Modern Neuroscience And The Katastematic / Kinetic Debate

As an aside, it is not the "within ourselves" aspect of such an interpretation that would bother me. Nothing wrong with the idea that we generate some of our pleasures internally rather than receiving it from outside our own bodies.

The issue I have is with the modern implications of "tranquility" as being "at rest" or "inactive" or similar words circling the drain of "nothingness."

I don't consider a mind actively exploring the depths of any part of nature to be "inactive" or in any way a negative concept. It is the Buddhist/(apparently Vedantic)/nihilist /Stoic view that tranquility implies detachment and being totally inactive mentally and physically, implicitly frozen in time, that I believe needs to be positively expelled from the interpretation of Epicurus. It is clear that many under the influence of other views are drawn to such an interpretation, and when we open the door to acceptance of that perspective, such a viewpoint undermines and distorts the rest of the philosophy. Why pursue pleasure when it is tranquility in the form of "detachment" that these people are arguing to be the goal?

If we take Epicurus as an example of his own paradigm, I consider Epicurus to be among the most "active" and energetic leaders in history. While much of that activity may have been mental rather than as a soldier or other "physical" way, his mind was not devoted to "rest" or "nothingness," and tranquility in the sense of a status quo unchanging passivity was the furthest thing from his mind.

"...a Greek Man first dared to raise his mortal eyes in opposition

and he was first to resist in opposition-

whom neither the Reputation of the gods nor Thunderbolts nor the Sky

with its menacing roar restrained but even more stirred up in him

the sharp power of the mind- so that He desired

to be the first to break off the locked bolts of nature’s doors." DRN 1.66-71

Sounds very vigorous and active indeed! As you allude to, his output of books and maintenance of a community is a testament to much activity.

Hello Don,

In response to Elli, you said.

Quote from Don

I'm not saying I disagree with the sentiment you're expressing, but I'm not seeing how you get from <τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας> to "those enjoyments that lie out of limits". Just trying to learn and understand.

I know we are always walking a line between translation and interpretation, but I am inclined to agree with your sentiment here! It seems to me "we do not mean (the... pleasures of) languishing in retirement" or something similar gets the idea in mind.

GPT "When, therefore, we say that pleasure is the ultimate goal, we do not refer to the pleasures of the profligate or those derived from indulgence."

Right - this is part of why the accusation that Epicurus was a believer in "gods" because he didn't want to be prosecuted like Socrates falls flat. Virtually every aspect of Epicurean philosophy is controversial and goes directly against the grain of establishment society. Epicurus had to know and to accept that he was launching a life of controversy for himself and for his associated philosophers. It would have been much easier to say "Well I respectfully disagree with Plato in some minor ways, but we're all one big happy family so let's all get along and drink some wine."

He didn't do that, and I don't think that anyone who seriously accepts the viewpoint that life is short and nothingness is ahead of us for eternity would for a second want to hurry up the arrival of that nothingness except in extreme circumstances (giving up oneself for the life of a friend, for example). We aren't put here by some malevolent god or universe for the purpose of suffering, we are here to do our best to pursue "pleasure" while we can.

Quote from Don

For example, if I ever found myself in a foxhole, I would want a commanding officer who approached the mission with a clear eye and calm mind rather than some screaming, yelling lieutenant.

And as to that statement by Don I would amplify it, and say that those of us who accept the key tenets of the Epicurean worldview are in a foxhole, metaphorically speaking. Every direction you turn the voices are there to tell you to "give up" and "give in" because the fight can't be won.

Epicurus didn't "give up" or "give in" and those of us who are actively engaged should likewise "approach the mission with a clear eye and calm mind!"

Quote from Don

Epicurus is on record for including both kinetic and katastematic pleasures within his definition of "pleasure." I have come to understand kinetic pleasures as those arising from factors and circumstances outside of ourselves; katastematic pleasures are those arising from within ourselves (such as tranquility, pleasurable memories, etc.). While Epicurus conveys (along with Metrodorus and Philodemus) that we can be more confident in katastematic pleasures, he clearly says that we should continue to "delight" in kinetic pleasures when they are available. It is the exclusivity of "getting stuck in" only seeing kinetic pleasures as pleasure that Epicurus is objecting to here with τὰς ἐν ἀπολαύσει κειμένας.

