Is All "Ataraxia" Equal?

Quote from Cassius

But within "pleasurable" and "painful" are there not obviously degrees or pleasurable or painful? And are we not going to choose those pleasures which we find to be more pleasurable than others?

In thinking about this, if we're making a choice about something we've never done before, there is no way for us to know which choice we would find more pleasurable. We can predict which choice we *think* would bring us more pleasure, but what are we basing this one. Previous experience - both our own personal experience and that knowledge that we've gleaned from seeing or reading about others' experiencess - is really the only criteria we can use.

I'm not sure what this implies, but I find it interesting when we (we all) say things like "We make choices that will bring us more pleasure." It seems we should probably say "We make choices that we believe will bring us more pleasure in the long run or the short term."

Quote from Cassius

the question is "Does Epicurean philosophy leave the door wide open to *whatever* interpretation of pleasure one desires to make?"

For Epicurus, pleasure is simply that feeling which is not painful derived from actions or states which do not result in struggle, distress, anxiety, pain, etc. Additionally, Pleasure comes in two "flavors" - that which is felt in a state of rest ; that which consists in motion and activity.

What seems to get interpreted is the activity leading to pleasure and the consequences flowing from pleasure. I think that's also why the pleasure from states is so important because it's source is a state of existence and not an action (something kinetic) and there are really no consequences other than continued pleasure in the state. Plus, we always have access to the pleasure deriving from a state of existence if we only will experience it.

I'm going to quote the letter to Menoikeus with some emphasis:

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[128] The steady contemplation of these things equips one to know how to decide all choice and rejection for the health of the body and for the tranquility of the mind, that is for our physical and our mental existence, since this is the goal of a blessed life. For the sake of this, we do everything in order to neither be in bodily or mental pain nor to be in fear or dread; and so, when once this has come into being around us, it sets free all of the calamity, distress, and suffering of the mind, seeing that the living being has no need to go in search of something that is lacking for the good of our mental and physical existence. For it is then that we need pleasure, if we were to be in pain from the pleasure not being present; but if we were to not be in pain, we no longer desire or beg for pleasure. And this is why we say pleasure is the foundation and fulfillment of the blessed life. [129] Because we perceived pleasure as a fundamental good and common to our nature, and so, as a result of this, we begin every choice and rejection against this, judging every good thing by the standard of how that pleasure affects us or how we react to considering experiencing that pleasure. And because pleasure is the fundamental and inborn good, this is why not every pleasure is seized and we pass by many pleasures when greater unpleasant things were to result for us as a result: and we think many pains better than pleasures whenever greater pleasure were to follow for a longer time by patiently abiding the pain. [130] So, all pleasure, through its nature, belongs to us as a good; however, not all are elected; and just as all pains are entirely evil by their nature, so not all are always to be shunned.It is proper when judging these things to consider what is advantageous and what is not advantageous for you; in other words (i.e., what the consequences will be). We consult the consequences of our actions; because, on the one hand, pleasure over time can lead to pain; and on the other hand, pain can lead to pleasure.

It seems to me that Epicurus is a consequentialist. The "correct" choice to make is based on the consequences of that choice.

Or did you have something entirely different in mind when you used "interpretation"? I suppose should have asked before I went off half-cocked.

Quote from Godfrey

If Lucretius was deciding between spending a life as a shepherd or spending it writing didactic poetry, how would intensity, duration and duration apply? I tend to think of this breakdown in terms of maximizing overall pleasure. In this case:

In thinking more about your intensity, duration, and location schema, it seems Epicurus himself endorses your idea of applying time/duration to pleasure and how we make our choices:

Quote from Letter to Herodotus

We must chiefly reflect upon that to which ***we attach this peculiar character of time***, and by which we measure it. [73] No further proof is required : we have only to reflect that we attach the attribute of time to days and nights and their parts, and likewise to feelings of pleasure and pain and to neutral states, to states of movement and states of rest, conceiving a peculiar accident of these to be this very characteristic which we express by the word `time.' [He says this both in the second book "On Nature" and in the Larger Epitome.]

