Can Determinism Be Reconciled With Epicureanism? (Admin Edit - No, But Let's Talk About Why Not)

I'm going to resurrect this thread since I think there are some good, thought-provoking points, and it mentions Sapolsky who recently came out with an even more provocative book than Behave:

Determined
A SCIENCE OF LIFE WITHOUT FREE WILL

Determined by Robert M. Sapolsky: 9780525560975 | PenguinRandomHouse.com: Books

The instant New York Times bestseller “Excellent…Outstanding for its breadth of research, the liveliness of the writing, and the depth of humanity it…

www.penguinrandomhouse.com

There's also a recent Clear and Vivid episode:

Robert Sapolsky: You Have No Choice - Clear+Vivid with Alan Alda

Learn to connect better with others in every area of your life. Immerse yourself in spirited conversations with people who know how hard it is, and yet how…

pca.st

The points earlier in the thread of determinism vs fatalism are very pertinent to this discussion. So, here we go again.... Discuss.... More later from me.

Quote

....Now, in Determined, Sapolsky takes his argument all the way, mounting a brilliant (and in his inimitable way, delightful) full-frontal assault on the pleasant fantasy that there is some separate self telling our biology what to do.

Determined offers a marvelous synthesis of what we know about how consciousness works—the tight weave between reason and emotion and between stimulus and response in the moment and over a life. One by one, Sapolsky tackles all the major arguments for free will and takes them out, cutting a path through the thickets of chaos and complexity science and quantum physics, as well as touching ground on some of the wilder shores of philosophy. He shows us that the history of medicine is in no small part the history of learning that fewer and fewer things are somebody’s “fault”; for example, for centuries we thought seizures were a sign of demonic possession.

Yet, as he acknowledges, it’s very hard, and at times impossible, to uncouple from our zeal to judge others and to judge ourselves. Sapolsky applies the new understanding of life beyond free will to some of our most essential questions around punishment, morality, and living well together. By the end, Sapolsky argues that while living our daily lives recognizing that we have no free will is going to be monumentally difficult, doing so is not going to result in anarchy, pointlessness, and existential malaise. Instead, it will make for a much more humane world.

I underlined two statements for comment:

(1) As I understand it Epicurus would certainly not assert that there is "some separate self telling our biology what to do." Epicurus is much more like "we are the sum of our biology and that sum has the ability to make choices affecting its life."

(2) "Making for a much more humane world" always seems to be at the bottom of attacks on free will, with the goal of nothing being anyone's "fault." In other words, this debate is usually driven by ethical issues rather than simply wanting to know more about "natural science." Where there is no "fault" and no "credit" there can be no praise and blame, which are essential to an Epicurean understanding of the workings of people in society. As Fernando brought up in our discussion last night, there is always the question of the fact that different people have different feelings of pleasure, and it is essential to think about how to reconcile what we think are the requirements of our feelings vs those of others.

Does the Epicurean want to fly to the stars for the pleasure of doing so, or does the Epicurean prefer to stay home where he is safe? Does the Epicurean who wants to fly to the stars stay home so that he can devote his resources to feeding and clothing people on the other side of the world who he's never met?

My view is that the answer to those questions from an Epicurean viewpoint has to start with the premise that there is no supernatural god, and there is no Platonic ideal, that gives every person the same answer to such questions. Not only is there no right and wrong course that every Epicurean / wise person should follow in every situation, the real heart of the matter is seeing why it is wrong to even consider the possibility that there might be inflexible and absolute ethical commandments for all persons, all times, and all places.

As also was stated yesterday, Epicurean philosophy doesn't consist of or lead to a set of "Ten Commandments." The way the Principal Doctrines are written is much different than those alleged tablets from Mount Sinai. Epicurus tells us what "is" about pleasure and pain, and then we have to go about applying it to our own circumstances.

And liking certain things (and "praising" them) and disliking other things (and "blaming" them) is what pleasure and pain are all about.

Don have you read Sam Harris' book "Free Will" published in 2012?

Free Will (book) - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

I wonder if the only thing new in the Sapolsky book is more detailed science. I did not listen to the audio link, and likely will not because after reading Sam Harris' book, I came to my own conclusion regarding this problem.

As soon as we think or speak the words "there is no free will" then it leads to thoughts and words such as either "I have no control over my life" or "I have very little control over my life" and then that leads to further problems and likely a very negative attitude.

