Episode One Hundred Thirty Eight - Letter to Menoeceus 5 - Pleasure Part One

Excellent last three posts. Plus this may be my nomination for quote of the week :

Quote from Godfrey

If desire is a pain, then per PD03 the limit of the magnitude of pleasure would include the removal of all desire. Is this what Epicurus had in mind? Then why would he describe natural and necessary desires? Does he say somewhere that gods have no desires?

That is an excellent observation. Also:

Quote from Godfrey

n other words, we've happened upon a very juicy topic

Yes. I cannot imagine that this topic was not a major one in antiquity. And did it not have a relatively easy explanation in which the very concept of desire is tainted with the negativity of being a pain then I cannot imagine that it would have been embraced by so many Romans.

I don't know if we have the original Greek of the phrase that Martin Ferguson Smith translates as "desires that outrun the limits fixed by nature," and it appears that the "outrun" may be Ferguson's own insertion, but after a couple hours of thought I still think that is a very useful way of looking at it. And if that is the case only the desires for things which are impossible by nature (eternal life, a personal relationship with a supernatural God, etc) are unnatural and intrinsically bad (painful because they are impossible by law of nature to fulfill) and merit to be called "roots of evil." From that perspective, even a desire for the latest iphone or a new Tesla is not "unnatural" even though the ancients never envisioned them.

Don't let me get this thread off track with this comment about Mill thinking some pleasures are better than others vs Bentham taking an opposing view. I started a new thread for it here: John Stuart Mill on Epicurus

But I think perhaps this witticism from John Stuart Mill is relevant as to the "satisfaction" issue. Probably this is a tangent to pursue in the other thread, but the tension between "happiness" and "contentment" if he developed the argument might be interesting and worth tracking down his full statement of it. I think it is a a very bad idea and dead end to consider any ranking of pleasures as "absolute" (for everyone all the time). But if we use "better" in the relative sense of "I prefer this pleasure right now because it is more pleasing to me than another X pleasure" then I would think the point is very obvious and very relevant to the discussion of whether desiring pleasures other than the ones we hold at the current moment is painful or pleasurable or simply the natural human condition or what. If we feel desires, then at least some desires seem to be pleasurable (they are natural and I can reasonably hope to achieve them) and others painful (they are impossible and yearning for them only brings unfulfillment and pain).

Quote from John Stuart Mill

Mill's major contribution to utilitarianism is his argument for the qualitative separation of pleasures. Bentham treats all forms of happiness as equal, whereas Mill argues that intellectual and moral pleasures (higher pleasures) are superior to more physical forms of pleasure (lower pleasures). He distinguishes between happiness and contentment, claiming that the former is of higher value than the latter, a belief wittily encapsulated in the statement that, "it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question."[74]

Quote from reneliza

I see the concern here, but my thought is that "moving toward pleasure" and "moving away from pain" are not just closely related concepts, but literally exactly identical. If pleasure and pain are the only two feelings, then having less of one means more than the other. The only way to remove pain is to add pleasure. The only way to add pleasure is to remove pain. There is no neutral state in between. There is no intermediary. So life can't be motivated by pleasure without being motivated by pain as well (more of one, less of the other)

But if it's disturbing to think of being driven by a negative, then by all means say that you're motivated to move toward the pleasure found in fulfilling desire rather than ending the pain of desire. Because they're wholly equivalent, one just feels more positive because of perspective.

I think we're seeing in this discussion the difference between (1) making a philosophically logical point vs (2) making a psychologically helpful suggestion to someone struggling with basic issues of life.

Both have their place and proper circumstance, but if we take the statement that is appropriate for one situation and try to apply it to the other, we end up with something that is confusing, disconcerting, and on the face of it "wrong."

That's exactly what I think has been done with the entire issue of the "absence of pain" passages ever since the time of Cicero. Cicero was a lawyer who opposed Epicurean theory so he intentionally used this technique to score debating points and make it appear that Epicurus was logically inconsistent. Everything that ReneLiza says in her post is logically correct as to the identity of "absence of one" being the same as "presence of the other." That logical observation is helpful and necessary in establishing that there is a limit to the quantity of pleasure - the limit is when all pain is gone. And if you're concerned about the issue "Does Pleasure Have A Limit?" because you're debating pleasure with Plato and you have to establish that pleasure does have a "boundary stone," then you're doing a great job and can feel very satisfied that you have proved your point.

