Pros and Cons Of Considering Epicurean Philosophy To Be A "Religion"

Also for example : I am presuming that in your scenario you are not presuming that at any step of the say that something was created from nothing, as that would violate an established Epicurean position.

Point 1

Quote from Peter Konstans

Atoms themselves were forged in stellar explosions but where exactly the raw physical energy that set the universe alight ultimately comes from is unknown. Since the universe can't have just 'popped up' as the late Hawkings believed we must assume that it actually has divine roots.

Point 2

Quote from Peter Konstans

We must then suppose that the universes emanate from the energies of divine entities that dwell in a realm beyond time and space that we cannot observe.

Point 3

Quote from Peter Konstans

Just as the Epicureans prayed to the gods not to request favors but to contemplate them and receive some of their divine essence, it can be assumed that the gods contemplate the One and that this contemplation results in a burst of creative energy that perpetually generates finite universes.

OK then Peter I presume then that these are your personal viewpoints and you are not representing them as consistent with Epicurean philosophy. Fair enough if you think those positions could be supported by "modern science," but not Epicurean viewpoints, as I understand your statement of them.

Because certainly in Epicurean terms:

1 - Atoms are eternal and were never created at any point in time from energy or anything else.

2 - I guess you're basing that on point one, but it's definitely not the Epicurean position.

3 - I see no Epicurean reason for thinking that gods contemplate "The One" any more than we contemplate "the one," because Epicurean are atomists and there is no "the one."

I see Don and I posted simultaneously on almost exactly the same points.

As for me, my answers are:

Quote from Peter Konstans

According to modern cosmology atoms did not exist forever. They were created through the process of nucleosynthesis. Are we in agreement that modern cosmology is correct in this?

I am definitely *not* in agreement with that. The purpose of this forum is to research and apply Epicurean philosophy, not "modern cosmology," especially on issues that are highly contentious and conflict with logical reasoning as to whether the universe as a whole had a beginning or is eternal. As for my personal views they are absolutely with Epicurus on this one. There are at some level particles that have been around eternally, whether "atom" is the right word for those particles is going to be a question of terminology.

Quote from Peter Konstans

According to Epicureanism gods exist between the intermundia, i. e. between the infinite cosmoi. Are we in agreement that this doesn't go against any Epicurean position?

We are in agreement that the Epicurean gods exist in theintermundia, which is hypothesized to be between the "worlds." I am not sure what you refer to when you say "this" however. The first part of your statement as to the gods existing in the intermundia is no doubt what the Epicureans held.

Quote from Peter Konstans

The existence of Epicurean gods raises the question where they came from. The logical answer to that would be that they emerged from a single divine source.

No, we would not be in agreement here either. The logical answer to any recurring process in a universe that is eternal and had no beginning is that these processes have been going on forever, and that there was never a "first." And to the extent your "divine" is intended to imply "supernatural" we were certainly not be in agreement.

Quote from Peter Konstans

Following Epicurus we affirm that gods are a part of nature and as such not' supernatural' but since they are immortal we also affirm that they are 'supernatural' in the sense that the the matter that makes them up doesn't dissolve.

I don't think that is quite correct. There is no reason to consider that the particles that make up the gods are different from any other particles. The difference is that the gods "replace" their particles in such a way that their pseudo-bodies never deteriorate like ours do. That's not supernatural - that's working within nature to continue their preservation, and that requires effort on their part (as per fragments discussed by Dewitt).

Quote from Peter Konstans

Epicurus encourages us to believe about the Gods whatever upholds their blessedness and immortality. The idea that gods are engaged in contemplative activity similar to prayer is an idea that doesn't violate the notion of their blessedness in itself.

Certainly contemplation could be a part, but if you are suggesting that that is *all* that they do, I see no reason for that conclusion, and it might well contradict the position stated above that the gods must act to maintain their deathlessness.

Quote from Peter Konstans

The idea that reality has a divine foundation (i. e. that space and time are not the whole of reality but simply a part of it) is the only way to support the notion that the universe has existed forever and always will exist and it is the only way to counter cosmological nihilism.

This is totally fail to follow as a reasonable suggestion and see no hint of it in the way that Epicurus constructed his view of the eternality of fundamental particles.

Quote from Peter Konstans

Immortality and indestructibility are not observed anywhere in space and time. If the cosmos has no divine foundation then both the place of the gods in it and the notion of infinity run into logical problems.

The are not observed, they are *deduced* from what we do see, as explained in more detail by Lucretius, so I would disagree here as well.

