Kungi's Natural and Necessary Discussion

Quote from Godfrey

I imagine this may sound like nitpicking

Doesn't sound like nitpicking to me

Yes I agree Godfrey it is an important point - a threshold way of getting the terminology right, because it helps clarify that all pleasures are pleasing and in that sense desirable.

But at that point the ball is still in play. Even if Pacatus had stated his comment in terms of only pursuing natural desires, we would still have essentially the same set of problems:

What exactly are these "non- natural desires" and what should be our attitude toward them? Are we to fully banish them from our lives?

This conversation moves us along toward those issues, which I think is where the deepest issues have to be resolved.

It would all depend on what is considered necessary for happiness.

Kalosyni you are saying those are the ones mentioned?

Quote from Godfrey

They are desires which are divorced from the limit of the natural homeostatic relationship between pleasure and pain, and thus have become unlimited

Godfrey so you are saying that this is the definition of unnatural desires? And can you spell our further what you mean by "the natural homeostatic relationship between pleasure and pain?

Yes, that diagram is based on the following:

Quote

Third, keep in mind that some desires are natural whereas others are groundless [note]; that among the natural desires some are natural and necessary whereas others are merely natural; and that among the necessary desires some are necessary for happiness, some for physical health [note], and some for life itself. The steady contemplation of these facts enables you to understand everything that you accept or reject in terms of the health of the body and the serenity of the soul — since that is the goal of a completely happy life. Our every action is done so that we will not be in pain or fear. As soon as we achieve this, the soul is released from every storm, since an animal has no other need and must seek nothing else to complete the goodness of body and soul. Thus we need pleasure only when we are in pain caused by its absence; but when we are not in pain then we have no need of pleasure.

ἀναλογιστέον δὲ ὡς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαί, αἱ δὲ κεναί, καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν αἱ μὲν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ μόνον· τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν. [128] τούτων γὰρ ἀπλανὴς θεωρία πᾶσαν αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἐπανάγειν οἶδεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀταραξίαν, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο τοῦ μακαρίως ζῆν ἐστι τέλος. τούτου γὰρ πάντα πράττομεν, ὅπως μήτε ἀλγῶμεν μήτε ταρβῶμεν. ὅταν δὲ ἅπαξ τοῦτο περὶ ἡμᾶς γένηται, λύεται πᾶς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς χειμών, οὐκ ἔχοντος τοῦ ζῴου βαδίζειν ὡς πρὸς ἐνδέον τι καὶ ζητεῖν ἕτερον ᾧ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀγαθὸν συμπληρώσεται. τότε γὰρ ἡδονῆς χρείαν ἔχομεν, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ παρεῖναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλγῶμεν· <ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἀλγῶμεν> οὐκέτι τῆς ἡδονῆς δεόμεθα.

This is why we say that pleasure is the beginning and the end of a completely happy life. For we recognize it as the primary and innate good, we honor it in everything we accept or reject, and we achieve it if we judge every good thing by the standard of how that thing affects us [note]. And because this is the primary and inborn good, we do not choose every pleasure. Instead, we pass up many pleasures when we will gain more of what we need from doing so. And we consider many pains to be better than pleasures, if we experience a greater pleasure for a long time from having endured those pains. So every pleasure is a good thing because its nature is favorable to us, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen — just as every pain is a bad thing, yet not every pain is always to be shunned. It is proper to make all these decisions through measuring things side by side and looking at both the advantages and disadvantages, for sometimes we treat a good thing as bad and a bad thing as good.

Letter to Menoikos, by Epicurus

"Thus we need pleasure only when we are in pain caused by its absence; but when we are not in pain then we have no need of pleasure."

and...

"It is proper to make all these decisions through measuring things side by side and looking at both the advantages and disadvantages, for sometimes we treat a good thing as bad and a bad thing as good."

So from this, when one is aware of physical or mental pain then one treats it with a pleasure which removes the pain.

Pains which are physical: hunger, thirst, being too cold or too hot, feeling sleepy, feeling the need to stretch, walk or exercise, needing sexual release

Pains of the mind: worry, fear, anxiety, anger, sadness, loneliness, boredom, etc.

(Wondering if maybe we need to move some of these posts to a new thread, since this was originally a thread for Kungi.)

Quote from Kalosyni

It would all depend on what is considered necessary for happiness.

Here's my take from my translation of the last part of section 127 of the letter to Menoikeus made into a bulleted list:

"Furthermore, ...

• on the one hand, there are the natural desires
• on the other, the 'empty, fruitless, or vain ones.'
• And of the natural ones,
  • on the one hand, are the necessary ones;
  • on the other, the ones which are only natural;
  • then, of the necessary ones:
    • on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia;
    • then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body;
    • then those necessary for life itself."

Quote from Kalosyni

(Wondering if maybe we need to move some of these posts to a new thread, since this was originally a thread for Kungi.)

Agree with Kalosyni on that.

