Is gratitude a katastematic or kinetic pleasure?
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Well said Don .
One of the values of thinking of katastematic pleasure as "a permanent condition produced by practice" is thinking of practice as an action or actions that we can and must take to benefit our well-being. I like that, at least for me, this seems more active than passive. I'm on the fence as to whether to think of KP as a permanent state, however. Stable, yes. But stability doesn't necessarily imply permanence. A volcano can be stable for ages, and then erupt. An illness can be stable until it gets better or worse.
TauPhi has referred to KP as the will to life, which is a permanent thing. I'm not denying that there is a will to life, in fact I agree that there is. But I question whether that is what KP is referring to. I'm thinking that life presents each of us with long term challenges (financial stability, stable good health, stable food and shelter, aging, caring for loved ones, and other things that come up). Doing prudent work of planning and preparation to address these challenges, and others, results in a stable freedom from fear and worry (i.e. pleasure) with respect to each individual challenge. This type of pleasure is quite different from the Cyrenaic type of pleasure which needs to be constantly replenished.
(Cross-posted... this post is in reponse to Don 's post #37.)
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Are we beginning to tread on "once saved always saved" theology?
You could go even further and define hell as "absence of god"... um... katastematic pleasure
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Quote from burninglights
Compare Epicurus's description:
“Joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity.” (DL 10.136)
With the following from Lucretius:
“This will whereby we move forward, where pleasure leads each one of us, and swerve likewise in our motions neither at determined times nor in a determined direction of place, but just where our mind has carried us. For without a doubt it is his own will which gives to each one a start for this movement, and from the will the motions pass flooding through the limbs.” (2.251ff)
From my perspective, you are spot on.
Remember, too, that "consist in motion and activity" is not technically what the Greek says. It's an instrumental dative there with "activity" being ἐνεργείᾳ which means "by (means of) 'energeia'."" It's pleasures through "kinesis" by means of "energeia." Well, that's clear as mud, right? It seems this is Epicurus again wrestling with the current philosophical debates and terms of his day, as energeia, kinesis, dynamis, etc., go back to Aristotle. And if you were a Greek philosopher in Athens *after* Aristotle, you had to contend with that environment. At its basic sense (to the best of my ability right now), Energeia is the putting into action of some potential (dynamis).
See also
Aristotle: Motion and its Place in Nature | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
There seems to be in the "pleasures consisting in motion by means of 'being-at-work'" a sense of bringing about pleasure through the actual work of motion of the individual. The motion, through the work/activity/actuality of the individual, brings about the pleasure.
Look at the words in the Lucretius translation: move forward, swerve in our motions, will, gives to each one a start, movement, motions.
Those are all active working words there.
I am becoming more convinced that the banal "kinetic pleasures" translation hides SO much that Epicurus was trying to get across here.
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All of this does actually align pretty well with the 'traditional' interpretation of these terms as reported by Cicero -- that a kinetic pleasure would be the pleasure of drinking when thirsty and katastematic being the pleasure of having fulfilled that desire. I think that, probably to hone his attack, he just picked a really banal and myopic example.
Yes - Cicero's discussion isn't unreasonable. No one - including Epicurus - seems to have ever alleged that (1) *acting toward a desire* and (2) *fulfilling a desire* are exactly the same thing. You'd have to be pretty obtuse to argue that those are exactly the same in every respect and that it isn't at least somewhat reasonable to distinguish them from each other.
The bigger questions include:
1 - Do both of these concepts (1) and (2) deserve to be included under the label of "pleasure?"
2 - Are (1) and (2) the the *only* type of pleasures, or are there (3) other activities / actions / conditions that also fall within pleasure which are not related to desires being acted toward or fulfilled?
3 - Do any of these concepts (1) or (2) or (3) stand intrinsically or by some absolute standard as superior, hierarchically, to the other(s), such that they separately deserve to be considered to be the "ultimate pleasure" or "highest pleasure" or the "best pleasure" or "real pleasure" for all people at all times and at all places?
As I understand it Epicurus would answer:
1- Yes.
2 - No.
3 - No.
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(1) *acting toward a desire* and (2) *fulfilling a desire* are exactly the same thing.
Call me pedantic, but I wouldn't characterize the two kinds of pleasure in exactly that way. Both "acting toward" and "fulfilling" are action words from my perspective. Maybe "experiencing pleasure while acting on a desire" and "resting in the experience of a fulfilled desire"? But even that doesn't sound right to me. The key concepts from my perspective are action and rest. Maybe - maybe! - mirroring Aristotle's idea of energeia and dynamis although I'm still REALLY shaky on my understanding of those terms.
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1 - Do both of these concepts (1) and (2) deserve to be included under the label of "pleasure?"
While I'd say "yes" to Cassius 's question posed here, I refer the reader to my pedantic post no. 48 above.
2 - Are (1) and (2) the the *only* type of pleasures, or are there (3) other activities / actions / conditions that also fall within pleasure which are not related to desires being acted toward or fulfilled?
