Episode 195 - Cicero's On Ends - Book Two - Part 05

Welcome to Episode 195 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the only complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where you will find a discussion thread for each of our podcast episodes and many other topics.

This week we continue our discussion of Books One and Two of Cicero's On Ends, which are largely devoted to Epicurean Philosophy. "On Ends" contains important criticisms of Epicurus that have set the tone for standard analysis of his philosophy for the last 2000 years. Going through this book gives us the opportunity to review those attacks, take them apart, and respond to them as an ancient Epicurean might have done, and much more fully than Cicero allowed Torquatus, his Epicurean spokesman, to do.

This week we continue with Book Two. Last week we made a few preliminary comments about it, and this week we will be starting it in earnest at the very end of section II, right before the beginning of section III, on page 32 of the Reid edition, as Cicero claims that Epicurus himself is unsure what pleasure is:

Follow along with us here: Cicero's On Ends - Complete Reid Edition

We are using the Reid edition, so check any typos or other questions against the original PDF which can be found here.

As we proceed we will keep track of Cicero's arguments and outline them here:

Cicero's Objections to Epicurean Philosophy

In addition to the excerpt above to indicate where we will start, I have reformatted into dialogue form the text from which we will be reading, because it seems to me it is super-important. I would suggest the possibility that the name of "Hieronymus of Rhodes" ought to become almost as familiar to us as any of the core Epicureans, because Cicero points out that he stands for exactly the position that many many commentators today allege to be the position of Epicurus. Nevertheless, Torquatus points out that Hieronymous of Rhodes is "grossly mistaken." I think we are going to find that it is very helpful to be able to understand and express clearly the difference between Hieronymous of Rhodes and Epicurus, which this from Book Two of On Ends allows us to do:

Cicero: "Do you understand, then, what Hieronymus of Rhodes declares to be the supreme good, by the standard of which he thinks all things should be judged?"

Torquatus: "I understand that he holds freedom from pain to be the final good.”

Cicero: “Well, what view does this same philosopher hold of pleasure?"

Torquatus: "He asserts that it is not essentially an object of desire."

Cicero: "So he is of opinion that joy is one thing, absence of pain another."

Torquatus: “Yes, and he is grossly mistaken, for, as I proved a little while ago, the limit to the increase of pleasure consists in the removal of all pain."

Cicero: "I shall examine afterwards, what is the sense of your expression absence of pain, but that pleasure means one thing, absence of pain another, you must grant me,unless you prove very obstinate."

Torquatus: "Oh, but you will find me obstinate in this matter, for no doctrine can be more truly stated."

Cicero: "Pray, does a man when thirsty find pleasure in drinking?"

Torquatus: "Who could say no to that?"

Cicero: "The same pleasure that he feels when the thirst has been quenched?"

Torquatus: "No, a pleasure different in kind. For the quenching of the thirst brings with it a steady pleasure, whereas the pleasure which accompanies the process of quenching itself consists in agitation."

Cicero: "Why then do you describe two things so different by the same name?"

Torquatus: "Do you not recollect what I said a little while since, that when once all pain has been removed pleasure admits of varieties but not of increase?"

Cicero: "I do indeed remember, but though your statement is in good Latin, it is far from clear. For variety is a Latin word, and is in its strict sense applied to differences of colour, but is metaphorically used to denote many differences; we speak of a varied poem, varied speech, varied manners, varied fortune, pleasure too is usually called varied when it is derived from many unlike objects which produce pleasures that are unlike. If you intended this by the term variety, I should understand it, as indeed I do understand the word when you are not the speaker; I am far from clear what the variety is of which you speak, when you say that we experience the highest pleasure as often as we are without pain, when however we are eating things which rouse a pleasurable agitation in our senses, then the pleasure consists in the agitation, which produces a variety in our pleasures, but that the pleasure felt in absence of pain is not thereby increased; and why you should call that feeling pleasure, I cannot understand."

Torquatus: "Can then anything be sweeter than to feel no pain?’

Cicero: "Nay, be it granted that there is nothing better, for I am not yet investigating that question; does it therefore follow that painlessness, so to call it, is identical with pleasure?’

