no doubt it reflects a historical and persistent

rivalry between the different schools.

Cicero—a critical yet attentive reader of Epicurean texts—tackles the issue we have

posed directly, especially in Book 2 of De finibus and Book 3 of the Tusculanae disputationes.

18 First of all, Cicero believes that Epicurus contradicts himself, because in his

view the philosopher believes not so much that the absence of pain can accompany the

absence of pleasure, but rather that pleasure and the absence of pain de facto coincide,

constituting a sort of analgesic hedonism (cf. Tusc. 3.47 = KD 18). Therefore, the ultimate

good would simultaneously coincide with the absence of pain and the highest degree of

pleasure. Furthermore, Cicero emphasizes that, in his approach to ethics, Epicurus has

separated the highest good (which coincides with pleasure) from virtue. In doing so, he has

created an unbridgeable gulf between the physical and the spiritual dimension. Cicero’s

ultimate thesis is the diametric opposite: “Pleasure is one thing, absence from suffering

quite another [aliud est voluptas, aliud non dolere].”19 In other words, suffering is the

opposite of its own absence, and not the opposite of pleasure (De Fin. 2.28). Cicero here is

adopting the thesis of Hieronymus of Rhodes, the Peripatetic philosopher (third century

BCE), according to whom the experience of pleasure and the absence of pain are two different things (De Fin. 2.9).

To avoid possible misunderstandings, Cicero introduces an

example: he asks whether the pleasure we feel when drinking is the same as that which we

experience after having quenched our thirst. The answer is very important: according to

Torquatus (the champion of the Epicurean thesis in Cicero’s dialogue), once our thirst has

been quenched, we enjoy a stable pleasure; whereas during the actual act of quenching our

thirst we experience an unstable pleasure, i.e. a pleasure in movement (De Fin. 2.9–10).

However, this means assigning the same name, pleasure, to two different kinds of pleasure;

and, according to Cicero, this is incorrect, as is the notion of “variation” [varietas] when it

is introduced to deny the radical difference between stable pleasure and kinetic pleasure. It

is untenable to argue that kinetic pleasure (i.e. pleasure that “varies”) must be added to and

coincide with stable pleasure, which “does not vary” (i.e. “absence from suffering”).

According to Cicero, Epicurus’ theory resembles an attempt to combine Hieronymus’

theory with that of the Cyrenaic Aristippus (De Fin. 2.19)—an absurdity.

By contrast, precisely the connection between “stability” and “perception” is key to

explaining the reason the Epicureans theorized the absoluteness of “katastematic pleasure,”

namely the kind of pleasure that does not vary. Epicurus himself would appear to

have been the first to draw a distinction between the two kinds of pleasure (DL 10.136 =

LS 21R), by emphasizing that only the former is perfect and lasting, whereas the latter is

temporary. The instability of kinetic pleasure, and its reduction to a mere physical condition

to be brought back to stability (which is to say, to katastematic pleasure), is the key

to understanding the Epicurean position. Reason is what brings this “reduction” about: it

rests on the realization that variation—which constitutes kinetic pleasure—is actually

entirely superfluous, given that any experience of freedom from pain coincides with the

highest good: “pleasure exists everywhere, and for the entire time it lasts, there is no

suffering either of body or of mind or both” (KD 3). This implies that the intermediate

state—the one which, according to Hieronymus and Cicero, makes the absence of pain

different from the presence of pleasure, even though the two may go hand in hand—is

meaningless, which is why Epicurus rejects it.