So, Epicurus states that we DO apply the characteristic of "time" to the feelings of pleasure and pain and to neutral states, to states of movement and states of rest (δὲ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπαθείαις, καὶ κινήσεσι καὶ στάσεσιν). Now, I'm not sure what we are to glean from the translation referring to a "neutral state" ἀπαθείαις (apatheiais) because that's not one of the two feelings of pleasure: κινήσεσι and στάσεσιν. But that might have to wait for another thread. What I wanted to point out that your duration criteria does appear to have a precedent from Epicurus himself.

Quote from Cassius

When PD09 refers to "intensity," location, and duration, are we talking about how pleasures differ from one another and how saying "absence of pain = 100% pleasure" does not tell us all we need to know about which pleasure to choose?

PD09. If every pleasure could be intensified so that it lasted, and influenced the whole organism or the most essential parts of our nature, pleasures would never differ from one another.

I think that the answer to this question must be "Yes!" If you want to describe an ethics of pleasure, you need to go into detail as to how to work with pleasure. You can't stop at "absence of pain = 100% pleasure", which is overarching and somewhat abstract.

Epicurus, as far as I can tell, developed at least three methods to approach a personal ethics of pleasure:

1) understand the difference between desires and pleasures, and work with the three categories of desires

2) examine the attributes of your various pleasures using intensity, location and duration

3) understand and work with katastematic and kinetic pleasures (which is difficult, given the dearth of texts on the matter)

These methods are not mutually exclusive, and in fact are mutually supportive. Or at least that's my current take.

Quote from Don

For Epicurus, pleasure is simply that feeling which is not painful derived from actions or states which do not result in struggle, distress, anxiety, pain, etc. Additionally, Pleasure comes in two "flavors" - that which is felt in a state of rest; that which consists in motion and activity.

I would add to this as per my comments above. Also, I'm not sure that I agree with "simply" in the above quote, Don . Some pleasures do involve various pains, but the resultant pleasure outweighs the pain involved in obtaining the pleasure (I think we all agree on that). I think what you're describing is pleasure resulting from natural and necessary desires.

Quote from Don

Now, I'm not sure what we are to glean from the translation referring to a "neutral state" ἀπαθείαις (apatheiais) because that's not one of the two feelings of pleasure: κινήσεσι and στάσεσιν. But that might have to wait for another thread.

Could it be that, early on, Epicurus had not yet settled on the idea of no neutral state? If so, could this give a rough idea of the approximate date the letter? (Just a thought for another thread.)

Quote from Godfrey

Some pleasures do involve various pains

I can't endorse that. The feeling of pleasure is pleasure and feeling of pain is pain.

If you're saying "Some overall pleasurable activities involve various pains," then, yes, I can endorse that. Riding on a roller coast for some is partly exhilarating and partly terrifying, but the "terror in a controlled environment" is part of the pleasure.

And we know that we have to undergo some pain (ex., exercise) for future pleasure (ex., better health, longer life hopefully). I have no problem with that scenario.

What I'm objecting to (and objecting is probably too strong of a word here) is that the feeling of pleasure itself is not mixed with pain. We can experience some pleasure and some pain in different parts of our body (or maybe even different parts of our mind?) but there is no such thing as pleasure/pain in one feeling.

That's what I meant by "simply."

Quote from Godfrey

Could it be that, early on, Epicurus had not yet settled on the idea of no neutral state? If so, could this give a rough idea of the approximate date the letter? (Just a thought for another thread.)

That's a possibility. If I knew that was there, I had forgotten about it. I'll have to dig in a little more on that "neutral state" (apatheia, a + patheia = "no feeling") comment... unless someone else can chime in! Please do!

Quote from Don

And we know that we have to undergo some pain (ex., exercise) for future pleasure (ex., better health, longer life hopefully). I have no problem with that scenario.

That's specifically what I was referring to. It sounds like we're in agreement; I got thrown off by "simply"

Quote from Cassius

"You have said Ataraxia is desirable. Is all Ataraxia the same?" How should I consider any differences in the experience of ataraxia in determining how I am going to live my life? Does the pleasantness of my experiences while I am not disturbed have anything to do with it? Am I supposed to consider the location, duration, and intensity of pleasures, or are all pleasures of equal significance to me so long as I am not disturbed?

How would you articulate the answer to that question to someone?

Have we already discussed PD 18? There, Epicurus states after reaching the quantitative maximum of pleasure it only differs in quality.