Torquatus: "It is quite identical, and is the greatest possible, and no pleasure can be greater."

Cicero: "Why then, when once you have so deigned your supreme good as to make it consist entirely in absence of pain, do you shrink from embracing, maintaining, and championing this exclusively? I ask what need there is for you to introduce pleasure into the assembly of the virtues, like some harlot into a company of matrons? The name of pleasure is odious, disreputable, open to suspicion. So you are in the habit of telling us this, very often, that we do not understand what kind of pleasure Epicurus means. Now whenever I have been told this (and I have been told it not unfrequently) I have the habit of getting now and then a little angry, though I usually bear myself with tolerable calmness in discussion. Do I not understand what hedone means in Greek and voluptas in Latin? Which, pray, of the two languages is it that I do not know? Next, how comes it that I do not know this, though all those are aware of it, whoever they be, that have chosen to become Epicureans? And this is a point argued by your school most admirably, that a man who is to become a philosopher has no need to be acquainted with literature. Thus just as our ancestors brought old Cincinnatus from his plough to make him dictator, so you gather from every village men who are indeed worthies, but surely not very well educated. They then understand what Epicurus means, and I do not?

Cicero: To let you know that I do understand, first declare that by voluptas I mean what he means by hedone. Now though we often search for a Latin word equivalent to a Greek word and conveying the same sense, in this case there was no need to search. No word can possibly be discovered which more exactly represents in Latin the sense of a Greek word than voluptas. All men everywhere who know Latin denote by this word two things, delight existing in the mind and a sweet agreeable agitation in the body. In fact the character in Trabea’s play describes delight as excessive pleasure in the mind, just like the character in Caecilius, who gives out that he is delighted with all delights. But there is this distinction, that voluptas is applied also to the mind (an immoral feeling, as the Stoics think, who deign it as an irrational elevation of the mind when it fancies itself in the enjoyment of some great blessing) while laetitia and gaudium are not used in connexion with the body. But according to the usage of all who speak Latin, pleasure consists in feeling that kind of agreeableness which agitates some one of the senses. This agreeableness too you may apply metaphorically if you please to the mind; for we use the phrase to affect agreeably in both cases, and in connexion with it the word agreeable; if only you understand that midway between the man who says I am enriched with such delight that I am unsteadied and the man who cries now at last is my heart on fire, one of whom is transported with delight, while the other is racked by pain, comes this man’s speech though this our acquaintance is quite recent, for he is neither in a state of delight nor of torture; and also that between him who is master of exquisite bodily pleasures and him who is tormented by the intensest pains comes he who is removed from both states.

Cicero: "Do you think then that I sufficiently grasp the force of expressions, or am I even at my age to be taught to speak either Greek or Latin? And, putting that aside, even granting that I do not clearly comprehend what Epicurus means, though I have, I believe, a clear knowledge of Greek, look to it that there be not some fault in him who uses such language that he is not understood."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laetitia_(goddess)

Noun[edit]

laetitia f (genitive laetitiae); first declension

1. joy, gladness, happiness, pleasure, delight synonyms, antonyms ▲quotations ▼Synonyms: dēlicium, dēlectātiō, voluptās, gaudium, frūctus, alacritāsAntonyms: maeror, maestitia, aegritūdō, lūctus, trīstitia, trīstitūdō, tristitās, dēsīderium

laetitia - Wiktionary, the free dictionary

gaudium - Wiktionary, the free dictionary

Noun[edit]

gaudium n (genitive gaudiī or gaudī); second declension

1. joy, delight synonyms, antonyms ▲Synonyms: dēlicium, dēlectātiō, voluptās, laetitia, frūctus, alacritāsAntonyms: maeror, maestitia, aegritūdō, lūctus, trīstitia, trīstitūdō, tristitās, dēsīderium

The listener will have to be the judge of the final product, but I think we had a good recording session today and I think the final product should be a help to our discussions. One comment during early editing:

We talk a lot about how the division of the principal doctrines is a later and artificial add-on. Here is something that I think will help for this episode as to PD03:

PD03. The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.

