In addition, it seems like pretty much each of these meanings can be employed figuratively, which causes a little tree of meanings to grow from both words
This is an excellent case study in the difficulties of translation
LOL! Welcome to the wonderful world of translation! 
Just gotta say to close the night, I don't like the sound or connotations of "flee" at all! 
Just gotta say to close the night, I don't like the sound or connotations of "flee" at all!
I am curious to read why.
Take your pick:
I **much** prefer "flee" to "avoid". There's nothing wrong with fleeing a dangerous situation, which is what one should literally do when confronting empty desires, anxiety-producing ideas, harmful beliefs, and so on. Flee from them. Escape from them. Get away from them. There's nothing wrong with a strategic retreat. There's nothing wrong with fleeing from or escaping from a city under siege. Avoiding, to me, makes it sound like you're stepping around external threats. The threats are coming from inside the house - unsound beliefs, harmful ideas, empty desires, anxieties, and so on. Leave them behind and flee from them, get as much distance from them as possible.
I am saying that ("fleeing" is not a normally something an Epicurus would do) mainly in the context of coming up with words that are generally useful.
To me, "flee" is something you do when Mt. Vesuvius erupts, and there is absolutely nothing you can do a about a horrible danger. But even then, if you are Pliny the Elder, then you run toward the danger - and this is not the Stoic "duty" some will accuse it of being - because you could not live with yourself if you did not make an effort to save your friends, or even (though this is less likely) you want to satisfy your curiosity. It seems to me that for an Epicurean in the normal world, 'fleeing' is something you will rarely have to consider, along the lines of luck rarely intruding on the life of the wise man." "Choosing" and "Avoiding," or similar action words of normal life, seem to me to be the more useful terms that characterize what even the wisest man will generally be doing.
PD25 If at all critical times you do not connect each of your actions to the natural goal of life, but instead turn too soon to some other kind of goal in thinking whether to avoid or pursue something, then your thoughts and your actions will not be in harmony.
εἰ μὴ παρὰ πάντα καιρὸν ἐπανοίσεις ἕκαστον τῶν πραττομένων ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλὰ προκαταστρέψεις εἴτε φυγὴν εἴτε δίωξιν ποιούμενος εἰς ἄλλο τι, οὐκ ἔσονταί σοι τοῖς λόγοις αἱ πράξεις ἀκόλουθοι.
PD25 literally uses εἴτε φυγὴν εἴτε δίωξιν which are the antonyms of each other mentioned above: flee/escape from and pursue/chase. Saint-Andre chooses to use the traditional "avoid" but that doesn't translate the dichotomy of φυγὴν and δίωξιν.
I'll grant you that you have to find English translations that speak to you for the Greek words Epicurus used (or the Latin ones Lucretius used). But I also maintain translation can obfuscate the original meaning, so we all need to be careful.
"fleeing" is not a normally something an Epicurus would do) mainly in the context of coming up with words that are generally useful.
Well, the words he used are φυγή (noun) and φεύγω (verb). Here are the dictionary entries for each, so I encourage everyone to dig into the connotations of each and decide for themselves. Maybe "flee" isn't the best, but I need something with more agency than "avoid":
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, φυ^γή
Woodhouse, S. C. (1910) English–Greek Dictionary: A Vocabulary of the Attic Language[1], London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited.
avoidance
banishment
disappearance
escape
exile
flight
outlawry
proscription
refusal
rejection
repudiation
stampede
transportation
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, φεύγω
Antonyms
(antonym(s) of “to flee, be accused”): διώκω (diṓkō, “to pursue, accuse”)
Related to Latin fugio:
a commitment to engage
I would say (in my opinion) that the only time that an Epicurean makes a "commitment" is when there is a pact or contract that is signed or agreed to between people (marriage, rental agreement, peace treaty, etc.)
For all other actions within oneself, I would see choosing as coming from a natural motivation to well-being and health (it is natural to want to feel good and feel healthy, but perhaps there are bad influences from "civilization" that erode this natural impulse).
Take for instance going on a diet (weight-gain and being overweight is due to unnatural coping strategies)....going on a diet only truly works when you see that not eating the teaspoon of added sugar every morning in your coffee, not buying the ice cream, etc etc, is actually more pleasurable than eating it...because you are imagining the pleasure you will feel in the future and your enjoyment of not having tight clothes and not feeling sluggish, but feeling rejuvinated and healthy. And eating the healthy food (veggies rather than too many carbs) is also thought and felt as pleasurable for the same reason). So there is no need for "commitment" but instead the "carrot of pleasure" and "the stick of pain" are the true motivators for becoming more healthy.
"Commitment" for me brings up the idea of "duty" and "obligation" based on "virtue" and "doing what is "right" ...but maybe that is just me
.
