Episode 249 - Cicero's OTNOTG 24 - Are The Epicurean Gods Totally Inactive, And Are We To Emulate Them Through Laziness?

Stephen Greenblatt, The Swerve; Giordano Bruno, The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast

The third post from this thread contains the full passage.

Velleius on the labors of the gods

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Your sect, Balbus, frequently ask us how the Gods live, and how they pass their time? Their life is the most happy, and the most abounding with all kinds of blessings, which can be conceived. They do nothing. They are embarrassed with no business; nor do they perform any work. They rejoice in the possession of their own wisdom and virtue. They are satisfied that they shall ever enjoy the fulness of eternal pleasures.

§ 1.52 Such a Deity may properly be called happy; but yours is a most laborious God. For let us suppose the world a Deity — what can be a more uneasy state than, without the least cessation, to be whirled about the axle-tree of heaven with a surprising celerity? But nothing can be happy that is not at ease. Or let us suppose a Deity residing in the world, who directs and governs it, who preserves the courses of the stars, the changes of the seasons, and the vicissitudes and orders of things, surveying the earth and the sea, and accommodating them to the advantage and necessities of man. Truly this Deity is embarrassed with a very troublesome and laborious office. We make a happy life to consist in a tranquillity of mind, a perfect freedom from care, and an exemption from all employment. The philosopher from whom we received all our knowledge has taught us that the world was made by nature; that there was no occasion for a workhouse to frame it in; and that, though you deny the possibility of such a work without divine skill, it is so easy to her, that she has made, does make, and will make innumerable worlds. Here

Ennius, Iphigenia; and Lucretius' response

Quote from Ennius

He who does not know how to use leisure
has more of work than when there is work in work.
For to whom a task has been set, he does the work,
desires it, and delights his own mind and intellect:
in leisure, a mind does not know what it wants.
The same is true (of us); we are neither at home nor in the battlefield;
we go here and there, and wherever there is a movement, we are there too.
The mind wanders unsure, except in that life is lived.

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Quote from Lucretius

If men, in that same way as on the mind
They feel the load that wearies with its weight,
Could also know the causes whence it comes,
And why so great the heap of ill on heart,
O not in this sort would they live their life,
As now so much we see them, knowing not
What 'tis they want, and seeking ever and ever
A change of place, as if to drop the burden.
The man who sickens of his home goes out,
Forth from his splendid halls, and straight- returns,
Feeling i'faith no better off abroad.
He races, driving his Gallic ponies along,
Down to his villa, madly,- as in haste
To hurry help to a house afire.- At once
He yawns, as soon as foot has touched the threshold,
Or drowsily goes off in sleep and seeks
Forgetfulness, or maybe bustles about
And makes for town again. In such a way
Each human flees himself- a self in sooth,
As happens, he by no means can escape;
And willy-nilly he cleaves to it and loathes,
Sick, sick, and guessing not the cause of ail.
Yet should he see but that, O chiefly then,
Leaving all else, he'd study to divine
The nature of things, since here is in debate
Eternal time and not the single hour,
Mortal's estate in whatsoever remains
After great death.

Persius Digital Library

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Lucretius on Empedocles; "A great man, greatly fallen"