In this instance, I am thinking that the conventional numbering tends to minimize the separate and equally important status of the two sentences. I would separate them so that they stand alone:

A: The limit of quantity in pleasures is the removal of all that is painful.

--- That's the sentence you are going to hear from Torquatus over and over and over. But the second in my view makes a separate point:

B: Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, there is neither pain of body, nor of mind, nor of both at once.

--- That's a very important separate point: That not only as established in "A" is the limit of pleasure IN SUM the total absence of pain, but as a second and equally important aspect, IN UNITS of pleasure and pain in discrete areas of our experience, each UNIT is either a pain or a pleasure (and no combination or third alternative) for so long as that unit lasts in that "wherever" area of body or mind. Pleasurable experiences and painful experiences co-exist in different parts of experience like oil and water, but like oil and water they stay separate and do not lose their individual separate nature.

In the discussion featured in this episode, Torquatus continuously stresses point "A." Cicero has allowed Torquatus to state point "B" in Torquatus' prior monologue in Book One.

However when Cicero presses Torquatus on why Epicurus seems to be including two entirely separate things ( 1- pleasures of stimulation, 2- pleasures of normal living which do not involve stimulation) in his definition of "Pleasure," Cicero allows Torquatus in Book Two - at least in the section we focus on today - to refer only to point "A" as evidence for his position.

As I see it, in truth Epicurus' formulation requires both "A" and "B" for clarity: "in sum" the limit of quantity of pleasure in total is arrived at when all pain is removed, but ALSO, all the way along the sequence of "discrete units," each experience of life which is not painful is seen as pleasurable. You have to have both observations at both summary and unitary levels to understand how "absence of pain" has two meanings: One in sum as the limit of quantity, and one in discrete unitary experiences that go to make up that sum.

If true, this observation would mean that both sentences in the form we have them in PD03, which are not stated explicitly in the Letter to Menoeceus, have to be fully developed and understood before the passages in Menoeceus about pleasure -- which lead some to an ascetic interpretation of Epicurus -- can be fully appreciated as not saying that at all.

Let's see how this plays out in the podcast.

Episode 195 of Lucretius Today is Now Available! We cover a lot of material that is very important to several rrecent discussions, so I wanted to get this out as quickly as possible.

Quote from Godfrey

Well stated Cassius !

Thank you Godfrey. This point plays a significant point in this episode 195, so if you get a chance to listen and comment I will be very interested.

DUH! thank you Martin!!!

Godfrey:

I am thinking that these guys are being ruthlessly logical. Hieronymous of Rhodes has for whatever reason identified "Freedom from pain" to be the ultimate good (maybe Hieronymous really WAS obsessed with escaping pain as all that matters to him, as Epicurus is alleged to be?) Since Hieronymous does not equate "pleasure" with "freedom from pain," he excludes "pleasure" from his goal and says it is not necessary.

In contrast as to Epicurus (and if I could record again I would stress this point harder) I am now convinced that Epicurus is saying BOTH of these two points:

"A" - The "limit of pleasure" is exactly the same as and can be called interchangeably "the absence of pain." ALSO:

"B" - Any discrete feeling of "pleasure" is exactly the same as and can be called interchangeably a feeling of "absence of pain." Likewise, if desired, any discrete feeling of "pain" is exactly the same as and could be called interchangeably a feeling of "absence of pleasure."

I think we should be reading Epicurus as being ruthlessly logical, and realizing that he had to bring the normal state within the term "pleasure" for philosophical discussion. You therefore end up with people like Torquatus, and Epicurus in the letter to Menoeceus, speaking in terms that sound like (and are, to an extent) a mathematical equivalency:

"Pleasure" = "Absence of Pain and "Pain" = "Absence of Pleasure."

In the past I would have said that Epicurus was equating them in terms of "Quantity" only, as per the first part of PD03. I would have stressed that Epicurus was not saying that "Pleasure" is the equivalent of "Absence of Pain" in every respect, just "quantity."