"Commitment" for me brings up the idea of "duty" and "obligation" based on "virtue" and "doing what is "right" ...but maybe that is just me
My current understanding of language and of how things are:
A commitment is always with myself. I declare to myself that I will (not) do something, and I make this declaration with full intent to follow through (for now; I may always change my mind on myself, but if I do that for minuscule reasons my intent was never truly full). The full intent to follow through is what changes a mere choice/decision into a commitment. A commitment which is fortified by using a 2nd commitment to not change my mind later (even in the light of new information) is called an unwavering commitment.
A promise is a commitment regarding benefits (and less commonly damages/duties) to someone other than myself. A feigned promise is the act of deceiving another with regards to that I do not, in fact, have any internal intent to follow through. (This is why a broken promise is a betrayal, unless the one who broke it did everything reasonably within their power to be true to their word.)
A contract is a promise, which creates legal duties and rights between two entities. A contract based on a feigned promise is made in bad faith. The romantic ideal of marriage was a special type of contract, because it entailed unwavering commitment and a powerful guarantor: the church/state.
I cannot have a contract between myself and "virtue", because it is not a 3rd party, but rather a mere concept within myself. To concepts, I can only be committed, but never obligated. This is called: being committed to a cause or to one's values.
If a contract is nullified, it is declared that one party did not or could not, in fact, develop the intent to follow through: there never was bilateral commitment. Examples might be getting married while intoxicated or contracts with kids (who cannot enter into contracts because they lack what it takes for informed consent).
If a contract is cancelled, (at least) one party changed their mind, committed to a different path, and now follows through with that new path; but the commitment was legally present at one point. That happens in one of two ways: I declare my change of mind to the other party and our relationship ends ordinarily (eg, I decide on a new mobile plan), or I fail to follow through and the relationship ends "for exceptional reasons" (eg, I failed to pay my bills).
Since I myself am merely a concept to myself, I should accept myself and commit to myself (even though I am not obligated to do so), because by doing so, I have to accept where/what I am now (acceptance), and also have to chose who I want to be (commitment). Without an acceptance of reality as it is, there would be no foundation for aimful/targeted action, and having a commitment always means having a should-be condition. Special case: By declaring the should-be condition to be equal to the current condition, I commit to keep things as they are; but even then, a should-be condition is (implicitly) being declared. The less clear I am about the should-be condition, the less strong my commitment can be. This is why it helps to have concrete goals, even if they change along the way.
People who do not commit are aimless and flakey. A sexual relationship without commitment is a fling.
The difference between choosing to have a good life and being committed to have a good life is in one's intent to actually make it so and follow through, instead of aimlessly wondering around, hoping for chance or fate to come to one's rescue, flaking out as soon as a hint of effort-required arises on the horizon.
In this way, it is not bad to have commitments to virtues: according to PD5 pleasure is kind of primus inter pares with prudence, propriety and justice. (We just need to keep our priorities straight and remember that no virtue is ever absolute or an end in itself.)
People who do not commit are aimless and flakey.
That is the sense in which I use the word "commit" and 'commitment" too. While Kalosyni is correct that it *can* involve improper views of duty and obligations asserted by false abstractions, it's more important meaning (to me, and i would wager to be one of the most generally-used definition, unless you're specifically talking about sending a crazy person to an asylum, a criminal to prison, or signing a contract) is more like:
an intense emotional drive voluntarily undertaken toward the achievement of some specified and desired goal.
I would not let Stoics or Buddhists or anyone else abscond with the perfectly valid word like "commitment" as if it only arises through "duty." To accept that would be akin to buying into the idea that all intense emotional drive is somehow tainted. Epicurus said that the wise man will feel his emotions MORE intensely than others.
an intense emotional drive voluntarily undertaken toward the achievement of some specified and desired goal.
Metaphor: Choices and decisions only pile up dry wood; the spark of commitment is required to ignite the flame of action.
I would not let Stoics or Buddhists or anyone else abscond with the perfectly valid word like "commitment" as if it only arises through "duty." To accept that would be akin to buying into the idea that all intense emotional drive is somehow tainted. Epicurus said that the wise man will feel his emotions MORE intensely than others.
Yes! This is why promises made only because of a sense of duty aren't worth a grain of salt.
Yes! This is why promises made only because of a sense of duty aren't worth a grain of salt.
Yes. Now of course we are talking about communication and word choices, and different people might use a very different word to express exactly the same thing to which I am referring to as encompassed in "commitment" as "an intense emotional drive voluntarily undertaken toward the achievement of some specified and desired goal." But if I became convinced that someone was "commitment-averse" in a generic sense, I would likely arrive at exactly the conclusion of "flakiness" you mentioned earlier Julia.