Additionally, I advocate getting away from the natural and "unnatural" descriptors. There are natural desires - those arising from nature - and those that are not natural arising from fruitless, void, groundless, empty beliefs. They are κεναί:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?do…57:entry=keno/s That's a much better description of what they are than unnatural. Unnatural implies they are somehow not human. They are unfortunately very human desires, but they're empty of substance and can never be satiated.

This is the exact same word Epicurus uses to name the "void" in "atoms and void." He's saying that there is literally nothing there to back up the desire. The void is the absence of atoms. It is the empty space within which the atoms move.

Here is another way of asking my continuing question on this topic:

I think we can all agree that air, food, water, shelter from the rain, and warmth in the cold, are natural and necessary desires.

I think we can all also agree that one can obtain all of these by living in a cave and never straying far except to gather firewood, kills a few deer or rabbits for food and clothing, and to gather water from a nearby stream.

What guidance does this discussion of natural and necessary desires give us as to what else to aspire for and work for beyond these few things which are natural and necessary for life? Is anyone who seeks more than that cave lifestyle a bad Epicurean?

My position has always been that the principle of the clasification is as Torquatus stated, that the N. And N are easy to obtain without much or any pain, and that those which are neither N. Nor N. can be obtained only with more effort and more pain.

And my view is that nowhere has Epicurus stated that we should confine ourselves to a strict list of N or N - just that we should be prepared to ask what will happen to us and that we be prepared to accept the consequences for our choices and avoidances according to our estimate of the pleasures and pains that will come from them.

If that is all we are talking about here I see no issues at all.

If, however, someone is seeing a suggestion that the best way of life for everyone is to always pursue that course which brings the least pain, regardless of the amount of pleasure obtainable by a person who accepts some pain as the cost, then I think that would be the issue that needs to be discussed much further.

While "putting minimal pain above all " might be a perfectly legitimate choice for a person to make, since we each have our preferences and tolerances, I do not at all see Epicurus promoting that as a general rule for everyone, just as he himself chose a course of school leadership which involved himself in regular controversies, in development of a school with legions of followers, in amassing several properties and even a number of slaves, and in promptimg an eventual following of whom none I am aware were reputed in any way to be ascetic or living or promoting a "simplistic" lifestyle.

In sum i clearly see the ascetic / simplistic lifestyle being promoted as the Epicurean ideal in popular writers like OKeefe, but I am wondering if that is the implication of any of the discussion here. That's where I think the ultimate issue lies in this discussion, so that's the point I keep trying to bring out. Is the best Epicurean the one who has so limited his desires that he lives closest to the cave lifestyle? Is that the way we should read the advice to Pythocles?

Torquatus was certainly right that weighing our choices by the N and N scale helps us predict the consequences of our actions, and discussing N and N helps us flesh out those questions. But predicting the consequences is entirely different from laying out a rule as to which consequences are to be chosen, and that's where we need to be very clear as to what we think Epicurus was saying as the general rule of the analysis.

It's that final step of drawing out the observations to their ultimate conclusion that I sense this discussion so far has not yet reached.

This is the quote from A Few Days In Athens That I cited Wednesday night and which I think applies to this discussion:

Quote

'Tell us not that that is right which admits of evil construction; that that is virtue which leaves an open gate to vice.’ This is the thrust which Zeno now makes at Epicurus; and did it hit, I grant it were a mortal one. From the flavour, we pronounce of the fruit; from the beauty and the fragrance, of the flower; and in a system of morals, or of philosophy, or of whatever else, what tends to produce good we pronounce to be good, what to produce evil, we pronounce to be evil.

The natural and necessary analysis is being used by OKeefe and others across the Internet to argue that the best Epicurean is the one who most limits his desires to only those which are "natural and necessary." Has Epicurus thrown open the gate to the construction of his philosophy that the best life is the one in which the desires are limited only to those which are natural and necessary? If so, we can quibble about the meanings of natural and necessary all day long, but Epicurus himself has not spelled those meanings out in the letter to Menoeceus, and he could not have failed to anticipate that his words would be interpreted by some to imply that he who limits his desires the most (to only the most basic natural and necessary functions of life) lives the best.

So our current situation is that just such an inference is the leading (in numerical terms) interpretation of Epicurus today. Is it correct? If so we should embrace it clearly, if not, like Lucretius said in another context, we should gird ourselves to battle to fight it and strike it down. Because like it or not this is the defining idea of Epicurus in the minds of many a academic authorities, and someone is very wrong about a very key interpretation.

My take has been to understand Epicurus's point as "If your circumstances, for some reason, made it so that you *had* to live in a cave by yourself on the barest of necessities, you *could* find pleasure in that since you're still alive and Nature can supply your necessary needs. BUT it is NOT necessary to live this way. Living among friends, discussing and practicing philosophy, making all your choices and rejections based on practical wisdom and other sound criteria, living neither with too much frugality nor descending into profligacy... That is a pleasurable life."