Now I would say that my prior interpretation did not go far enough. I would now say that Epicurus is simply redefining the terminology and saying that the terms are interchangeable, because there are only two feelings and the presence of one is the absence of the other, period.

The reason I can embrace this equivalency is I think it is also clear from numerous references in Epicurus and Torquatus this does not lead to a woo-woo definition of absence of pain as something other than or higher than pleasure. The first part of PD03 just gives us the "goal" in terms of "the sum of our experience" -- the theoretical goal being to reach 0% painful experiences which literally means 100% pleasurable experiences.

The second part of PD03 gives us the rest, which is that life is lived as a combination of discrete experiences (even "feeling happy" at a particular moment is a discrete experience) and when we refer to discrete feelings, we can label the desirable ones as either "pleasure" or "absence of pain" and mean exactly the same thing with either term.

To me this is validated by concluding that it is obvious to us (as it would have been to Epicurus) that the step from 99% pleasure/absence of pain to 100% pleasure/absence of pain is absolutely not a difference in kind, but only in degree. No "practical" person in his right mind would suggest that in climbing a mountain, there is no benefit from approaching within a foot of the summit, and that only at the very last inch of the summit is the benefit of mountain climbing realized. The benefit of being within a foot of the summit is essentially indistinguishable from being at the very point of the summit.

You could extend that analogy forever: No practical person in his right mind would suggest that in climbing a ladder, there is no benefit from being on the next to the last rung, and that only when you position yourself on the very last rung does climbing a ladder have any benefit. The benefit of being on the next-to-last rung is essentially similar in every practical respect to being on the highest rung.

No practical person in his right mind would suggest that in dining at a banquet there is no benefit from eating the first delicacy in front of you, and that only after you have eaten delicacies to the point of being stuffed does eating delicacies have any benefit. The benefit of eating each delicacy along the way until you are close is essentially similar in every practical respect to having eaten the last delicacies to the point where you are full.

No one of reasonable mind would conclude that reaching the very summit of the mountain or the top rung of the ladder or being close-to-full of delicacies at a banquet means that every step or bite along the way has been worthless and should be discarded. No MORE steps up the mountain or the ladder or bites of food are needed, but the ones you have taken already are an essential and necessary part of whatever it is that you have accomplished.

Unless Hieronymous was a dedicated ascetic viewing pleasure as evil to be avoided at all costs (maybe he was a proto-Stoic) he was committing the grossest error in denying that pleasure is not a requirement and the same as freedom from pain. So while Hieronymous and Epicurus both were comfortable with embracing "freedom from pain" as a statement of the supreme good, their definitions of what "freedom from pain" really means are so dissimilar as to make a night and day difference.

And in conclusion let's go ahead and be "obstinate" and validate two of Cicero's criticisms:

(1) As to terminology, "Pleasure is the absence of pain" is a key insight that Epicureans naturally keep repeating even if it drives Cicero batty that it has two meanings (first as to the sum or limit, and second as to discrete feelings). If it makes Cicero angry , so what? (I see this as another example of the in-your-face approach, such as "the sun is the size it appears to be.")

(2) Regardless of whether it is immodest to say it, Epicurus was wise about the supreme good, and Hieronymous was a fool. If it is being immodest to take a firm position on what is wise and what is not wise in regard to pleasure, then taking a firm position is just what Epicurus was doing, and it seems to me that he is telling us to do the very same thing.

Here's the text again for quick reference:

Quote from Cassius

Cicero: "Do you understand, then, what Hieronymus of Rhodes declares to be the supreme good, by the standard of which he thinks all things should be judged?"

Torquatus: "I understand that he holds freedom from pain to be the final good.”

Cicero: “Well, what view does this same philosopher hold of pleasure?"

Torquatus: "He asserts that it is not essentially an object of desire."

Cicero: "So he is of opinion that joy is one thing, absence of pain another."

Torquatus: “Yes, and he is grossly mistaken, for, as I proved a little while ago, the limit to the increase of pleasure consists in the removal of all pain."

Cicero: "I shall examine afterwards, what is the sense of your expression absence of pain, but that pleasure means one thing, absence of pain another, you must grant me, unless you prove very obstinate."

