Episode 270 - Life Is Desirable, But Unlimited Time Contains No Greater Pleasure Than Limited Time

Here's the Reid edition, which we used in the podcast because it seemed more literal.

But I shall be reminded (as you said yourself) that Epicurus will not admit that continuance of time contributes anything to happiness, or that less pleasure is realized in a short period of time than if the pleasure were eternal. These statements are most inconsistent ; for while he places his supreme good in pleasure, he refuses to allow that pleasure can reach a greater height in a life of boundless extent, than in one limited and moderate in length.

More context:

XXVII. But we dwell too long upon very simple matters. When we have once concluded and demonstrated that if every- thing is judged by the standard of pleasure, no room is left for either virtues or friendships, there is nothing besides on which- we need greatly insist. And yet, lest it should be thought that any passage is left without reply, I will now also say a few words in answer to the remainder of your speech. Well then, whereas the whole importance of philosophy lies in its bearing on happiness, and it is from a desire for happiness alone that men have devoted themselves to this pursuit, and whereas some place happiness in one thing, some in another, while you place it in pleasure, and similarly on the other side all wretchedness you place in pain, let us first examine the nature of happiness as you conceive it. Now you will grant me this, I suppose, that happiness, if only it exists at all, ought to lie entirely within the wise man’s own control. For if the life of happiness may cease to be so, then it cannot be really happy. Who indeed has any faith that a thing which is perishable and fleeting will in his own case always continue solid and strong? But he who feels no confidence in the permanence of the blessings he possesses, must needs apprehend that he will some time or other be wretched, if he loses them. Now no one can be happy while in alarm about his most important possessions; no one then can possibly be happy. For happiness is usually spoken of not with reference to some period of time, but to permanence, nor do we talk of the life of happiness at all, unless that life be rounded off and complete, nor can a man be happy at one time, and wretched at another; since any man who judges that he can become wretched will never be happy. For when happiness has been once entered on, it is as durable as wisdom herself, who is the creator of the life of happiness, nor does it await the last days of life, as Herodotus writes that Solon enjoined upon Croesus. But I shall be reminded (as you said yourself) that Epicurus will not admit that continuance of time contributes anything to happiness, or that less pleasure is realized in a short period of time than if the pleasure were eternal. These statements are most inconsistent ; for while he places his supreme good in pleasure, he refuses to allow that pleasure can reach a greater height in a life of boundless extent, than in one limited and moderate in length. He who places good entirely in virtue can say that happiness is consummated by the consummation of virtue, since he denies that time brings additions to his supreme good; but when a man supposes that happiness is caused by pleasure, how are his doctrines to be reconciled, if he means to affirm that pleasure is not heightened by duration? In that case, neither is pain. Or, though all the most enduring pains are also the most wretched, does length of time not render pleasure more enviable? What reason then has Epicurus for calling a god, as he does, both happy and eternal? If you take away his eternity, Jupiter will be not a whit happier than Epicurus, since both of them are in the enjoyment of the supreme good, which is pleasure. Oh, but our philosopher is subject to pain as well. Yes, but he sets it at nought; for he says that, if he were being roasted, he would call out how sweet this is! In what respect then is he inferior to the god, if not in respect of eternity? And what good does eternity bring but the highest form of pleasure, and that prolonged for ever? What boots it then to use high sounding language unless your language be consistent ? On bodily pleasure (I will add mental, if you like, on the understanding that it also springs, as you believe, from the body) depends the life of happiness. Well, who can guarantee the wise man that this pleasure will be permanent? For the circumstances that give rise to pleasures are not within the control of the wise man, since your happiness is not dependent on wisdom herself, but on the objects which wisdom procures with a view to pleasure. Now all such objects are external to us, and what is external is in the power of chance. Thus for- tune becomes lady paramount over happiness, though Epicurus says she to a small extent only crosses the path of the wise man.

Joshua the passage that Cicero states right after the part that we are quoting bolsters the argument that this entire discussion is related to the Philebus argument.

Cicero is essentially arguing exactly what Plato argued: that virtue can be the good because it has a limit (it can be "consummated") while pleasure cannot be the good because it has no limit; it can always be made better (by adding more).

He who places good entirely in virtue can say that happiness is consummated by the consummation of virtue, since he denies that time brings additions to his supreme good; but when a man supposes that happiness is caused by pleasure, how are his doctrines to be reconciled, if he means to affirm that pleasure is not heightened by duration? In that case, neither is pain. Or, though all the most enduring pains are also the most wretched, does length of time not render pleasure more enviable? What reason then has Epicurus for calling a god, as he does, both happy and eternal? If you take away his eternity, Jupiter will be not a whit happier than Epicurus, since both of them are in the enjoyment of the supreme good, which is pleasure.

Epicurus is responding to Plato by saying that pleasure does have a limit, and that limit is reached when your experience is "full" of pleasures with no mixture of pains.

Epicurus' argument is not any more guilty of gamesmanship with words than is the Stoic argument that the virtuous man is purely virtuous. The Stoics still have to point to individual people and individual cases of people pursuing virtuous activities, and Epicurus still has to point to individual people and individual cases of people pursuing pleasurable activities. But the words provide a model which is understandable and serves as a target to work to achieve.

In other words, the reason we're having this discussion is not because Epicurus wanted to argue that there's no difference between a long pleasant life and a short pleasant life.

