The "Epicurus in Lycia" source says three different versions of KD's !!!
It seems to me the three are more editions of the same text rather than thinking of them as three different "versions." Not saying it's not important to see the differences among the editions but I don't think we're seeing completely divergent texts.
It seems to me the three are more editions of the same text rather than thinking of them as three different "versions."
Thank you Don for clarifying that 
Don or Nate, what about the varying translations of "natural" vs "physical"? What explains that variation and which do you think is best?
I'm interested to hear Nate's take.
Both are generally adequate, and, given the Greek (ΦYΣIΣ) and not Latin (NATVRA) source, “physical” works; however, “natural” in contemporary English vernacular expresses Epicurus’ nuance more appropriately than does “physical”. When we employ “natural”, we imply a contrast against the “supernatural”, which is an important criticism in Epicurean philosophy. Epicurus was responding to the supernatural propositions of metaphysicians, so invoking “nature” is appropriate. “Physical” can connote a contrast against “mental” or “spiritual” (within the context of contemporary English), which is inappropriate, because Epicurus sees “mental” and “spiritual” as being a subset of that which is “physical”, not an alternative to it. Additionally, there is an allusion with “physical” to Cartesian dualism, which implies that “the physical” is just one facet of reality. On top of that, it further reinforces the idea that contemporary “physics” is unable to deal with mental phenomena, and can only deal with actions between particles, whereas some “higher” knowledge is required to explain the complexities of a non-physical mind. I’ll take them both, but I prefer “nature”.
As always, Eikadistes , a pleasure to read your insightful commentary!
Your post got me thinking again.
The two main categories of desires are:
φυσικοι "natural/physical"
κεναι "empty/vain/groundless/void"
I am going to assume that natural was chosen by many translators because of its nice alliteration with "necessary": natural AND necessary.
However, I got an inclination that this somewhat skews an English-reading audience to think it's "natural" as in "It's natural to have those desires" as in:
1 : based on an inherent sense of right and wrong
instead of more like
5 : implanted or being as if implanted by nature : seemingly inborn
It sets up a "natural" vs "unnatural" as in acceptable vs deviant.
In thinking about "physical/material" Ι'm considering what it would mean if we looked at those desires as "physical and necessary" and "physical and unnecessary" in the sense of φυσκιος's meaning of "physical, having to do with the study of the material world."
These are desires arising from our being part of the material world, having a physical existence.
As opposed to those desires that are empty or *void.*
This would set up a categorization of *desires* that mirrors or complements the basis of our material existence:
atoms (which are the material basis of our existence) paired with physical desires
void (which is empty space) paired with "void" desires
I don't have this fleshed out entirely, but I wanted to get it down for reaction before I forgot it!
For your consideration:
"on the one hand, there are the desires arising from our physical, material existence; on the other, the 'empty, fruitless, or vain ones.' And of the desires arising from our physical, material existence , on the one hand, are the necessary ones; on the other, the ones which merely arise from our physical, material existence; then, of the necessary ones: on the one hand, those necessary for eudaimonia; then, those necessary for the freedom from disturbance for the body; then those necessary for life itself."
I wonder if those three categories of physical and necessary desires have any correspondence to Aristotle's three categories of goods:
He says goods are divided into three classes:
1. External goods τῶν ἐκτὸς (ektos)
2. Goods of the soul τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν (psykhe)
3. Goods of the body καὶ σῶμα (soma)
Regarding thinking along the lines of atoms and void for the desires, I too was starting to go in that direction but I don't think that it's fruitful. It could easily lead to thinking that an urge or thought comes from the void, which opens the door to the supernatural.
I'm pretty certain that none of us are thinking of anything coming from the void: we all agree (right?) that everything, including desires and thoughts, are ultimately material. But I can envision all sorts of people latching on to the idea that various things come from the void. Well, I don't even have to envision it as all sorts of people already think that various things (gods, angels and all types of woo-woo) come from the void!
Referring to desires or thoughts as "empty" is completely different from relating them to the void, despite any linguistic similarity. At least as far as I can tell.
It could easily lead to thinking that an urge or thought comes from the void, which opens the door to the supernatural
Oh, no, no, no, no. I didn't mean to imply there was anything coming *from* the void. It would only be by analogy.
I'm wrestling with the idea of "why only two main categories of desires?" This led to atoms and void especially since Epicurus used the same exact word to describe the empty space in which atoms move to also describe desires that have no ground. They don't come *from* the void in some woo-woo way, but they do share the *characteristic* of being *empty* of any reason to follow them.
There's also the dichotomy of pleasure and pain. Walking down this path a little further and stream-of-consciousnessing it, the desires with a physical basis typically lead to pleasure; empty desires typically lead to pain. Still working this out.
all sorts of people latching on to the idea that various things come from the void. Well, I don't even have to envision it as all sorts of people already think that various things (gods, angels and all types of woo-woo) come from the void!
LOL! For me, The tendencies of the hoi polloi aren't a reason to not explore a possibility of getting behind Epicurus's ideas. The more I think about it, the more I have to think Epicurus deliberately described desires as κενός AND used the same exact word to describe the empty space in which the atoms moved THEN limited main categories of desires to two.
PD29 Τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι φυσικαὶ <καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι· αἱ δὲ φυσικαὶ> καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ οὔτε φυσικαὶ οὔτε ἀναγκαῖαι ἀλλὰ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι.
Of the desires/cravings, first there are those that are physical/natural and required to live, then there are those that are physical/natural but not required, and, finally, there are those that are neither physical/natural nor required which come to be along with empty beliefs (beliefs devoid of merit).(Ancient scholia/commentary: Epicurus regards as physical/natural and necessary, desires which bring relief from pain, as e.g. drink when we are thirsty ; while by physical/natural and not necessary he means those which merely diversify the pleasure without removing the pain, such as costly foods; by the neither natural nor necessary (i.e., empty) he means desires for crowns and the erection of statues in one's honor.)
Referring to desires or thoughts as "empty" is completely different from relating them to the void, despite any linguistic similarity.
I'm still not so certain, albeit with the caveats I've laid out here.