It seems to me, as long as I am mentally undisturbed and in a state of corporeal well-being, pleasureful sensations are "adding up" as an optional seasoning. This may be practically adressed in PD 29, where the natural but not necessary category of pleasures addresses also a qualitative matter. We can find relieve from thirst by simply drinking water or we could also spice our experience e.g. with additional flavour to our drink, heating or cooling it.

I think we also have to take into respect, that this is not only a theoretical discussion of ideas, but of experiences that are fundamental to our being. The idea of fulfilling natural and necessary needs while sitting in a cave by drinking water and eating bread is a state of idealized sanctification. While it focuses on the relatively low hardware requirements concerning human material needs, it ignores all the other variables to our lives in our ever-changing material conditions.

While the natural but not necessary entities are somewhat "optional", they reflect our interaction with our environment. There we have to make decisions continously. So while ataraxia seems to me somewhat equal as a comparable term, it is also confronted by a physical reality that has to be adressed by personal choices and avoidances.

Quote from Titus

The idea of fulfilling natural and necessary needs while sitting in a cave by drinking water and eating bread is a state of idealized sanctification. While it focuses on the relatively low hardware requirements concerning human material needs, it ignores all the other variables to our lives in our ever-changing material conditions.

Quote from Cassius

While there are definitely times and places in world history where sitting in a cave and subsisting on bread and water would be exactly the right course of conduct, doing as some do and setting up such states of existence as not only desirable, but the highest life desirable for a human being, would be better described in my view as "supremely stupid."

I feel the urge to address the "cave and bread" metaphor as it raises its head yet again. This is a favorite metaphor of Cassius's to illustrate the popular but misguided conception of Epicurean philosophy as ONLY satisfying the "natural and necessary" desires. As I understand it, the "cave" signifies the idea that Epicurus walled himself off from the world in the Garden, like some kind of medieval anchorite:

Anchorites: Medieval Women And Men Walled Up Alive

During the Middle Ages, thousands of women and men chose to be walled up alive. Read on to discover why anchorites were willingly immured.

www.thecollector.com

The popular "cave" isolation idea is simply wrong. The Garden, as I hope I've shown in my impromptu presentation and longer article available on the forum, wasn't isolated from Athenian society. The primary reason Epicurus taught in the Garden is that, as I understand, it was private property and he could do what he wanted there. The gymnasiarchs and others had no control or authority over what he taught there. It was what we would call "a safe space." What happens in the Garden stays in the Garden, to riff on a Vegas ad campaign. But that doesn't mean it was "cut off" or walled off from society (insert disgruntled frustrated noise here)... but I digress.

The "bread" is taken as literal instructions on how to live from the Letter to Menoikeus and other snippets taken out of context. I addressed the "maza (barley bread or porridge) and spring water" in my Menoikeus commentary to my satisfaction at least... but I am but a lone voice crying in the wilderness... (insert disgruntled frustrated noise here)

To take one random example of this conception, here's one of the first results in a web search on [Epicurus live on bread]

https://classicalwisdom.com/people/philosophers/epicurus-proto-scientist-secular-saint-and-sophisticated-hedonist/

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Just as important to the Epicurean ethic is a reduction of desires. If we want less, we will be happy with less. The Epicurean path to happiness is not a result of an excess of external pleasures or material goods. Live simply, and without an excess of wealth or luxury, says Epicurus, and with that proclamation he very well may lay claim to the title of “first western minimalist!” Moderation, temperance, and cheerfulness are Epicurean virtues; unbridled luxury and feverish desire Epicurean vices.

From my readings, Epicurus does want us to look at our desires practically and with discretion. This website's "If we want less, we will be happy with less" is *almost* right, in my opinion. I would expand that to say "In times of want, we will be happy with less because we understand that we don't require - it is not a necessity - to have luxuries or even variety in all circumstances if we recognize the pleasure right in front of us. However, if we have the opportunity to partake of luxuries and variety with a minimum of stress, enjoy them! But don't think you *need* them to have a sense of well-being in your life." But that's a little wordy for a breezy podcast website!

I realize the "cave and bread and water" metaphor is a convenient shorthand for this on-going, perpetual, bang-one's-head-against-the-wall frustration with most/many popular and academic takes on Epicurus and his school and philosophy. That is exactly one of the reasons I like and recommend Dr. Emily Austin's Living for Pleasure so highly! I think she got it exactly right...but again... voice, Wilderness, (insert disgruntled frustrated noise here).