It may be noted that the ancient atomists did not distinguish between the two kinds of

pleasure. Rather, Democritus observed that the ultimate goal which man must set himself is

contentment [euthymia]: only by finding satisfaction in what we have and what is proper to

our nature, and by appreciating what befalls us, can we attain safety and absence of

apprehension [athambia], and well-being (Stobaeus, Anthology 3.1.210, LM 27D226–231 =

DK 68B3, 189, 191; A1, 167, 169. See 133.1–4, 152.1–4, 139.1, 137.1 Leszl). “Contentment”

seems to foreshadow katastematic pleasure, insofar as it consists in the capacity to

limit desire and pleasure. We can ask if a specific connotation distinguishes the denominations

with which Clement of Alexandria20 labels the ultimate end [telos] that Democritus’

successors identified. And whereas Democritus identifies telos with euthymia or euestô

(contentment and feeling good), Nausyphanes (Epicurus’ teacher) uses the word akataplêxia

(absence of fright). But according to Clement, the akataplêxia of Nausyphanes corresponds

to the athambia (absence of apprehension) attributed to Democritus. Furthermore,

Anaxarchus of Abdera, one of the first followers of Democritus, proposed the apatheia (the

absence of passions) and the adiaphoria (the indifference to external things) as means to

reach the eudaimonia (happiness). However, it is evident that only Democritus defines telos

(the ultimate end/the purpose) positively: all the other words are qualified by the presence

of the “privative alpha”—a prefix meant to indicate the negation of a word—and seem to

allude to happiness as the result of a process of “reduction” in the human psycho-physical

experience, the exact process that can also be recognized in the way Epicurus conceives of

katastematic pleasure.

The Cyrenaics’ interpretation of pleasure leads them instead to acknowledge the distinction

between the two kinds of pleasure. However, this theory denies that it is de facto

possible to grant katastematic pleasure. Given the varied and successive way in which we

experience pleasures, we can grasp only kinetic pleasure or katastematic pleasure, either

successively or not at all, and any increase in pleasure is kinetic.

Unlike that of the Cyrenaics, Epicurus and Lucretius’s interpretation is intended as a

renewed version of Democritus’ position. By introducing a distinction between two different

kinds of pleasure, the Epicureans also reach another remarkable conclusion: the idea

that contentment is already a katastematic pleasure in itself. Clearly, it is possible to grasp

different facets of such pleasure, which present themselves as varietas and hence as kinetic

pleasure. Epicurus and Lucretius are aware that it is the task of reason to process this varied

sensory experience, in such a way that each specific detail may be positively appreciated

and grasped in the most pregnant possible way [katapuknôsis]. Epicurus gives great weight

to cogitation [logismos and phronesis] and, ultimately, reason (which is to say the mind,

psuchê), demanding that they be capable of grasping and focusing on the pleasurable

aspects of life, so that negative ones may be considered absent (and be de facto eliminated).

But if the physical side of the experience of pleasure constitutes the point of departure, the

point of arrival is the rational processing of this experience. In The Letter to Menoeceus

(129–130 = LS 21B3) Epicurus writes:

Every pleasure, because of its natural affinity, is something good, yet not every

pleasure is choice worthy. Correspondingly, every pain is something bad, but not

every pain is by nature to be avoided. However, we have to make our judgment on

all these points by a calculation and survey of advantages and disadvantages. For

at certain times we treat the good as bad and conversely the bad as good.

Consequently, Epicurus—opposing the Cyrenaics—can argue that, even in the apparently

most painful moments, the wise man is capable of being happy: for, if needs be, he knows

how to concentrate on the sheer fact of being alive. At this point, “being alive” may be

seen to coincide with katastematic pleasure. Epicurus states as much in a letter to his

mother: “When we are alive, we experience a joy akin to that of the gods” (PHerc. 176 5

X Vogliano = fr. 72.38–40 Arrighetti). Even his spiritual testament, which is to say the

letter addressed to his friend Idomeneus and transmitted by Diogenes Laertius, bears

witness to this. The philosopher maintains that the day in which he is dying is a blessed

one, even though his bladder and bowl pains could hardly be more intense (Letter to

Idomeneus = DL 10.22).

