Gratitude and Weakness (Especially In Relation to the Gods)

Quote from Nate

... given all of this, I am wondering: what is unique about the employment of kharisi in KD1 that contradicts these other usages

Presumably that a "god" would be so self-sufficient that it would never experience an emotion of receiving something that it lacked previously?

I would see this as tending to show how the human conception of a god is probably constructed logically as an expectation (based on isonomia and similar observations extrapolated out) as much as a subject of particular observation.

In my mind that would not diminish the sincerely of the statement or the expectation of reality that gods do exist, but would parallel other things I see as logical constructs. For example that is how I see "absence of pain" as being the "limit of pleasure" (there are only two so they are defined as the opposite of the other) rather than as a specific positive description of a particular feeling.

So I would see putting a characteristic that is very beneficial to humans in a negative light in relation to the gods as stemming from a similar logical construct. Even pain has actual benefits to us in our world (though we define the best life as having none), but pain would have no benefit to a being living in a perfect state.

Just preliminary thoughts....

"One who is blessed/completely happy/blissful and imperishable/indestructible has no troubles themself nor causes troubles for others; as a consequence, they are affected by neither anger nor gratitude; because all this would be an indication of weakness/sickness/lack of strength."

ἀσθενεῖ

• weakness
• sickness
• moral weakness, depravity

Being affected by anger as a sickness or weakness makes sense, but why would being affected by gratitude be a sign of weakness? In the Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus wrote (10.77) "For troubles and anxieties and feelings of anger and partiality do not accord with bliss, but always imply weakness and fear and dependence upon one's neighbours." This appears to demonstrate that the negative aspects of anger or gratitude would be that it would show a lack of self-reliance / αυτάρκεια. If we needed reassurance / affirmation from others and didn't just do things because they were pleasurable, we're not truly living a blessed life.

I would answer yes to Cassius's sentiment when he says:

Quote from Cassius

a "god" would be so self-sufficient that it would never experience an emotion of receiving something that it lacked previously?

PD1 refers to those who are incorruptible and completely blessed. So, we "mere" humans should show gratitude.

We need to also take into account what Diogenes Laertius reports that:

[121] Two sorts of happiness can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures.

It seems there could easily be two standards when it comes to gratitude as well, one "such as the gods enjoy" and one for the rest of us who should be thankful for our pleasures that we experience.

There's a pleasurable aspect to gratitude as well, such as the gratitude of waking up to a beautiful day in a beautiful place. Whereas normal folk may feel a pleasing sense of gratitude in this case, apparently a god would experience the pleasure but no gratitude.

Quote from Godfrey

There's a pleasurable aspect to gratitude as well, such as the gratitude of waking up to a beautiful day in a beautiful place. Whereas normal folk may feel a pleasing sense of gratitude in this case, apparently a god would experience the pleasure but no gratitude.

I *think* part of it is that a god is literally by definition filled with maximum pleasure already and only would experience the variety of pleasure expressed in PD18.

Quote from PD18

Pleasure in the flesh admits no increase when once the pain of want has been removed; after that it only admits of variation...

Yeah, I've wondered about the same thing. I seem to remember that concern showing up in the objections section of a paper I read on Epicurean gratitude by Ben Rider (attached in its pre-published form)

Great paper! Thanks for sharing. The take on the gods near the end seems spot on from my perspective:

Quote

The gods exist, but because they are ‘blessed and indestructible’ they need not feel gratitude. Gratitude indicates weakness and is relevant only for those who have deficiencies and thus need others to help or benefit them. That humans feel anger or gratitude reveals our limitations and dependency. So, if wisdom enables a human to ‘live as a god among men’ (Ep. Men. 135), would not a wise and virtuous person also have no need for gratitude?

The answer, it seems to me, must be ‘no.’ The fact that gods feel no gratitude does not mean that we should not; though Epicureans seek to emulate the gods’ tranquility and happiness, no human can attain their invulnerability or immortality, and any desire to do so would be unnatural and empty.

It is important to remember, in this context, that for Epicureans all virtues—like moderation and justice—are defined not absolutely, by an independent objective standard. They are instrumentally valuable because they contribute to a pleasurable life, and so what counts as virtuous in a case depends on what in fact produces happiness (Ep. Men. 132).

...for indestructible and perfectly self-sufficient gods, gratitude is not a value, while for vulnerable and deficient humans, it is. No matter how wise we become, we cannot eliminate these facts about what we are. Gratitude is part of how we achieve what limited and imperfect self-sufficiency we can obtain.

"It is important to remember, in this context, that for Epicureans all virtues—like moderation and justice—are defined not absolutely, by an independent objective standard. They are instrumentally valuable because they contribute to a pleasurable life, and so what counts as virtuous in a case depends on what in fact produces happiness (Ep. Men. 132)."

