I'm inclined to think of hope and desire as degrees of the same thing. For a pop culture reference, consider the Ted Lasso episode "The Hope That Kills You". Any sports fan hopes that their team wins, but isn't that really a desire? And in that case, even a vain desire as they have no control over the outcome.
Likewise, do I desire world peace or hope for it?
BTW post #36 is a great start toward pinning down the details of desires v feelings!
I'm inclined to think of hope and desire as degrees of the same thing
I agree they're related, but I'm thinking they're not degrees but species of the same genus.
But of course that begs the question: What genus?
Here may be an interesting paper:
Sigh... It seems it may be instructive to read Aristotle's 2 Ethics: Nichomachean and Eudemian. It may need interesting to see how he categorized the pathē and what subdivisions he came up with. Even if Epicurus didn't agree with him in all things, Aristotle and Plato had a huge impact on Greek thought.
We know there aren't streams of atoms being generated as films impacting our minds. I'm pretty confident saying "know" there, too.
I am less confident, and think that we may eventually find particles flows that we don't currently know about, but I don't intend to get distracted on trying to explore that. I have enough to do exploring for intelligent space "gods" 
do I desire world peace or hope for it?
Excellent question! Hmmm...
I guess I would ask if you actually expect world peace to happen. Do you have an expectation that will actually occur? Or do you want it to happen with no real expectation that it will occur? If the former, I would call that hope/expectation/confidence. If the latter, I would call that a desire.
Sadly, I don't. But I hope that it does.
Sadly, I don't. But I hope that it does.
Well played there 
Display MoreFrom that table above, desire (epithymia) is a feeling of something that results in some pleasure. The opposite of desire is fear (phobos) which appears to be a feeling repelling against something that leads to pain.
I'm not sure I can get on board with the underlined part above. Lucian opposes fear to hope, which I think is nearer the mark;
And from this point, as Thucydides might say, the war takes its beginning. These ambitious scoundrels were quite devoid of scruples, and they had now joined forces; it could not escape their penetration that human life is under the absolute dominion of two mighty principles, fear and hope (ἐλπίδος καὶ φόβου) and that anyone who can make these serve his ends may be sure of a rapid fortune.
Which drives me on to my next (tentative) conclusion--that fear and hope are both kinds of desire. Desire is everything that happens when you see things as they are, and wish that they were different. When unscrupulous scoundrels prey on hope and fear, they prey on desire.
And now for the tricky part--if I defend my thesis that desire presents as a feeling of pain, how do I avoid the path that Cassius is rightly concerned about? In truth I don't think there's a real problem here, because I don't think that pain is necessarily "bad" or "evil". If I lean against a hot stove, I ought to be thankful that nature has furnished a biological alarm system warning me to move quickly, or risk serious injury. Rocks and gods and corpses can get by without pain, but not me--I need pain in order to go on living. Some rare people don't experience pain, and are at high risk for an early or sudden death;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Congenita…itivity_to_pain
Congenital insensitivity to pain (CIP), also known as congenital analgesia, is one or more extraordinarily rare conditions in which a person cannot feel (and has never felt) physical pain.[1] The conditions described here are separate from the HSAN group of disorders, which have more specific signs and cause. Because feeling physical pain is vital for survival, CIP is an extremely dangerous condition.[1] It is common for people with the condition to die in childhood due to injuries or illnesses going unnoticed.[1][2] Burn injuries are among the more common injuries.
So I don't want to lose the sensation of pain. I also very generally don't want to experience the sensation of pain--it's necessary, and very natural, but it doesn't feel good--I'd rather experience continuous pleasure.
I think it's like that with desire. I understand that I have a 2 or 3 pound mammalian brain, and that, having that, I am driven almost constantly by the desire for things that are likewise desired by nearly all other mammals--the desire for food, water, shelter, warmth, sex, rest, etc. In addition to these are the particularly human desires, cultivated by things like community engagement, culture, society, economics, etc.
I cannot fulfill all of my desires. Moreover, Epicurus recognized a tendency in us to develop new desires when we have worn out or satisfied the old ones. If desire is a kind of pain, as I argue, and if I cannot fulfill all of my desires, the question naturally arises as to what I should do about them. It is by no means obvious or self-evident that, because desire is a kind of pain, the only thing left to do is to spurn desire, suppress it, condemn it, or bury it in a hole. I have basically four options; I can try to fulfill them all, and inevitably fail. I can spit contempt on them all, and probably end up dead sooner than later. I can proceed more or less reactively and without a plan, satisfying the easy desires as they pass and seldom reaching far for the difficult ones. Or I can develop and establish a plan of choice and avoidance, with the goal of maximizing pleasurable outcomes over the course of a whole human life. Some desires will have to be put by; some will have to be vigorously rejected; some will be indulged for the sake of pleasure, and some other few will be made into something like a life's ambition--the desire which, well-chosen, will become the theme of a life well-lived.
Can we expect such an outcome from desire, if desire is a kind of pain? Why not? Pain is not nature's moral or judicial punishment--pain, like pleasure, is one of nature's guide-posts. Desire and pain direct us toward lives of pleasure and remembrance--the happy memory of all that we have come to enjoy in our lives. If there is an opposite to desire, then let that be it.
This is a really interesting topic and basically I agree with everything Joshua says here. I think "desire" must be a lack of something good (or at least something I perceive as good), and given that we're using pretty broad definitions of "pleasure" and "pain" here, that any lack must be a pain.
Hunger is a desire for food, and I think it is clearly a pain, even though it's one so easily satisfied for me that I rarely get to the point of actually registering the lack as pain.