So then I must take for my own awareness and my own belief for my self and my body that "I have choices and the power to make choices", but other people are outside of my power - and I cannot hold other human beings to "free will" because they are outside of my personal power to make choices.

But also, we know that some things happen through the power of our choice and some things happen due to chance. Not everything is under our control, but with an optimistic attitude we can go much further with a belief that we have the power to act. And we need to be grounded in reality so as to be clear about the things in the world and in life that we do have the ability to affect and act upon.

Quote from Kalosyni

Sam Harris' book "Free Will" published in 2012

VS09. Necessity is an evil, but there is no necessity to live under the control of necessity.

VS40. He who asserts that everything happens by necessity can hardly find fault with one who denies that everything happens by necessity; by his own theory this very argument is voiced by necessity.

++++++++++++++++++++

The full pdf of Daniel Dennett’s (to my mind, quite cogent and devastating) refutation of Harris can be downloaded here: https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/…/rifp.2017.0018. Interestingly, Dennett mentions Lucretius’ “swerve.”

Here is an interesting case where Dennett challenges Harris’ claim to have no control over his desires:

Harris: “And there is no way I can influence my desires – for what tools of influence would I use? Other desires?”

Dennett: “Yes, for starters.”

+++++++++++++++++++++

Because of the confusions among various understandings of “free will” (which Dennett addresses) I prefer the term “constrained choice” or “constrained agency” – that is, although facing causal/situational constraints (including endogenous ones, such as native intelligence or ability), nevertheless we have positive agency. That seems to be a version of “compatibilism.”

Quote from Pacatus

Because of the confusions among various understandings of “free will” (which Dennett addresses) I prefer the term “constrained choice” or “constrained agency” – that is, although facing causal/situational constraints (including endogenous ones, such as native intelligence or ability), nevertheless we have positive agency. That seems to be a version of “compatibilism.”

I can understand that the corruptions of religious thinking have caused this area of discussion to require lots of hedging.

However from my admittedly "man on the street" Epicurean perspective, I get a strong feeling that the advocates of the position that Epicurus was embracing have gone far too much on the defensive. The pendulum of the discussion on this has swung far too much in the direction of accommodating the hard determinists, with the result that they monopolize the discussion and the common-sense support that ordinary people need is lacking.

It seems to me that Epicurus was "in-your-face" on this issue (as he was on others), and that he was trying to drive the point home with his "it would be better to believe in the myths of the religions" than to follow the path of the hard determinists. When it is better to believe a lie than to believe an error, the error must be pretty damaging!

I am glad that Don brought this up because it is a reminder that the determinists have held the initiative on this subject for far too long. Dennett seems to be the main one fighting this issues, and it deserves books from more people with a non-religious but Epicurean "in your face" strong reaction to it.

Quote from Cassius

I can understand that the corruptions of religious thinking have caused this area of discussion to require lots of hedging.

Agreed. We have a lot of focus on defining our terms here, for clear understanding, and maybe it would have been better for me to say "This is what I mean, in practical terms, by a reasonable version of free will." Or something like that.

First off I'd like to point out that most people who point to quantum physics do not actually apply it properly, and secondly that ALOT of it is not hard science but theoretical. So the author is basing assumption on assumptions. Mathematicians (Theoretical Physicists) in-particular love a deterministic universe because it makes maths easier when they don't have to account for any variations, it's the reason for short cuts like the blackbody.

As to whether or not determinism is Epicurean, it is not. I'm just gonna end this now, with a single statement. So long as we accept that the swerve exists, determinism does not. In fact this is the very purpose of the swerve to free us from the tyranny of determinists.

You can look at modern determinism, ethically, from 2 points of view, neither of which I like, nor should be advocated by any rational person.

First the Victimhood argument. That people are not responsible for their actions because of -insert any irrational emotion based argument here- and since it's all predetermined by said factor we should let them get away with whatever terrible behavior they are engaged in because they have no choice. When the opposite should be true for any rational being. If we know that factor x in our life may push us toward an undesirable outcome, we should adjust our-self accordingly to avoid said outcome. IE If you are predisposed to addictive behavior you should avoid alcohol, drugs, gambling, etc. Not doing so is a choice, no one puts a drink in your hand, unless someone actually did then you need to get better friends.

Secondly the Facist argument. The idea that behavioral genetics can identify undesirable elements and since we are just biological machines that cannot deviate from our programming those people should be treated as guilty and removed from society before they have a chance to cause harm.

