Episode 270 - Life Is Desirable, But Unlimited Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than Limited Time

Welcome to Episode 270 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

We are continuing our series of key doctrines of Epicurus, and this week and next week we are focusing on the Epicurean view that "Life Is Desirable, But Unlimited Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than Limited Time."

This is currently discussed here in our wiki:

Life Is Desirable, But Unlimited Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than Limited Time

And our new Discussion Guide will be here:

Life Is Desirable, But Unlimited Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than Limited Time

Much more work to do to get the discussion guide in shape, so feel free to make comments and suggestions in this thread.

Update:

I think we have most of the sources we need for our recording of Episode 269 this coming Sunday on the full meaning of Pleasure, absence of pain, etc., because we discuss that frequently. We'll probably have all the material we can handle if we just touch on what is discussed here.

But for the final Episode 270, the final episode in this series, we're dealing with the very challenging "unlimited time contains no greater pleasure than limited time if we measure the limits of pleasure by reason" doctrine.

I think we can deal with that as well based on what Epicurus himself says and our understanding of pleasure, but I don't recall seeing much academic or outside commentary on this point beyond what DeWitt has to say about it in his chapter on "the new hedonism."

If anyone is aware of academic or commentary discussion specifically on PD18, 19, or 20, please post in this thread so we can consider including that in this episode. As I find more material I too will post it here or in the discussion guide for this episode.

Yes I agree they all read together very well, and there are a number of good translations.

And it does make some degree of sense on its face and in context with the rest of the philosophy.

What I don't recall is seeing a lot of academic commentary or other / later Epicureans picking up on the point and giving analogies or illustrations. If anyone has come across additional commentary that would help, be sure to post that too.

Especially the "therefore has no need of infinite time, yet the mind does not flee from joy..."

It seems to me that going into detail and explaining the time factor is the most challenging aspect.

I would like to be able to incorporate what Sedley or similar have said on that, if possible.

Thanks don! that title on the second one looks great and i will look into both!

Yes, from the Mitsis article, this is what I want to argue against - specifically, the position such as taken by Furley that "no surviving Epicurean text offers a defense for this strongly counter-intuitive claim"

Quote

Notoriously, however, the Epicurean strongly denies that death in any way diminishes life's pleasures by cutting them short. To many, this has seemed merely perverse. David Furley, for example, dismisses this feature of Epicurus' theory as "dogma without argument" and denies that any surviving Epicurean text offers a defense for this strongly counter-intuitive claim.4 A related objection is raised by Cicero in De Finibus ii. Cicero complains that nothing, in fact, could be more at odds with Epicurus' own hedonism than the claim that death involves no loss or deprivation of hedonic goods (ii 87-88; cf. Plutarch, Non posse 1106bff.). If pleasurable states are what make us happy, Cicero insists, surely we will be happier if we can remain in these states longer. Thus, he wonders, how can death fail to be an evil for Epicureans, if it prevents them from being happy for a longer period of time?

Again, Don thank you because that article leads to finding what Sedley and Long say on this. Unfortunately Mitsis disagrees with Long and Sedley and finds their argument deficient.

So once again I find myself disagreeing with those who disagree with Sedley Here is Mitsis's summary of the Long and Sedley position - for example even in the first sentence here - I would say Mitsis is wrong in saying that duration is "unimportant." So Mitsis is defending CIcero's view and Sedley attacks Cicero:

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In closing, I want to return briefly to Epicurus' claim about the unimportance of duration in rational assessments of the overall pleasantness of our lives (KD 19-21 ). Cicero takes Epicurus to be clearly (though wrongly) denying that pleasure is increased by duration (voluptatem crescere longinquitate) or rendered more valuable by its continuance (De Fin. ii 83). Recently, several scholars have resisted Cicero's interpretation because they take Epicurus to be claiming something much less bewildering about the role of duration in our evaluation of pleasures. Long and Sedley, for instance, argue that Epicurus does not mean to assert that time has no bearing at all in assessing quantities of pleasure. Rather, in their view, he is claiming that we can experience the same level of pleasure in a finite or infinite time.36 Pleasure is something with clear natural limits and we can reach these limits as soon as we understand them sufficiently. Epicurus is thus merely observing that we do not need an infinite amount of time to come to such an understanding; nor could any particular complete experience of pleasure reach more intense levels, even if we repeated it an infinite number of times.

On this interpretation, Epicurus must still admit that death can cut short and hence harm the happiness of mortals enjoying even these most complete levels of pleasure. He might therefore readily acknowledge that a long, happy life is preferable to a short, happy one. Long's and Sedley's reading has obvious attractions inasmuch as it leaves Epicurus with a much less paradoxical claim to defend

So Mitsis thinks that Epicurus would not say that if one has an option to choose between a long happy life and a short happy one he would choose the longer?

Sorry Phil, i have to go with Long and Sedley on that one!

I think Mitsis is flatly wrong in saying that duration is of no significance to happiness. The longer is not NECESSARILY greater, because there are other factors that can come into play (intensity and parts of the body) but that doesn't mean that time is irrelevant.

Quote from Don

My interpretation of this whole concept is that it is specifically the fear of death that makes us unable to take pleasure in the life we have here and now.

While I think that is very important and very true, there's also the separate question of the benefit of duration which I don't think is answered by the issue of fear.

