Paul Thyry (Baron D'Holbach / Mirabaud) - French / German Sympathizer With Some Epicurean Ideas

    Quote from Onenski

    For example, contemporary proponents of free will skepticism (such as Derk Pereboom) recognize the elimination of desert and, therefore, the absence of justification of punishments, rewards, guilt, resentment, gratitude and pride (which I honestly consider positive for human societies).

    I'm not familiar with Derk Pereboom or the general reference you're making. My personal view I'll admit is more "superficial" from the point of view of how an "average" person would look at it. My general view would be that a regular person would conclude that If there's no impact you can have on something, then it makes no sense to try to change it. To a regular unsophisticated person that would be a very damaging attitude to take.

    Onenski

    “Free will” can be a fraught concept. What is generally called “libertarian free will” (which might be what most people mean) is incoherent.

    The term I learned in economics is “constrained choice” – which I suspect is closer to another version of free will called “compatibilism”: Yes we choose. But our choices are constrained by our resources, by circumstances and our own abilities – some of which are determined (e.g. by evolution), and some of which result from our own (past) choices.

    And strict determinism would mean that our (under that principle, illusory) perception that we do choose is also determined. So it would seem to be a vicious circle: “Why do you think it’s all determined?” “Because I believe determinism is correct.” “Why do you think that?” “Because it’s determined …”

    "We must try to make the end of the journey better than the beginning, as long as we are journeying; but when we come to the end, we must be happy and content." (Vatican Saying 48)

    Quote from Pacatus

    “Free will” can be a fraught concept. What is generally called “libertarian free will” (which might be what most people mean) is incoherent

    That's exactly the epicurean point of view, so far as I know, right?

    I mean, Epicurus was not a compatibilist, he believed that we are free because the world is undetermined.

    Quote from Onenski

    That's exactly the epicurean point of view, so far as I know, right?

    I mean, Epicurus was not a compatibilist, he believed that we are free because the world is undetermined.

    I think Epicurus thought that some things are determined and some are not (e.g. the "swerve"). Some things are up to us and some are not. If nothing at all is causally determined, then it all becomes random.

    Just thinking "out loud" here, but strict determinism and strict randomness would have the same problems (both epistemologically and ethically).

    "We must try to make the end of the journey better than the beginning, as long as we are journeying; but when we come to the end, we must be happy and content." (Vatican Saying 48)

    I recall some old philosophical discussions of compatibilism that scrambled my brain. ?( =O

    Basically, I take its foundation to be that although some things are determined beyond our control (and affect the range of available choices in any situation), we are still ethically responsible for our choices because – within those constraints – we do choose (even if those constraints can be mitigating factors, ethically speaking).

    "We must try to make the end of the journey better than the beginning, as long as we are journeying; but when we come to the end, we must be happy and content." (Vatican Saying 48)

    Let me add to the conversation that through all my years of reading Epicurus I have never failed to see how difficult this issue is for those who really want to explore its logical complexities.

    At the same time, I've become more and more comfortable taking the position that I am not especially overwraught about the people who want to explore all its logical complexities. ;)

    It seems to me that Epicurus was focused on developing a "real-world" frame of reference that can help most every normal person live a better life. From that point of view, there are definitely things that are within our control, while some other things are clearly not. There's a common sense line that doesn't take an advanced degree to figure out.

    While we haven't developed the analogy too far yet, that seems to be also what Epicurus was doing with his "canon of truth." What is "real" in life to us is what are feelings and five senses tell us is real (and of course I'll include prolepsis in that as soon as we can be clear what it is). Now of course that kind of point of view is going to leave intellectuals aghast at the logical implications, but that's what matters to the normal person in life, and frankly the elaborate intellectual theories are of little or no use to normal people in unraveling those realities.

    I've been thinking about some more general posts on this subject as we end the year but this is a good place to make the same point.