Aristippus’ Hedonic Presentism and Epicurus’ Doctrine of Limits

According to the Cyrenaic Aristippus, pleasure persists and has value only as long as we

are experiencing it. His grandson, Aristippus the Younger, thinks that a “unitemporal”

present pleasure constitutes de facto the happiness that every man must propose to himself

as an end. No doubt that this experience of pleasure is, moreover, an essentially physical

experience. We observe that there is a strong emphasis on the physical dimension and the

instantaneousness of the perception of pleasure; it is a real limitation that aims to capture

only the most obvious character of pleasure: intensity. The Cyrenaics renounce the lasting

experience of pleasure because their focus is the intensity of the instant in which man

experiences pleasure. The Cyrenaics focus on the search for an ever more intense and

varied experience of pleasure in order to guarantee the intensity of the present perception

and avoid the distraction involved in waiting for an uncertain future. Kinetic pleasure is the

actual limit of the Cyrenaic ethics.

By contrast, it is important to understand the ethical basis of Epicurus’ doctrine, and, in

particular, its therapeutic proposal. Every Epicurean master and every reader of Epicurean

texts considers the “fourfold cure” [tetrapharmakos] a crucial element in Epicurean doctrine.

Lucretius himself, while not directly referring to this doctrine, no doubt bore it in

mind when composing his poem. Cicero explicitly mentions the Key Doctrines in which

Epicurus summed it up. Even Philodemus of Gadara explicitly mentions the theory.25 Epicurus

pithily expressed it as follows: “Were we not upset by the worries that celestial

phenomena and death might matter to us, and also by failure to appreciate the limits of

pains and desires, we would have no need for natural philosophy” (KD 11 = LS 25.B.11;

cfr. KD 1–4, 10, 20, and Ep. Men. 133).

It is interesting to note that the tetrapharmakos also rests on a doctrine of the “limit”; this

time, however, in an Epicurean version. This doctrine applies to everything that exists and

is perceived within the cosmos. Take atoms: we have isolated atoms that eternally fall and

never combine with others; but we also have atoms that combine into endless, more or less

changeable structures. The gods constitute the ultimate “limit” of this changeability, for

they are eternally stable atomic compounds. They never change because, by definition, they

are intangible: they never collide with other atoms or other compounds. Take death: by

definition, it never has anything to do with life. It constitutes the “limit” of life. Take pain

and, in parallel, pleasure: each constitutes the other’s “limit.”

Based on this doctrine of the “limit,” Epicurus infers that we must not fear the gods,

because they are imperturbable and, hence, take no interest in us or interfere with other

atomic compounds (Ep. Men. 123–124). We must not fear death, because when it exists, we

do not; and as long as we are alive, we cannot perceive it (Ep. Men. 124–127). We must

not fear pain, because it may be more or less intense: if it is light, it is so easily endurable

that at its limit it can be perceived as pleasure; if it is extreme, a loss of sensibility occurs

and we no longer feel it (KD 4). Finally, we must not fear pleasure, in the sense that we

must not fear the dissatisfaction that affects those who give themselves over to the pursuit

of the most intense and prolonged sort of kinetic pleasure, as did the Cyrenaics, for kinetic

pleasure finds its limit in katastematic pleasure (Ep. Men. 131–132).

This is exactly the opposite of what the Cyrenaics claim. Although both consider the

“limit” as an inevitable psychophysical border, the experience of the limit leads the Cyrenaics

to renounce katastematic pleasure, denying its reason; on the contrary, it leads Epicurus

and the Epicureans to re-evaluate katastematic pleasure by reconsidering kinetic

pleasure as an irrelevant variable.”

(Maso, Stefano. “Epicureans, Earlier Atomists, and Cyrenaics”. The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Kelly Arenson. Routledge, 2020, 60-65)

An excerpt from “Epicureans on Pleasure, Desire, and Happiness” by B. A. Rider:

“Epicurus’ second important distinction between types of pleasure was more original and

challenging, and its interpretation remains controversial. Epicurus evidently distinguished

between kinetic pleasures—those involving some kind of “movement [kinesis]”—and

katastematic (or static) pleasures (from “katastema” referring to a condition of equilibrium)—

those arising from the healthy state of the body and mind, free from pain and

disturbance. This distinction cuts across the previous one. Epicurean texts mention both

mental and bodily kinetic pleasures, and mental and bodily katastematic pleasures (see, e.g.,

DL 10.136).

