To my (likely limited) knowledge, strict libertarian free will entails that our agency (decisions/actions) are so unconstrained that, in any exact same situation, one could have always chosen differently. This implies that both exogenous circumstance and endogenous circumstances (e.g., my state of mind, education, ability to observe and analyze) are the same, and yet I could have chosen differently in any and every case. Now, if all those circumstances are strictly determinative, then the only way I could have chosen differently is if my choices are random. That is why I reject strict libertarian free will (again, as I understand it). I don’t see Epicurus as a strict free-will libertarian.
That does not mean the only alternative is strict determination. Some constraints (both exogenous and endogenous) may be determinative, others not. In some cases, in some ways, I might have been able to choose otherwise. In some cases, not. Some constraints might be sufficiently determinative as to present mitigating circumstances (ethically); others not so much.
So, I take a kind of middle ground about questions of what could be and what might have been possible.