Don, just wanted to add in my thoughts here...I think I understand kinetic (moving, rising and falling) and katastematic (static, still, or smooth) in a slightly different manner. I am coming to this with an intuitive approach: both of these labels are describing the feeling nature inside the body-mind. So the experience of eating something with a high quantity of sugar or honey will always be kinetic, but if you only use a very small amount of sugar then it may be not create the same kinetic experience as compared to something with more sugar. Another example: eating whole grain/whole wheat bread with cheese when hungry could lead to more of a katastematic experience compared to eating a big bowl of ice cream which would cause a quick sugar spike and then a quick fall back down in glucose levels as insulin metabolizes the sugar (and thereby leaving you hungry again within a short period of time). So what I am thinking is that the "feeling-tone" and "excitement level" which arises while we partake of various pleasures AND it is up to each person to determine what feels best, such as if it is a dark and raining day then seeking some kinetic pleasures can help a sleepy person to wake up. Other people who feel anxious may need to turn toward katastematic pleasures.

Quote from Don

The pleasure derived from the anticipation of eating or the recollection of eating is always katastematic.

This doesn't sound right to me; at first blush I'd consider these to be kinetic. Katastematic, to me, would be more along the lines of the stable pleasure of knowing that you aren't going to go hungry any time soon, or the stable pleasure of having a correct worldview. Even though the anticipation or recollection of eating are "inner" pleasures, they are very kinetic. I see the difference between the activity and the anticipation of the activity as physical v mental and not kinetic v katastematic.

Don:

I glanced back at the Gosling and Taylor treatment in "The Greeks on Pleasure" and I don't see at first glance any mention of a distinction between "produced by stimulus from without" or "created by itself without external stimulus." So I suppose the question then would be - What evidence does Farrington use to support his contention that this distinction of "produced by stimulus from without" vs "created by itself without outside stimulus" is a distinguishing factor of kinetic vs katastematic?

For example, as Gosling and Taylor come to their conclusion, I see no distinction being made about outside vs self-generated, but rather they are focusing on perception, which might be perception of something from either class:

Do you know the basis of Farrington's reasoning? The bringing into a state you are referring to could be either perception of something from outside, or thoughts of understanding generated by oneself through true philosophy, could it not?

I think this portion of the last cite bears a lot of emphasis, because it is important to keep in mind that the standard interpretation of katastematic pleasure being the true goal goes hand in hand with, as Gosling and Taylor say, those who are "baffled by the apparent inconsistency between eulogizing sensory pleasures, and so, presumably, unbridled sensuality, while advocating a life of simple asceticism and lack of disturbance." The underlined part is what I think we agree here that Epicurus did not do.

Quote from Don

I've never been overly enamored of G&T's interpretation anyway IF I remember it correctly.

At least in my case I always have a hard time getting a fix on what G&T's interpretation really is other than for the cites I included above. I suspect they realized that they were throwing a nuclear bomb into the world of standard Epicurean interpretation and that they preferred to do so as gingerly as possible, so they wrap up their own views in layers of "This then that and then the other..."

It would be a good addition to the discussion to try to summarize exactly what the opposing views are.

If in fact Farrington's position reduces to "generated from within" vs "generated from without" that would at least have the virtue of being clear and understandable, whether it's agreeable or not.

I will take a stab at one aspect of what I think is part of what G&T are saying:

Cicero objected to Epicurus' sweeping definition of pleasure as both (1) the standard active stimulations that we normally associate with pleasure and (2) the healthy painfree functioning of the living organism. Cicero objected because item (2) is not normally included within the standard definition of ordinary people - it is considered neutral. Cicero therefore insisted on considering these two types to be distinct categories and referenced kinetic vs katastematic as the way to do that.

