OMG wait til you get to chapter 22 and see what she suggests Lucretius might have intended to do to close the poem! She states that she doesn't claim the point is original to her but I agree I have not read it either and it is ingenious!!!
If she is correct then it is indeed easy to imagine that Cicero (or someone else) might indeed have "emended" the text to delete it!!!
This section is worth the price of the book and may be near genius (at least in my initial enthusiasm for it)! 
LOL! If y'all don't stop calling attention to interesting bits, I'm never going to finish this in the right order 
With apologies to Don, I have to also note that it opens up the possibility that someone creative with Latin and in tune with the Eoicurean viewpoint might actually be able to reconstruct the thrust of what might have been included at the end of Book Six.
Maybe at some point Austin herself could take a stab at it, or even someone like David Sedley or Martin Ferguson Smith
OK I have now finished reading the book. My basic opinion is unchanged: it is excellent. It's now probably first on my list of recommendations for a newer / younger reader who isn't really into philosophy at all and who might have an open mind about Epicurus. It's really targeted at a different audience than DeWitt's book, so I really don't see them in competition with each other. After you read "Living for Pleasure" you'll know the type person who will do best to start with one book versus the other. The type person who I might normally have suggested read one of Catherine Wilson's books I would definitely now refer the Austin book, to some extent because it gives a lot more "philosophy" and a lot less "political justification" than does Wilson's books. Wilson's work is good too, but if I recall correctly Austin's citations and examples from the text are much more detailed. (Now that I think about it I bet Austin read Wilson's book, and future writers can build on both of these as they extend the work in the same direction.)
Does it have shortcomings? In my humble view I would say yes, but they pale in comparison to the good work that the book achieves. Two things I would point out:
(1) The book is entirely devoid, if I read it correctly, of any discussion of canonics / epistemology. I think that's a significant omission, and I would love to have seen her intellect applied to that issue in the same way she attacked many others. Unfortunately I think the absence of that discussion plays into my point two:
(2) If she had taken to heart more of Epicurus' advise as to "waiting" and consideration of "multiple causes," she might not have been so quick to cite some of her contemporary examples on what she takes to be matters of "fact" that not everyone will agree with. The constant temptation of current writers seems to be to want to justify their interest in the subject by wrapping in contemporary political positions, and given the nature of these as controversial, I think the tactic detracts from the overall persuasiveness of the philosophy as a whole. I do agree with most of her example applications, but I wouldn't myself want to suggest that Epicurus would have had a specific position on the World Economic Forum, John McCain, John F. Kennedy, or many of the other contemporary hot-button examples she uses. I understand the desire to make books relevant, but sometimes getting too far into contemporary details can be off-putting, especially given Epicurus' own apparent disposition to keep his advice general rather than personally specific. No doubt there are Epicurean aspects to the World Economic forum and non-Epicurean aspects of the forum, but the political controversy that surrounds it tugs on the emotions and risks distortions in ways that less political examples would not involve. If I recall correctly she does a lot less of this than does Catherine Wilson, but it's still a shame to risk diluting the attractiveness of Epicurus according to one's current political persuasion. Gosh knows my own views have changed over time but I've always tried to keep an open mind on the deepest philosophical ideas. At this point I no longer feel it's a good idea to label contemporary figures as "Epicurean" or "non-Epicurean" given how many factors are involved and how complicated situations can be. She's at her best when she cites "evergreen" examples like children or nature or other situations that really do speak for themselves.
And as per the comments already in this thread, I think Emily Austin is more "in tune" with Epicurus than most anyone else I have read in a very long time. Of course that comes across as implying that she's "in tune with Cassius" but I really don't mean to describe it that way. As I see it she takes a very DeWittian approach of looking at each of the major controversies about Epicurus (from marriage, children, gods, etc) and she finding a very reasonable and persuasive sympathetic position. Of course she fails my standard test of "if they don't cite DeWitt in the notes then they're probably no good!" but at this point in Academia that's par for the course, and if she cited him for anything she would probably get herself banned from polite academic company 
Anyway I look forward to the comments of others. This is a REALLY good book to use from here on out in reaching out to new people. And in terms of things like her suggestion as to what Lucretius intended for the end of book six, she's pointing in new directions that will be fascinating to explore.