This distinction was important because, Epicurus argues, the pleasures that matter for

eudaimonia are katastematic ones: the health and painless state of the body [aponia] and

the tranquility of the mind (ataraxia—literally “freedom from disturbance [tarache]”) (Ep.

Men. 128; KD 3, 18). Epicurus uses this idea to argue that pleasure has a limit. Once your

body and mind are in a good state, the quality of your experience of life cannot be

improved—it is as good as it can get. At this point, there is no need for more food, luxury,

or indulgence, because adding more cannot make your life any better, and it may even

damage your ability to experience health and tranquility in the long term.

[…]

Later, Cicero contends that the arguments supporting Epicureanism depend on a fallacy of

equivocation, using “pleasure” ambiguously to make their position appear more attractive

than it is. He criticizes Epicurus’ appeal to the behavior of infants:

What sort of pleasure, static [katastematic] or kinetic […] will the bawling infant

use to determine the supreme good and evil? If static, then clearly its natural

instinct is for self-preservation, which I accept. If kinetic, as you in fact claim, then

there will be no pleasure too foul to be experienced. Moreover, our new-born

creature will not be starting from the highest pleasure, which you regard as the

absence of pain.

Admittedly, infants and uncorrupted animals want to feel good; they desire sensory stimulation,

kinetic pleasure. But if so, how can the baby’s behavior be evidence that katastematic

pleasure is the highest good? By conflating two very different kinds of experience

and calling both “pleasure,” Cicero believes, Epicurus seeks illicitly to combine the crude

enticements of indulgent hedonism with the moderation and order of a theory that aims for

satisfied painlessness. Cicero suggests that while such a bait-and-switch sales pitch appeals

to the shallow minded, it fails as a coherent and livable ethical theory.

Is Cicero’s criticism fair? In part, the issue turns on how exactly we are meant to

understand the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasures, and what precisely

Epicureans had in mind in identifying aponia and ataraxia as the highest good. Unfortunately,

on this point the surviving texts are especially fragmentary and contradictory, leaving

open a variety of interpretations.

Since Cicero’s On Moral Ends has the most detailed description of the doctrine, many

interpreters use it as a starting point (including Long and Sedley 1987; Mitsis 1988; Woolf

2009). According to Cicero, Epicureans classify any pleasure that actively stimulates the

senses as kinetic, involving a “movement” in sensation (De Fin. 2.10, 2.16). These sensory,

kinetic pleasures include both appetite satisfactions that fill deficiencies like hunger (what

we might call “restorative” pleasures) and pleasant sensations that do not fill a deficiency,

such as the pleasures of hearing beautiful music or seeing a beautiful statue (“non-restorative”).

This breakdown leaves katastematic pleasure as simply the state of being free from

pain or mental disturbance. This state does not in itself “stimulate the senses” (which would

make it kinetic); but we recognize that it is good because of the relief we receive when pain

or distress abates (1.37).

Notice that Cicero’s way of drawing the distinction plays directly into his criticisms—if

only kinetic pleasures involve sensory stimulation, it becomes puzzling why katastematic

pleasure is pleasure and why we should think of it as being the goal. Moreover, Epicurus

clearly places great importance on sensory pleasure. As quoted above, he claims that he

“cannot conceive of anything as good” without the pleasures of taste, sight, sound, and

sex (Cicero, Tusc. III.18.41 = LS 21L1). But if Cicero’s interpretation of the distinction

between kinetic and katastematic pleasures is right, these are kinetic pleasures, and why

would he care so much about inferior, kinetic pleasures? If the mere state of being free

from pain itself represents the highest limit of quality experience, why would an Epicurean

need them?

For this reason, many scholars look for other ways to interpret the distinction. The debate

about this topic has produced a dizzying array of interpretations. For the purposes of this

chapter, I will describe just a few of the most prominent proposals.

