Episode 234 - Cicero's OTNOTG - 09 - Dealing With Marcus Aurelius And The Canonical Basis For the Epicurean View Of Divinity

Reminder to All Members - Join Us For Our First Monday Meet and Greet Zoom - at 8:00 PM EST - Members who have recently joined EpicureanFriends are especially welcome!

    I suppose the question is whether Epicurus thought ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας was a different criterion from 'the other criteria' (τῶν κριτηρίων). You could think the Epicureans were taking it as an additional criterion from a straightforward reading of the Letter to Herodotus itself. See DL X 38, and especially 51 (τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων). But then what would it contribute that the other criteria do not?

    LR's last question I think points out the problem in making the criteria to be four rather than three. I have always thought that the following arguments on this point, also from Chapter 8, seemed persuasive to me:

    The following objections may also occur to the mind of the reader: if the formation of the general concept ensues upon acts of sensation, then all elements of anticipation are removed; again, if it is formed as the residuum of acts of sensation, this is a sort of inductive process and no result of a rational process can itself be a primary criterion of truth, which Epicurus declared the prolepsis to be; still again, if the general concept is the sum of a series of sensations, then the prolepsis is merged with sensation, and the second criterion of Epicurus disappears. This, in turn, would mean that Epicurus possessed no criterion of truth on the abstract levels of thought. Such a conclusion is hardly to be tolerated.

    ....

    Even within Epicurean circles the term prolepsis underwent unjustified extensions. For instance, Epicurus, recognizing Nature as the canon or norm, had asserted that, just as we observe fire to be hot, snow to be cold, and honey to be sweet, so, from the behavior of newborn creatures, we observe pleasure to be the telos or end. Certain of his followers, however, shaken no doubt by Stoic criticism, took the position that the doctrine was an innate idea, that is, a prolepsis.48 In strict logic this error was a confusion between quid and quale. The problem was not to decide what could be predicated of the end or telos but what was the identity of the end. Was it pleasure or was it something else?

    ....

    When once these ambiguities and confusions have been discerned and eliminated, it is possible to state the teaching of Epicurus with some of that precision by which he set high store. In the meaning of the Canon, then, a sensation is an aisthesis. All such sensations may possess value; otherwise there would be no sense in saying, "We pay attention to all sensations." Their values, however, range all the way from totality to zero. The value is total only when the sensation is immediate. For example, when Aristotle says, "The sense of sight is not deceived as to color," this is true only of the close view, because colors fade in more distant views.

    Sensations, however, usually present themselves in combinations of color, shape, size, smell, and so on. An immediate presentation of such a composite unit is a phantasia. All such presentations are true, but they do not rank as criteria in the meaning of the Canon, for the reason that the intelligence has come into play. An act of recognition (epaisthesis) has taken place in the mind of the observer, which is secondary to the primary reaction that registered color, shape, size, smell, and so forth.

    That Epicurus did not regard these composite sensations as criteria is made clear by a statement of his own: "The fidelity of the recognitions guarantees the truth of the sensations." 19 For example, the animal standing yonder is recognized as a dun-colored ox. This is a secondary reaction. Only the primary perceptions of color, shape, size, and so on constitute a direct contact between man and the physical environment. The truth of these perceptions is confirmed by the fidelity of the recognition.

    ....

    Again, let it be assumed that the quality of sweetness is registered by sensation. It is not, however, sensation that says, "This is honey"; a secondary reaction in the form of a recognition involving intelligence has taken place. This, in the terminology of Epicurus, is "a fantastic perception of the intelligence." These were not given the rank of criteria by Epicurus for the reason already cited. It is on record, however, that later Epicureans did so.20

    Quote from Don

    it's honestly been awhile since I considered it.

    Me, too.

    I had once supposed that "ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας" was a direct synonym for "προλήψεις", but I have since come to see an "προλήψεις" as just one type of "ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας", some of which are canon (like a raw, mental impressions), and some of which are vain (like astrological predictions).