In contrast, Epicurus held all pleasures to be desirable, and Epicurus did not elevate any type of pleasure over another - which he could not do, because if there are better and lower types of pleasures, then mastering the art of distinguishing between these types of pleasure would be more important than pleasure itself. Epicurus therefore considered that unity of all pleasures under the umbrella of 'pleasure' was critical to his analysis, with all kinds of pleasure to be pleasures of perception, while acknowledging also that some pleasures last longer than others. This would explain why Torquatus flatly holds that all who are without pain are in the greatest state of pleasure - you don't need to know any details about what they are doing because you have defined absence of pain - the normal state of life - to be pleasurable. So you can say without knowing any more details as an axiom: "I affirm that all who are without pain are in pleasure, and in that the fullest possible!" - Cicero's On Ends, Book 2 (V)16

You are then left with what Gosling and Taylor say as to Epicurus not considering this kinetic vs katastematic distinction between pleasures to be of prime importance:

"The more one stresses this the less important the distinction comes to look, since any condition, however steady, of a living thing, must according to Epicurus, be a condition of perceiving: but there is no evidence of a special kind of perceiving or object of perception to constitute ataraxia and aponia. Consequently we should be left with steady long-lasting perceptions over against fleeting ones. It seems simplest just to suppose that when the organism is functioning harmoniously it is always having some form of perception; that since the operation is harmonious the perception is pleasant and without pain; and that is just what aponia is. Ataraxia is the condition when, because of correct views, our expectations are undisturbed by fear, our desires do not pursue empty objectives and our memories are pleasant: this leaves us to enjoy our pleasures unanxiously."

Don , I particularly like the last 2/3 of the quote from Farrington. When I read his book a year or two, though, I found some of his interpretations to be quite interesting and others to be rather hostile. So I'm not quite sure what to make of him. I may have to re-read his book when I have some spare time... just one more book on the stack!

However, this:

Quote from Cassius

"The more one stresses this the less important the distinction comes to look, since any condition, however steady, of a living thing, must according to Epicurus, be a condition of perceiving: but there is no evidence of a special kind of perceiving or object of perception to constitute ataraxia and aponia. Consequently we should be left with steady long-lasting perceptions over against fleeting ones. It seems simplest just to suppose that when the organism is functioning harmoniously it is always having some form of perception; that since the operation is harmonious the perception is pleasant and without pain; and that is just what aponia is. Ataraxia is the condition when, because of correct views, our expectations are undisturbed by fear, our desires do not pursue empty objectives and our memories are pleasant: this leaves us to enjoy our pleasures unanxiously."

pretty much sums up my understanding of the topic. I think of katastematic as more of a "steady state" whereas kinetic is constantly changing. At least that's how I interpret the terms. Practically speaking, this conception requires some sort of a transition point between "constantly changing" and "steady state": this adds a layer of unnecessary complexity to determining the difference between the two. So from this point of view, defining the difference as "inside v outside" is maybe more concrete, but to me it seems incorrect.

Practically speaking, again, I subscribe to the idea that katastematic pleasure is largely because of correct views. Once you hold correct views you are in a steady state, because correct views shouldn't be constantly changing. (That's not to say that they won't change with additional information, but they are relatively stable.)

Don do you see homeostasis as being a helpful idea in sorting out this conundrum?

I think it would also be fair to say for Gosling and Taylor that when they say that they don't consider the distinction between kinetic vs katastematic pleasures to be of prime importance, they aren't saying that it is not important to recognize that some types of pleasure last longer than others. The length of time a particular pleasure is available, and how we obtain it, is certainly an important aspect of judging what pleasures to pursue. The controversy seems to be more over whether there is some other quality about katastematic pleasure which elevates it above perception and somehow makes it more desirable than other types of pleasure and actually elevates it to being the "true end" rather than the perception of pleasure itself.

Maybe just as we acknowledge that pleasure means nothing unless we are living, we need to also acknowledge and make clear that pleasure means nothing unless we are perceiving it.