    Speaking only for myself here (but that colors the way I work on and write about Epicurus) I think Epicurus' main focus was on helping regular people of normal intelligence be confident of a reasonable framework that addresses the major "big picture" questions of life and therefore helps them live most happily. Chasing down ever rabbit trail toward total logical completeness was not a major aspect of his project, and in fact the further you chase those issues down the more clear it becomes that it's actually damaging to look at and live life that way.

    The two biggest practical starting point positions that outweigh all other considerations by far is (1) there's no gods or ideal forms to tell you what to do or punish you for doing wrong, and (2) when you're dead your dead forever and there will be no future life of reward or punishment or rebirth or anything else. You get one shot at living life, and you want to live it as happily as you can. That's what Epicurus helps us do.

    Cassius

    That’s a good post, and I generally agree. But –

    Just like Epicurus’ natural physicalism, a fundamental understanding of how (let alone if) we choose seems basic. Under strict determinism, those who (for example) follow Epicurus and those who follow (say) the Stoics are simply determined to do so – without any actual choice based on study and reflection.

    The same for strict randomness: those who are Epicureans and those who are Stoics are just so – randomly (even if they think they have reasonably chosen).

    So I do think these are important philosophical questions. (And, as I hope I have made clear, I reject both those polar extremes.)

    "We must try to make the end of the journey better than the beginning, as long as we are journeying; but when we come to the end, we must be happy and content." (Vatican Saying 48)

    Quote from Pacatus

    Under strict determinism, those who (for example) follow Epicurus and those who follow (say) the Stoics are simply determined to do so – without any actual choice based on study and reflection.

    Right -- and Epicurus says exactly that:

    VS09. Necessity is an evil, but there is no necessity to live under the control of necessity.

    VS40. The man who says that all things come to pass by necessity cannot criticize one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity: for he admits that this too happens of necessity.


    So as I read and interpret his position, it is very important to be very firm: Hard determinism is bunk! ;)

    I think I (and if I recall we have here in the past) analogized this to the argument that was used to prove the motion is impossible.

    If a particular logical argument seems to lead you in the direction of a position that you are absolutely sure of based on your senses and feelings and prolepsis is correct, then what you throw overboard is that logical argument, not your sensations and your feelings and prolepsis.

    No need for hand-wringing -- you *must* trust your natural faculties in order to be able to continue to live. Anything that would lead you in another direction should be rejected out of hand.

    Cassius

    Yes! I only want to add that VS40 is employing deductive logic (here a kind of reductio ad absurdum) in a way that illustrates one of the things deductive logic is good at: illustrating incoherent thinking. However, it is possible to construct a valid deductive syllogism that leads to an empirical falsity (i.e. the syllogism is valid, but not sound).

    Empirical arguments (e.g. from the senses, feelings and prolepseis) depend largely on inference from revealed facts: inductive logic. Although none of that was formalized in Greek thinking of the time, Epicurus seems (to me at least) to have been a kind pf precursor on that path.

    "We must try to make the end of the journey better than the beginning, as long as we are journeying; but when we come to the end, we must be happy and content." (Vatican Saying 48)

    Thank you for your great comments, Cassius and Pacatus .

    I recognize that one of the theses that Epicurus would not have renounced is precisely free will. And to deny it would be to move away from Epicurean philosophy.

    Skepticism about free will, I think, is a personal position of mine, and it is perhaps the one that makes me wonder things like: if the study of nature pointed out that we do not have free will, would Epicurus accept it? Or couldn't it be that Epicurus was wrong about this question just as he was wrong about the size of the Sun? Or also, if what matters is practical life for ordinary people, then would it be valid for us to accept things like biases just because we feel it although they are unjustified?

    There is a conflict (apparent or real), which D'Holbach recognized, between the study of nature and the belief in an exclusive capacity of human beings not to be subject to prior events, or just those that are convenient for attributing moral responsibility.