    If that taxonomy is reasonable, then, applied to the divine nature, the true "προλήψεις" are naturally-occuring icons (in dreams) that once inspired ancient hominids to plant the seeds of spirituality that would eventually develop into national cults. Some of the "ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας" about the divine nature are coherent with the basic nation of a "divine creature", such as the proposition that Hermarkhos and Philodemos seem to insist, that (1) the blessed figures of our natural aspirations correspond with metacosmic waveform creatures whose bodies pump ghostly blood and respirate imagination, or also (2) the coherence of admirably "godlike" human (i.e. Epicurus) who are near-enough to the general notion of the "προλήψεις" of a "god" that the concept becomes present and useful and meaningful in the way that word-making first naturally develops. Likewise, some "ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας" are vain, like the beliefs that (a) magic genies grants personal favors, or that (b) the divine nature is punishing you by willing Mercury into retrograde, which mysteriously, metaphysically drops your credit score.

    Quote from DL 10.37-38

    "In the first place, Herodotus, you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning. [38] For the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving; this being necessary, if we are to have something to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.

    "Next, we must by all means stick to our sensations, that is, simply to the present impressions (ἐπιβολὰς) whether of the mind *or* of any criterion* whatever (εἴτε διανοίας εἴθ᾽ ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων), and similarly to our actual feelings (παθη), in order that we may have the means of determining that which needs confirmation and that which is obscure.

    I read this as Epicurus conveying that words can be - should be - referenced back to and denoting impressions of the senses. He urges Herodotus to test "opinions, inquiries, or problems" in reference to real sensations impressed upon the senses (including the mind) from the real, true external-to-ourselves world.

    I see "or of any criterion"* as referring to the other senses - tasting, hearing, etc. - and he includes the mind (διανοίας "thinking faculty, intelligence, understanding" LSJ) specifically in that list of "sensations" as all members in his list of criteria.

    The "every term... ought to need no proving" appears to also say that words need to refer back to a mental/physical sensation of some kind, an impression from the real world.

    The criteria of truth then, to me, are the sensations, the prolepseis, and the feelings, precisely because they all interact directly with the "real external world." They are the impressions set upon us from the world outside ourselves. These criteria are our first line of contact, unmitigated by "opinions, inquiries, or problems", with the real, true, existing world in which we live.

    Now, are opinions almost instantaneous sometimes, following directly on the heels of sensations and prolepseis? Sure! I have no problem with that. Consider you're walking through the woods, your sensations register a long skinny shape on the ground, your prolepseis have identified this shape as a danger in the past (the grooves are well worn in your eye's and mind's apprehension of the shape... so the "prolepseis" slips right into the groove, metaphorically).. your reason jumps in with "Snake!" and you jump back. It is only seconds later that you realize it was a discarded rope. Your opinion was in error, even though there was indeed a long slender shape that registered in your sensations from our external environment. Your sensations were true. Your prolepsis faculty registered the pattern seen and reinforced. Your feelings registered pain. It was your opinion layered on top that got it "wrong."

    That's a VERY rudimentary scenario illustrating where my mind is at right now on this topic. To get a "modern Epicurean" take on things, I still think it is fruitful to dig into the work of Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett and her colleagues. I think that line of modern research has a lot of ideas worth exploring when it comes to really understanding how the mind actually works, and I still find a number of very interesting Epicurean echoes if not parallels in it.

    Quote from Little Rocker

    I suppose the question is whether Epicurus thought ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας was a different criterion from 'the other criteria' (τῶν κριτηρίων). You could think the Epicureans were taking it as an additional criterion from a straightforward reading of the Letter to Herodotus itself. See DL X 38, and especially 51 (τινὰς ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας ἢ τῶν λοιπῶν κριτηρίων). But then what would it contribute that the other criteria do not?

    Image perceptions of the mind are 'senses at the distance', so to speak. According to Epicureans every object (most likely with the exception of singular atoms and the void - but let's not go there right now) emits images - εἰδωλα. That's why we have two ways of detecting objects:

    1) direct contact - eidolas do not make any difference as we have exposure to the objects themselves. In this scenario, the senses are criterion of truth (take precedence) for image perceptions of the mind, which in simpler terms, makes the 4th criterion irrelevant.

    2) indirect contact - we get the truth about objects by their eidolas sent to us at the distance (this is the example of a round tower in Epicurean terms). In this scenario, the 4th criterion is crucial and it is considered a full-fledged criterion of truth (equal to the other canonical three criteria) allowing us to know the truth about objects outside of direct sensations.