Quote from Lucretius, Book I

As first Empedocles of Acragas,
Whom that three-cornered isle of all the lands
Bore on her coasts, around which flows and flows
In mighty bend and bay the Ionic seas,
Splashing the brine from off their gray-green waves.
Here, billowing onward through the narrow straits,
Swift ocean cuts her boundaries from the shores
Of the Italic mainland. Here the waste
Charybdis; and here Aetna rumbles threats
To gather anew such furies of its flames
As with its force anew to vomit fires,
Belched from its throat, and skyward bear anew
Its lightnings' flash. And though for much she seem
The mighty and the wondrous isle to men,
Most rich in all good things, and fortified
With generous strength of heroes, she hath ne'er
Possessed within her aught of more renown,
Nor aught more holy, wonderful, and dear
Than this true man. Nay, ever so far and pure
The lofty music of his breast divine
Lifts up its voice and tells of glories found,
That scarce he seems of human stock create.
Yet he and those forementioned (known to be
So far beneath him, less than he in all),
Though, as discoverers of much goodly truth,
They gave, as 'twere from out of the heart's own shrine,
Responses holier and soundlier based
Than ever the Pythia pronounced for men
From out the triped and the Delphian laurel,
Have still in matter of first-elements
Made ruin of themselves, and, great men, great
Indeed and heavy there for them the fall:
First, because, banishing the void from things,
They yet assign them motion, and allow
Things soft and loosely textured to exist,
As air, dew, fire, earth, animals, and grains,
Without admixture of void amid their frame.
Next, because, thinking there can be no end
In cutting bodies down to less and less
Nor pause established to their breaking up,
They hold there is no minimum in things;
Albeit we see the boundary point of aught
Is that which to our senses seems its least,
Whereby thou mayst conjecture, that, because
The things thou canst not mark have boundary points,
They surely have their minimums. Then, too,
Since these philosophers ascribe to things
Soft primal germs, which we behold to be
Of birth and body mortal, thus, throughout,
The sum of things must be returned to naught,
And, born from naught, abundance thrive anew-
Thou seest how far each doctrine stands from truth.
And, next, these bodies are among themselves
In many ways poisons and foes to each,
Wherefore their congress will destroy them quite
Or drive asunder as we see in storms
Rains, winds, and lightnings all asunder fly.

Persius Digital Library

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David Sedley, Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom

Amazon

An excerpt of the first ten pages from chapter one is available in PDF form from Cambridge University Press; link to PDF.

Norman Wentworth DeWitt, Epicurus and His Philosophy

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At the outset it must be observed and kept diligently in mind that nowhere in his extant writings does Epicurus call the gods immortal. This might be thought an accident of the tradition were it not for the
fact that other considerations rule out this possibility. If Lucretius does call them immortal repeatedly, this may be set down as an indication that he never really mastered the Epicurean lore of the gods and did not live to make an intensive study of it in preparation for writing about it.

The reasoning behind this doctrine of incorruptibility is readily discerned. From the doctrine that nothing exists except atoms and void it follows that the bodies of the gods must be corporeal. Gods are zoa, "animate beings." They are thus units in the ascending order of Nature, as is man. Being in this order and corporeal, they cannot be deathless. If deathlessness were inherent in their nature, they would be in another class by themselves. Since they do belong in the same class as man, it is a logical necessity to think of their incorruptibility as by some means preserved. Since in the cosmos of Epicurus, unlike that of Plato, this incorruptibility lacked a superior being to guarantee its
continuance, the sole possibility was that the gods preserved it for themselves by their own vigilance. Thus it must be discerned that just as the happiness of man is self-achieved, so the happiness of the gods is self-preserved.

Quote from Cassius

I am glad we reached this section before we do our special episode on the "real vs ideal" debate. This section contains some very interesting material on images, a subject that most seem to agree play into the question of prolepsis.

I’m looking forward to your upcoming podcast discussion of the Epicurean idea of "images flowing" and how this ties into human perception and knowledge. From my reading of Epicurus (although I can’t cite source), all objects continuously emit thin films of atoms called eidola or "images." These images flow through space and interact with our senses, particularly our eyes, to create perceptions. These images maintained the shape and properties of the objects they came from, allowing us to perceive the world accurately. I find this to be a reasonable explanation for perception, consistent with Epicurean atomic theory, and refined (not discredited) today’s scientific knowledge.

As I understand it, Prolepsis is closely tied to the theory of flowing images because these preconceptions are ultimately derived from sensory experiences caused by these images. It's a way of explaining how we form general concepts from particular experiences, bridging the gap between atomic theory and human cognition.