Definitely a paper I want to read. That simple statement has profound implications, and I think is very difficult to appreciate without working on a drastic overhaul of the way we think. The same action that we normally see as courageous becomes in fact foolhardy in the wrong circumstances. The action isn't just "courageous, but sadly turned out wrong" but in fact no longer meets the definition of courageous in the first place.

At least in my mind that is very hard to appreciate. My mind wants to say courage is courage is courage and place the blame for a bad result somewhere else (luck? fate? gods?) rather than think that courage has no set definition that applies at all times and places.

But that seems to be exactly what Epicurus is saying, and he hammers it home apparently in his own words in those statements about "justice" at the end of the PDs.

One more thing -- I think that last observation from the paper is the key to understanding PD5 and Epicurus' whole position on virtue. PD05 isn't the way to accommodate Epicurus to Stoicism and reconcile them as similar, it's the way - by explaining the totally different perspectives on virtue - to show how drastically incompatible they are.

“It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and well and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and well and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives well and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life.” Hicks (1925)

Basically, PD05 says, to me, you can't live pleasantly without living virtuously BUT virtue is not the end/goal. The virtues contribute to living pleasantly, and living pleasantly is a result of living virtuously. But one's eye should always be on the pleasant life lived.

Quote from Don

one's eye should always be on the pleasant life lived.

And you could think of gratitude as a kind of awareness and recognition that you are living pleasantly and pleasurable - therefore gratitude is always a necessary ellement, as Nate pointed out in the very first post:

Quote from Nate

In nearly every other extant document, "gratitude" (expressed using forms of kharis) is encouraged as an indispensable moral practice:

Although I wouldn't call it a "moral" practice, but rather a wise practice

Quote from Don

Basically, PD05 says, to me, you can't live pleasantly without living virtuously BUT virtue is not the end/goal. The virtues contribute to living pleasantly, and living pleasantly is a result of living virtuously. But one's eye should always be on the pleasant life lived.

Yes i think what you are saying is the correct statement of the Epicurean view, but I don't see PD5 saying that one's eye should be on pleasure than on virtue. It doesn't explicitly or even implicitly say that, does it? (I would think you have to go to Torquatus or to Diogenes of Oinoanda to hit that point home.) In the case of PD5 he seems to be equating the two phrases ("living virtuously" with "living pleasantly") and it seems to me that you have to understand something else which is not stated to make sense of the equivalence.

I agree that one unstated point is, as you say, that (1) the goal is pleasure rather than virtue.

But the other unstated presumption is that (2) virtue is not absolutely tied to a certain set of facts, just like pleasure is not tied to a certain set of facts. (Eating ice cream is sometimes pleasurable and sometimes not, right?)

Actually maybe I should ask, Don, do you agree with this sentence from the paper as written, or would you modify it?

"It is important to remember, in this context, that for Epicureans all virtues—like moderation and justice—are defined not absolutely, by an independent objective standard. They are instrumentally valuable because they contribute to a pleasurable life, and so what counts as virtuous in a case depends on what in fact produces happiness (Ep. Men. 132)."

Quote from Cassius

Actually maybe I should ask, Don, do you agree with this sentence from the paper as written, or would you modify it?

"It is important to remember, in this context, that for Epicureans all virtues—like moderation and justice—are defined not absolutely, by an independent objective standard. They are instrumentally valuable because they contribute to a pleasurable life, and so what counts as virtuous in a case depends on what in fact produces happiness (Ep. Men. 132)."

Yes. I agree with the quoted passage.

Quote from Nate

about the status of the gods' social lives and their speech patterns; that, combined with the analysis of gratitude, which is a seemingly human-unique, conscious behavioral practice (there are better words for that)

Yes it would be pushing the envelope for the Epicureans to be talking about such things if they viewed them as wholly abstractions.

As for whether the gods evolved to that state, I tend to hesitate there, and to consider this to be a more complex application of the eternality issue - I am not sure there. Maybe individual instances of types of gods in particular intermundia evolved toward and arrived at perfection, but if there was never a start to the universe it's hard to say that applies to the whole.

Evolution might be another aspect of human experience that does not apply to gods.

Well that's the "quasi-" body material in Velleius / On the nature of the gods, right?

Here's a section from my Menoikeus translation:

Quote from Don

τὸν θεὸν ζῷον "a god (is a) ζῷον. But what is a ζῷον?

ζῷον (zōon) is where English zoology comes from.

LSJ gives two primary definitions:

living being, animal

in art, figure, image, not necessarily of animals (or a sign of the Zodiac)

So, unfortunately, at this point in the Letter we can't necessarily resolve the question of what the nature of the gods (or of a god) is according to Epicurus. Some scholars think Epicurus believed the gods were material beings ("living being, animal") somehow living between the various world-systems (cosmos) in the universe. Some think Epicurus believed the gods were mental representations or personifications of the concepts ("figure, image, sign") of blessedness.