    The answers to your questions Little Rocker are probably something like that:

    Quote from Little Rocker

    whether Epicurus thought ἐπιβολὰς τῆς διανοίας was a different criterion from 'the other criteria' (τῶν κριτηρίων).

    Yes, most likely and probably he reserved the three canonical criteria for 'perfect conditions of getting to the truth' without complications arising from 'suspension of belief' due to eidolas' possible distortions resulting from the distance between the observer and the object.

    Quote from Little Rocker

    But then what would it contribute that the other criteria do not?

    The ability to know truth about our surroundings outside of the direct contact.

    Quote from Don

    Now, are opinions almost instantaneous sometimes, following directly on the heels of sensations and prolepseis? Sure! I have no problem with that. Consider you're walking through the woods, your sensations register a long skinny shape on the ground, your prolepseis have identified this shape as a danger in the past (the grooves are well worn in your eye's and mind's apprehension of the shape... so the "prolepseis" slips right into the groove, metaphorically).. your reason jumps in with "Snake!" and you jump back. It is only seconds later that you realize it was a discarded rope. Your opinion was in error...

    In a manner analogous to pulling your hand from a hot stove, I would interpret jumping back from the "snake" as a reflex rather than an instantaneous opinion. As I understand it (for the moment at least), opinion occurs when you realize that it was a rope, based on the additional sensations from looking at it directly. However it could be that this isn't opinion either, but instead "focusing of the mind" on the object. You have a prolepsis of a rope which somehow comes into play when you focus your mind on the object.

    Quote from Godfrey

    In a manner analogous to pulling your hand from a hot stove, I would interpret jumping back from the "snake" as a reflex rather than an instantaneous opinion.

    But how would we define a "reflex" in ancient Epicurean terms as opposed to other mental or physical activities?

    Honestly, in some ways, I think we're trying to do two different things here, and I admit I've contributed. On the one hand, it seems to me, we're trying to get a grasp on Epicurus's understanding of the mind and sensations and prolepsis and how he understood thought and memory etc. On the other, I'm trying to shoehorn a 2,000+ year old round peg into a modern neuroscience square hole. The understanding of Epicurus's perspective is interesting, valuable, and worthwhile from a philosophical and historical perspective but I'm skeptical if it's possible to "translate" that perspective and connect it to a modern neuroscience understanding of the brain, perception, sensation, etc. Understanding the brain and sensation in a modern setting and requiring a lining-up of Epicurus's terms or ideas with that seems fraught with difficulties. I'm beginning to think it might be better to simply acknowledge that the two frames are irreconcilable, and move on to understanding each (the ancient and modern) separately.

    Quote from Don

    On the other, I'm trying to shoehorn a 2,000+ year old round peg into a modern neuroscience square hole. The understanding of Epicurus's perspective is interesting, valuable, and worthwhile from a philosophical and historical perspective but I'm skeptical if it's possible to "translate" that perspective and connect it to a modern neuroscience understanding of the brain, perception, sensation, etc.

    i'm not focusing on you or this discussion with this comment, but yes I think you've put your finger on a big problem. Epicurus wasn't working in our current framework and I'd say we need to first understand Epicurus in his own terms before we can even begin to apply what he said to another framework.

    But to repeat this isn't a problem of individuals in this discussion, I think the entire history of Epicurus is warped almost beyond recognition by trying to interpret him in terms of ideas that he never thought or considered plausible. Epicurus was working in the framework that had been put in place by Plato and others well before his time, and it's going to be more revealing to compare him to what came *before* than to what came *after*.

    I'd say that much of the frustration that we find in disagreements about Epicurus among commentators comes from that attempt to force him into Stoic or Buddhist or modern psychology frameworks. We can and should do that, but *after* we're confident of Epicurus's views, not before.

    Quote from Cassius

    I think the entire history of Epicurus is warped almost beyond recognition by trying to interpret him in terms of ideas that he never thought or considered plausible.

    Yes, exactly this.

    Quote from Don

    On the one hand, it seems to me, we're trying to get a grasp on Epicurus's understanding of the mind and sensations and prolepsis and how he understood thought and memory etc. On the other, I'm trying to shoehorn a 2,000+ year old round peg into a modern neuroscience square hole. The understanding of Epicurus's perspective is interesting, valuable, and worthwhile from a philosophical and historical perspective but I'm skeptical if it's possible to "translate" that perspective and connect it to a modern neuroscience understanding of the brain, perception, sensation, etc....I'm beginning to think it might be better to simply acknowledge that the two frames are irreconcilable, and move on to understanding each (the ancient and modern) separately.

