Episode 166 - The Lucretius Today Podcast Interviews Dr. David Glidden on "Epicurean Prolepsis"

For reference:

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, ε , ἐπιβολ-ή , ἐπιβολ-ή

Bryan 's description of "focus" seems a good way to think of it. The basic definition in LSJ of "throwing or laying on" gets at that same idea.

Yes (expanding on what I said in KD24) instead of using the modern analogy of ‘focusing’ the mind (as though the mind were something like a camera), Epicureans used the analogy of ‘throwing’ or ‘casting’ the mind (as though the mind were something like a net). The paraphrases animī iniectus ("throwing the mind") and ἡ επιβολή τῆς διανοίας ("casting the mind upon") therefore are equivalent to our modern use of ‘attention' or 'focus' in the broad sense. Everything from trying to hear a particular sound out of many to focusing on our automatic mental images/stereotypes.

As Lucretius says, often things in the room with us are totally out of our thoughts, so much so they may as well be miles away—until we focus on them. He says the same of our mental images. Many people are very busy and ignore all but the most pressing impressions that cannot be ignored for life to continue (stereotypes of dangerous things, for example).

There is also the idea (cynically promoted by those who prefer that they -- not you -- are in control of your thoughts) that if a stereotype is wrong even once it is invalid. But abandoning this natural mechanism would make us defenseless in body and enfeebled in the mind. In reality nobody can actually live for very long without using them.

If some people tell you to stop relying on your senses as the basis of your thinking, you must stop trusting those people.

The above is some very helpful explanation and great analogies. Particularly comparing the technology of casting a net to focusing a camera lens: that's a great way to illustrate the 2300 year time difference.

One thing that I'm still confused about: is this focusing conscious? To my understanding prolepseis are pre-conscious in a way that might be analogous to a feeling being pre-conscious. Then we use conscious thinking to examine the data provided by the senses, prolepseis and feelings.

My understanding, again, is that the mind does tons of focusing and processing without our conscious awareness. I've been interpreting this as the activity that generates prolepseis. However I can also see that the focusing I'm doing now, consciously, could be considered an activity that generates a prolepsis. But now I'm getting confused, because my line of thought is leading to a prolepsis being both a process and a result. And also "learning".

I need to go back and review from the beginning of this thread. Meanwhile, any further explanations would be much appreciated!

Thank you for the conversation!

It seems to me that the data contained in sight is pre-rational and automatic whether (1) we are purposefully focusing our eyes on something, (2) we just happen to see that thing, or (3) that thing grabs our attention.

If we choose to look at a dog, the data we see about the dog will still be pre-rational upon reception. We will then immediately (but nevertheless subsequently) start thinking about this data.

Similarly our anticipations are honest witnesses that report directly the data contained in the perpetuated disturbances that strike and stimulate the mind. Just like sight, anticipations/stereotypes are pre-rational and automatic whether (1) we focus on them, (2) we observe them as they come and go, or (3) they grab our attention.

Examples:

(1) We choose to think of a dog, the general stereotype (our anticipation) of a dog automatically strikes our mind -- and from this pre-rational basis -- we can then immediately begin to manipulate the idea/image of a dog.

(2) We let the images come and go without thought or analysis -- most often when we are very relaxed or sleeping.

(3) We see a dog-like thing, the general stereotype (our anticipation) of a dog automatically strikes our mind -- we can then immediately (but nevertheless subsequently) begin to think "this is a dog," "this is a dog-like animal," or "this is actually just a statue of a dog."

Thanks Bryan ! I think we're on the same page.

This morning I listened to the Dr. Glidden interview again. He explicitly states that prolepseis are not infallible, which makes sense to me. But in this way he repeatedly separates them from sensations and feelings while leaving them in the Canon. He may have gone as far as to say that they're not true, but I'm interpreting that as not infallible. Riffing on this I get the notion that the three elements of the Canon all vary in degrees of infallibility:

- Sensations are true, but not infallible (as in the bent stick in the water, or the rounded or square tower)

- Anticipations can be true or false, so not infallible (as in the snake or stick illustration)

- Feelings are true and infallible. But they need to be carefully attended to in order to properly hear them (particularly wrt to those who incorrectly think that there is a "neutral zone".)

(I'm using infallible here to mean "a reliable source of information".)