When the day started I had no idea this book existed and found it by accident. It's been a great day reading it!
Addenda: In relation to the epistemology comment above, it occurs to me that might have been a good idea to include in the physics discussion the observations of her fellow North Carolina professor Gellar-Goad that we mentioned recently as to Epicurus' position on the size of the sun. That would have at least introduced the topic of Epicurus's hesitance to embrace theories that contradict appearances even when those theories end up being found to have merit when the technology to analyze appearances improves later. For reference that is discussed here.
With apologies to Don, I have to also note that it opens up the possibility that someone creative with Latin and in tune with the Eoicurean viewpoint might actually be able to reconstruct the thrust of what might have been included at the end of Book Six.
Maybe at some point Austin herself could take a stab at it, or even someone like David Sedley or Martin Ferguson Smith
For those interested, here is Thucydides's account of the plague. Open the Year 2 section on the linked page:
History of the Peloponnesian War/Book 2 - Wikisource, the free online library
The scholarly impulse to portray him as an ascetic sometimes seems like an interpretive overcorrection to the long-standing, much greater misunderstanding that he was a sex-crazed glutton.
Finally, someone said it.
Finally, someone said it.
And refreshingly, in this case, someone with very good scholarly credentials and the ability to marshal for mainstream use many references and cites to support her position.
My biggest issue though, are her chapter(s) concerning politics.
I forgot to elaborate on this. Her issue with politics in the philosophy is that she spends so much time focusing on ethics, specifically the categorization of desires and that section from Torquatus about reform being insufficient, rather than justice and the inherent individualism found within Epicureanism. If I remember correctly, she does briefly bring up the flexibility of the philosophy in the face of Athens facing sieges and blockades, but over the few years I've come to see some of the wisdom in Will Durant's criticism: "...it provides an excellent design for bachelorhood, but hardly for a society."
I feel déjà vu in saying an Epicurean Government may be an unfeasible concept. However, an Epicurean society is perhaps much easier to adopt, envision, or mold into than many other philosophies or ideologies. When we think of Epicurean morality, we (as in the forums here) tend to focus on the fact that there is no absolute pleasure. I think the desires are categorized because of this. What may be unnecessary for some is necessary for others. What is unnatural in one culture may be necessary in another to conform without risk of greater pains. Which leads us to the phrases "Live unknown" and "Escape all culture", of which we all know their meaning. Yet Epicurus himself approved of the religious festivities in Athens, and partook in them, while living outside the walls of the city. There are other examples of social conformity such as the advice of paying court to a king, if need be, fulfilling an obligatory military conscription, or engaging with the conventions and customs of marriage by providing dowry, etc.
An Epicurean society is political in the sense of caring for the well-being and health of their country. Its citizens would not be ignorant or secluded from the world around them, on the contrary, they would have knowledge of the various figures and events around them. Epicurus was well read on Plato and his contemporaries; he could not have rejected them and devised the system of the garden had he chosen to completely and utterly withdraw into isolation.
The same applies to civic government and culture. The only difference is that our activism is within the interest of the garden and the safeguarding of our pleasure, not partisan issues that ebb and flow with each week and month. I think focusing on the desires in the scope of a political society is a bit tunnel visioned. What matters more is the culture that surrounds an Epicurean, and whether their pursuance of pleasure is admonished, encouraged, or ignored. The doctrines concerning justice and no absolute pleasure are the remedy to this. That's the key to flexibility and ultimately the answer of politics within the philosophy.
Edit: I brought up the Will Durant quote to emphasize why the question of an Epicurean society is so hard to answer satisfactorily. It's a question that has been bothering me for years now. I think Austin struggled with it too in her scope of interpersonal ethics applied en masse.
I am gathering that is your point but I am not sure whether you are saying that she gives the wrong impression on what she does say, or just that she left out an important aspect?
I think she left out an important aspect, namely justice and moral relativity and how specific Epicurus' advice can be applied to his own time period versus their application to today's world. That's something she did bring up though with the fear of death and increased scientific understanding. But other than that, I can't really quite comment on what her thoughts may or may be aside from just the contents in the book which is a casual introductory into the philosophy. Maybe that'd be something to ask her.