Determinism is inherently nihilistic, in that your happiness is not in your control but predetermined, which is contrary to literally everything that Epicurus taught.

I like your post DavidN and I'd like to add slightly different perspective for you all to consider.

Whether we live under the impression of free will in deterministic universe or live having free will in indeterministic universe ultimately is indistinguishable for us humans. To be able to experience determinism one would require computational power we humans simply don't possess. Due to our limitations even if the universe is perfectly determined from start to finish, we have no option to experience the universe this way. In other words, even if we are part of a complete information game we are only capable of playing the game as if it would be an incomplete information game.

My point is, there are aspects of our reality where existence of something or lack of it does not change our situation a bit. In deterministic universe we live like we have free will; in indeterministic universe we have free will. The outcome for humans is the same. I can illustrate my point with more examples of the same outcomes despite opposite realities. Epicurean gods exist but we cannot have interaction with them equals to epicurean gods do not exist. Multiverse is a thing but we have no access to any of its infinite universes equals to there's only one universe. John Smith got his innate intelligence tested and now he knows it equals to 83 of whatever-units-of-intelligence. And now what? He's 83. Cool. He can't do anything with this knowledge. He can't be smarter nor he can be dumber.

Thinking and talking about things like these is very pleasant and intellectually stimulating but I personally wouldn't organize my life around (in)determinism; (lack of)gods; (multi/uni)verse or my (in)ability to connect dots better than John Smith.

Hi, everybody. You know that I sympathise with Hard Incompatibilism (the idea that we don't have free will nor moral responsibility).

The debate is: we human beings assume that we are free to choose what we do and we assume that every event in the universe can be explained by prior causes. For incompatibilists these to assumptions are, evidently, incompatible. Those who affirm that we are free and responsible (so that the world is indeterministic) are libertarians (traditionally in the debate Epicurus is considered a libertarian).
Those who defend that every event has prior causes are determinists.
Compatibilist think that, in fact, both assumptions are compatible: we can affirm that we have free will and we are moral responsible in a deterministic world. I think Epicurus is not a compatibilist.

Hard Incompatibilism says that if the world is deterministic or indeterministic is the same: we have no free will, nor we are morally responsible.

1. I'd like to suggest a question: why the burden of proof is on the side of skeptics of free will and not the other way.

2. Kalosyni , I think you mention something about the capacity of control. The idea of deterministic views is that that capacity can be explained scientifically by previous causes. From my perspective, accepting determinsim doesn't need to imply that you have to be in your house doing nothing. Instead, implies to understand that you are not exempt to the chains of causes in the universe. If the notion of "agency", as Martin prefers to refer instead of "free will", is associated with self-control, I guess determinism would say that agency can be explained. So, agency would not incompatible with determinism. But, I don't know what Martinthinks.

2. Cassius, the ethical worry is one of the motivations but not the justification:

Quote from Cassius

In other words, this debate is usually driven by ethical issues rather than simply wanting to know more about "natural science."

The debate is metaphysical with ethical implications. Philosophers want to know in favor of which conclusion we have better arguments. The same applies to the metaphysical question on the existence of God, universals, the existence of time, and so on. So, the main reasons to accept determinism, compatibilism or libertarianism are metaphysical not ethical.
3. TauPhi, the ethical implications bring up consequences on our human practices. In a world in which we accept as a fact that we are free and responsible of our actions we consider that rewards, punishments, jail, gratitude, resentment, guilt, proud, and others, are justified. If we thought differently, we'd have reasons to change those practices. Effectively, as Peter Strawson argues, we have reactive attitudes (guilt, resentment, proud, forgiveness, gratitude, etc.) and it's hard to feel differently when we interact with other people. However, our practices can be unjustified anyway.
4. DavidN, your reconstructions are straw-man fallacies. The Victimhood argument particularly, besides being more ironic than descriptive, goes into revictimization. Addictions, for example, are public health problems, not a mere matter of choice.
The chapter dedicated to Quantum Mechanics in Determined I think is very reasonable. Do you think was simplistic?
5. I highly recommend to read Sapolsky's Behave, even more than Determined in order to understand his point. Sapolsky offers a reconstruction of the causes of behaviour. The evidence he finds obvioulsy is not conclusive, but he adds to the debate the picture some people need to see how strongly, using Pacatus terms, our decisions are constrained.

I believe that Epicurean philosophy and Free Will Skepticism can be reconciled, but in order to do so I will need a deeper understanding of both things and a better capacity to explain my ideas.