I look forward to the fascinating discussion on the podcast, with maybe some commentary on how this system of thought - from flowing images to sensory perception to prolepsis - forms a coherent materialist explanation for how we perceive and understand the world today, which was a cornerstone of Epicurean philosophy over 2000 years ago.

We didn't make it that far in our discussion today, but that will be the next part of the text starting with this;

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for you asserted likewise that the form of the Deity is perceptible by the mind, but not by sense; that it is neither solid, nor invariable in number; that it is to be discerned by similitude and transition, and that a constant supply of images is perpetually flowing on from innumerable atoms, on which our minds are intent; so that we from that conclude that divine nature to be happy and everlasting.

Joshua Around 40min mark when you talk about Empedocles and the four elements, I think we may already have a better source than Lucretius dealing with this failed idea. P. Herc. 1148, column 34 seems to be a refutation of philosophers endorsing the four elements as building blocks of reality coming directly from Epicurus in his 'On Nature - Book 14'.

I'm not going to pretend I know what I'm talking about, but if Bryan or Don or anyone else who knows Ancient Greek feels like spending some time on the fragment below, we may have few more words from the Dude himself to talk about.

DCLP/Trismegistos 59752 = LDAB 856

[πρὸς τοὺς]
ὁρίζοντας σχῆμα π̣[υρ]ὸς ἴ-
διο̣ν ἢ γῆς ἢ ὕδατος ἢ̣ [ἀ]έ̣ρος,
ὅτι γελοιότεροί εἰσι τῶν οὐχ ὁ-
ριζόντων μέν, κατὰ δὲ τὰς
παραθέσεις ὁμολογησάν-
[τ]ων ἂν ἢ ἑκουσίως ἢ ἀκου-
[σί]ως γίνεσθαί τινα σχημά-
[τ]ων ἴδια εἴδη καθ' ἑκάστην
[οὐ]σιώδη ῥηθεῖσαν ἂν σύγ-
[κρ]ισιν· ο̣ἱ μὲγ γὰρ τοῖς μὲν
[στ]οιχείο[ι]ς ἁμαρτάνουσιν,
[ἀ]κόλουθ̣ον δέ τι τούτοις
[μ]ᾶλλον, οὕτω λέγοντες,
[λέ]γ̣οιεν ἄ̣ν, καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὴν
[τα]ῖς μείξ̣εσι[ν] παραλλαγήν·
[οἱ] δὲ πρὸς τὴ̣ν   ̣  ̣  ̣ σ   ̣[  ̣  ̣] δι-
[ὰ σχημ]άτων̣ π[⁦ -ca.?- ⁩] 

Thanks, TauPhi , for the citation. I did have On Nature 14 as part of my review of Les Epicuriens that I checked out of the library on interlibrary loan. Here's my rough translation from the French, but we'll need to march this up to the Greek, too. This rough draft just happened to be sitting in my Google Drive:

[34 : p. 19 Leone: (29.22)]. [those] who specify a particular form belonging to fire, earth, water or air, are more ridiculous than those who, without specifying any, according to the juxtapositions, willy-nilly, that certain particular species of forms arise, which correspond to each of the associations which one could call substantial (for some are mistaken on the subject of the elements); but in speaking thus, they would say something that is more in line with these. And generally also they [introduce ?] differences in mixtures, and...

π̣[υρ]ὸς ἢ γῆς ἢ ὕδατος ἢ̣ [ἀ]έ̣ρος

Fire or earth or water or air

γελοιότεροί something like "those who are to be laughed at", ultimately from γελάω "laugh" but meaning more like ludicrous, absurd; mirth-provoking, amusing. Maybe in the spirit of the "laughing philosophers"?

From my perspective, it is problematic to assign the gods the activity of maintaining their "incorruptibility" through their actions. That implies to me that if they, for some reason, fail to maintain themselves that would be a source of anxiety for the gods. They would have to remain vigilant every minute, maintaining, checking, working to keep balance in their atoms, or some such thing. That seems incompatible with Epicurus's whole definition of divinity. To me this excerpt from Diogenes Laertius implies that not only do the gods not experience an increase in pleasure but they do not experience any decrease as well. If their "incorruptibility" aspect dips a little and they have to maintain it, that implies a decrease in pleasure as well.

