"Epicurean Philosophy: An Introduction from the 'Garden of Athens'" edited by Christos Yapijakis

Todd in your item 4 "this idea" is a reference to point 3, or to something else. I agree with all your points but wanted to be sure I understood this one.

Quote from Cassius

Todd in your item 4 "this idea" is a reference to point 3, or to something else. I agree with all your points but wanted to be sure I understood this one.

I'm referring to their entire #18.

In reading the texts you quoted yesterday, I just don't see how this is any kind of key takeaway. I couldn't even see where it was explicitly stated. Implied, OK...but does that qualify it to be a fundamental principle?

(I mean it's obviously subjective as to what would qualify, as Nate has amply shown. This one seems like a big stretch to me.)

Quote from Todd

In reading the texts you quoted yesterday, I just don't see how this is any kind of key takeaway. I couldn't even see where it was explicitly stated. Implied, OK...but does that qualify it to be a fundamental principle?

I think I see why it is tempting to include a summary statement about the level of bodies with their emergent properties being just as "real" as the level of atoms and void. I see that myself as a hugely important point to make as the way to understand atomism that does not lead to nihilism/despair. But I am not sure it is really a principle of physics as much as it is a point of epistemology and maybe even ethics, so I agree that it's not really a physics principle.

And I am not sure that there is much evidence that this was an issue that the ancient Epicureans were concerned about -- the whole subject may be something that modern philosophies and perspectives have made it necessary to address.

But I am not sure about that, and maybe we will find more ancient Epicurean texts some day that bring out this point more clearly. And maybe there are more already that aren't known to me.

To me this is much the same issue as Paul complaining about his flock being slaves to the "weak and beggarly elements." Maybe the whole question is so implicit in any discussion of atomism that we'd see that Epicurus himself addressed it if we had more texts.

Quote from Cassius

I think I see why it is tempting to include a summary statement about the level of bodies with their emergent properties being just as "real" as the level of atoms and void. I see that myself as a hugely important point to make as the way to understand atomism that does not lead to nihilism/despair

To me, it just seems obvious that it's all one reality. I can't even imagine thinking otherwise.

If anything, I'd go the opposite direction: what I see around me and interact with every day is obviously real; it's what I can't see that I would be tempted to question.

To someone who sees atomism as leading to nihilism or despair, I'd say they're forgetting the part about relying on the senses.

Using the right words helps too. Different aspects of one reality.

Quote from Todd

To someone who sees atomism as leading to nihilism or despair, I'd say they're forgetting the part about relying on the senses

Or they are letting the Platonists convince them that the senses are ultimately untrustworthy and inferior to pure reason or revelation which the Platonists have successfully done to most of the world.

Quote from Nate

... and I'm willing to bet a discussion on epibolai tês dianoias is to shortly follow.

So, later in the book, the offer non-lucid dreams as an example of the "extra" leg of the Canon.

"The imaginary impositions of the mind. The third criterion of truth, the imaginary imposition of the mind, is its attachment to representations (images) created in it. The imaginary imposition of the mind is of various kinds:

1) Depictions from direct sensory perception are classified by the Epicureans in senses or, if repeated, in preconceptions.

2) Depictions not derived from a direct sense include images of the unconscious, for example, the dreamlike depictions during sleep. For Epicurus, there is no distinction. He argues that 'what moved us it true, even the dreams of the lunatics, because only the non-existing does not affect us.' So, we have an ancient philosophical school which sees the value of analyzing the images of the unconscious in dreams and urges us to seek the truth that they may hide. Many centuries later, with the psychoanalytic interpretation of dreams, Freud proved, in his way, of course, that these interpretations are true for a specific individual.

The Epicurean philosophy does not give dreams any prophetic properties, as other ancient schools did, but observes with caution how our desires and especially our fears are displayed int eh form of depictions during sleep. Many of these images have no direct sensory origin. The sage knows well that these fears often cause pain, so Epicurenas consider this attachment to images of the unconscious as a criterion of truth."

Other than the point about not giving dreams prophetic properties, which would certainly be correct, something bothers me about most of the other formulations there.

While I understand the point that we should consider them as events that are real in our minds, I just don't see clarity in considering dreams criteria of truth.

One reason for my concern would be that if we are focusing on "images" as the topic of the discussion, then why not just consider the receipt of images, as Lucretius does in Book IV, along with the other phenomena of the senses like seeing, hearing, etc.? It's not like Epicurus said (as far as we know) that there are only 5 senses. Lucretius talks about those 5 in the same chapter as he discusses images, so if someone wanted to focus on the information derived from images directly by the mind, I don't see why that would would not constitute just an extension of the "sense" leg, rather than an entirely separate fourth leg.