Very in-depth post Onenski!

So why do you not consider your position to be hard determinism? (I see you called it "hard incompatibilism.")

A quick comment before i turn in for the night is that it seems to me that Epicurus thought that "reality' is what we perceive (or experience might be better word). And as I think has already been mentioned by several people in several ways, we perceive that we have the ability to make choices.

Even dreams are real from that perspective - anything that affects us is real; anything that does not affect us is unreal to us.

While I appreciate that it makes sense to look for physical explanations to back up that position (that we have the ability to make choices), in the end it seems to me the force of Epicurus' position comes from the opposite approach from that which draws some people to determinism.

Rather than looking for reasons not to praise or blame, it seems to me that if I think that my life is short I want to make the very most of it that I can. From that perspective, my first and really only concern is that which affects me in some way. What other people do can definitely affect me, and it really doesn't make any difference *why* they do what they do - if it pleases me I should react appropriately; if it displeases me I should act appropriately. Of course the meaning of "appropriately" is going to be entirely contextual, but I would not consider it helpful to my own or to other people's lives to consider myself or them to be unable to make choices.

Thanks for your answer, Cassius.

Quote from Cassius

So why do you not consider your position to be hard determinism? (I see you called it "hard incompatibilism.")

"Hard incompatibilism" is Derk Pereboom's position and it means that whether the world is deterministic of indeterministic, we don't have free will. Another possible term is "Skeptic of free will".

Quote from Cassius

it seems to me that Epicurus thought that "reality' is what we perceive (or experience might be better word). And as I think has already been mentioned by several people in several ways, we perceive that we have the ability to make choices.

Well, reality is more than what we perceive, because, as you usually recall, Epicurus thought that we can infer the existence of things that we can't perceive.

That, I hope, also means that we can be wrong in our experiences. Think about Müller-Lyer illusions: we can't stop "perceiving" two equal lines with opposing arrows as if they were different in magnitude. The same happens with other illusions, like that of the Sun going around the Earth because we see it rising every morning. Or the size of the Sun or the Moon. Indeed, we can infer the real nature of the world and see that we were wrong with those illusions.

Psychological facts can also be explained and criticize in that way. Beliefs are the product of a complex net of personal experience, culture, and a lot of other factors. Belief in free will can be an illusion too (we don't know it, but we can't assume it isn't just because).

Quote from Cassius

Of course the meaning of "appropriately" is going to be entirely contextual, but I would not consider it helpful to my own or to other people's lives to consider myself or them to be unable to make choices

The idea of Free Will Skepticism it's not that people don't make choices. The idea is that those choices are not independent of prior causes (in fact, that they are constrained totally, even if we don't see it). People will keep making choices, the difference will be how independent they think they are.

1. Well then Onenski what is your definition of "free will?"
2. What is your view of the word "agency?"
3. Though it appears to be a scholium, what is your view of the passage "with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity and some by chance, and some are within our control..."?

Kalosyni I have not read Harris's book. On my list but not yet.

Here's a debate between Dennett and Sapolsky. Skimmed thru but applicable.

Here is the section from Letter to Menoeceus (Saint Andre translation) that is relevant to this discussion:

"For he holds that we are responsible for what we achieve, even though some things happen by necessity, some by chance, and some by our own power, because although necessity is not accountable he sees that chance is unstable whereas the things that are within our power have no other master, so that naturally praise and blame are inseparably connected to them. [note] Indeed he sees that it would be better even to cleave to the myths about the gods (since that leaves some hope of prevailing upon them through worship) than to be subject to the destiny of the scientists (since that way lies an inexorable necessity). [note] And such a man holds that Fate is not a god (as most people believe) because a god does nothing disorderly, and he holds that Fate is not an uncertain cause because nothing good or bad with respect to a completely happy life is given to men by chance, although it does provide the beginnings of both great goods and great evils."

Quote from Don

Kalosyni I have not read Harris's book. On my list but not yet.

Hey Don - You started this latest iteration of the Determinism saga and then you never weighed in yourself!!!

Quote from Cassius

1. Well then Onenski what is your definition of "free will?"

There two main ways to understand free will on the debate: leeway freedom (for incompatibilism: deterministic and libertarian) and source freedom (for compatibilists).

Leeway freedom: it's the capacity to have acted otherwise. Suppose, for a moment, that there are a chain of events caused by other events. That chain leads to the event that I will choose a strawberry ice cream. If I had leeway freedom, I'd be able to choose strawberry, chocolate, vanilla or any other, or doing something else. That is, prior events don't determine what I'm going to do.