I agree with Don's formulation. The only thing I might tweak is to bring what is implied and to explicitly refute the hyper-frugality option by saying:

"My take has been to understand Epicurus's point as "If your circumstances, for some reason, made it so that you *had* to live in a cave by yourself on the barest of necessities, you *could* find pleasure in that since you're still alive and Nature can supply your necessary needs. BUT it is NOT necessary to live this way, nor is it desirable, unless circumstances require. Living among friends, discussing and practicing philosophy, making all your choices and rejections based on practical wisdom and other sound criteria, living neither with too much frugality nor descending into profligacy... That is a pleasurable life."

Ha - I will say on my last reading that I detect some bias in listing "too much frugality" without listing the negative "descending" that is attached to profligacy"

But Don is basically quoting VS63 and that's where Epicurus makes plain that both are errors, and I don't see that he is favoring one error over the other: "VS63. Frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is like him who errs through excess."

Note: Once again I wish we had a list of alternate translations of the Vatican Says such as we do with Nate's list of PD'. There just aren't as many alternatives out there, however.

Quote from Cassius

Ha - I will say on my last reading that I detect some bias in listing "too much frugality" without listing the negative "descending" that is attached to profligacy"

Not intentional bias.

VS63 warns of choosing too much frugality.

The letter to Menoikeus clearly says that "an endless string of drinking parties and festivals" is not how Epicurus defines pleasure.

So... One is looking for pain with too much frugality or too much "sex, drugs, and rock and roll."

Quote from Don

So... One is looking for pain with too much frugality or too much "sex, drugs, and rock and roll

Ha - All things being equal in terms of the pain measurement, as implied in the hypothetical, I am pretty sure I know which option I would take!

But all humor aside that would surely seem to be a matter of personal preference and individual circumstance and it would be critical to make that point.

Quote from Epicurus

Therefore, whenever we say repeatedly that "pleasure is the τέλος," we do not say the pleasure of those who are prodigal like those who are ignorant, those who don't agree with us, or those who believe wrongly; but we mean that which neither pains the body nor troubles the mind. [132] For it is not an endless string of drinking parties and festivals, and not taking advantage of slaves and women, nor does an extravagant table of fish and other things bring forth a sweet life but self-controlled reasoning and examining the cause of every choice and rejection and driving out the greatest number of opinions that take hold of the mind and bring confusion and trouble.

It seems to me that he's clearly stating that an "endless string" of drinking parties and those others do not fall under his definition when he says "pleasure is the goal/end/telos." He's not being coy or obtuse. When we say this, we don't mean that.

See I read that differently. I think he's saying not saying that everyone has to avoid those things completely, but that everyone has to evaluate their circumstances and options and preferences and decide exactly how much partying and fine food is going to be what they wish to pursue - for the more they pursue, if their circumstances do not allow it - the more pain they will suffer in cost. I put key emphasis on the "endless" adjective.

That's why I see this as included: " reasoning and examining the cause of every choice and rejection and driving out the greatest number of opinions that take hold of the mind and bring confusion and trouble."

That's not a flat rejection of the activities listed, because those are the ways Epicurus has said he knows the good. Instead, he is saying to prudently deliberate how much of it to engage in considering your own resources and your own preferences and tolerances for pain.

It is not the activity itself which is inherently wrong - that would not be maintainable under the big picture of the philosophy - but the manner of engaging in it (constant / endless) as opposed to the right amount (which may be none or a lot) depending on your circumstances. And no activity is going to have the same amount of pain and pleasure in it for everyone in every circumstance - not even for the same person at different times.

Reading that quote as a flat prohibition or even a sweeping preference would create a list of absolutes that would not be consistent with VS63 or more importantly with the absence of fate and supernatural gods and ideal forms - it would be handing down a list which applies to everyone, which violates the most basic view of how the universe operates.

Quote from Cassius

See I read that differently. I think he's saying not saying that everyone has to avoid those things completely, but that everyone has to evaluate their circumstances and options and preferences and decide exactly how much partying and fine food is going to be what they wish to pursue - for the more they pursue, if their circumstances do not allow it - the more pain they will suffer in cost. I put key emphasis on the "endless" adjective.

LOL. I don't think we read it that differently in the end in light of your explanation there.

He clearly didn't forbid attendance at drinking parties. He wrote a book entitled Symposium after all.

I too think the emphasis is on the "endless". And it doesn't really say that in the Greek. Here are my notes from my commentary:

οὐ συνείροντες (ou syneirontes) "not stringing together"

"not an endless string of drinking parties and festivals…"

Note that he doesn't say you can't attend drinking parties or take part in village festivals! He's saying life shouldn't be an "endless string" of them. That's going to lead to more pain than pleasure in the end.

συνείρω

only in pres. and imperf.

I. to string together, Lat. connectere, Ar., Plat.

II. to string words together, Dem., etc.: then, seemingly intr. (sub. λόγους) to speak on and on, go on without pausing, Xen.

PS. I still think this whole line of argument from him is a direct refutation of the Cyrenaics.