Quote from Cassius

just consider the receipt of images, as Lucretius does in Book IV, along with the other phenomena of the senses like seeing, hearing, etc.?

That's always been my take. The mind is just a sensory "organ" that perceives subtle images.

And we know now, there are more than the 5 traditional senses (see one of my other posts), but even just adding on the mind makes 6.

Probably bears repeating that I don't think it's too productive to get too far into the weeds on these issues without looking back at the big picture.

It seems to me that the big picture is that Epicurus is saying that Nature equips us with faculties through which we can make sense of what is going on around us, and that those faculties operate naturally and are not divine or prophetic or inherently deceptive in nature. Using those faculties we can make sense of many things within the flux and we don't have to throw up our hands and give in to radical skepticism. We also don't have to worry that there is some divine or ideal or true world to which we can get access only through revelation or esoteric logical maneuvering.

As far as the details of what those faculties are and how they operate, some of that is obvious (that the senses are honest but don't constitute truth in themselves - we have to evaluate the data to decide what we think is true) and some of it is less obvious (that the mind can be influenced by things other than the 5 classic senses - which is where the images apparently come in as a proposed explanation).

I certainly think there can be lots of varying positions and disagreements about how to get into the details of how these faculties operate, and that's largely a matter of advancing scientific knowledge that we gain through better technology. But the bigger picture that all this is natural simply gets clarified in details by the advancing technology, it doesn't get reversed or called into serious question.

Also, I was trying to think of examples of phenomena that might not seem crazy to entertain.

It's not just in movies, but how many times have we "felt" that someone out of our vision was looking at us. Maybe I've seen too many war movies where the explorers say "We're being watched" but I do from personal experience think that there are times we "feel" something going on which is not strictly a matter of hearing rustling leaves or catching glimpses of things out of the corner of our eyes. I need to read back up the thread to see the list Don gave, but I don't think it is likely a good bet to draw a bright line at "five" or "six" or "ten" or whatever. The big issue is whatever there is is going to be natural, and in order to believe it it's going to require repetition and some kind of concrete demonstration of its reality.

Quote from Cassius

I need to read back up the thread to see the list Don gave, but I don't think it is likely a good bet to draw a bright line at "five" or "six" or "ten" or whatever.

Post

RE: Episode 155 - "Epicurus And His Philosophy" Part 11 - The Canon, Reason, and Nature 02

It's also important to remember we have more than "5" senses, including, at least:

1. Vision
2. Hearing
3. Smell
4. Taste
5. Touch
6. Balance (vestibular sense)
7. Temperature
8. Proprioception (body awareness)
9. Pain (nociception)

https://www.press.jhu.edu/newsroom/how-m…nses-do-we-have

See also

https://www.psy.gla.ac.uk/~steve/best/senses.html

Don

January 10, 2023 at 10:50 PM

From Don's link:

"The Stoic-Kantian duty to authority, race and the misunderstood notion of homeland led in the recent past to a whole nation of high cultural standards to provoke World War II massacres and unprecedented genocidal crimes against other peoples that were historically defined as the Holocaust" (Dimitris Altas 115).

Wow. Bold statement, correlating our Stoic (and Kantian) philosophical opponents with the Holocaust, but I like it.

History is complicated and I am sure the Stoics would howl at that. And the Sedley article on the Ethics of Brutus and Cassius implies that the Stoics were not the most consistent of fighters (Brutus was not primarily a Stoic and apparently there were not many Stoics helping B & C against Caesar).

But at the very least I think it is safe to say philosophically that when you think you have a divine sanction, or a categorical imperative that everyone should follow the same rules all the time and everywhere, then you have a strong tendency to plant seeds that will likely grow into a major conflict that will violate all sorts of otherwise ethical norms.

Quote from Nate

Quote from Nate

... and I'm willing to bet a discussion on epibolai tês dianoias is to shortly follow.

So, later in the book, the offer non-lucid dreams as an example of the "extra" leg of the Canon.

"The imaginary impositions of the mind. The third criterion of truth, the imaginary imposition of the mind, is its attachment to representations (images) created in it. The imaginary imposition of the mind is of various kinds:

1) Depictions from direct sensory perception are classified by the Epicureans in senses or, if repeated, in preconceptions.

2) Depictions not derived from a direct sense include images of the unconscious, for example, the dreamlike depictions during sleep. For Epicurus, there is no distinction. He argues that 'what moved us it true, even the dreams of the lunatics, because only the non-existing does not affect us.' So, we have an ancient philosophical school which sees the value of analyzing the images of the unconscious in dreams and urges us to seek the truth that they may hide. Many centuries later, with the psychoanalytic interpretation of dreams, Freud proved, in his way, of course, that these interpretations are true for a specific individual.