Source freedom. I think it's more related to agency. The idea is that from the fact that people is the source of their intentional actions, we can attribute responsibility to them. The best way to understand it is with the famous Frankfurt cases.

Imagine that there's a scientific who implants a chip in my brain. He knows that I want to kill James, but to be sure the chip will activate if I stop in the last moment. So if I don't shoot, the chip will activate and I will shoot anyway. It results that I kill James, so the chip wasn't activated. The argument is that I couldn't do otherwise, but I'm responsible for my action, because I intentionally did it.

The majority of philosophers think that leeway freedom is very hard to defend, so they prefer compatibilism and a kind of source freedom.

Sapolsky's book, by the way, doesn't touch compatibilism. That's why so many philosophers think it's not a serious objection to moral responsibility.

Is I said, Epicurus is usually considered a libertarian, so it can be interpreted that he was in favor of leeway freedom.

Quote from Cassius

2. What is your view of the word "agency?"

I share a very broad concept from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Quote

In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. The philosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and a standard theory of action. The former construes action in terms of intentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events.

So, I understand that an agent is a subject who can act intentionally. There's not a contradiction with Free Will Skepticism.

Quote from Cassius

3. Though it appears to be a scholium, what is your view of the passage "with us lies the chief power in determining events, some of which happen by necessity and some by chance, and some are within our control..."?

I think that, as TauPhi sometimes recalls, there are aspects of the ancient thought that we can, and will never be able to, understand. We don't know exactly how Epicurus understood the debate and arguments on determinism and freedom. Possibly he thought it in terms of Fate (like in ancient tragedies). Fatalism is not the same that determinism and if he thought they were the same, I'd understand why he was so against it. (I doubt about this possibility because, supposedly, he knew very well Democritus' philosophy.)

In any case, my personal opinion on that passage of the Letter to Menoeceus, is that he's talking superficially (because is just a letter and it's about ethics).

He recognizes the distinction that it's present in other philosophers, including the Stoics: there are things in my control, and things beyond my control. Those beyond my control include necessity and chance (this one make sense with the introduction of the swerve).

I hope I answered clearly. Free will Skepticism can be a very sofisticated and interesting point of view, and I'm thankful that there's a thread on how epicureanism can be reconciled with it. I wish I can make a better contribution later.

Quote from Cassius

Quote from Don

Kalosyni I have not read Harris's book. On my list but not yet.

Hey Don - You started this latest iteration of the Determinism saga and then you never weighed in yourself!!!

Sorry. Things came up. It's turned into a little of "Let the games begin!" It's on my agenda for this evening.

I also have one more follow-up question: how does believing that everything you do is predetermined enhance a person's happiness?

I am perfectly willing to think that for some people it might, because everyone does have different perspectives and pleasures and pains, and the same idea that some find offensive may be pleasing to others.

But I find it difficult to see how the positions being advocated for determinism would be of general usefulness even from a determinist point of view.

Quote from Cassius

how does believing that everything you do is predetermined enhance a person's happiness?

It's a belief about how the world is. It is what it is. Besides, Sapolsky believes, for example, that many people can feel liberated from regrets and guilts (I guess specially the belief that their circumstance it's their fault).

I think it can contribute to certain amount of individual serenity, and if more people agree with it, it can lead to a society more just. Imagine how happily can people live if the practical political, social and economic problems are solved in their roots instead of just blaming and punishing.

But, again, this is a metaphysical question. One can ask the same for this than for other questions: "how does believing that there isn't a God enhance a person's happiness?", "how does believing that the stars don't influence behavior enhance a person's happiness?", "how does believing that human beings are not special in the universe enhance a person's happiness?".

We have motives to investigate which metaphysical conclusion has the best arguments. The next part is to reasoning how that conclusion influence our ethical commitments. It can't go backwards (begin with ethical commitments and argue in favor of metaphysical conclusions, unless we want to conclude whatever people like).

Quote from Onenski

The idea of Free Will Skepticism it's not that people don't make choices. The idea is that those choices are not independent of prior causes (in fact, that they are constrained totally, even if we don't see it).

I guess I would not call that “choice” but the illusion of choice. At the very least, it would seem a highly idiosyncratic usage, applying the term to behaviors that are “constrained totally.”

The same for "intentional agency" -- unless intentionality (itself a kind of choice?) is not totally constrained.