But that kind of philosophical debate is not the way that normal people talk, and if you try to talk with them that way you end up confusing them and looking impractical or even a fool.

So we have to find a way to articulate this problem to people who are reading Epicurus so that they are aware of it and can therefore reason themselves out of the way of the difficulty. People need to understand that many deep issues in Epicurus are not just friendly disagreements among people of good faith who are searching for the truth, but are in fact a philosophical war. Every Epicurean needs a helmet and to be ready to fight in it.

I will never forget the second paragraph of this review from Dewitt:

Cicero was a trial lawyer and in this allegations that Epicurus was being inconsistent he was intentionally misrepresenting Epicurean doctrine. Cicero had a brilliant mind and access to all the texts and Epicurean teachers and he could have chosen to explain Epicurus' viewpoint from a sympathetic and understandable "big picture" viewpoint. Instead, he chose to take these passages we are debating outside of their full context and hold them up as inconsistent and foolish.

If we aren't willing to take a stand ourselves and explain how these interpretations are misrepresenting the truth, then Cicero's arguments will continue to prevail, as they have prevailed for 2000 years already.

Quote from reneliza

Having just looked up PD26 (which I've read but then forgot) in preparation for next week, I'm more certain than ever that Epicurus was working with a different definition of desire than I am, since he says that the unnecessary desires cause no pain when unmet!

Great observation!

Yes let me place that thought in this thread. Given that by coincidence we are taking up PD26 at 8:30 PM eastern next Wednesday night, let's specifically invite everyone here to attend if they can so that we can have a major "DESIRE" extravaganza!

Thread

September 14, 2022 - Epicurean Zoom Gathering Topic - PD26 - "DESIRE"

Bailey: 26. Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled when the object is hard to procure, or they seem likely to produce harm.

**TΩΝ EΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ ****ΟΣAΙ ΜΗ EΠ AΛΓΟΥΝ EΠAΝAΓΟΥΣΙΝ ****EAΝ**

**ΜΗ ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΝ ****ΟΥΚ EΙΣΙΝ AΝAΓΚAΙAΙ ****AΛΛ' **

**EΥΔΙAΧΥTΟΝ ****TΗΝ ΟΡEΞΙΝ EΧΟΥΣΙΝ ****ΟTAΝ ΔΥΣΠΟΡΙΣTΩΝ**

**[ῌ] Η ΒΛAΒΗΣ AΠEΡΓAΣTΙΚAΙ ΔΟΞΩΣΙΝ ****EΙΝAΙ. **

“All desires that lead to no pain when they…

Cassius

September 8, 2022 at 10:27 AM

**TΩΝ EΠΙΘΥΜΙΩΝ ****ΟΣAΙ ΜΗ EΠ AΛΓΟΥΝ EΠAΝAΓΟΥΣΙΝ ****EAΝ**

**ΜΗ ΣΥΜΠΛΗΡΩΣΙΝ ****ΟΥΚ EΙΣΙΝ AΝAΓΚAΙAΙ ****AΛΛ' **

**EΥΔΙAΧΥTΟΝ ****TΗΝ ΟΡEΞΙΝ EΧΟΥΣΙΝ ****ΟTAΝ ΔΥΣΠΟΡΙΣTΩΝ**

**[ῌ] Η ΒΛAΒΗΣ AΠEΡΓAΣTΙΚAΙ ΔΟΞΩΣΙΝ ****EΙΝAΙ. **

Bailey: 26. Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled when the object is hard to procure, or they seem likely to produce harm.