Quote from Peter Konstans

That's why modern cosmologists tend to believe in a finite, one-shot, once-in-an-eternity universe that came from nothing i. e. 'quantum fluctuations'. I am not saying they are correct but if you assume that the universe has absolutely no divine foundation then it makes sense to think this way.

Again I wonder why you switch the term from "supernatural" to "divine." Do you mean to imply a difference? As to the point that modern cosmologists tend to go off in that direction, that's probably correct, and why I recommend people avoid them like the plague. I think Epicurus' deductive logic about an eternal and infinite universe, based on observations of what we do see every day around us makes much more sense than postulating a one-shot deal that violates that which we do see.

Quote from Peter Konstans

However we can't assume that the gods are engaged in a struggle to 'feed' and preserve their bodies similar to that of biological beings. This would imply that they are not blessed but live in a state of at least partial insecurity. The idea that instead of dealing with issues of survival the gods engage in care-free creative activity (like creating works of art) and then in contemplation as a means of 'resting' from creative activity fits the image of blessedness better.

Here is the very interesting section in DeWitt that explains the "gods must preserve their deathlessness" issue, which begins on page 267:

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At the outset it must be observed and kept diligently in mind that nowhere in his extant writings does Epicurus call the gods immortal. This might be thought an accident of the tradition were it not for the fact that other considerations rule out this possibility. If Lucretius does call them immortal repeatedly, this may be set down as an indication that he never really mastered the Epicurean lore of the gods and did not live to make an intensive study of it in preparation for writing about it.

The reasoning behind this doctrine of incorruptibility is readily discerned. From the doctrine that nothing exists except atoms and void it follows that the bodies of the gods must be corporeal. Gods are zoa, "animate beings." They are thus units in the ascending order of Nature, as is man. Being in this order and corporeal, they cannot be deathless. If deathlessness were inherent in their nature, they would be in another class by themselves. Since they do belong in the same class as man, it is a logical necessity to think of their incorruptibility as by some means preserved. Since in the cosmos of Epicurus, unlike that of Plato, this incorruptibility lacked a superior being to guarantee its continuance, the sole possibility was that the gods preserved it for themselves by their own vigilance. Thus it must be discerned that just as the happiness of man is self-achieved, so the happiness of the gods is self-preserved.

However astonishing this doctrine may seem, it is well authenticated. Plutarch, for example, who, though hostile, wrote with texts of Epicurus before him, has this to say: "Freedom from pain along with incorruptibility should have been inherent in the nature of the blissful being, standing in no need of active concern."⁵⁷ This manifestly implies that the Epicurean gods were unable to take their immunity from corruption for granted but must concern themselves for its perpetuation.

The incongruity between this selfish concern for their own bodily security and their indifference to the good of mankind was certain to elicit condemnation from believers in divine providence, and this has not escaped record. Thus the Christian Eusebius quotes his Atticus as saying: "According to Epicurus it's good-bye to providence, in spite of the fact that according to him the gods bring to bear all diligent care for the preservation of their own peculiar blessings."⁵⁸

When once it has been discerned that the gods are under the necessity of preserving their own blessings, the next step is to learn that this activity is ascribed to them as a virtue. The recognition of this fact will serve to explain a rather cryptic statement from the pen of Epicurus himself. Writing of the "false suppositions" of the multitude, who thought of the gods, now as punishing the wicked, now as having venal relationships with them, he concluded as follows: "for [the gods], being exclusively devoted to their own peculiar virtues, are partial to those like themselves, deeming all that is not such as alien."⁵⁹ The first half of this statement has been variously interpreted, but the recognition of our puzzling doctrine will make the meaning intelligible. Just as it is the virtue of men to achieve their own happiness, so it is the virtue of the gods to preserve their own blissfulness. This task so completely engages their attention that no participation in human affairs is possible.

This notion was so well known as to have been familiar to the dull Horatian commentator Porphyry, who lived early in the third century A.d. Horace had quoted freely from Lucretius: "I have learned the lesson that the gods live a life free from concern." ⁶⁰ The comment runs: "This derives from the doctrine of the Epicureans, who assert that the gods cannot be immortal unless enjoying leisure and immune from all responsibility."