It seems to me that there are only two types of pleasure, but I'd again characterize them as "action" and "rest" (with obvious more explanation needed to flesh out those two words). I may also use "change" and "stability" (NOT "static") but also something like unreliable pleasures vs. those pleasures one can be confident in having. Pleasures that depend on energeia are subject to being able to perform the actions necessary to experience them, while the other kind are available without putting forth the effort of activity. *That's* the importance of a word like aponia. It's not painlessness (as far as I can see), it's effortlessness, from ἄπονος (áponos, “without toil or trouble, effortless, painless”).
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Yes I agree Don's pointing out an improvement on the fulfillment aspect, so I would reword:
Cicero's discussion isn't unreasonable. No one - including Epicurus - seems to have ever alleged that (1) *acting toward a desire* and (2) *being fulfilled* are exactly the same thing. You'd have to be pretty obtuse to argue that those are exactly the same in every respect and that it isn't at least somewhat reasonable to distinguish them from each other.
The bigger questions include:
1 - Do both of these concepts (1) and (2) deserve to be included under the label of "pleasure?"
2 - Are (1) and (2) the the *only* type of pleasures, or are there (3) other activities / actions / conditions that also fall within pleasure which are not related to desires being acted toward or being fulfilled?
3 - Do any of these concepts (1) or (2) or (3) stand intrinsically or by some absolute standard as superior, hierarchically, to the other(s), such that they separately deserve to be considered to be the "ultimate pleasure" or "highest pleasure" or the "best pleasure" or "real pleasure" for all people at all times and at all places?
As I understand it Epicurus would answer:
1- Yes.
2 - No.
3 - No.
It seems to me that there are only two types of pleasure, but I'd again characterize them as "action" and "rest" (with obvious more explanation needed to flesh out those two words).
As for this part I'd say "if we want to talk in terms of action and rest there are only two, but there are many ways to categorize and describe forms of pleasure."
And making the whole issue a question of "movement" being the key question bakes into the cake doubt about the status of "stillness." It becomes very difficult to see how the status of "health" of body or mind is a pleasure if "movement or stillness" is elevated as the defining criteria.
I see issues of movement as one of many ways to slice and dice aspects of pleasure, but I wouldn't elevate movement to the core issue. The core issue is whether whatever we are talking about is pleasing to us or not, and it's not necessary to specify anything more than "being alive and without pain." If we specify that we are alive and what we aren't feeling in a particular experience is pain, then what we're feeling at that experience is pleasure, regardless of how fast or slowly that thing is "moving."
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3 - Do any of these concepts (1) or (2) or (3) stand intrinsically or by some absolute standard as superior, hierarchically, to the other(s), such that they separately deserve to be considered to be the "ultimate pleasure" or "highest pleasure" or the "best pleasure" or "real pleasure" for all people at all times and at all places?
Dropping into the middle of this thread (no doubt my comment will be too many cooks stirring the pot, but anyway...) ...so these questions could be applied to kinetic and katastematic. Right now as I type this, I think I am currently in the process of experiencing kinetic pleasure, which is pleasurable but there is a sense that I can't be fully satisfied and a niggling feeling of a lack of completion (ever so slight agitation...hint: it involves eating something sweet). Where as katastematic pleasure has a deeper sense of fulfilment and a sense of being at peace (and at rest). So it is an inner felt experience that will be different for everyone depending on the situation, so there is no absolute regarding this. Life is one big mix of both kinetic and katastematic and that just how it is --- so why distinguish between the two?...because you are acknowledging the truth of your own subjective feelings and this will help you make better choices.
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I like where I think burninglights is going with this.
One question to add into the mix of classifying pleasures into two types: how would a pleasure that doesn't fulfill a desire be classified? If active/passive, moving/still, fulfilling/fulfilled desires relate to k/k, where do pleasures like happening across a pleasant smelling flower, or feeling warm sunshine on a cool day fall in terms of k/k? I think of these as passive, moving (in that they're fleeting), and unrelated to desire. To me, these are kinetic, but I'm not sure how they relate to Cassius ' question 2:
2 - Are (1) and (2) the the *only* type of pleasures, or are there (3) other activities / actions / conditions that also fall within pleasure which are not related to desires being acted toward or being fulfilled?
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burninglights is onto something again and I think I like where he's going!
My perspective is that Epicurus, to the extent that he may be doing it, "prioritizes" katastematic pleasure because of the confidence that we can have it accessing it. It's not dependent on energeia.
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“When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profilgates [...] but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind. (Men. 131).” This point is pretty clear, in my opinion.
This is a key statement. This is "clear," in my opinion, in relating to "katastematic pleasure," only if you previously and firmly have a position that "freedom from pain" is linked to katastematic pleasure.
If Epicurus is, as Torquatus asserts, using the term "freedom from pain" to be an exact synonym of "pleasure," then there is no necessity to read anything whatsoever into the statement in terms of "katastematic pleasure" other than that freedom from pain - which means any experience whatsoever that is not painful - "kinetic," "katastematic," or "supercalifragilistexpealidocius" is a pleasure.