    For what it's worth, I tend to have two criteria that guide my efforts to 'figure Epicurus out':

    Criterion 1: the text is the chief constraint. If we want to take Epicurus on his own terms, the text itself has to support, or at least not decisively rule out, a viable reading, and I prefer, all things considered, to keep my body of primary text reasonably narrow (as in, what we have from Epicurus, not what Plutarch or Clement of Alexandria say about Epicurus).

    Criterion 2: I know this is contentious, but I also think we should seek the most philosophically and empirically charitable account the text can sustain. That means we should rule out interpretations that unnecessarily saddle Epicurus with untenable positions, if a more plausible position can be attributed to Epicurus within the bounds of textual evidence. Which is to say I think it's totally fine, Don, to consider whether Epicurus might be in striking distance of what might count as a viable contender of a view today. I think it's always good to ask, 'how close is he to our current understanding?' Even if, in the end, it turns out the answer is, 'nowhere near.'

    Quote from Little Rocker

    Criterion 1: the text is the chief constraint. If we want to take Epicurus on his own terms, the text itself has to support, or at least not decisively rule out, a viable reading, and I prefer, all things considered, to keep my body of primary text reasonably narrow (as in, what we have from Epicurus, not what Plutarch or Clement of Alexandria say about Epicurus).

    I concur with that. While not using Plutarch, Clement, et al. limits what's available, limiting oneself to *actual* Epicurean writings at least removes some of the likely anti-Epicurean bias inherent in "quotations" from those opposed (vehemently) to the Epicurean school.

    Where do you come down on Cicero? Valuable? Reliable? LOL I find Cicero insufferable as a commentator, but he preserved some pivotal information... but how much to trust him as a conveyor of Epicurean teaching?

    Curious also about your view of using the Herculaneum material: Philodemus, the fragments of On Nature, and so on. I'm inclined to make use of it where there is a reasonable amount of intact text, but skeptical of a lot of what might need "reconstruction."

    Quote from Little Rocker

    Criterion 2: I know this is contentious, but I also think we should seek the most philosophically and empirically charitable account the text can sustain.

    Sure, I got no problem with that. We have such little text (although, relatively speaking, we have a treasure trove!) that we have to read between the lines sometimes.

    Quote from Little Rocker

    That means we should rule out interpretations that unnecessarily saddle Epicurus with untenable positions, if a more plausible position can be attributed to Epicurus within the bounds of textual evidence.

    Yep, agree with that as well. :) For me, an example of this idea would be that Epicurus was an ascetic as seems popular in some circles. A more plausible position from my perspective is that he may very well have tested himself from time to time to see how much he could live on and still be satisfied... but I certainly don't see him doing this day in day out. I have source amnesia but seem to remember one author talking about "from time to time" Epicurus would test the limits of this kind of thing and to better appreciate abundance when one has it. I think of Lent or Ramadan in a regular religious context.

    Quote from Little Rocker

    Which is to say I think it's totally fine, Don, to consider whether Epicurus might be in striking distance of what might count as a viable contender of a view today. I think it's always good to ask, 'how close is he to our current understanding?' Even if, in the end, it turns out the answer is, 'nowhere near.'

    I can see that. I think my issue is trying to retrofit modern understanding into an Epicurean context. That's why I think (and, trust me, this is a recent realization on my part) it's vitally important to understand what Epicurus thought, taught, and understood within his own contemporary historical and philosophical context. Once that is reasonably well understood, then we can look for parallels or echoes or similarities to modern understandings. Heck, the ancient Greeks coming up with atoms - fundamental building blocks of matter common to everything across the cosmos - is pretty darn impressive... even if our modern "atoms" are not per se Epicurean or Democritean "atoms." Coming up with a material cosmos and making supernatural gods unnecessary was a great leap forward. It wasn't science but it gets you walking toward a scientific understanding of the universe. Kudos to them!