This doctrine has two facets. The gods are characterized by two attributes, blissfulness and incorruptibility. Neither is inherent in their nature. They are incorruptible only because the contingency of destruction is avertible by their vigilance. If this seems subtle, the notion that keeps company with it is more so and also paradoxical. Let it be allowed that incorruptibility is tantamount to eternal life. Then, according to Epicurus, this eternal life is not to be thought a cause of happiness but rather the perpetuity of happiness is a cause of eternal life. The gods win eternal life by maintaining their own pleasures perpetually. This conceit appealed to Menander, who exploited it in his Eunuchus. It survives through transfer to the Andria of Terence, where the happy lover is made to exclaim: "I think the life of the gods to be everlasting for the reason that their pleasures are perpetual, because immortality is assured to me if no grief shall intervene to mar this joy." ⁸¹ This is labeled as "Epicurean dogma" by the Donatus commentary.

This curious conceit consists in a curious semantic shift. Since the life of the gods becomes immortal only through perpetuity of happiness, it follows that the word immortal comes to denote a quality of life, something superb or exquisite. This is the only sense in which it is employed in the extant remains of Epicurus. For example, the good Epicurean "lives among immortal blessings" and friendship is styled an "immortal good." ⁶²

The notion that this activity should be ascribed to the gods as a virtue seemed as weird to Plutarch as it does today: "This is not what we mean when we speak of virtue as strong and vice as weak; we do not apply the words to the perpetuation and dissolution of body; wherefore [the Epicureans] are at fault when they represent eternal life as accruing to the divine being through guarding against and dispelling the forces that would destroy." ⁶³ Manifestly the gods are not assured of their safety merely by dwelling in the spaces between the worlds. They must also be forever on the watch. This is the view satirically presented by Seneca: "[The divine being] in the space between this heaven and another . . . dodges the debris of the worlds crashing to ruin above it and around it." ⁶⁴

Very differently are described the divine abodes in the opening lines of the third book of Lucretius; all is at rest, no wind, no rain, no frost, no snow, and no clouds, but always serenity of sky; Nature unasked supplies all needs and nothing occurs at any time to mar the perfection of peace.⁶⁵

This contrast between Lucretius and Seneca marks a chimerical union in the thought of Epicurus between a relentless logic and a sort of romanticism. The logic can be made clear by a chain argument. It has its source in a tenacious materialism, which demands that the bodies of the gods be corporeal; by the same logic the corporeal cannot be immune from the hazard of destruction; the gods are consequently not deathless, only incorruptible; this incorruptibility, not being inherent, demands some sort of conservation, which can only be ascribed to the foresight and effort of the gods themselves. This, then, is their virtue, to preserve their own happiness and incorruptibility.

The weakness of logic, of course, is its lack of dynamic. Men do not feel called to devote their lives to the propagation of syllogisms. The merit of romanticism, on the contrary, is the dynamic that goes with it. It is powered by emotion. Lucretius often handles the logic of Epicurus with clarity and skill, but the force of propulsion behind the logic is emotion, pity for the superstitious misery of man and eagerness to emancipate him. In respect of this enthusiasm Lucretius seems to surpass his master, and yet Epicurus is on record as saying: "[The wise man] will be more susceptible of emotion than other men and this will be no obstacle to his wisdom." ^6a Here we have the recognition of the chimerical blend of logic and romanticism. It is the latter, the emotion, the eagerness to emancipate men from fear and to show them the road to happiness, that leads Epicurus to extol the blissfulness of the gods as a perfection to contemplate and imitate. It is the logic of materialism that compels him to deny it to them as a birthright, so to say, and to impose upon them the necessity of preserving it.

Strange as this contingent immortality may seem, a similar notion was entertained by Plato. According to him the eternity of the cosmos depends upon the will of the supreme demiurge; since he was the creator, he could also destroy. It is impossible, however, to think of him choosing to do so.⁸⁷ Thus the cosmos is eternal because it is subject to a contingency that will never occur. Even the immortality of the Christian falls in the same class: being the gift of God it could also be withdrawn by the same power, but perfect faith exists that this contingency will never occur.

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Quote from Peter Konstans

Maybe the gods even have a blessed 'end' where they reach a stage of existence so high that they merge with God.

I can't imagine the phrase "merge with God" to be something Epicurus would find consistent.

Quote from Peter Konstans

The notion that reality has a divine foundation means theism. It means that divine beings in some form exist, that the universe is in some form a divine expression and that the whole of reality emanates in some way from ontologically superior planes.

No I don't see that as compatible with Epicurus at all. There is no implication whatsoever that the universe arises from the divinities, and in fact quite the opposite - any "divinities" that exist are purely natural.

Quote from Peter Konstans

Religions are false and harmful not because they accept the reality of a divine sphere (regardless of how they define this sphere) but because of their completely false notions about the divine.