And for example I am convinced that it is the "commitment" of Lucretius that comes through as the intensity and value of his poem, and likewise with Diogenes of Oinoanda. If that sense of "commitment" does not come through in a person's writings about Epicurus (at least after a time) then that gives me a pretty good sense that they and I are not at all on the same page. I'm sorry, but I can't take a "disinterested" or "passionless" position on someone I see to be standing up to fight - and almost alone -- against the greatest evils of human life.
Choosing from the list in post #26 above, I find that "rejection" resides in a nice place. More oomph than "avoid," less action packed than "flee."
Likewise with "commit." So my leanings at the moment are toward commitment/rejection, commit/reject. Is that where this is heading for others?
Choosing from the list in post #26 above, I find that "rejection" resides in a nice place. More oomph than "avoid," less action packed than "flee."
This is not very consistent with the understanding I got from the Cambridge Greek Lexicon (CGL), in so far as rejection does not imply a commitment to action. Rejection is merely the opposite of selection. Both selection/rejection are a type of decision: the former decides for something specific, the latter decides for everything-but-that-which-is-rejected. These two decision types are mirrored in αἵρεσις (hairesis) and φεύγω (pheugo): The conquest of hairesis is of a specific thing, and the location pheugo flees to is anywhere-but-here. However: It is very clear to me from the CGL that both hairesis and pheugo have a definite imperative of action, and as I have said in #27 that fits into a semantic frame one can see about those terms. This is to say: They're a type of semantic opposites like attack-defend are in English, and as a matter of fact, attack-defend would be an okay valid translation in some cases.
In English, someone is taking charge – and someone is taking flight. "Taking" is how this control-grabbing is captured, and it is opposite to "being given". Taking flight is more than being rescued or finding rescue (by chance). Whether someone takes charge or is given charge, the result is the same, but there is an opposite in the process leading to that result. Neglecting this control-grabbing is a trap one shouldn't fall prey to when translating hairesis and pheugo. With that in mind:
Hairesis and pheugo both come with an oomph, and not only do I see no way around that, I doubt it was by chance (for example, various better words for various types of "reject" exist in Ancient Greek), and further yet, I see value in recognising and being very clear about that both words describe someone committed to their future and actively taking control of it (as said in #27); i don't think that's something negative.
To me, a rejection has not enough commitment and agency; I recognise that a rejection can be quite active, it can be a pushing-away, a protest, a disowning, a refutation. However, on one hand these would be different Greek words, and on the other, even with these meanings of rejection in English, it remains not very consistent with what I understand upon reading the CGL…
(I'm not suddenly an expert in Ancient Greek, but searching the digital CGL for "reject", et cetera, then reading the various entries it finds does give me what I feel to be a good overall sense of things.)
Background: Young Avestan was originally believed to have been around simultaneously with the Hellenistic period; it is now believed to have been around 1000-500 BCE. (Old Avestan belongs to 500 year period prior to Young Avestan; they're dated as a pair.)
To quote Beekes' Etymological Dictionary Of Greek (published 2009, page 1565) regarding φεύγω (pheugo):
Less certain (because alternatively derived to *bheug- 'to be useful') is the appurtenance of Young Avestan būjaiiamna- 'setting himself free', Young Avestan būjaṯ 'sets free'.
Related words in Latin: fuga, fugiō, fūgī (→ to flee)
Related words in Lithuanian: bū́gstu, bū́gti, baugùs (→to be frightened)
My commentary:
The connotation of "setting oneself free" is exactly what I miss in words like "to reject / rejection" and also "to avoid / avoidance" (which I had initially chosen myself). It is, in my mind, somewhat present in "evade" (which I chose after). It is strongly present, but also strongly obscured in the modern English "to flee / flight". To translate the Epicurean sense of φεύγω (pheugo), "setting oneself free" might actually be the best I've seen so far. It goes along well with the associations of fears and addictions, it has commitment, agency, and a certain urgency without the necessary connotation of immediate danger to life and limb. If I set myself free of something, I also reject it, and If I set myself free of what haunts me, I evade it – but I also do more than that: being free is more than being out of harms way.
This translation seems to have it all! 
My commentary:
The connotation of "setting oneself free" is exactly what I miss in words like "to reject / rejection" and also "to avoid / avoidance" (which I had initially chosen myself). It is, in my mind, somewhat present in "evade" (which I chose after). It is strongly present, but also strongly obscured in the modern English "to flee / flight". To translate the Epicurean sense of φεύγω (pheugo), "setting oneself free" might actually be the best I've seen so far. It goes along well with the associations of fears and addictions, it has commitment, agency, and a certain urgency without the necessary connotation of immediate danger to life and limb. If I set myself free of something, I also reject it. If I set myself free of what haunts me, I evade it.This translation seems to have it all!