An early attempt to reconsider the distinction between kinetic and katastematic pleasures

was made first by Diano 1935 and later by Rist 1972; Wolfsdorf 2009 defended this

interpretation more recently. This interpretation accepts that all sensory pleasures are

kinetic—they are “events in which the perceptual or rational faculties are smoothly or

gently stimulated or activated” (252). But, on this interpretation, katastematic pleasure—

the well-balanced state of body and mind—is the necessary precondition for any kinetic

pleasure. A person cannot experience kinetic pleasures in a part of himself unless that part

is in a pain- and disturbance-free state. Wolfsdorf explains, “perceptual pleasures [which

are kinetic] reveal katastematic pleasures […] because perceptual pleasures depend on

katastematic pleasures. The smooth functioning of the perceptual faculties indicates the

correlative katastematic conditions” (245). Proponents of this interpretation focus on

passages like Principal Doctrine 3, where Epicurus states, “As long as pleasure is present,

so long as it is present, there is no pain, either of body or soul or both at once”

(Wolfsdorf’s translation, 246). This interpretation allows for aponia and ataraxia to be

fundamental (you can’t have any pleasure without them), while still taking into account

Epicurus’ statements about the importance of sensory pleasures (since we need sensory

pleasures to “reveal” the healthy state).

As an illustration, consider someone who is hungry. He is hungry, Lucretius explains

(DRN 2.963–72), because certain parts of his body are disturbed and out of place and

require replenishment to restore their integrity and functioning. So he eats. As he eats, he

feels pleasure on his palate and throat (from tasting and swallowing the food) but that is

only because these parts aren’t disrupted. As the atoms from the food are absorbed into the

body and the deficiency is remedied, the pain of hunger recedes. Wolfsdorf argues that the

recession of hunger is not itself pleasurable, but it leaves us in a state that is free from pain

and therefore capable of (kinetic) pleasure (252).

On this picture, then, katastematic pleasure is a state of healthy functioning, and it is a

precondition for any pleasurable stimulation. Kinetic pleasure occurs when healthy, painfree

parts are “moved” and stimulated. What I’ve called “restorative pleasures,” however,

don’t exist, because there can be no pleasure while parts being restored are still in pain.

This interpretation has a possible problem—since it assumes, with Cicero, that all sensory

pleasures are kinetic, it suffers some of the same objections: If only kinetic pleasures

have a sensory quality, what is attractive about the katastematic pleasure in itself? On the

Diano-Rist-Wolfsdorf picture, it starts to look like we seek a well-balanced state merely as

means to experience kinetic pleasures. Moreover, why call the katastematic state “pleasure”?

Finally, Epicurus insists that all good and bad occur in sensation (Ep. Men. 124), so

how do we perceive the goodness of aponia and ataraxia, if they have no sensory quality

of their own? For these reasons, Gosling and Taylor 1982 argue for a different interpretation.

They contend that, actually, aponia and ataraxia are states of sensory pleasure:

Aponia is a condition of having sensory pleasures but with no accompanying pain,

and ataraxia is the state of confidence that one may acquire such sensory pleasures

with complete absence of pain. This confidence is itself a positive state.…What is

important is to get a life of sensory pleasure untainted by pain.

When a person is conscious in a healthy, well-balanced state, Gosling and Taylor explain,

she naturally experiences a wide variety of positive sensations: she feels warm and comfortable;

tastes foods; hears sounds; enjoys the sights of things around herself. These

experiences are not kinetic, as Cicero or Wolfsdorf assume, but are themselves manifestations

of katastematic pleasure. Distinctively kinetic pleasures, on their view, are merely the

subset of sensory pleasures involved in restoration or replenishment (373). In fact, Gosling

and Taylor believe that, for Epicureans themselves, the distinction between kinetic and

katastematic pleasures wasn’t really that important. It does not mark two vastly different

kinds of pleasures, since both are sensory. The categorization has more to do with a pleasure’s

functional role than its inherent qualities (374).

Arenson’s recent book on Epicurean pleasure (Arenson 2019) updates and adds additional

nuance to Gosling and Taylor’s approach. She agrees that the Epicureans’ main

concern was with healthy functioning, and she traces Epicurus’ ideas to debates in Plato’s

Academy, including Eudoxus and Aristotle, about the role of pleasure and healthy functioning

in a good human life. Plato takes a strong anti-hedonist position: In the Philebus,

Plato’s Socrates argues that pleasure cannot be the good, because pleasure occurs only in

the process of filling a deficiency (53c-55c). Therefore, pleasure itself isn’t the good, but

instead a means to a good end: healthy functioning.