It's a legitimate question to ask, separate and apart from fear of loss: Does longer length of time necessarily make something preferable?

Ha --- I am trying to move the discussion beyond "Fear" which is not at all the only thing I think Epicurus was concerned about

If we're looking for practical analysis to drive our choices and avoidances, we need a clear picture of the role that time/duration plays in that analysis. Because it surely plays some, or Epicurus would not have mentioned it in PD09.

Surely most everyone will agree that duration plays some role in deciding what to pursue and what to avoid, right?

Well, if so, we need an analysis of that decision which does not end with "duration of time makes NO difference" - because I can certainly tell the difference between a minute and a year. And not simply because I am afraid of opportunities lost.

Quote from Joshua

I still tend to think Epicurus was responding to Plato's Philebus in his discussion of limits, duration, and death. I'll have to review that dialogue.

Yes, that I think is the ultimate answer. "Limit" has multiple meanings and so does any variation of "greater." Unless you add something extra such as "in every respect" then it's going to be a very fair reading to acknowledge that what you're saying is "greater" is not greater "in every respect." What Epicurus is talking about is the limit of Pleasure, but pleasure has many aspects, of which one is time, and not all pleasures are equal in time or in many other respects.

And that's where you come back to what Epicurus said to Menoeceus that just as the wise man does not choose the most food, but the most pleasant food, the wise man does not choose the longest life, but the most pleasant.

That right there is a clear illustration. The food the wise man chooses is better to him, but not more in quantity, and the time the wise man chooses more pleasant for him, but not longer in time.

But the difference in quantity of food and length of time is not physically abolished by the choice of the wise man. The wise man is simply intentionally choosing to ignore the quantity difference and the time difference. because he has mentally chosen to recognize that the pleasantness is more important to him than the extra time or the extra quantity.

So that's why I think Long and Sedley are clearly correct: Epicurus would recognize that length of time is something that can definitely be desirable, but it is not the overriding factor. The overriding factor is what you choose to feel and recognize as the most pleasant for you. The mind can influence what it finds pleasurable even more than can the body.

So it is perfectly proper to say "infinite time contains no greater time than finite time" on the grounds that the "greater" you are talking about is what you deem to be "the most pleasant." What is "most pleasant" for you is something that you can choose to recognize as something that doesn't necessarily get better with significantly more time.

One example is standing on the tip of the mountaintop - the more time you spend there the less you're likely to want to stay.

So I would say too that this is why Epicurus is saying several times that you get to this recognition through "reason" and through "the mind." The body itself is not able to figure this out, nor is someone who doesn't have the benefit of Epicurean philosophy and who thinks that unlimited time will necessarily allow him to reach greater heights of pleasure.

To repeat what I agreed with Don earlier, this view of duration totally gets rid of fear, and that's very important. But not everyone is as subject to "fear" as are others, and it is perfectly legitimate and in fact natural when you are young to take the position - "I am not afraid of death or anything else -- I simply want to understand how to spend my life."

And Epicurus has the answer that "time" or "duration" is not at all the overriding factor in making your choices. You can in fact live like "a god among men" not only because you not afraid of death, but because you are confident that you are able to obtain whatever is the greatest pleasure for you in the time that you have.

Another way to ask this is : Is Cicero summarizing Epicurus accurately here?

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Cicero takes Epicurus to be clearly (though wrongly) denying that pleasure is increased by duration (voluptatem crescere longinquitate) or rendered more valuable by its continuance (De Fin. ii 83).

In other words, did Epicurus in fact deny that pleasure is increased by duration or rendered more valuable by it's continuance?

Of course Mr. Mitsos could be being unfair to Cicero. Let's see what De Finibus ii 83 says:

EDIT - looks like it's 88, not 83.

The Loeb / Rackham translation of that is:

"It may be enjoined that Epicurus, as you yourself were saying, maintains that long duration can not add anything to happiness, and that as much pleasure is enjoyed in a brief span of time as if pleasure were everlasting."

which appears to come from the underlined part below:

[88] haec dicuntur inconstantissime. cum enim summum bonum in voluptate ponat, negat infinito tempore aetatis voluptatem fieri maiorem quam finito atque modico. qui bonum omne in virtute ponit, is potest dicere perfici beatam vitam perfectione virtutis; negat enim summo bono afferre incrementum diem. qui autem voluptate vitam effici beatam putabit, qui sibi is conveniet, si negabit voluptatem crescere longinquitate? igitur ne dolorem quidem. an dolor longissimus quisque miserrimus, voluptatem non optabiliorem diuturnitas facit? quid est igitur, cur ita semper deum appellet Epicurus beatum et aeternum? dempta enim aeternitate nihilo beatior Iuppiter quam Epicurus; uterque enim summo bono fruitur, id est voluptate. 'At enim hic etiam dolore.' At eum nihili facit; ait enim se, si uratur, 'Quam hoc suave!' dicturum.

Don I agree with everything you just wrote.

So if we accept Rackham's translation, which I am not sure we should) that "Epicurus, as you yourself were saying, maintains that long duration can not add anything to happiness, and that as much pleasure is enjoyed in a brief span of time as if pleasure were everlasting."

What should we say to somone who says something like:

Epicurus is denying that pleasure is increased by duration or rendered more valuable by its continuance.