Episode One Hundred Forty-One - Proclaiming Epicurus To The World: Diogenes of Oinoanda (Part One)

Quote

Epicureanism found the field most favorable for expansion in the East, especially Asia Minor and Palestine. It was late arriving in Italy but spread rapidly in the last century of the republic. The movement was fully matured before the poem of Lucretius was published.

-Notes on the History of Epicureanism, by Norman DeWitt

For anyone who's interested, here is the Greek text for the inscription:

DCLP/Trismegistos 865216 = LDAB 865216

Check this out, too:

L'inscription philosophique d'Oenoanda - Persée

It has drawings of the fragments of the inscription!

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

For anyone who's interested, here is the Greek text for the inscription:

DCLP/Trismegistos 865216 = LDAB 865216

And that's exactly what we need to address Kalosyni's question! Thank you!

Fragment 2, column 6, lines 5-14

γύρω ματαίως [κ]ατ[έχον-]

τας ἡμᾶς φόβους [ἀ-]

πελυσάμεθα, ⁦ vac. 1⁩ τῶν τε

λυπῶν τὰς μὲν κ̣εν̣ὰ̣ς

ἐξεκόψαμεν εἰς τέ-

λειον, ⁦ vac. 1⁩ τὰς δ̣ὲ φυσικὰς

εἰς μεικρὸν κομιδῇ

συνεστείλαμεν, ἐλα-

χιστιαῖον αὐτῶν τ̣[ὸ]

μέγεθος ποι̣ή̣σ̣α̣[ντες]

λυπῶν τὰς μὲν κ̣εν̣ὰ̣ς = lypōn tas men kenas

λυπῶν = pain (of mind or body), suffering, affliction, distress

κ̣εν̣ὰ̣ς = same word used throughout Epicureanism for void, empty, groundless, vain, etc.

So the Wall of Diogenes of Oinoanda may be the only place where we see the idea of "pains which are groundless", and "pains which are natural"?

Cassius, I want give you credit for your mentioning the following idea:

The phrasing at the end of fragment 1, "pleasure / pain" is not being differentiated from "desire for pleasure / pain" so he must be talking loosely. If you feel pain there is always a reason for that pain, and the desire to remove that pain -- so that is how we get either groundless or natural

So this wording on the wall is a quick way to wrap up the whole idea quickly.

I was curious to see where Epicurus uses λύπη "pain, distress, etc" or its variants elsewhere and found:

PD3 Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δ’ ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθ’ ὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον.

The limit of the magnitude of pleasure (is) the whole of the removal of that which causes pain. Where that which gives pleasure exists, during the time it is present, there is neither pain nor that which causes pain in body or *in the mind* nor either of these together. ( Don)

PD10 Εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ [τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν] ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τούς [τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων], ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐδίδασκεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴχομεν ὅ τι μεμψαίμεθα αὐτοῖς, πανταχόθεν ἐκπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ὅ περ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν.

If the things that produced the delights of those who are decadent washed away the mind’s fears about astronomical phenomena and death and suffering, and furthermore if they taught us the limits of our pains and desires, then we would have no complaints against them, since they would be filled with every joy and would contain not a single pain or distress (and that’s what is bad). (Saint-Andre)

Menoikeus 125

οὐθὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ ζῆν δεινὸν τῷ κατειληφότι γνησίως τὸ μηθὲν ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ μὴ ζῆν δεινόν. ὥστε μάταιος ὁ λέγων δεδιέναι τὸν θάνατον οὐχ ὅτι λυπήσει παρών, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι λυπεῖ μέλλων. ὃ γὰρ παρὸν οὐκ ἐνοχλεῖ, προσδοκώμενον κενῶς λυπεῖ. τὸ φρικωδέστατον οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὁ θάνατος οὐθὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἐπειδήπερ ὅταν μὲν ἡμεῖς ὦμεν, ὁ θάνατος οὐ πάρεστιν· ὅταν δ᾽ ὁ θάνατος παρῇ, τόθ᾽ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἐσμέν. οὔτε οὖν πρὸς τοὺς ζῶντάς ἐστιν οὔτε πρὸς τοὺς τετελευτηκότας, ἐπειδήπερ περὶ οὓς μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, οἱ δ᾽ οὐκέτι εἰσίν.

For there is nothing terrible in living for the one who truly comprehends that there is nothing terrible in not living. So, the one who says death is to be feared is foolish, not that there will be pain and distress when it is present but that there is pain in anticipation; because that which is present does not trouble, disquiet, or annoy, and anticipation itself pains and distresses one fruitlessly. Death, that which causes utter horror, which causes one to shudder, that "most utterly horrifying of pains" as it is understood by the hoi polloi, then is nothing to us. On the one hand, at the time when we are (that is while we are living), death is not present; on the other hand, whenever death is present, then we are not (that is, we don't exist). Death is neither a concern for those who are living nor for those whose lives are ended.