Torquatus: "Oh, but you will find me obstinate in this matter, for no doctrine can be more truly stated."

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Another key question, Godfrey:

If "pleasure" = "absence of pain," does that mean that all pleasures are the same, and it makes no difference to us which pleasures we experience in life?

My answer would be:

Of course it does NOT mean that!

Pleasures (and pains) differ in intensity, duration, and location. Cites for that proposition would include PD09 + the common experience of everyone.

The pleasures of sitting on the floor of a cave chanting to yourself are quite different from the pleasures of flying to the moon in a rocket with your best pals.

No one with any degree of intelligence would allege that those pleasures are the same, but no one has the inherent authority to substitute their judgement of what is pleasing for those of another person. Some people may in fact find their ultimate fulfillment in life in sitting in a cave chanting. I am not such a person, and I doubt most of us in this forum are such people either. If we don't make more of our lives then that, then we will feel psychological pain of missing out on pleasure that was within our reach at reasonable cost but which we failed to seize.

You can view it in terms of different people having different estimates of pleasure and pain, or in other ways, but it would be ludicrous to suggest that all pleasures are the same and that it makes no difference to us which we choose to pursue in life.

In general, "we want to pursue choices that produce the life for us that is most completely full of pleasure," which means exactly the same thing as that "we want to pursue choices that produce that life for us that is most completely devoid of pain." Once you understand the equivalency then you are fine, but under conditions in which "absence of pain" first evokes in the person you are speaking to visions nihilistic nothingness, then you need to explain what you are saying in full.

I am unfamiliar with the details of Bentham and utilitarianism so I can't comment too much except to say that my problem with Utilitarianism has always been that I believe "the greatest good for the greatest number" is a terrible way of looking at things in sum.

I can't believe that Epicurus would agree that "the greatest number" is a desirable way of ranking an ultimate goal, but it may be that along the way the Utilitarians had aspects of their thought that was closer to that of Epicurus.

Apparently Frances Wright thought so.

If someone has expertise or wants to read up then we can eventually start or renew a Utilitarianism comparison thread -- I think we have one already...

Indeed we do:

Epicurean Philosophy vs. Utilitarianism

Godfrey I think that is creative and makes a lot of sense. Someone might ask if the "entire organism" includes the mind and I think the answer to that would be "of course."

Quote from Godfrey

"In terms of an entire organism, the maximum pleasure is the absence of pain throughout the organism. In any part of the organism, any degree of pleasure removes all pain in that part for as long as it is there, because pleasure is equal to the absence of pain.

As to the question: "Should an organism be satisfied with a low degree of pleasure that in fact drives out all pain when a higher degree of pleasure exists and is available to the organism that would also drive out all pain?"

What would you say to that?

Or is that impossible due to the first sentence of your restatement? Do we come back to the issue of location, intensity, and duration? How do we integrate the two perspectives (whole organism vs individual experiences) more clearly?

"Full" is a term that applies equally to a jar whether the size of the jar is pint, quart, or gallon. But an organism is alive and can perhaps expand or contract its "size" in a way that may be relevant to this conversation?

In other words how do we look at "the full organism" in a way that accounts for the desirability of not simply accepting the "minimum pleasure" that is available to it immediately at hand?

Is there something about the nature of a human or intelligent being that leads to pain if the organism does not seek out the pleasure that is available to it?

What is the most clear way of explaining "This is why you don't just accept the food and water and shelter that is readily at hand, and why you instead educate yourself and work to add to the amount of pleasure that you experience in your life?"

Quote from Godfrey

"In terms of an entire organism, the maximum pleasure is the absence of pain throughout the organism. In any part of the organism, any degree of pleasure removes all pain in that part for as long as it is there, because pleasure is equal to the absence of pain

So to restate my question, I think this is significant advance in explaining what "absence of pain" is intended to mean. But there still remains a "degree" question as to why a baby whose day is 100% pleasure should wish to live another day, much less live to adulthood. There is another aspect of identifying what we mean by "the entire organism" that must explain that point. Something relating to the lifespan and/or natural capacities of the organism.