“All desires that lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Yonge (1853)

“Some desires lead to no pain when they remain ungratified. All such desires are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Hicks (1910)

“All such desires as lead to no pain when they remain ungratified are unnecessary, and the longing is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to procure or when the desires seem likely to produce harm.” Hicks (1925)

“Of desires, all that do not lead to a sense of pain, if they are not satisfied, are not necessary, but involve a craving which is easily dispelled, when the object is hard to procure or they seem likely to produce harm.” Bailey (1926)

“Those desires that do not bring pain if they are not satisfied are not necessary; and they are easily thrust aside whenever to satisfy them appears difficult or likely to cause injury.” Geer (1964)

“Those desires that do not lead to pain, if they are not fulfilled, are not necessary. They involve a longing that is easily dispelled, whenever it is difficult to fulfill the desires or they appear likely to lead to harm.” O'Connor (1993)

“The desires which do not bring a feeling of pain when not fulfilled are not necessary; but the desire for them is easy to dispel when they seem to be hard to achieve or to produce harm.” Inwood & Gerson (1994)

“All desires which create no pain when unfulfilled are not necessary; such desires may easily be dispelled when they are seen as difficult to fulfill or likely to produce harm.” Anderson (2004)

“Of desires, those which do not bring one to pain if they remain unfulfilled are not necessary; such desires are actually accompanied by appetites that are easily defused: indeed, [this is evidently what happens] when it is thought difficult to find the means to satisfy [unnecessary desires] or when the desires themselves are thought to be productive of harm.” Makridis (2005)

“The desires that do not bring pain when they go unfulfilled are not necessary; indeed they are easy to reject if they are hard to achieve or if they seem to produce harm.” Saint-Andre (2008)

“All desires that do not lead to physical pain if not satisfied are unnecessary, and involve cravings that are easily resolved when they appear to entail harm or when the object of desire is hard to get.” Strodach (2012)

“All desires that do not lead to pain when unfulfilled are unnecessary, and such cravings are easily dissolved when the desired objects are hard to procure or are thought to do harm.” Mensch (2018)

“Any desires that do not lead to bodily pain if they are not fulfilled are not necessary; rather, the motivation they supply is readily dispelled whenever we believe they are difficult to satisfy or liable to result in harm.” White (2021)

Quote from reneliza

It's a lot easier to eliminate pain once you understand this. I am on the Epicurean subreddit and see many people trying to avoid both pain and pleasure (out of fear that pleasure will cause long term pain), and that's simply not possible. The only way to eliminate pain as they are trying to do is to move toward pleasure.

I think that is very close to identifying the real issue we are working to combat here. That's a very widespread notion. Why love (desire!) anything or anyone when you know that you could lose them or they could die before you do and cause you all sorts of pain? This is the topic Frances Wright tackled in Chapter 10. I am not sure she is correct to argue that we would not appreciate the good without the bad, but there is a lot to think about starting with "Should we, then, to avoid the evil, forego the good?"

Quote from Frances Wright

But there is yet a pain, which the wisest and the best of men cannot escape; that all of us, my sons, have felt, or have to feel. Do not your hearts whisper it? Do you not tell me, that in death there is yet a sting? That ere he aim at us, he may level the beloved of our soul? The father, whose tender care hath reared our infant minds — the brother, whom the same breast hath nourished, and the same roof sheltered, with whom, side by side, we have grown like two plants by a river, sucking life from the same fountain and strength from the same sun — the child whose gay prattle delights our ears, or whose opening understanding fixes our hopes — the friend of our choice, with whom we have exchanged hearts, and shared all our pains and pleasures, whose eye hath reflected the tear of sympathy, whose hand hath smoothed the couch of sickness. Ah! my sons, here indeed is a pain — a pain that cuts into the soul. There are masters that will tell you otherwise; who will tell you that it is unworthy of a man to mourn even here. But such, my sons, speak not the truth of experience or philosophy, but the subtleties of sophistry and pride. He who feels not the loss, hath never felt the possession. He who knows not the grief, hath never known the joy. See the price of a friend in the duties we render him, and the sacrifices we make to him, and which, in making, we count not sacrifices, but pleasures. We sorrow for his sorrow; we supply his wants, or, if we cannot, we share them. We follow him to exile. We close ourselves in his prison; we soothe him in sickness; we strengthen him in death: nay, if it be possible, we throw down our life for his. Oh! What a treasure is that for which we do so much! And is it forbidden to us to mourn its loss? If it be, the power is not with us to obey.