    That said, I'm finding that I'm unable to be as generous when it comes to the psykhe and the mind and memory and all that. Our minds don't seem to grasp eidola from their air to conceive of things. Is it impressive that Epicurus posited a material cause for sensation, and the interaction of "soul atoms" to describe the activity of what is actually the human nervous system? You betcha! But Epicurus was working with a completely different paradigm when it comes to the mind. I just don't think we'll find exact parallels of prolepseis from a modern understanding... but I remain open to the idea!! There are several old posts of mine where I've done exactly that after all ^^ For example...

    Thread

    Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett on The Functions of the Brain

    I just started reading Dr. Barrett's book How Emotions Are Made (2017) and find it fascinating. I just finished the first chapter, so, in looking for something to listen to on the treadmill this morning, found her TED talk.

    I see implications and applications to Epicurean philosophy (I think). She talks about the basic experiences all humans have from birth like pleasure and displeasure (I'm calling that pain). Overlaid on these basic sensations are the emotions our brains build from contextual…
    Don
    December 15, 2020 at 7:49 AM

    https://www.epicureanfriends.com/wcf/conversation/381-homeostasis/

    Quote from Don

    Our minds don't seem to grasp eidola from their air to conceive of things.

    Say it ain’t so, Don! I mean, at least Santa emits eidola, right?!;)

    Quote from Don

    Where do you come down on Cicero? Valuable? Reliable? LOL I find Cicero insufferable as a commentator, but he preserved some pivotal information... but how much to trust him as a conveyor of Epicurean teaching?....Curious also about your view of using the Herculaneum material: Philodemus, the fragments of On Nature, and so on. I'm inclined to make use of it where there is a reasonable amount of intact text, but skeptical of a lot of what might need "reconstruction."


    Cicero, though largely hostile, and burdened with the conceit of a talented undergrad, does seem to me to have one redeeming quality—his Academic Skepticism required him to take seriously and weigh competing positions, never fully accepting any of them. And his bestie was an Epicurean. So I generally take his reports of Epicurean views seriously, unless it seems to set the Epicureans up for a too easy dismissal by Cicero’s subsequent critique or has the vague odor of emblematically Roman interests that Cicero might have picked up from Philodemus. And unless he’s the only one to say something that radically alters a general understanding.

    I take Philodemus with a dose of caution for the reasons you mention—the text is fragmentary, and reconstruction is sometimes guided by the view of the person producing the reconstruction. The use of AI in reconstruction, though, interests me. I’m also a bit wary of Philodemus because he taught Romans, and Romans were a weird lot.

    Quote from Don

    I just don't think we'll find exact parallels of prolepseis from a modern understanding... but I remain open to the idea!!

    Yeah, I think if Epicurus is a radical empiricist of the sort that many people take him to be, where the mind contributes nothing to 'complete' perception, and more importantly, to the generation and refinement of prolepseis, then he had the wrong view. Nothing bad about that because some people still have that view—it’s not a settled question. But I think developmental psychology and animal research show that cognitive systems come prepared to structure the key parts of experience using built-in capacities for abstractions, especially those required to navigate the environment. And honestly, given his Cradle Argument and his view that humans, like animals, are hedonists, I suspect Epicurus would privilege the evidence from those experimental fields, even against his own view, if it got him what he wanted in the end.

    I stumbled on this today while working on something else. And it reminded me of initial conversation in this thread:

    Quote from Bryan

    This is a physical sense that stems from contact -- impressions of particles entering your body -- just like all the other senses. We can only form propositions after we have this sense/contact.

    In some circumstances you may focus on being physically touched by the images of trees that are around you, at other times you may focus on being physically touched by circumstances in a way that produces a sense of guilt (or lack of guilt) or a sense of justice (or lack of justice), at other times you may focus on being being physically touched by the images of the gods.

    Just as we have an innate ability to sense trees with our eyes, we have an innate ability to sense gods with our mind.

    It's from Catherine Wilson's 'Epicureanism: A Very Short Introduction':

    "According to the account given in Cicero’s dialogue on this topic, the Epicureans believed that the gods were not perceived by the senses but by the intellect, via images arising from the ‘innumerable atoms’ that compose thoughts and dreams. While some commentators appear to believe, on the basis of a problematic preposition in Cicero’s text, that these images flow from the gods, in the manner of the ordinary idola emitted from solid objects, this does not seem to be what Epicurus had in mind. Rather, the texts suggest that our thoughts flow to the gods on account of the images."