    I recognize, Cassius, that for the moment it would be very hard for people to live without that belief. The same was said about the belief in God: that people would behave immorally, that one cannot trust in an atheist, or that life would become meaningless. One of my personal projects consists in thinking about a possible way of life that integrates free will skepticism and epicurean philosophy.

    In any case, I don't want to be heterodox enough to say that Epicurus was wrong, or anything like that. I know that the purpose of the forum is to discuss Epicurean philosophy as closely as possible to its original sources, and that does not involve a defense of free will skepticism.

    What may possibly be pertinent is to seek, over time, a stronger and more robust understanding of Epicurus' position vis-a-vis this kind of skepticism.

    Quote from Onenski

    Or also, if what matters is practical life for ordinary people, then would it be valid for us to accept things like biases just because we feel it although they are unjustified?

    If when you say "bias" what you are talking about is "stereotypes" or "generalities" then I have had several discussions about this subject recently.

    I personally relate this to issues of "statistics."

    The nature of a generality is that it is "generally" true, even if exceptions exist. Working with them it is essential to recognize that generalities are "statistically more likely" while at the very same time you are affirming that "exceptions do exist."

    Does the fact that exceptions exist nullify the beneficial uses of generalities? I would say clearly "no!" Generally speaking, we can expect the sun to rise in the east tomorrow. Does our firm conviction that the sun will one day explode (or something else bad will happen) mean that we should not plan to get up tomorrow morning? No.

    In the case of free will, Epicurus is being very clear that some things are determined while others are not. Both are affirmed to be true. Depending on what you choose to look at, the fact may be that *most* things are determined in some way, and what we have firm control over is a much smaller subset. But it can still be true that both categories exist, and I don't see that we should let one overwhelm the other, any more than we should let the perfect be the enemy of the good. :)

    Quote from Onenski

    Skepticism about free will, I think, is a personal position of mine, and it is perhaps the one that makes me wonder things like: if the study of nature pointed out that we do not have free will, would Epicurus accept it?

    Can I assume that if I were to say: "There is no such thing as free will" that this means that I am not actually choosing anything and that everything always is predetermined by forces outside of my conscious mind? Such that we are saying that what appears to be free will is just an illusion? Or can we say "free will" = an individual's ability to choose.

    Quote from Cassius

    In the case of free will, Epicurus is being very clear that some things are determined while others are not. Both are affirmed to be true.

    Here is an example: I drink a large cup of tea. I then need to go pee. There is something in my mind which is registering pleasure and pain sensations throughout my body, and it is also balanced by my awareness of mental thoughts. Perhaps I am sitting with friends and I want to hear someone finish a story so I sit and wait till the end, and then excuse myself. But maybe I am fed up with hearing a story, so I leave before the end. There are millions of insignificant events that can't possibly be predetermined. As we become more aware of how to skillfully deal with pleasure and pain, it actually increases our ability to freely choose.

    I have more thoughts on this but perhaps I will add more later 8o

    Quote from Kalosyni

    Can I assume that if I were to say: "There is no such thing as free will" that this means that I am not actually choosing anything and that everything always is predetermined by forces outside of my conscious mind?

    Including believing and saying “There’s no such thing as free will.” Or that there is. Or believing that Epicureanism is a better philosophy than Stoicism, and why; or vice versa.

    Quote from Kalosyni

    Or can we say "free will" = a individual's ability to choose.

    For me, that’s just what it is -- even in the face of constraints that limit our choices and how we are able choose.

    "We must try to make the end of the journey better than the beginning, as long as we are journeying; but when we come to the end, we must be happy and content." (Vatican Saying 48)

    Quote from Kalosyni

    There are millions of insignificant events that can't possibly be predetermined.

    The predetermined nature of all our choices is exactly what the current crop of the "no free will" crowd says. Their contention is that if we knew the position of every atom and the physical laws that pertained to them, it would be possible to accurately know what would happen next ad infinitum. Just because we don't know how to do that yet doesn't negate the "fact" that there's no free will.