Should we, then, to avoid the evil, forego the good? Shall we shut love from our hearts, that we may not feel the pain of his departure? No; happiness forbids it. Experience forbids it. Let him who hath laid on the pyre the dearest of his soul, who hath washed the urn with the bitterest tears of grief — let him say if his heart hath ever formed the wish that it had never shrined within it him whom he now deplores. Let him say if the pleasures of the sweet communion of his former days doth not still live in his remembrance. If he love not to recall the image of the departed, the tones of his voice, the words of his discourse, the deeds of his kindness, the amiable virtues of his life. If, while he weeps the loss of his friend, he smiles not to think that he once possessed him. He who knows not friendship, knows not the purest pleasure of earth. Yet if fate deprive us of it, though we grieve, we do not sink; Philosophy is still at hand, and she upholds us with fortitude. And think, my sons, perhaps in the very evil we dread, there is a good; perhaps the very uncertainty of the tenure gives it value in our eyes; perhaps all our pleasures take their zest from the known possibility of their interruption. What were the glories of the sun, if we knew not the gloom of darkness? What the refreshing breezes of morning and evening, if we felt not the fervors of noon? Should we value the lovely-flower, if it bloomed eternally; or the luscious fruit, if it hung always on the bough? Are not the smiles of the heavens more beautiful in contrast with their frowns, and the delights of the seasons more grateful from their vicissitudes? Let us then be slow to blame nature, for perhaps in her apparent errors there is hidden a wisdom. Let us not quarrel with fate, for perhaps in our evils lie the seeds of our good. Were our body never subject to sickness, we might be insensible to the joy of health. Were our life eternal, our tranquillity might sink into inaction. Were our friendship not threatened with interruption, it might want much of its tenderness. This, then, my sons, is our duty, for this is our interest and our happiness; to seek our pleasures from the hands of the virtues, and for the pain which may befall us, to submit to it with patience, or bear up against it with fortitude. To walk, in short, through life innocently and tranquilly; and to look on death as its gentle termination, which it becomes us to meet with ready minds, neither regretting the past, nor anxious for the future.”

It is unclear to me exactly how Godfrey and I ended up on close to the same page, but it appears to me that is the direction things are taking.

Quote from Godfrey

For me, desire is intricately tied to both pain and pleasure; it can have elements of either or both.

Just to keep things lively, I would carry that forward and say "For me, desire is intricately tied to life itself."

If you don't actively have desires, you aren't alive, and I would analogize the absolute minimizing of all desire to being on the very doorstep of death - such a person might still be be breathing and conscious, but if he has no desire of any kind, not even for the continuation of life, then that is what I would expect to observe in a hospital who has lost the battle against some disease and who is totally ready to die. (Leaving aside for the moment that such a person might indeed desire death.)

That's why it is essential to establish the initial presumption that not all desire is inherently painful and something to be minimized.

So therefore I would say that the Epicurean gods have desires as well -- all of which are presumably met. Which is not to say that Epicurean gods are omnipotent and can do anything and everything, but that they are smart enough not to have desires for things which are impossible by nature.

This is my vote for best summary statement so far:

Quote from Godfrey

For me, desire is intricately tied to both pain and pleasure; it can have elements of either or both. My practical Epicurean take is that desire provides the stimulus to action, while pleasure/pain provides guidance in how to act. Practice involves being aware of and responsive to all of these: desire, pleasure, and pain.

Except I would delete the "for me" and render it more firmly something like:

Quote from "Collective Genius" of the EpicureanFriends Forum

Desire is intricately tied to both pain and pleasure; it can have elements of either or both. Desire provides the stimulus to action, while pleasure/pain provides guidance in how to act. Epicurean practice involves being aware of and responsive to all of these: desire, pleasure, and pain. The advice of Epicurus to consider whether desires are natural and necessary is a call to consider the full results of pursuing any desire so as to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, not a call to minimize all desire.

Edit: I checked Don's post 36 to see if there is anything in that list that needs to be added to such a really simple summary statement. On first glance I don't know that there is. There are some important points in 36 about voluntary vs automatic but I am not sure those really fit in addressing the main point, which is the issue of how to avoid the implication that ALL desire needs to be avoided/minimized. However if Don or someone sees something pithy to add, please say so. I would eventually like to take a paragraph like the above and add it to the summary outline on page one. We can link to this thread for the full discussion of the extra details of the varying opinions. Link to post 36: RE: Episode One Hundred Thirty Eight - Letter to Menoeceus 5 - Pleasure Part One