That's the point Nikolsky and Gosling and Taylor make at length -- there is no reason to read any presumptions about katastematic or kinetic whatsoever into the nature of "freedom from pain" other than that the term "freedom from pain" is interchangeable as a synonym for pleasure.
Every time we go down the road of saying "it's a particular TYPE of pleasure that really is important" then the red warning bells ought to be clanging full force. Pleasure is pleasurable because it is a feeling like snow is white and sugar is sweet. Once you start applying additional qualifiers to "what kind of pleasure you really want" then you've got a major logical dilemma. It's 100% logical to talk about choices and avoidance in terms of what kind of results that they bring, and I think that's where this discussion really goes. You choose and avoid your actions in terms of the total pleasure and pain that result. And yes mental pleasures are often (but not always) more easily in reach than mental ones. But that's not always true, nor does it mean that one type of pleasure is better than another.
All this is to say that I think his point is that it’s ‘pleasure all the way down.’
With that I fully agree, and that takes us back to whether and how to pursue the K/K discussion in a way that doesn't take our eye off the ultimate objective, which is a life of "pleasure."
As to DL 10:137, that's a statement that's reflected in Torquatus at greater length in On Ends Book One XVII. I agree that in general it means that mental feelings are going to be more significant than "bodily" ones, but again that doesn't resolve anything as to katastematic and kinetic because those terms don't map straight to mental and bodily. So again we have a situation where it's clear and productive to observe that mental feelings can be used to overcome bodily pains, and that's graspable and easy to understand. But dividing them katastematically and kinetically is not at all the same observation.
XVII. And I will now explain in a few words the things which are inseparably connected with this sure and solid opinion.
There is no mistake with respect to the ends themselves of good and evil, that is to say, with respect to pleasure and pain; but men err in these points when they do not know what they are caused by. But we admit that the pleasures and pains of the mind are caused by the pleasures and pains of the body. Therefore I grant what you were saying just now, that if any philosophers of our school think differently (and I see that many men do so, but they are ignorant people) they must be convicted of error. But although pleasure of mind brings us joy, and pain causes us grief, it is still true that each of these feelings originates in the body, and is referred to the body; and it does not follow on that account that both the pleasures and pains of the mind are not much more important than those of the body. For with the body we are unable to feel anything which is not actually existent and present; but with our mind we feel things past and things to come. For although when we are suffering bodily pain, we are equally in pain in our minds, still a very great addition may be made to that if we believe that any endless and boundless evil is impending over us. And we may transfer this assertion to pleasure, so that that will be greater if we have no such fear.
This now is entirely evident, that the very greatest pleasure or annoyance of the mind contributes more to making life happy or miserable than either of these feelings can do if it is in the body for an equal length of time. But we do not agree that, if pleasure be taken away, grief follows immediately, unless by chance it happens that pain has succeeded and taken the place of pleasure; but, on the other hand, we affirm that men do rejoice at getting rid of pain even if no pleasure which can affect the senses succeeds. And from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is not to be in pain. But as we are roused by those good things which we are in expectation of, so we rejoice at those which we recollect. But foolish men are tortured by the recollection of past evils; wise men are delighted by the memory of past good things, which are thus renewed by the agreeable recollection. But there is a feeling implanted in us by which we [pg 119] bury adversity as it were in a perpetual oblivion, but dwell with pleasure and delight on the recollection of good fortune. But when with eager and attentive minds we dwell on what is past, the consequence is, that melancholy ensues, if the past has been unprosperous; but joy, if it has been fortunate.
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My perspective is that Epicurus, to the extent that he may be doing it, "prioritizes" katastematic pleasure because of the confidence that we can have it accessing it. It's not dependent on energeia.
But in Epicurus' own example at the end of his life, it's the kinetic pleasure of the memory of his associations to which he refers as overriding the pain, correct?
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My perspective is that Epicurus, to the extent that he may be doing it, "prioritizes" katastematic pleasure because of the confidence that we can have it accessing it. It's not dependent on energeia.
But in Epicurus' own example at the end of his life, it's the kinetic pleasure of the memory of his associations to which he refers as overriding the pain, correct?
Touché!
Back to the drawing board!
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128: The right understanding of these facts enables us to refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the soul’s freedom of disturbances, since this is the aim of the life of blessedness.
Keywords
the health of the body
τὴν τοῦ σώματος ὑγίειαν (tēn tou somatos hygieian)
the soul’s freedom of disturbances
τὴν <τῆς ψυχῆς> ἀταραξίαν (tēn (tēs psykhēs) ataraxian)
131: When, therefore, we maintain that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasures of profilgates [...] but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind.
but neither to be pained throughout the body
ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀλγεῖν κατὰ σῶμα (alla to mēte algein kata sōma)
nor to be troubled throughout the mind.
μήτε ταράττεσθαι κατὰ ψυχήν·
(mēte tarattesthai kata psykhēn)
