Episode 253 - Not Yet Recorded - How The "Riddle Of Epicurus" FIts In To the Epicurean View of The Gods

Welcome to Episode 253 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we have a thread to discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

Today we are continuing to review Cicero's "On the Nature of The Gods," which began with the Epicurean spokesman Velleius defending the Epicurean point of view. This week will continue into Section 42 as Cotta, the Academic Skeptic, continues to attack the Epicurean view of the nature of divinity.

For the main text we are using primarily the Yonge translation, available here at Archive.org. The text which we include in these posts is available here. We will also refer to the public domain version of the Loeb series, which contains both Latin and English, as translated by H. Rackham.

Additional versions can be found here:

• Frances Brooks 1896 translation at Online Library of Liberty
• Lacus Curtius Edition (Rackham)
• PDF Of Loeb Edition at Archive.org by Rackham
• Gutenberg.org version by CD Yonge 

A list of arguments presented will eventually be put together here.

Today's Text

XLII. And why should we worship them from an admiration only of that nature in which we can behold nothing excellent? and as for that freedom from superstition, which you are in the habit of boasting of so much, it is easy to be free from that feeling when you have renounced all belief in the power of the Gods; unless, indeed, you imagine that Diagoras or Theodorus, who absolutely denied the being of the Gods, could possibly be superstitious. I do not suppose that even Protagoras could, who doubted whether there were Gods or not. The opinions of these philosophers are not only destructive of superstition, which arises from a vain fear of the Gods, but of religion also, which consists in a pious adoration of them.

What think you of those who have asserted that the whole doctrine concerning the immortal Gods was the invention of politicians, whose view was to govern that part of the community by religion which reason could not influence? Are not their opinions subversive of all religion? Or what religion did Prodicus the Chian leave to men, who held that everything beneficial to human life should be numbered among the Gods? Were not they likewise void of religion who taught that the Deities, at present the object of our prayers and adoration, were valiant, illustrious, and mighty men who arose to divinity after death? Euhemerus, whom our Ennius translated, and followed more than other authors, has particularly advanced this doctrine, and treated of the deaths and burials of the Gods; can he, then, be said to have confirmed religion, or, rather, to have totally subverted it? I shall say nothing of that sacred and august Eleusina, into whose mysteries the most distant nations were initiated, nor of the solemnities in Samothrace, or in Lemnos, secretly resorted to by night, and surrounded by thick and shady groves; which, if they were properly explained, and reduced to reasonable principles, would rather explain the nature of things than discover the knowledge of the Gods.

XLIII. Even that great man Democritus, from whose fountains Epicurus watered his little garden, seems to me to be very inferior to his usual acuteness when speaking about the nature of the Gods. For at one time he thinks that there are images endowed with divinity, inherent in the universality of things; at another, that the principles and minds contained in the universe are Gods; then he attributes divinity to animated images, employing themselves in doing us good or harm; and, lastly, he speaks of certain images of such vast extent that they encompass the whole outside of the universe; all which opinions are more worthy of the country of Democritus than of Democritus himself; for who can frame in his mind any ideas of such images? who can admire them? who can think they merit a religious adoration?

But Epicurus, when he divests the Gods of the power of doing good, extirpates all religion from the minds of men; for though he says the divine nature is the best and the most excellent of all natures, he will not allow it to be susceptible of any benevolence, by which he destroys the chief and peculiar attribute of the most perfect being. For what is better and more excellent than goodness and beneficence? To refuse your Gods that quality is to say that no man is any object of their favor, and no Gods either; that they neither love nor esteem any one; in short, that they not only give themselves no trouble about us, but even look on each other with the greatest indifference.

I made a long set of notes on my reading of Humes "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion" and they are now here:

Thread

David Hume and his "Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion"

Not sure yet how to approach the Hume material from Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, or how much time we will have for it in the podcast beyond the Riddle, but I may collect a few notable quotations as I go through it. It's notable that none of the major players are advocating an Epicurean position:

• Whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up: We shall then see, whether you go out at the door or the window; and

…

Cassius

October 30, 2024 at 7:54 AM

Quote from Eikadistes

I wanted to mention that I've recently com across a few scholars who suggested that this trilemma actually comes from a Skeptic (perhaps Carneades the Academic), and not Epicurus (Larrimore, Mark Joseph. The Problem of Evil: A Reader. Blackwell, 2001). Based on De Ira Dei David Hume attributes this argument to Epicurus: “Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?“ (Dialogues concerning Natural Religion 1779). While it comports with Epicurean theology, it does not correspond with any extant writings of Epicurus nor another Epicurean. I also note that Lactantius documented this material approximately 600 years after Epicurus was teaching in Athens. <https://twentiers.com/anger-of-god>

Excellent post Nate. Now that I am fresh from reading Hume's Dialogue in which it appears, I tend to agree that it was a skeptic who framed the argument this way. As presented, it is focused on "the problem of evil" and tightly interwoven with the position that it is illogical to take the Stoic position that "god" is benevolent. The real root of it seems to be as part of the larger argument that there is so much pain and suffering in the world that a "good" god is impossible. While that argument helps against "design," and definitely has aspects that rings of the Epicurean argument that the world has so many defects that it can't have been designed by a benevolent god, it rings to me of having a much more "skeptical" flavor than Epicurus would have used.

As we know Epicurus focuses on stating the positive things that we *should* believe about gods - that they are living beings blessed and imperishable. While the two perspectives can be made to fit together, to me the Hume/Lanctatius version rings with a real emphasis on suffering that does not strike me as the way Epicurus would have presented anything.

When Epicurus presents suffering it's usually (always?) in the context of how suffering can be avoided. After all pain is generally manageable if long and short if intense. Seems to me Epicurus' focuses on the remedy to pain and suffering and it would be uncharacteristic of him to use an argument that takes as its premise an emphatic endorsement that suffering inevitably dominates the human condition.

Another comment after reading Hume's Dialogue: Truer words were never spoken than this passage from DeWitt's Book, under the section "True Opinions: False Opinions" - "In the succession of philosophers the place of Epicurus is immediately after Plato and Pyrrho the skeptic. Platonism and skepticism were among his chief abominations."

Hume seems to see the same thing, and he structures his entire Dialogue as a debate between skepticism and dogmatism. He let's "mysticism" have a voice initially, but then has the advocate of mysticism walk out before the end as if no reasonable person, whether dogmatist or skeptic, will accept the mystic's arbitrariness.

Epicurus' whole argument about the gods - and everything else for that matter - is framed in terms of how you refute the claims of skepticism that nothing is knowable. Epicurus' conclusions about happiness, pleasure, death, life - the whole ball of wax - are framed in terms of "how" we are confident that his conclusions are true. And the "how" derives from taking the position that we test "truth" according to what we get from the canonical faculties. The feelings of pleasure and pain are as "true" to us as the data we gather from the five senses, and the rest of the picture is that the data from images/prolepsis must be viewed that way as well.

Truth isn't measured by X number of scientists or philosophers or priests telling us that it is so, and we don't wait for "gods" to tell us what is true either. Seems to me that the best way to look at it is that Epicurus held opinion about anything to be "true" if that opinion is consistently confirmed, and without contradiction, by the data from the three canonical sources.