The Epicurean philosophy does not give dreams any prophetic properties, as other ancient schools did, but observes with caution how our desires and especially our fears are displayed int eh form of depictions during sleep. Many of these images have no direct sensory origin. The sage knows well that these fears often cause pain, so Epicurenas consider this attachment to images of the unconscious as a criterion of truth."

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The suggestion that dreams are as reliable as sensation reminds me of the movie "Minority Report". Are you all guys familiar with it? Law enforcement records the minds of human "precogs" whose prophetic dreams of "precrimes" provide law enforcement with the information needed to prevent crimes before they happen. While the author does acknowledge Epicurus' rejection of "prophecy", they seem to walk a thin line around clairvoyance.

I have just recently received an email from Christos Yapijakis indicating that he has read through this thread. His comments that I am pasting below were drafted as a private communication to me, rather than as an exhaustive commentary on the various points raised above, so please understand that they are written in that context. I asked him for permission (which he granted) to repost these so as to include them in the discussion.

It has been some time since this thread started and I have not read back through it with an eye toward adding additional commentary myself as I add Christos' notes into the thread. The main thing I want to restate is that I appreciate all the effort and scholarship Christos has put into his work, and also the effort involved by those who have commented here, all of whom I am sure have written in good faith and with constructive intent to help all of us in the pursuit of Epicurean philosophy. From here on in the thread is Christos' comment, minus his personal introductory and closing thoughts. Christos is very busy and may not check in with additional comments anytime soon, but I should make clear that I am posting this not to end the conversation but to encourage additional constructive commentary on these very important subjects.

---

... I know all that discussion comes from a friendly perspective towards both Epicurus and myself, so let me clarify some points:

1. The paper "Philosophical Management of Stress based on Science and Epicurean Pragmatism: A Pilot Study" describes a program for the general public and is written for the general experts in philosophy, psychology etc. Therefore, it is written in an objective, emotionless, generalized manner so that people all over the world to be convinced that there are some significant scientific findings using the Epicurean approach. it is not about the Epicurean philosophy per se and that is why we speak about happiness (ataraxia/aponia) and not about pleasure (the paper on Epicurean eustatheia on the other hand describes more in depth the Epicurean philosophy).

2. The tripartite brain is still a sound model in neurobiology (I am an expert in neurogenetics and George Chrousos is an expert in stress neurobiology). Of course the brain is more interconnected and more complicated than that, but that simple model is useful philosophically for the lay people to grasp the main characteristics of human potential. This is the most Epicurean approach possible. Epicurus was not interested for the little details as much as the big picture of things. The details are for specialists, the big picture and the first principles are for everyone to grasp to avoid confusion and fear of the unknown.

3. Regarding pleasure and happiness, just see Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus that explicitly says that:

-We aim to happiness (eustatheia of katastematic pleasure/pleasurable state)

-We do not need pleasure unless our body is in pain lacking it

"He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquility of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a happy life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living being has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained lacking pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure".

4. Regarding useful and harmful pleasures, again see Epicurus' Letter to Menoeceus that explicitly says that:

-Although pleasure is naturally akin to us, some pleasures lead to greater annoyance than pleasure

-Useful pleasures=those that appease pain or vary our enjoyment of life (the second ones we don't need necessarily)

-Harmful pleasures=those that result in more pain than pleasure

"...we do not choose every pleasure whatever, but often pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And often we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure. While therefore all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is worthy of choice, just as all pain is an evil and yet not all pain is to be shunned. It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these matters must be judged. ".

All three papers I authored in that special issue of Conatus-Journal of Philosophy on "Philosophical Management of Stress" (the first ever such issue of an international philosophical journal and I was invited to be the Editor) promote Epicurean philosophy, although they do that in a more subtle, "politically correct" and objective way discussing other philosophical approaches too, which by comparison are barely useful for a very short period of time until reality prevails.

I hope I have made my point to you. I rest my case, as you say in court.

---

NOTE: In a subsequent followup, Christos included the following, which I think is relevant to the same discussion:

Always remember that the pursuit of pleasure is the path to eustatheia and happiness (katastematic pleasure or pleasurable state) for Epicurus and not a goal by itself as Aristippus or 'prodigals' think (see letter to Menoeceus DL 131-132).

All the best wishes.

Before I comment much more myself in this thread I would very much like to hear what others think. In the meantime, though, I have supplemented an earlier thread which may become relevant here.

I'm ashamed to say I still haven't read his book, so there will be no help forthcoming from me in the near future.