The Letter goes on to describe what kind of ζῷον a god is: ἄφθαρτον and μακάριον

These are the exact words used in the first of the Principal Doctrines (Κυριαι Δοξαι): Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον "One who is blessed and imperishable." (Note, these are again singular.) The words held the first spot in the Principal Doctrines, and Epicurus chooses this as the first element of noble living of which to remind Menoikeus. Πρώτον, indeed! Epicurus obviously placed a great deal of importance on this topic so it behooves us to study it in-depth, to engage in some μελέτη.

μακάριον

This word is often translated as "blessed, fortunate, wealthy, 'well-off.'" There appears to be no certain etymology of the root [makar] or the longer form [makarios/on]. It appears to possibly have something to do with being wealthy, either literally or figuratively. Taking Ancient Mythology Economically by Morris Silver has a very interesting section on the origins of the word. This is yet another example of the inadequacy of using one word to translate from one language to another.

ἄφθαρτον

LSJ gives the definition of "incorruptible, eternal, immortal, uncorrupted, undecaying" and gives references to Epicurus, Philodemus, and Diogenes of Oenoanda. At its root, the word is α- "not" + φθαρτον "destructible, perishable." LSJ states φθαρτον is the opposite of ἀίδιος "everlasting, eternal" (related to ἀεί "ever, always") which poses an interesting question: Why did Epicurus choose to use ἄφθαρτον instead of ἀίδιος or ἀθάνατος? Φθαρτον is related to θνητός "liable to death, mortal, opposite: ἀθάνατος [athanatos]" (LSJ) Φθαρτον is also connected to the verb φθείρω "destroy, pass away, cease to be, perish." It seems that Epicurus didn't want to evoke that the gods (a god?) were simply immortal or eternal but that he wanted to impress upon us the sense that they would not pass away or cease to be. This is in contrast to everything else composed of atoms and void. Everything else is subject to be φθαρτον; only the gods are ἄφθαρτον! How can this be? Could it be that they are ἄφθαρτον precisely because they are mental concepts? That's one of the reasons I find Sedley's so-called "idealist" nature of the Epicurean gods intriguing.

I have also seen arguments that the stress should not be on the "eternal," as in everlasting in time, but rather the "incorruptible," as in the state of being. A "god" is "incorruptible" or "not able to be corrupted or to decay." They are unaffected by the vicissitudes of fortune, unaffected by anger or gratitude. To me, this is an intriguing perspective and gives a possible reason why Epicurus made the decision to use ἄφθαρτον and not an alternative that evokes the "eternal in time" connotation like ἀθάνατος. From my perspective, this argument is a strong one and deserves some study and thought. For now, let's move on to see if there are more clues.

Display More

Quote from Nate

It seems to me that he (and apparently Hermarchus, based on fragmentary attestation I'm still trying to organize) had concerns about the status of the gods' social lives and their speech patterns

If you compile those sources, I'd be very interested to see them.

I'm posting this as food for thought, and because I don't see it suggested elsewhere:

Perhaps we're reading it wrong? The usual reading is that the gods are "unaffected by [hypothetical] anger [that they might otherwise feel] and [hypothetical] gratitude [that they might otherwise feel]."

Could it be credibly inferred that the anger and gratitude that the gods are immune to is our anger and gratitude?

It doesn't matter whether your words are "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" or "into thy hands I commend my spirit"; the result is the same. The gods, by virtue of being gods, are necessarily deaf to human griefs, as well as human joys.

Under this new reading, the first Principal Doctrine falls in line with the recurring literary devices that mark the whole series; the Chiasmus, and the Antimetabole. I can summarize a few examples, with the caveat that brevity is the mother of misinterpretation.

1. Do not trouble about the gods, for the gods do not trouble about you.

2. When we are, death has not come. When death has come, we are not.

3 and 4. What is good is easy to get, what is terrible is easy to endure.

5. It is not possible to live pleasantly without living [x], and it is not possible to live [x] without living pleasantly.

6. Take courage from other men, or at least from men who can give courage.

11. If suspicion of nature did not trouble us, we should not trouble to study nature.

I write these merely to isolate the main point--that the literary devices are constantly repeated, and are there for a reason.

From Wikipedia;

Quote

Chiasmus derives its effectiveness from its symmetrical structure. The structural symmetry of the chiasmus imposes the impression upon the reader or listener that the entire argument has been accounted for.[13] In other words, chiasmus creates only two sides of an argument or idea for the listener to consider, and then leads the listener to favor one side of the argument.

As I say, food for thought. And thanks to my old copy of Walter Harding's edition of Walden for alerting me to these literary devices.

Quote

When my hoe tinkled against the stones, that music echoed to the woods and the sky, and was an accompaniment to my labor which yielded an instant and immeasurable crop. It was no longer beans that I hoed, nor I that hoed beans; and I remembered with as much pity as pride, if I remembered at all, my acquaintances who had gone to the city to attend the oratorios.

-Henry David Thoreau