Quote from Diogenes Laertius 10.121

Happiness must be understood in two senses; the highest happiness, such as is that of God, which admits of no increase; and another kind, which admits of the addition or abstraction of pleasures. (Yonge)

[121] Τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν διχῆ νοεῖσθαι, τήν τε ἀκροτάτην, οἵα ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν θεόν, ἐπίτασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν: καὶ τὴν <κατὰ τὴν> προσθήκην καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν ἡδονῶν.

VS33 also says "The body cries out to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold. Anyone who has these things, and who is confident of continuing to have them, can rival the gods for happiness." To me, a god would not have a body that cries out to not be incorruptible. I suppose someone could counter that the gods are "confident of continuing" to be incorruptible.

The paper by Geeta Raghunanan provides an interesting solution to the incorruptible seen as eternal issue:

“Imperishability” as Immunity to Moral Corruption: A Response to the Problem of the Imperishability of the Epicurean Gods (Presentation for the CPA Annual Congress 2014)

“Imperishability” as Immunity to Moral Corruption: A Response to the Problem of the Imperishability of the Epicurean Gods (Presentation for the CPA Annual…

www.academia.edu

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I contend that they may be imperishable; that is, the Epicurean gods may be destined to dissolution and yet be imperishable in the sense that they are impervious to decay or corruption, particularly, what might be termed moral decay or moral corruption. ... But I emphasize “moral corruption” or “moral decay” also to incorporate Epicurean descriptions of the gods that seem to suggest that imperishability might in fact have meant to the Epicureans imperviousness to moral corruption. ... it is possible
to maintain that given an Epicurean physical theory and the doctrine that all compounds will dissolve, the Epicurean gods, as compounds, are yet still imperishable in the sense that they are morally incorruptible.

This appeals to me - if I were to accept the idea that the Epicureans thought of the gods as living beings. One of my main objections to "god as living being" vs "god as conceptual metaphor" is that I can't reconcile Epicurus's foresight and critical thinking with believing in a physical god... However, Raghunanan narrowing of αφθαρτον to "incorruptible" ie "not able to be corrupted, from a moral/ethical perspective" - with the understanding that the gods will eventually physically decay due to their being material compound beings is enticing. And, if the gods do die, it would be nothing to them as they have lived in the midst of unceasing pleasure.

Things to think about for me at least.

Quote from Don

I suppose someone could counter that the gods are "confident of continuing" to be incorruptible.

This actually makes sense if you follow the reasoning that (I think; correct me if I'm wrong!) Cassius is doing in the podcast. There's a prolepsis of gods, but one must use correct reasoning to determine their nature. This leads from the fullness of pleasure, and the confidence of it continuing, to blessedness and incorruptibility.

Quote from Don

However, Raghunanan narrowing of αφθαρτον to "incorruptible" ie "not able to be corrupted, from a moral/ethical perspective" - with the understanding that the gods will eventually physically decay due to their being material compound beings is enticing.

It was for this reason that I went with "incorruptible" in my own translation.

Short of addressing the seeming tension between "gods having immortal quasi-bodies" and "all compound objects being subject to the forces of dissolution", I can, at least, say, confidently, that, at least, the gods are buttressed against moral corruption. Whether they are space ghosts who exist forever on an infinite timeline, or whether they are self-actualized animals who have advanced beyond their terrestrial biochemistry but still threatened, or whether they are just conceptual metaphors: all of those beings neither cause trouble to themselves nor cause trouble to others.

Quote from Godfrey

This leads from the fullness of pleasure, and the confidence of it continuing, to blessedness and incorruptibility.