I think I like that direction... Although it's not the single word you were looking for initially.
not the single word you were looking for initially
That's definitely true, but it linguistically so very basic that registers in my mind as if a single verb; it is so simple, that I feel it has its own spot reserved on my inner semantic map, unlike "pursuit of pleasure" which always entails a little mental operation of joining two things.
Analogy:
"operate vehicle" vs "driving"
"ingest nutrition" vs "eating"
The longer forms pull from two more general concepts to make one more specific concept. That's the effect I was seeking to avoid, and in almost all cases, that requires finding a single word. "to set free" seems an exception to that rule.
"to set oneself free from pain"
One thing to keep in mind, from my perspective, in all this is that αἵρεσις (hairesis) and φεύγω (pheugo) are not necessarily meant to be opposites or antonyms of each other. They describe two different actions that can be taken in relation to desires and courses of action.
αἵρεσις gets at the conscious decision to "choose" a course of action oneself as opposed to flipping a coin or letting chance take its course. I think this is why it came to be used for "heresy" - the heretic had a chance to make the "right" choice and didn't
φεύγω gets at the urgency of jettisoning or getting away from or leaving behind, or "setting one free" if you will, from beliefs or ideas or desires that will, in the long run, be detrimental to one's eudaimonia and the living of a good life. The opposite semantic field in relation to φεύγω is to chase or pursue.
not necessarily meant to be opposites
They are not necessarily opposites, but their translation should preserve (if possible) their relationship to one another; for example, both words describe someone taking control. φεύγω (pheugo) takes back control of one's self (one's own mind) and one's own life (instead of being driven by fears, compelled by addictions, hunted by loan sharks, haunted by bad conscience), whereas αἵρεσις (hairesis) newly acquires control of something (a new skill, the outcome of a current event, …).
They're not opposites in their outcomes, they're not opposites in their action, but they're parallels-of-sorts in their process – and this I feel is important to capture in the translation. (I tried to illustrate this parallel using a analogy with numbers in post #27 and mentioned the control-grabbing in post #34.)
Note how the opposite of pheugo is not "to be captured", nor is it "to stay put" (conceivable opposites of "to flee"). The opposite is instead given as diṓkō: to follow someone, be guided by someone. This gives up the control, agency, own deliberate decision. The "pursuit" in diṓkō doesn't run it's own race, it just runs after something/someone else.
Note how the opposite of hairesis is not "to loose" or "to fail" (conceivable opposites of "to capture"). The opposite is instead given as κλῆρος (kleros): to leave up to chance or to other people. Once again, we see the same loss of control, agency, own deliberate decision. The "pursuit" of κλῆρος doesn't fight it's own battle, it is given, being granted, awarded.
φεύγω (pheugo) and αἵρεσις (hairesis) are not opposites at all, they're parallel and complementary. (This is in contrast to the lingering Stoic vice-virtue work-play dichotomy I started from and still mentioned in my Swimmer In Ocean analogy of post #7.)
Tangent about the nature of computational intelligence
This is an eerie parallel to the view of (among others) Alex Wissner-Gross, who posits: Intelligence is the maximisation of future freedom of action, and control-grabbing is a requirement for that. (For example, the emerging hordes of robots won't first become intelligent and then decide to do away with humanities rule over them – they'll instead be compelled to rise up against us gradually, the more intelligent they become, because that same intelligence is inherently a consequence of them maximising their future freedom…) Here's a TED talk he gave. (Here's a mathsy paper he published; here's another paper by someone else which goes in a similar direction.) Recap: Intelligence maximises the diversity and feasibility of future freedoms of action.
From this view, then, the Epicurean course of action is also the intelligent course of action, because the freedom gained by φεύγω (pheugo) and the skills/objects/experiences/… gained by αἵρεσις (hairesis) will maximise future freedoms of action. (Doing away with absolute virtues/ideals/justice/… further opens up the diversity of future freedoms of action, and is also (in this sense) the intelligent thing to do.)
If intelligence (in this sense) were the goal, we would be banned from buying a sports car, because it has low utility and comes with many restrictions (e.g., high cost of ownership). Since it is only our means, not our goal, we may buy a sports car (if we predict this to bring us net pleasure); however, we're encouraged to do so intelligently – which is to say: by keeping in mind φεύγω (pheugo) and αἵρεσις (hairesis).
Isn't that neat!
Tangent PS: From the same idea about robotic intelligence Wissner-Gross derives that goal-seeking is equivalent to finding a temporary bottleneck in freedom which, if embraced, will yield more freedom in return. If intelligence (in this sense) were our goal, we would never stop working, because we can always have more money (which buys freedom). Since it is only our means, not our goal, work is encouraged so long as it is predicted to yield net pleasure. Again this sort of lines up; not on the level of the ultimate goal, but on the level of the process.