    I don't want to make this topic even more complicated, but I'm curious about the direction of the images' flow. Can someone confirm if the images flow from the gods or to the gods according to Epicurus?

    Quote from TauPhi

    I don't want to make this topic even more complicated, but I'm curious about the direction of the images' flow. Can someone confirm if the images flow from the gods or to the gods according to Epicurus?

    My understanding is that the text explicitly says "to the gods." Translators said "it can't really say that, so we'll correct it" and substituted "from the gods."

    An additional fly in the ointment is that in reading ahead to a section where Velleius is being attacked, it seems that I remember seeing another reference to these images and the gods, and that in the second reference the preposition goes the other way.

    Of course I don't have the cite on the tip of my tongue and without it this comment is useless, but I will see what I can do, and Joshua and I can look for it as we go further in OTNOTG.


    Edit - it might be this from later in Book One, but I may remember something even more definite. Plus this is Yonge and I may be remembering Rackham:

    XXXVII. “They have nothing to do,” your teacher says. Epicurus truly, like indolent boys, thinks nothing preferable to idleness; yet those very boys, when they have a holiday, entertain themselves in some sportive exercise. But we are to suppose the Deity in such an inactive state that if he should move we may justly fear he would be no longer happy. This doctrine divests the Gods of motion and operation; besides, it encourages men to be lazy, as they are by this taught to believe that the least labor is incompatible even with divine felicity.

    But let it be as you would have it, that the Deity is in the form and image of a man. Where is his abode? Where is his habitation? Where is the place where he is to be found? What is his course of life? And what is it that constitutes the happiness which you assert that he enjoys? For it seems necessary that a being who is to be happy must use and enjoy what belongs to him. And with regard to place, even those natures which are inanimate have each their proper stations assigned to them: so that the earth is the lowest; then water is next above the earth; the air is above the water; and fire has the highest situation of all allotted to it. Some creatures inhabit the earth, some the water, and some, of an amphibious nature, live in both. There are some, also, which are thought to be born in fire, and which often appear fluttering in burning furnaces.

    In the first place, therefore, I ask you, Where is the habitation of your Deity? Secondly, What motive is it that stirs him from his place, supposing he ever moves? And, lastly, since it is peculiar to animated beings to have an inclination to something that is agreeable to their several natures, what is it that the Deity affects, and to what purpose does he exert the motion of his mind and reason? In short, how is he happy? how eternal? Whichever of these points you touch upon, I am afraid you will come lamely off. For there is never a proper end to reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation; for you asserted likewise that the form of the Deity is perceptible by the mind, but not by sense; that it is neither solid, nor invariable in number; that it is to be discerned by similitude and transition, and that a constant supply of images is perpetually flowing on from innumerable atoms, on which our minds are intent; so that we from that conclude that divine nature to be happy and everlasting.


    Edit TWO == same implication of direction from the gods:

    XXXVIII. What, in the name of those Deities concerning whom we are now disputing, is the meaning of all this? For if they exist only in thought, and have no solidity nor substance, what difference can there be between thinking of a Hippocentaur and thinking of a Deity? Other philosophers call every such conformation of the mind a vain motion; but you term it “the approach and entrance of images into the mind.” Thus, when I imagine that I behold T. Gracchus haranguing the people in the Capitol, and collecting their suffrages concerning M. Octavius, I call that a vain motion of the mind: but you affirm that the images of Gracchus and Octavius are present, which are only conveyed to my mind when they have arrived at the Capitol. The case is the same, you say, in regard to the Deity, with the frequent representation of which the mind is so affected that from thence it may be clearly understood that the Gods are happy and eternal.