An Epicurean society is political in the sense of caring for the well-being and health of their country. Its citizens would not be ignorant or secluded from the world around them, on the contrary, they would have knowledge of the various figures and events around them. Epicurus was well read on Plato and his contemporaries; he could not have rejected them and devised the system of the garden had he chosen to completely and utterly withdraw into isolation.
The same applies to civic government and culture. The only difference is that our activism is within the interest of the garden and the safeguarding of our pleasure, not partisan issues that ebb and flow with each week and month. I think focusing on the desires in the scope of a political society is a bit tunnel visioned. What matters more is the culture that surrounds an Epicurean, and whether their pursuance of pleasure is admonished, encouraged, or ignored. The doctrines concerning justice and no absolute pleasure are the remedy to this. That's the key to flexibility and ultimately the answer of politics within the philosophy.
Yes. I think this is spot on, and provides an Epicurean grounding for social activity and political participation. Thank you.
I think she left out an important aspect, namely justice and moral relativity and how specific Epicurus' advice can be applied to his own time period versus their application to today's world.
Yes I agree that she is definitely light on that aspect, and that probably also explains her willingness to be very free with her commentary on contemporary issues that are at least partly or even wholly political (as I have mentioned in regard to the John F. Kennedy and John McCain issues). I am reading into this that because she didn't highlight and bring out the "moral relativity" (or maybe calling it context-dependency would be accurate too) she is too free in implying that her own view of such issues is necessarily what every Epicurean would conclude. So yes I think that you're commenting on something I agree with.
Personally I have a pretty low expectation for this kind of thing, since I see it done so frequently. Seems like half the articles that get written about Epicurus are more psychology or political opinion that just brings in Epicurus as a justification for decisions the writer has already reached. That's the way I see the modern Stoics - they are really just CBT/pyschotherapists but they want to wrap their conclusions around some ancient writers for prestige purposes.
But I think in this case we're mostly coming up here with observations that might help serve as a preliminary comment to someone setting out to read it. Once you understand the point it's pretty easy to dismiss personal judgments as personal without undermining the credibility of the rest.
At this point in my thinking my attitude is still that we're going to come up with some preliminary comments that would be good for new readers to bear in mind as they read the book, but that the issue is not as serious as it often occurs, and its something that makes for a good discussion while reading the book.
I've barely started the book, and I am reading the chapters out of order... chapter 16 - the label of "extravagant desires" doesn't seem quite right to me.
Nevertheless, Epicurus thinks sexual pleasure and committed romantic relationships are natural, but unnecessary, desires (or so I argue). In the terms of this book, they are extravagant desires, and all extravagant desires can adorn the tranquil life if you do them right.
If you live in a location where everyone surrounding you is in a committed romantic relationship, then you will be the odd one out. If you live in a location where everyone is not in a committed relationship but you are, then you will be the odd one out in that situation. Your environment and the culture that surrounds you will affect you, as it does to any animal. What we need to be happy should not be labeled extravagant. But if we try to get something we want and can't achieve it after giving it a considerable effort, then we eventually say: okay I tried and move on to something else, or move to a different environment.
the label of "extravagant desires" doesn't seem quite right to me.
That's an interesting reaction - I wonder if you would have had it if you had read straight through. I am tempted to say you might not have.
I am still absorbing and thinking about the book, and considering that we who are pretty well-read in the subject might get a different impression from people who are probably her target subject and less well read. It's as if there is a multiple layer discussion going on here. When she says "in the terms of this book" I am thinking that those of us who have talked a lot about the necessary and natural categories will immediately think of the different ways we have seen this issue expressed, and we haven't generally seen "extravagant" used - although that sort of reminds me of the "fancy pleasure" term that Elayne used in her past article her on the forum.
I still see issues with clarity in the whole subject. Is necessary being referred to as necessary for life (water, air, etc) or "necessary for happiness" which seems to be a very broad and ambiguous approach in the first place ("what does happiness mean?")
I could imagine the possibility of her commenting about this subject in a similar manner to what she said about the tetrapharmakon - that it's a useful memory device but easily confusing without significant context and grounding in the details.