    Here are some videos to react to...

    Quote from Don

    Their contention is that if we knew the position of every atom and the physical laws that pertained to them, it would be possible to accurately know what would happen next ad infinitum.

    Would that entail that there is no randomness in the system? That every event is perfectly predictable?

    Now I want to hear from Martin! :/ :)

    "We must try to make the end of the journey better than the beginning, as long as we are journeying; but when we come to the end, we must be happy and content." (Vatican Saying 48)

    Aren't emergent properties a form of randomness? Or do they fall under the idea of "if we knew enough about everything, we would see how they actually emerged"?

    Does "if we knew enough about everything, then we would see how x" mean that as we learn more we will have more free will?

    Quote from Kalosyni

    Can I assume that if I were to say: "There is no such thing as free will" that this means that I am not actually choosing anything and that everything always is predetermined by forces outside of my conscious mind?

    For me, another way to see it, Kalosyni ,

    is that the fact that you believe in free will has an explanation that goes beyond your control. It means that you grew up in a certain context, with some genes, certain hormones, that you've had certain experiences, live in a certain cultural context, etc. that explain why you have that belief.

    It doesn't mean that your are like a puppet that it's controlled by someone else, it means that even your desires and beliefs are the product of a chain of events prior to you. It also means that there's not a Self above your body who can make choices: you are your body and this body it's immerse in a natural world with laws and different levels of explanation.

    It also means that we, human beings, don't have a very special ability, which suspiciously other animals don't have, to make choices out of nothing. Even our small choices have their context and explanation.

    Unfortunately, debate on free will tends to focus on very local choices, not in the history of how your intention was formed. For some people is more important to prove that I made certain choice freely, without see any context of my history, than to see what brought me here to choose that thing.

    Quote from Pacatus

    Would that entail that there is no randomness in the system? That every event is perfectly predictable?

    There's an important nuance to make. There can be unpredictability even under deterministic processes. In chaotic systems, which can be understood under deterministic functioning, we can't predict the results, but that doesn't mean they are random.

    Quote from Godfrey

    Aren't emergent properties a form of randomness?

    That also apply to emergent complexity.

    For relevant purposes randomness present in quantum mechanics it's not strong enough to produce relevant consequences to the functioning of neurons (which can be the first level of explanation of human behavior).

    I've read these things in Sapolsky's book Determined (another recent book about this is Kevin Mitchell's Free Agents, this was suggested by Godfrey last Wednesday).

    As I said up, I think this neuroscientific discussion can be enriching for epicurean philosophy, because as it's understood in the debate, Epicurus was a libertarian about free will. That means that, arguably, Epicurus thought that a deterministic world is incompatible with free will. But between those two options he defends the existence of free will, which imply that we live in an indeterministic world (that's why he defends the swerve).

    Kevin Mitchell defends that the brain has evolved to work in an indeterministic way so that it can make choices that permits an adaptation to a very changeable world (like a quantum computer). Sapolsky, on the other side, defends that human behavior works in a deterministic way, so we're not morally responsible of what we do.

    See you later, guys! ^^

    Quote from Godfrey

    Aren't emergent properties a form of randomness? Or do they fall under the idea of "if we knew enough about everything, we would see how they actually emerged"?

    That would *not* be my understanding Godfrey. Emergent qualities would arise from the attributes of the atoms and void which make them up in a mechanistic way. There is no function assigned to the swerve of the atom other than free will and bringing atoms together to form worlds in the first place. Sedley thinks the swerve was only developed later in response to the need to respond to the hard determinists.

    It's been a long time since I read it but I always recommend the Long article on this -- Chance and Natural Law in Epicureanism, the basic thrust of which is to argue that virtually everything in the Epicurean universe IS determined except for the free will of intelligent animals, which is the one place that the swerve "breaks through" into observability. If the swerve were constantly making many things random then the whole basis of atomism would implode because atomism would not be able to explain the regularity that we do see.

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