Epicurus' Rejection of "Reductionist Atomism" (And The Related Issues of Skepticism and Determinism)

This is an important topic that bleeds over into epistemology / canonics, but given how closely it is related to atomism it needs a thread here. I will try to go through the forum and crossreference threads to Democritus' statement about "....in reality, only atoms and void..." and why Epicurus would not have accepted this viewpoint. At the moment, one of the best discussions of this is in David Sedley's "Epicurus's Refutation of Determinism.

Hard to overstate how critical this paragraph is:

As Sedley says, Epicurus rejects "reductionist atomism," in favor of the common sense perspective: "that there are truths at the microscopic level of elementary particles, and further very different truths at the phenomenal level; that the former must be capable of explaining the latter, but that neither level of description has a monopoly of truth.'

This is an important topic that bleeds over into epistemology / canonics, but given how closely it is related to atomism it needs a thread here. I will try to go through the forum and collect threads or references to Democritus' statement about "....in reality, only atoms and void..." and why Epicurus would not have accepted this viewpoint. At the moment, one of the best discussions of this is in David Sedley's "Epicurus's Refutation of Determinism" which we will also link here.

There is a great deal of good information, which leads to explanation of why Epicurus disagreed with Democritus on a number of key things, in this article:

Democritus (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The article points out that there is a lot of controversy about what Democrtus was really saying, but to the extent that he was interpreted to be saying that things which we perceive at the macroscopic level are "unreal," it is easy to see why Epicurus would object to that. Sedley's summary that Epicurus was holding that that there are two levels - microscopic and macroscopic for shorthand - and that neither level has a monopoly on truth seems to me to be pretty good phrasing of Epicurus's position.

Quotes from the article:

He famously denies that perceptible qualities other than shape and size (and, perhaps, weight) really exist in the atoms themselves: one direct quotation surviving from Democritus claims that ‘by convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention color; but in reality atoms and void’ (DK 68B9, trans. Taylor 1999a).

While several reports of Democritus’ view, apparently direct quotations, mention exclusively sensible qualities as being unreal, a report of Plutarch includes in the list of things that exist only by convention the notion of ‘combination’ or sunkrisis. If this report is genuinely Democritean, it would broaden the scope of the claim considerably: the idea that any combination—by which he presumably means any cluster of atoms—is ‘unreal’ or merely ‘conventional’ suggests that Democritus is drawing a more radical distinction than that between sensible and nonsensible qualities. The implication would be that anything perceived, because it is a perception of combinations of atoms and not atoms themselves, would be suspect, not merely the qualia experienced by means of individual sense organs. One report indeed attributes to Democritus a denial that two things could become one, or vice versa (DK 68A42), thus suggesting that combinations are regarded as conventional.

However, Furley concedes that Plutarch at least understands the earliest atomists to be committed to the view that all combinations of atoms, as much as sensible qualities, should be understood as conventional rather than real (Furley 1993 pp. 76–7n7). This would suggest that everything at the macroscopic level—or, strictly, everything available to perception—is regarded as unreal.

This topic is discussed in the threads for podcast 168 and 169, especially 168:

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RE: Episode 168 - "Epicurus And His Philosophy" Part 21 - Chapter 10 - The New Freedom 01

There is a great deal of good information, which leads to explanation of why Epicurus disagreed with Democritus on a number of key things, in this article:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/democritus/

The article points out that there is a lot of controversy about what Democrtus was really saying, but to the extent that he was interpreted to be saying that things which we perceive at the macroscopic level are "unreal," it is easy to see why Epicurus would object to that. Sedley's summary that…

Cassius

April 3, 2023 at 12:49 PM

Quote from Kalosyni

[..in Buddhism..] The ultimate truth is its emptiness.

Quote from Kalosyni

I personally reject any idea of "two truths" (no matter the source) because it leads to meaninglessness and passivity.

Yes, that is the point. And as Dewitt says in the chapter we are discussing in the podcast right now, to a moral reformer like Epicurus, skepticism and determinism, which go hand in hand with meaningless and passivity, have to be exposed as illogical and denounced as unacceptable:

"To [Epicurus] as a moral reformer two things ranked foremost as abominations, skepticism and physical determinism."

"In the domain of physics the charge of ingratitude is aggravated because the sin is against Democritus. "What is there in the Physics of Epicurus that is not from Democritus?" demands Cicero, and elsewhere he says: "What he changes he seems to spoil." Incidentally, every offense that was charged to Epicurus seemed more heinous than those of others. The defection of Epicurus from the teachings of Democritus, however, is almost wholly in the domain of ethics. To him as a moral reformer two things ranked foremost as abominations, skepticism and physical determinism. To such moral indignation Nausiphanes seems to have been immune; even if he rejected Pyrrhonian skepticism, this need not mean that he became alert to the evil of skepticism in general. To Epicurus he seemed insensate. The pupil was advancing beyond the teacher.