We're having the discussion because Epicurus wanted to show how pleasure can be viewed as having a limit - an utmost point that can be reached. In the case of virtue they've defined their utmost point as "pure virtue" -- virtue with no mixture of sin; good with no mixture of evil.

In the case of Epicurus's argument he has defined the utmost point as "pure pleasure." Pure Pleasure with no mixture of pain.

In both cases the utmost point is theoretical. It's a description using generalized words that tells you nothing about what specific activities the person being considered is actually doing with their time to reach the point of pure virtue or pure pleasure. The only thing you can say about whatever activities the "Virtuous" person is engaged in is that they are virtuous. The only thing you can say about whatever activities the "Pleasurous" person is engaged in is that those activities are pleasurable.

There's nothing wrong with this analysis as long as you admit that it's a purely logical and philosophical perspective. The real person in the real world still has to make specific decisions about what virtues to pursue and what pleasures to pursue. But this kind of analysis does give you a logical framework to organize your thoughts, and that is very valuable.

Yes and note the switch in wording between happiness and pleasure, which adds more potential for confusion.

Did not Epicurus say that one can be "happy" even in the bull of phaloris, but that would not mean that the torture itself is pleasurable.

There's a lot of switching going on between general concepts vs particular feelings that has to be taken into account.

Quote from Don

Epicurus denies that:

1. the length of time contributes anything to living happily

I believe that I could agree with this if it's an accurate translation. You can live a "happy" short life or a "happy" long life. The length of the life doesn't necessarily equate to one's overall happiness

Perhaps, but I am not sure there.

I do think Epicurus knew the difference between pleasures that last a short time vs. a long time. But on the other hand, long pleasures are not necessarily the most pleasant. So it really makes a difference how you phrase what it is you are talking about.

Quote from Godfrey

In a worldview where life is finite, infinite time does nobody any good.

Godfrey if I am reading this correctly then I think you are right in the same way as Don's point in several posts above. Pleasures differ from one another in terms of duration, intensity, and parts of the experience that are involved. For a being with a finite life span, infinite time before and after our lives is of only intellectual relevance. Those are correct and important points.

I also agree that this phrasing amounts to a "shibboleth" - a challenge to think more deeply about the problem analogous to "the sun is the size it appears to be."

But I think there is also more that is going on. While it is true that (1) our bodies have finite lifespans and (2) that pleasures differ (which means that we have to choose intelligently among those pleasures), there is still the question of "Is it better to live a longer time than a shorter time?" which needs to be answered.

Epicurus' wording of this section of the PDs can be read productively and be seen to address this, or the section can be read as ridiculous on its face and used to attack Epicurus, as Cicero is doing.

Appearing to assert that "infinte time contains no greater pleasure than finite time" (as if length of time has no bearing on our experience of pleasure), has very much the same effect as appearing to assert that "the sun is the size it appears to be" or that "by pleasure we mean the absence of pain."

These statements are either profoundly helpful if you understand that they are challenging you to reason about these issues properly, or they are ridiculous on their face if you think they mean what people who doesn't understand or accept the way nature really works think they mean.

See what you think when you've read the Sedley article that Don just linked to from Academia.

"The confusion stems from the (perhaps deliberate) parallel construction, by which the sum total of pleasures is related to the sum total of the sentient human."

I think that's a particularly important observation. I'm not able to validate that it is true from the Greek, but I think that the description of what Epicurus is doing is accurate. It looks to me like Epicurus is definitely evaluating "the sum total of pleasures" in relation to "the sum total of the sentient human."

To me, the comparison of the "sum total of pleasures" to the "sum total of the sentient human" is the "vessel" analogy. Just as the example is given in the opening of Lucretius Book 6, you can view a human life as a vessel (jar / vase / whatever) and realize that a vessel or a life can only be filled so far with pleasures.

After you pour in pleasures and fill the vessel of life to the rim, you can vary the pleasures by pouring in more pleasures, but some of the existing pleasures will overflow over the rim (the same quantity that you pour in will be expelled). The vessel can never get "more full."

When the "sum total of the sentient being" is full of pleasure, it is full of pleasure, and you can never be more full than full no matter how much time you spend pouring in new pleasures.

I just noticed the abstract to the Sedley article: a very good summary especially the first sentence:

Eudaimonia, happiness, is a property of a whole life, not of some portion of it.

What can this mean for hedonists? For Epicurus, it is made possible by the mind's capacity to enjoy one's whole life from any temporal viewpoint: to relive past pleasures and enjoy future ones in anticipation, importantly including confidence in a serene closure. Enjoying your life is like enjoying a day as a whole, not least its sunset. Although pleasure is increased by greater duration (contrary to a more favoured reading), and premature death therefore better avoided, the finitude of human life as such does not lessen its value, and even a premature death need not prevent a life's being enjoyed as 'complete'. In this chapter, the above interpretation is documented, explained, and contextualized in terms of Epicurus' diametrical opposition to his contemporaries, the Cyrenaics.

-----------------

Brilliant summary. Flies in the face of much prominent academic orthodoxy. Prompts me again to say that David Sedley is at or near the top of greatest living writers on Epicurus. Without him and a few others we'd have a largely stoicized Epicurean academic world taking the position that duration has no relationship to pleasure.