This is a minefield, so I’ll just register an occurrent thought. Epicurus clearly thinks that all pleasures are perceived (or available to perception), so I find G&T compelling on that front. The thing is, if all pleasures are a kind of perception, and all perceptions are a kinesis, then all pleasures are kinetic. Some are (perhaps) just more kinetic than others. Now, you could invent a different kind of perception, one in which the subject and the object of perception are somehow the same (that’s, as I understand it, Aristotle’s attempted, semi-incoherent solution), but G&T don’t see any indication of that solution in Epicurus. And I'm not sure I do either.
So for what it's worth, I'm inclined to think the difference is that katestematic pleasure is always there, always available to perception. I can call it to mind and experience it wherever I am. 'Kinetic' pleasure comes and goes. But that's just me shooting from the hip.
LOL! Well, that hasn't stopped us before! 
Our feelings and sensations (including interoception) are how we experience that monitoring. And as Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett points out, that monitoring and prediction function is the main job of our brains... that whole reasoning thing comes along for the ride later on as I understand it.
) get when they're in the flow and their bodies are just acting effortlessly. That's my sense of aponia.
After rereading that post I'm thinking that kinetic is of short duration and katastematic is of long duration, and there's a large gap between the two. There's no precise point that differentiates between the two. But it's a good question and I don't know if there's anything resembling a precise answer. (If we were Supreme Court justices we could say we know it when we see it, but that's too sloppy for earnest philosophical discussion. )