I found κενῶς λυπεῖ interesting because one of the best ways to translate that is "distressing one fruitlessly" which may give a sense of Diogenes' wall.

I'm joining late as I've had post-booster brain fog for most of the day.

Quote

These medicines we have put [fully] to the test; for we have dispelled the fears [that grip] us without justification, and, as for pains, those that are groundless we have completely excised, while those that are natural we have reduced to an absolute minimum, making their magnitude minute.

The way that I read Epicurus, as a Feeling a pain can never be groundless, nor can a pleasure. All pains and pleasures are natural and are true. Only what leads to a pain or a pleasure can be groundless. Also, if some desires are to be considered pains, some must also be considered pleasures. But to do that invites Ciceronian obfuscation and should be avoided.

So, using multiple explanations, since I'm not very familiar with Diogenes: 1) Don has probably the best explanation in the previous post. 2) Diogenes seems like an enthusiastic student and not a teacher, so his terminology may be looser than we're accustomed to from the other extant texts. 3) It could be that Joshua is correct and desires are pains. To some extent this is correct, but with all due respect I don't see this as being what Epicurus was saying. 4) It could also be that by the time of Diogenes, EP had evolved to include desires as pains.

Until we have more evidence, my guess is that the wording comes partly from the translator and partly from the use by Diogenes of less specific word choices.

Quote from Cassius

I. sorry if I missed it but Don did you agree with MFS' translation? I don't see any brackets there so preumably this part is not reconstructed (?)

Yes, I'd agree with Smith and your assumption that this part is not reconstructed. Using that French link, we can see that large stretches of the wall are actually intact.

In looking at Menoikeus 125 in conjunction with the wall, I'm definitely leaning toward seeing "τῶν τε λυπῶν τὰς μὲν κ̣εν̣ὰ̣ς ἐξεκόψαμεν" as referring to completely excising pains that are fruitlessly or unnecessarily experienced. Those pains that one needlessly experiences, probably stemming from trying to satisfy groundless desires.

Quote from Don

I'm definitely leaning toward seeing "τῶν τε λυπῶν τὰς μὲν κ̣εν̣ὰ̣ς ἐξεκόψαμεν" as referring to completely excising pains that are fruitlessly or unnecessarily experienced.

Those pains that one needlessly experiences, probably stemming from trying to satisfy groundless desires.

This does bring up the additive vs the subtractive. The word "desires" has a sound of adding in something. Where as "removing pains" is getting rid of something. I think all of this is open to further contemplation. We are going to be engaging in choices and avoidances that sometimes are one and sometimes are the other. And we may have differences in which direction we tend to go in (removing pain/adding in pleasure). We will be on the right track, as long as our choices are not bringing great pain (bad results).

Quote from Kalosyni

The word "desires" has a sound of adding in something. Where as "removing pains" is getting rid of something.... And we may have differences in which direction we tend to go in (removing pain/adding in pleasure).

Kalosyni could you elaborate on this? Are you saying that desires add in pleasures? Or that desires equate to pleasures? Or desires are additional to pleasures and pains? I'm not clear as to what you're thinking here.

Another explanation to add to my post 14 above:

5) Since the purpose of the inscription was evangelism, saying that we've excised and minimized pains is much more appealing to the average passersby than saying we've excised and minimized desires. Working with desires is a way that pain can be minimized, but that detail can come later.

Quote from Godfrey

Are you saying that desires add in pleasures? Or that desires equate to pleasures? Or desires are additional to pleasures and pains?

There are some desires for adding in experience of sweetness and enjoyablenes, and there are some desires which are to stop the experience of pain. Eating chocolate cake is a desire which brings in extra stimulation beyond just the removal of hunger -- and if it was just for removal of hunger then we could eat bread instead of cake. If we eat too much cake we may start to feel overly full, and so we then stop eating cake to stop the discomfort. But there are other desires for additive pleasures besides just eating cake.

And some people may be more oriented (motivated) to stop pain rather than seek pleasure. For example a person who calls up a friend to talk because they feel lonely (and want to remove the pain of loneliness) vs a person who calls up a friend because they enjoy telling jokes and laughing together (desire for adding in fun).

Quote from Godfrey

Since the purpose of the inscription was evangelism, saying that we've excised and minimized pains is much more appealing to the average passersby than saying we've excised and minimized desires. Working with desires is a way that pain can be minimized, but that detail can come later.

lol -- this made me laugh, and yet there could be truth to it. But of course this brings up the whole "tranquility problem" -- which for me seems unresolvable. To be tranquil or not to be tranquil - perhaps we have to move beyond the "either/or" -- because sometimes we will take on pains if future pleasures will be greater.