From this current direction I'm headed, the gods would have confidence in the continuation of their incorruptible nature because they've come to a right view of how things are, the nature of pleasure, their inability to be affected by praise or blame, their self-reliance, and so on. The gods would have no more need of infinite lives than a mortal would, but I'd have to dig into the texts a little deeper than Raghunanan does on that eternal existence issue. Gods or the divine nature as a class may be eternally existing but that doesn't necessarily imply to me the necessity of the eternal existence of any one specific god.

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... it is possible to maintain that given an Epicurean physical theory and the doctrine that all compounds will dissolve, the Epicurean gods, as compounds, are yet still imperishable in the sense that they are morally incorruptible.

It's morally acceptable to kill a mosquito but killing a cat is morally unacceptable. It was morally acceptable for Epicurus to own slaves but it's morally unacceptable for us. I'm giving these examples to show that human morality is liquid, ever changing set of societal rules arbitrary agreed upon by majority of people at any given time.

To say that Epicurean gods are morally incorruptible basically means to me: Let's grant gods human liquid, ever changing morality and then let's make people believe they have to behave accordingly since they have godly example to imitate.

I see few problems with gods and morality combined. Epicurean morally incorruptible gods interpretation sounds awfully familiar to me. Is it just me or is it just another code name for Ten Commandments? After all, these dos and donts are perfectly sensible to live by in societies. Therefore, these commandments must have been given to us by a god to follow.

Quote from Cassius

I know some of us are shying away from these conclusions, but I don't think that Epicurus would have shied away from them any more than from his other radical conclusions. This is a subject we need to examine much more closely but I see no supernatural force or "necessity" that any particular object must be limited to a set and particular life span.

I suspect Epicurus to shy away from such conclusions if he had lived in our times. He would have been aware of laws of thermodynamics, for example. As far as we currently know, you don't need supernatural force of any kind to limit immortality. Natural forces do the trick perfectly well. If any compound of atoms is to perform meaningful work (that is to exchange energy and interact with its surroundings), immortality is out of the equation.

I am perfectly aware that human knowledge is not at the point (not even close) where we can claim with authority what is physically possible and what is impossible but I think Epicurus would be very cautious regarding the immortality of compounds of atoms of any sort by any means.

Notes from a ruminaceous journey through my “innermundia” after reading the Raghunanan article:

- I didn’t find the premise very convincing.

- Might it be most constructive to be satisfied with multiple possible explanations of the gods? And perhaps useful to look at the subject for practical insights, through modern eyes?

- If the goal is to live like gods among men, and since we have no direct evidence of their existence (others may feel differently) is there any point in trying to discern anything about them other than their blessedness and incorruptibility? Other than for the pleasure of scholarship, of course. One can live like a god by not troubling oneself or causing trouble for others by worrying about the form(s) of the gods. Instead, what if one were to think of a god as "the being whose blessedness is incorruptible" rather than "the blessed and incorruptible being"? I realize that this is a leap from the texts, but it may be a more useful way for us moderns to contemplate the gods by being more in line with our current understanding. Instead of troubling ourselves over the forms of the gods, we can focus on achieving a godlike state of blessedness.

- Also, could it be that one will only come to a proper conception of the gods when one has achieved a state of blessedness that one has a reasonable expectation of continuing? By focusing on the action, not on the form. There’s no textual evidence of this that I’m aware of; I’m just ruminating. But it's kind of indirectly analogous to Eastern "enlightenment" or the rarity of the Stoic sage, although I'm not suggesting any direct connection, just ruminating.

- And "neither causes trouble for oneself or another" (which the author repeated several times) can also be read to say that an Epicurean isn't a selfish hedonist, but one whose "hedonic calculations" include the well-being of others as consequences of one's own pleasure. EP is a philosophy of personal responsibility: nobody is dictating what is right. Consider, though, that one of the greatest gifts is multiplying pleasure by sharing it.

- In sum, know that a god is a being whose blessedness is incorruptible…. Meditate on this and other things, and you will live like a god among men!