According to Arenson, Epicurus introduces the distinction between kinetic and katastematic

pleasures in part to address these kinds of anti-hedonistic argument. Plato was right

that some pleasures—kinetic pleasures—occur in the process of restoration, and these

pleasures are indeed merely a means to a greater end. But, against the anti-hedonists, Epicurus

argues that other pleasures—katastematic pleasures—arise from the healthy functioning

itself. Arenson goes on to argue that katastematic pleasure itself has two

manifestations: First, a general pleasurable quality of experience from having body and

mind in a good state—a sort of non-specific pleasure of being alive, conscious, and healthy

(Chapter 6). Second, there are pleasures that arise from specific activities of healthy faculties,

including pleasures of seeing, hearing, and tasting. Arenson calls these “non-restorative

pleasures,” because while they involve active stimulation, they do not restore deficiencies,

as happens when we eat while hungry or drink while thirsty (Chapter 8). Now, these two

manifestations of katastematic pleasure are not really distinct; rather, in line with Epicurus’

doctrine that the highest pleasure has a limit, the non-restorative pleasures merely “vary”

but do not add to the general quality of life (KD 18).

[…]

I would suggest that the Epicureans understood this lesson, and that by defining the best

experience of life as aponia and ataraxia, they aimed to capture something like this idea.

Haybron’s attunement dimension corresponds most closely to Epicurean katastematic pleasure:

both refer to a fundamental state of healthy functioning, security, and freedom from

disturbance that makes other kinds of enjoyment possible. Epicurus realized that when a

person’s mind and body are in a healthy, well-balanced state, it becomes possible for them

to become engrossed in and enjoy a variety of different kinds of activities and experiences

as expressions of that healthy state. Far from being ad hoc, then, Epicurus’ idiosyncratic

form of hedonism may simply have been the right way to think about what makes for a

good experience of life.”

(Rider, B. A.. “Epicureans on Pleasure, Desire, and Happiness”. The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Kelly Arenson. Routledge, 2020, 286-91)

Wow that is quite a collection thank you Nate!

Quote from Nate

For this reason, many scholars look for other ways to interpret the distinction. The debate

about this topic has produced a dizzying array of interpretations. For the purposes of this

chapter, I will describe just a few of the most prominent proposals.

THAT (underlined sentence) is for sure!!!

After reading all that I am still at the point ---

"Categorize the pleasures and experience them however you see fit, the guide of life is the feeling of pleasure, not virtue, not religion, not abstract logic."

Please correct me if I am wrong, but in addition to being "rare" this is a statement by Diogenes Laertius, which we may presume to be a quote, but of which we don't for sure have an original sentence by Epicurus, or surrounding context.

That observation (absence of a clear original where we see Epicurus making the point in full context) is a key aspect of the criticism of Nikolsky/Gosling/Taylor) in pointing out that it is Diogenese Laertius and Cicero who bring this issue to our attention, not its prominence in original works of Epicurus or core Epicureans.

So we if are categorizing the main objections, they include, not necessarily in this order:

- Rare at best.

- Not featured as important in clear writings by core Epicureans

....and then combined with....

- All of the textual consistency issues that arise from any implication that Epicurus valued "katastematic" more (or even equal to) than "kinetic" pleasure.

I am gravitating toward privileging the idea that "Epicurean texts mention both mental and bodily kinetic pleasures, and mental and bodily katastematic pleasures", which creates more of a spectrum than a strict duality:

Others seem to argue for a horizontal division:

Others advance this into a vertical hierarchy:

Others seem to propose an equivalency between desires and types of pleasure:

There seems to be a further suggestion that the division between katastematic and kinetic pleasures was as a response (or perhaps re-formulation) of the Cyrenaic proposition of a neutral state:

With all of these typologies, I continue to wonder if these words were just general adjectives used to describe the diversity of pleasure, or whether they were strict technical categories. I am reminded that "no pleasure is an evil in itself" (KD 8 ) and that "pleasures would never differ from one another" (KD 9), so any hierarchy seems to diminish the unconditional proposition that "Pleasure is The Greatest Good" (not "Stable Pleasure is The Greatest Good to which Moving Pleasure is Subordinate"). Still ... there must be a significant reason this description exists.