As for Democritus himself, he committed himself to a certain degree of skepticism when he declared "atoms and void to be the only existences and all else to exist by convention." ⁴⁵ This, however, was only individual skepticism, which did not prevent him from practicing cheerfulness (euthumia) any more than Pyrrho was prevented from enjoying indifference. To Epicurus, on the contrary, belief or disbelief had become a matter of morals and the happiness of mankind. He was incapable of taking comfort in a negative attitude, as did Democritus and Pyrrho. Thus he was compelled by the inward urge to become a pragmatist as well as a dogmatist and to insist that knowledge must not only be possible but also have relevance to action and to happiness. In this matter none of his teachers had set him an example.

"A second ground of his defection from Democritus was physical determinism. Determinism is not offensive to intellectuals, but to moral reformers it is neither conceivable nor tolerable. Moral reform is synonymous with the experience of conversion, and conversion presumes freedom of the will. To Democritus the prime and only causation in the universe was the motion of the atoms. In this motion there was no deviation, no freedom possible. It constituted an absolute determinism. In order to open an escape from this intolerable physical necessity Epicurus postulated sufficient play in the motion of the atoms to permit of freedom of the will. Thus he introduced into the sum of things a new cause, human volition, which was to him at one and the same time a necessity of thought and a necessity of action. This innovation may not be commendable in physics, but ethical considerations had become paramount and in ethics the desired end had been served by the innovation. For this invention he was in debt to no teacher."

I was tracing down one of Sedley's footnotes as to Democritus and it appears that for citing Democritus he is using a collection from  Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. : Hermann Diels; Walther Kranz :

Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. : Hermann Diels; Walther Kranz : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Berlin : Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1959-60.

archive.org

I haven't had time to see whether there is an English equivalent but it sure looks like this would be a nice collection to find. Maybe there is a collection at Attalus.org.

The cite Sedley refers to is from that work at 68 B 7; cf. B 9, which Sedley implies contains essentially this argument as self-refuting on skepticism:

"The argument is essentially that of J.B.S. HALDANE, Possible Worlds (London 1927), p. 209: «If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motion of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true ... and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms ». (I think it was Bob Sharples who first drew my attention to this passage)."

From the inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda:

Fr. 54

...

If anyone adopts Democritus’ theory and asserts that because of their collisions with one another the atoms have no free movement, and that consequently it appears that all motions are determined by necessity, we shall say to him: «Do you [not] know, whoever you are, that there is actually a free movement in the atoms, which Democritus failed to discover, but Epicurus brought to light, —a swerving movement, as he proves from phenomena?» The most important consideration is this: if fate is believed in, all admonition and censure are nullified, and not even the wicked [can be justly punished, since they are not responsible for their sins.]

While mentioning Diogenes of Oinoanda, here is the fragment that includes the "Who will choose to seek what he can never find?" argument that to me seems very powerful in the context of this discussion.

Who will seek knowledge of any kind if he is convinced that knowledge is impossible?

Who will seek to be free of the supernatural gods or of fear of death or pain of any kind if he is convinced that everything happens by necessity?

Here's the fragment:

Fr. 5

[Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find?

Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.

I do not think it would be going too far to assert that in fighting against skepticism and determinism Epicurus realized those doctrines ultimately deny the validity - the reality - of the world revealed to us by our senses (and our feelings and prolepsis).

Since the world revealed to us by our senses / feelings / prolepsis is the only one we have, and the only one we are ever going to have, few doctrines could be so destructive of human happiness than these.

They can't be left in the category of "Too complicated - I don't know."

It seems to me that Epicurus was emphasizing that we should place them in the category of "incorrect - wrong" - and that given the arguments we already have, no "waiting" is required for us to consider those theories as invalid and harmful.

And as we mentioned in the most recent podcast, given how many times this issue is hammered over and over in the letter to Menoeceus, in Lucretius, in Diogenes of Oinoanda, and in other places in the texts we still have, it seems a reasonable conclusion that refutation of determinism and skepticism deserves to be considered at the very core of Epicurean philosophy.

Quote from TauPhi

Considering determinism as harmful or destructive is giving it too much power. I don't think it's such powerful concept. If this is fallacy on my behalf, feel free to point it out but let me explain how I see it.

I was looking for something else today and came across this. Given the recent discussions with Onenski, Tau Phi, are you of the same opinion today?