    Joshua and I will get to all of this over time, but it's apparent that there is a lot more in OTNOTG in regard to images that is relevant to prolepsis, even if we have to reverse engineer it from Cotta's criticisms:

    XXXIX. The whole affair, Velleius, is ridiculous. You do not impose images on our eyes only, but on our minds. Such is the privilege which you have assumed of talking nonsense with impunity. But there is, you say, a transition of images flowing on in great crowds in such a way that out of many some one at least must be perceived! I should be ashamed of my incapacity to understand this if you, who assert it, could comprehend it yourselves; for how do you prove that these images are continued in uninterrupted motion? Or, if uninterrupted, still how do you prove them to be eternal? There is a constant supply, you say, of innumerable atoms. But must they, for that reason, be all eternal? To elude this, you have recourse to equilibration (for so, with your leave, I will call your Ἰσονομία), and say that as there is a sort of nature mortal, so there must also be a sort which is immortal. By the same rule, as there are men mortal, there are men immortal; and as some arise from the earth, some must arise from the water also; and as there are causes which destroy, there must likewise be causes which preserve. Be it as you say; but let those causes preserve which have existence themselves. I cannot conceive these your Gods to have any. But how does all this face of things arise from atomic corpuscles? Were there any such atoms (as there are not), they might perhaps impel one another, and be jumbled together in their motion; but they could never be able to impart form, or figure, or color, or animation, so that you by no means demonstrate the immortality of your Deity.

    More:

    XLI. But they are free from pain. Is that sufficient for beings who are supposed to enjoy all good things and the most supreme felicity? The Deity, they say, is constantly meditating on his own happiness, for he has no other idea which can possibly occupy his mind. Consider a little; reflect what a figure the Deity would make if he were to be idly thinking of nothing through all eternity but “It is very well with me, and I am happy;” nor do I see why this happy Deity should not fear being destroyed, since, without any intermission, he is driven and agitated by an everlasting incursion of atoms, and since images are constantly floating off from him. Your Deity, therefore, is neither happy nor eternal.


    You guys are much better with the text than I am, and i have read many times that the earlier section seems to have the images going the wrong way, but when you look at the rest of what is said in attacking Velleius, it sure looks like a case can be made that everyone understood the images to be coming *from* the gods, and the "to" must be some kind of transcription error.

    (Of course given the nature of the theory, it IS true that we ourselves are giving off images too, which the gods would be able to observe (if they were so inclined) just like we apparently are argued to perceive theirs. But I wouldn't expect that our paying attention to the idea of gods in any way "focuses" the images streaming off of us to go in the direction of the intermundia.)

    Quote from TauPhi

    from the gods or to the gods

    Quote from Cassius

    it IS true that we ourselves are giving off images too... But I wouldn't expect that our paying attention to the idea of gods in any way "focuses" the images streaming off of us to go in the direction of the intermundia

    Yes, I agree all around -- films (τὰ εἴδωλα) come off every object. We can focus on films that come off other objects toward us, but we cannot direct the films that come off us toward other objects.


    48b ...for there is a continuous flow from the surface of bodies – not noticeable by decrease due to replenishment – preserving the position in the solid and arrangement of atoms for a long time...

    49b For external objects would not imprint their nature of color and shape through the air between us and them... without certain impressions coming to us from the objects (of the same color and of the same shape) according to the size that fits into the vision or mind, by means of swift movements.

Unread Threads

    1. Title
    2. Replies
    3. Last Reply

    2. November 2024 General Thoughts On What Epicurean Philosophy Means To Me. 3

      • Cassius
      • December 3, 2024 at 9:18 AM
    3. Replies
      3
      Views
      264
      3

    4. Cassius

      December 3, 2024 at 9:18 AM

    2. Prolepsis / Anticipations As Epicurus' Answer to the MENO Problem 34

      • Cassius
      • December 1, 2024 at 6:38 AM
    3. Replies
      34
      Views
      1.9k
      34

    4. Cassius

      December 1, 2024 at 6:38 AM

    2. Stoics Aren't Ascetics... It's Those Epicureans! 9

      • Don
      • November 29, 2024 at 7:18 PM
    3. Replies
      9
      Views
      391
      9

    4. Joshua

      November 29, 2024 at 7:18 PM

    2. Epicurean Views On How To Integrate "Anger" Into A Healthy Life 17

      • Cassius
      • November 27, 2024 at 8:20 AM
    3. Replies
      17
      Views
      3.1k
      17

    4. Don

      November 27, 2024 at 8:20 AM

    2. Atoms Make Up the Human Psyche 3

      • kochiekoch
      • November 27, 2024 at 7:32 AM
    3. Replies
      3
      Views
      277
      3

    4. kochiekoch

      November 27, 2024 at 7:32 AM