Quote from Don

Not from my reading. The original specifically says "And Epicurus in On Choices says as follows..." Then gives the quote.

I didn't mean to dispute that the texts present this as a quote, just to point out that it is Diogenes Laertius presenting it out of context, so more than just relying on him to present it accurately, we're relying on him to have judged the context correctly.

Quote from Nate

t "pleasures would never differ from one another" (KD 9)

That's a good one to remember in this context.

Quote from Nate

Still ... there must be a significant reason this description exists.

To me, the issue of its being a response to Plato holding that pleasure could not be continuous is more than sufficient to justify its existence.

Lots of good deep thinking in this thread so thank you again to all who are putting time into it.

De Witt seems to think that this distinction (between "static" and "kinetic" pleasure) was profound:

Quote

“It was the discovery of static pleasure, without which continuity of pleasure was impossible, that resulted in the division of pleasures into static and kinetic. There was no call for such a division until the name of pleasure had been extended to denote the possession of health. On this point, however, as on many others, greater precision is possible. The modern use of the word static as opposed to kinetic is Aristotelian in origin. The Epicurean word is katastematikos, from katastema, explained in the lexicon as 'stable condition.’ It connotes, moreover, change of state, from action to rest. To Epicurus it denotes a normal state of pleasure to which the individual returns after kinetic pleasure, which is activity. For example, it is the comfortable feeling that follows after the satisfaction of hunger and thirst, the relaxed condition that follows after attending the theater, a public festival or a banquet. Exceptionally, it describes the return to normal after the joy of escape from peril of life.

Since this innovation was, as it were, the keystone of the new hedonism, it is not surprising to learn that it was expounded in the letter addressed to the philosophers in Mytilene, which is rightly regarded as having been written in Lampsacus, nor that it was emphasized in other major writings and kept in the forefront by successors. That it was an innovation is made clear by a sound paragraph of Laertius. Discussing the divergence from Cyrenaic doctrine he quotes a phrase of Metrodorus: ‘Pleasure being thought of both as associated with motion and as static.’ Epicurus is quoted at slightly greater length: 'Serenity of mind and freedom from bodily pain are static pleasures, but joy and delight are seen to be associated with motion, that is, activity.' In both these passages modern usage calls for the adjective static; the Greek would demand catastematic. Static and kinetic would apply to the state of a stone, now lying on the ground, now sent hurtling through the air. Catastematic and kinetic would apply to the pleasure of a healthy Epicurean, now enjoying a quiet evening at home, now having a rollicking time at one of the monthly banquets.” (De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy 242-43)

So, for De Witt, Kinetic pleasure is a rolling stone and Katastematic pleasure is a mossy stone?

Quote from Don

If that's the concern, we would arguably have to throw out the majority of fragments and even Cicero since he also didn't necessarily cite context but cherry picked what he wanted.

Well that is definitely a consideration as to all the fragments. Everyone was cherrypicking to suit their purposes, and even Diogenes Laertius was apparently following a system so he could present similar material on all the different philosophers.

Quote from Nate

De Witt seems to think that this distinction (between "static" and "kinetic" pleasure) was profound:

My interpretation of that, Nate, is that DeWitt is saying that indeed the designation of normal functioning without high-speed activity is definitely profound because that is what allows us to say that pleasure is continuous.

I see the issue of whether this "normal functioning" is katastematic or kinetic, and whether the division makes any difference, as a totally different issue.

If you define pleasure and pain as the only two states, then BY DEFINITION when you aren't feeling pain you are feeling pleasure, and that's regardless of what you happen to be doing or thinking about at the time.