I am interested to look more into the neuro side of things though. There is some neurological overlap between the experience of physical and emotional pain (and of course emotional pain can be manifested as physical symptoms) but I'm not sure how desire might register. I would also expect hope to be entirely different, but I'm interested to see if any studies have been done looking into any of these things
Elisabeth Kübler-Ross said that all emotions derive from fear and love. I'm wondering if gratitude might be an inverse of fear. Instead of pain from worrying about how things are, it's a pleasure from appreciating how things are.
Also I just saw there's a few more pages so sorry if I'm repeating others!
I think "desire" must be a lack of something good (or at least something I perceive as good), and given that we're using pretty broad definitions of "pleasure" and "pain" here, that any lack must be a pain.
Reneliza would you say that your sentence there boils down to "all desire is painful?" Would that cause you any issue to embrace that as a sweeping general statement?
Maybe we ought to be considering the dictionary definitions of "desire" today, and also follow Don's lead and take a position on what we think the word meant exactly to Epicurus. Otherwise we are likely to never gain much clarity.
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/desire
I think "desire" must be a lack of something good (or at least something I perceive as good), and given that we're using pretty broad definitions of "pleasure" and "pain" here, that any lack must be a pain.
Reneliza would you say that your sentence there boils down to "all desire is painful?" Would that cause you any issue to embrace that as a sweeping general statement?
Yes, I would agree with that, but with the understanding that some desires are painful at the level of noon-time hunger after a 9AM breakfast, and some are painful like losing a limb.
However - I do think I'm defining "desire" here as I do in everyday English, and it seems to likely be different than what Epicurus meant. At the same time, I'm defining pleasure and pain as I understand them from a broad Epicurean point of view and that mix-and-match may be complicating things. I don't have a desire for needs that are already met, only for things I'm lacking, and I'm not sure that's what he meant for this concept. I don't desire housing because I already have it. But if I was outside in a downpour, I would have a desire for shelter.
Maybe we ought to be considering the dictionary definitions of "desire" today, and also follow Don's lead and take a position on what we think the word meant exactly to Epicurus. Otherwise we are likely to never gain much clarity.
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/desire
well we crossposted but yes this corresponds well with my last post. I did also consult m-w.com before I posted haha
Having again consulted Merriam Webster, I think I view Epicurean "desire" as more closely akin to "concern" or "consideration" or even "interest" (noting that "concern" obviously has a negative connotation in most people's minds as a type of worry so it wouldn't be best for communication)
The difference to me is that a desire must necessarily be unmet. Once it's met, the desire goes away. But a consideration doesn't go away when it's met, it just isn't really at the forefront anymore. There are other considerations that are more important or interesting at the moment, due to being unmet.
Interest:
1.b. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/interest
1a: a feeling that accompanies or causes special attention to something or someone : CONCERN
b: something or someone that arouses such attention
Consideration:
2.a. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consideration
2a: a matter weighed or taken into account when formulating an opinion or plan
In reading the last few posts on desire being associated with pain, I personally find it disturbing to think my life would be motivated by pain. Desires are motivating factors. Maybe not the only ones and I admit I need to think about this more. But desires motivate us to take action. If desires are initiated by pain, then is my life motivated by pain?
I would rather think my life is motivated by an appetite to move toward pleasure. I realize that could simply be rephrased as "to move away from pain" to me it's a matter of emphasis and/or perspective. Am I concentrated on the pleasure or the pain?
All that said, Epicurus did write:
By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul.
I'm still not convinced that desire (epithymia/ orexis) necessarily involves pain but I'm not saying I have a cogent alternative at this point.
I'd like to propose again that a desire is not a pain, but it may produce pain or be a response to a pain.
To test a somewhat muddled analogy: fire is not a pain, but if you put your hand in it, it will lead to pain. Moving on from the analogy: if you keep your hand in the fire, you will have a desire (in this case a response to pain) to remove your hand from the fire. If someone offered you a large sum of money to keep your hand in the fire, the natural desire to remove your hand will be fighting with the (vain? depends on the circumstances) desire to get the money (choices and avoidances: which resultant pleasure/pain leads toward a better outcome?).
If desire is a pain, then per PD03 the limit of the magnitude of pleasure would include the removal of all desire. Is this what Epicurus had in mind? Then why would he describe natural and necessary desires? Does he say somewhere that gods have no desires?
Can we even experience pleasure without desire? Certainly we can by stumbling into something pleasurable. But Epicurus is very clear that prudence is of critical importance; this is how we live our lives with intention and not by chance.
As I recall from an experiment described in the book Dopamine Nation, rats with their dopamine blocked would starve to death. They weren't motivated by the pleasure of food or by the removal of the pain of hunger, but by dopamine. So if dopamine equates to desire (does it?) then it would clearly not be a pain or a pleasure. Desire would be a stimulus to action as opposed to pleasure and pain, which serve as guides to action and results of action. (OK I'm mixing modern and ancient here)
The concluding paragraph from the paper that Don posted previously in this thread:
"Without separating off emotions as such, Plato and Aristotle alert us to their compositional intricacy, which involves body and mind, cognition and desire, perception and feeling. Even the differences of interpretation to which scholars are resigned focus our minds upon the complexity of the phenomena, and their resistance to over-unitary definitions. Emotions, after all, are things that we feel; at the same time, emotionally is how we often think. Discarding too simple a Socratic focus upon contents of thought, Plato and Aristotle embrace the interconnections, within the emotions, of body and soul, and of perception, imagination, feeling, and thinking. Theirs was not the last word; but, after them, there was no going back to first words. We should still read them, for the reason that what demands clarification in them demands clarification in itself. The questions that they bring alive for us are our questions."
In other words, we've happened upon a very juicy topic 
PD 26 says "All desires that do not lead to pain when they remain unsatisfied are unnecessary, but the desire is
easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to obtain or the desires seem likely to produce harm."
So not all desires produce pain, so Epicurus concept of desire was not quite so black and white.