Now that sentence I agree with as being exactly what Epicurus is saying.

I have to add as an aside to what I quoted from DeWitt above that I've never seen that argument anywhere else. If someone has seen it elsewhere, please let me know, because I tend to see this is one example of the value of DeWitt's approach. DeWitt charges ahead to explore important questions where few others seem to want to go. If I have a criticism it is as I said in a recent podcast, that sometimes I don't think DeWitt follows his own lead far enough. So if I had been him I would not have written the following to imply that Lucretius' approach was superior to that of Epicurus (if in fact it does; as I reread it, I think DeWitt is maybe just making the point that you need both):

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The weakness of logic, of course, is its lack of dynamic. Men do not feel called to devote their lives to the propagation of syllogisms. The merit of romanticism, on the contrary, is the dynamic that goes with it. It is powered by emotion. Lucretius often handles the logic of Epicurus with clarity and skill, but the force of propulsion behind the logic is emotion, pity for the superstitious misery of man and eagerness to emancipate him. In respect of this enthusiasm Lucretius seems to surpass his master, and yet Epicurus is on record as saying: "[The wise man] will be more susceptible of emotion than other men and this will be no obstacle to his wisdom." ^6a Here we have the recognition of the chimerical blend of logic and romanticism. It is the latter, the emotion, the eagerness to emancipate men from fear and to show them the road to happiness, that leads Epicurus to extol the blissfulness of the gods as a perfection to contemplate and imitate. It is the logic of materialism that compels him to deny it to them as a birthright, so to say, and to impose upon them the necessity of preserving it.

DeWitt has himself pointed out that:

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“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing."

To me this logical reasoning about the gods sustaining their own deathlessness is very similar to the example of the logical reasoning behind concluding that if the feelings are only two, then the absence of pain *is* pleasure, and vice versa. Both are logical assertions that stand or fall on the precise meaning of words that are asserted to correspond with the actual facts of reality, and to the rejection of interpretations that contradict these conclusions.

The gods are composed of atoms and void and therefore they are not by nature immortal. The feelings are two and therefore the presence of one is the absence of the other. Granting the premises of these propositions, then, to paraphrase Torquatus, nothing can be more true than the truth of these propositions, and Epicurus was asserting them dogmatically as established beyond doubt.

Yes we need "emotion" and "romanticism" to give force to the conclusions, but the logical reasoning supports the emotion and romanticism, it doesn't undermine it. DeWitt pioneers the discussion of the gods not being naturally deathless, but then he unfortunately draws back from the conclusion, when he should follow each step out to the end.

Lucretius may have tripped up on calling the gods immortal (I say may because I see this as more likely an issue of connotation and translation / wording), but I don't think there's anything inconsistent at all about the emotion and drive of Lucretius compared to Epicurus. We don't have the texts but I feel sure Epicurus was at least as driven and intense as Lucretius himself.

Quote from Bryan

The same Epicurus asserts that there are four other natural beings which are immortal: of this sort are (1) atoms, (2) the vacuum, (3) the infinite, and (4) the similar parts; and these last are called Homoeomeries and likewise elements." (Goodwin trans.)

Point 3 reminds me of DeWitt's comment about the forces of creation prevailing over those of destruction in the universe as a whole - individual worlds come and go, but the universe as a whole continues forever. To me that makes sense and is a useful point.

Point 4 seems to imply something else that isn't so immediately understandable, at least to me. So this is the same homoeomery that Lucretius argues against "going downward" from our level of existence (that men are not made of little men)? But since we aren't concerned about infinite division on a scale going upward, it is ok to observe that at some level bodies can be grouped together to form larger versions of the same bodies on an infinite or between-the-worlds or "god-level" scale? I think what you are implying Bryan is a grouping of similar particles, perhaps fractal-like - sustainable by flows of similar components, analogous to drops of water forming a waterfall or river or groupings of stars forming a milky way?

The point that even the gods require some form of activity to maintain their deathlessness would likely be a significant part of Epicurean theology, giving us another useful thing to consider as points of emulation. We too have to act properly to sustain our happiness just as they do - there's no supernatural state that "hands it to us free" for men or gods.

Or stated in the way that the death argument is made in Lucretius (if even Epicurus and Scipio had to die, we should not be offended that we too die), then the analogy would be something like: If even the gods must act properly to maintain their happiness, who are we to complain that we must do the same? We should emulate the gods not only in the result of being happy, but also in the process of getting there, with both gods and men acting property to perpetuate our happiness.

Note: I made some edits in the above paragraphs to try to be more clear.