Episode 275 - Does Motion Provide Evidence For The Existence of God And Divinity Of The Soul? - TD05

Welcome to Episode 275 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we continue our series covering Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations" from an Epicurean viewpoint. This series addresses five of the greatest questions in philosophy, with Cicero speaking for the majority and Epicurus the main opponent:

1. Is Death An Evil? (Cicero says no and Epicurus says no, but for very different reasons)
2. Is Pain An Evil? (Cicero says no, Epicurus says yes)
3. Does the Wise Man Experience Grief and Fear? (Cicero says no, Epicurus says yes)
4. Does the Wise Man Experience Joy and Desire? (Cicero says no, Epicurus says yes)
5. Is Virtue Sufficient For A Happy Life? (Cicero says yes, Epicurus says no)

As we found in Cicero's "On Ends" and "On The Nature of the Gods," Cicero treated Epicurean Philosophy as a major contender in the battle between the philosophies, and in discussing this conflict and explaining Epicurus' answers to these questions, we will deepen our understanding of Epicurus and how he compares to the other major schools.

These week we turn our attention further to "Is Death An Evil," and we will read beginning in Section XXIII where the discussion continues with more about the Pythagorean / Platonic view of the human soul.

Our general discussion guide for Tusculun Disputations is here: https://handbook.epicureanfriends.com/notes/epicurea…html#org0c11d2e

And a side-by-side version with comments is here: https://epicureanfriends.github.io/tusculundisput…glish/section:5

Here is the heart of the argument regarding motion that we will want to address:

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“That which is always moved is eternal; but that which gives motion to something else, and is moved itself by some external cause, when that motion ceases, must necessarily cease to exist. That, therefore, alone, which is self-moved, because it is never forsaken by itself, can never cease to be moved. Besides, it is the beginning and principle of motion to everything else; but whatever is a principle has no beginning, for all things arise from that principle, and it cannot itself owe its rise to anything else; for then it would not be a principle did it proceed from anything else. But if it has no beginning, it never will have any end; for a principle which is once extinguished, cannot itself be restored by anything else, nor can it produce anything else from itself; inasmuch as all things must necessarily arise from some first cause. And thus it comes about, that the first principle of motion must arise from that thing which is itself moved by itself; and that can neither have a beginning nor an end of its existence, for otherwise the whole heaven and earth would be overset, and all nature would stand still, and not be able to acquire any force, by the impulse of which it might be first set in motion. Seeing, then, that it is clear, that whatever moves itself is eternal, can there be any doubt that the soul is so? For everything is inanimate which is moved by an external force; but everything which is animate is moved by an interior force, which also belongs to itself. For this is the peculiar nature and power of the soul; and if the soul be the only thing in the whole world which has the power of self-motion, then certainly it never had a beginning, and therefore it is eternal.”

Now, should all the lower order of philosophers, (for so I think they may be called, who dissent from Plato and Socrates and that school,) unite their force, they never would be able to explain anything so elegantly as this, nor even to understand how ingeniously this conclusion is drawn. The soul, then, perceives itself to have motion, and at the same time that it gets that perception, it is sensible that it derives that motion from its own power, and not from the agency of another; and it is impossible that it should ever forsake itself; and these premises compel you to allow its eternity, unless you have something to say against them.

This will relate to the argument given by Thomas Paine here:

Thread

Thomas Paine's Article: "On The Existence of God"

My late reading into the Matthew Stewart book. combined with the fact that @Joshua and I are about to pick up on the topic of "motion" in the podcast (via Tusculun Disputations) reminded me of this article - "On The Existence of God by Thomas Paine. It's an example of the disappointment I feel in the deists not going all the way back to Epicurus, and I have to think that their failure to do so was a major part of what doomed their entire "deist" enterprise.

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Cassius

April 2, 2025 at 10:56 AM

And the difference in presentation by Paine and Cicero probably affords a good clue on how to respond to it.

Paine states a key premise in question (that motion is not an inherent property of matter) as if it were a fact: "The universe is composed of matter, and, as a system, is sustained by motion. Motion is not a property of matter, and without this motion, the solar system could not exist. Were motion a property of matter, that undiscovered and undiscoverable thing called perpetual motion would establish itself."

While Cicero (at least in this excerpt) does not go so far as to directly state that matter does not move itself - he just implies it.

Epicurus states that atoms have properties of "weight," shape, and size, with weight apparently the motion aspect.

Cicero says this is explained by Plato in Phaedrus -- that dialogue is here:

Phaedrus (Jowett) - Wikisource, the free online library

Phaedrus, by Plato

Includes this:

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The soul through all her being is immortal, for that which is ever in motion is immortal; but that which moves another and is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases also to live. Only the self–moving, never leaving self, never ceases to move, and is the fountain and beginning of motion to all that moves besides. Now, the beginning is unbegotten, for that which is begotten has a beginning; but the beginning is begotten of nothing, for if it were begotten of something, then the begotten would not come from a beginning. But if unbegotten, it must also be indestructible; for if beginning were destroyed, there could be no beginning out of anything, nor anything out of a beginning; and all things must have a beginning. And therefore the self–moving is the beginning of motion; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten, else the whole heavens and all creation would collapse and stand still, and never again have motion or birth. But if the self–moving is proved to be immortal, he who affirms that self–motion is the very idea and essence of the soul will not be put to confusion. For the body which is moved from without is soulless; but that which is moved from within has a soul, for such is the nature of the soul. But if this be true, must not the soul be the self–moving, and therefore of necessity unbegotten and immortal? Enough of the soul’s immortality.

We'll need to parse this because it would appear that Epicurus would probably agree with some of this, but not all.

For reference, a Chatgpt summary of Phaedrus:

In Plato's Phaedrus, the major arguments revolve around the nature of love (eros), rhetoric, and the soul. Here’s a summary of the key themes:

1. The Nature of Love (Eros):
   • Socrates’ Speech on Love: Initially, Phaedrus presents the idea of love as a powerful and noble force. Socrates, in his speech, challenges the traditional view of love. He argues that true love, or divine madness, comes from the gods and can lead the soul toward greater understanding and virtue.
   • The Role of the Lover and the Beloved: Socrates describes the relationship between the lover and the beloved as one where the lover aims to guide the beloved’s soul toward the good. Love is depicted as a form of divine madness that can inspire individuals to seek truth and beauty.
2. The Myth of the Soul:
   • Socrates elaborates on the idea that the soul is immortal and undergoes cycles of reincarnation. The soul is drawn to the divine and seeks to return to the Forms, especially the Form of Beauty, which it glimpses during moments of deep love. This connection between love and the soul's journey is central to understanding why love can be seen as a guiding force.
3. Rhetoric and the Art of Persuasion:
   • The Power of Rhetoric: In the dialogue, Socrates and Phaedrus discuss the role of rhetoric and its potential to either lead people toward truth or manipulate them for personal gain. Socrates critiques rhetoricians who rely on persuasion without understanding the true nature of their subject matter.
   • Rhetoric as a Skill for the Good: Socrates suggests that rhetoric should be used to guide the soul toward truth, not just to win arguments. The best rhetorician is one who understands the nature of the soul and uses this knowledge to persuade others toward justice and virtue.
4. The Ideal Speaker:
   • An important section of the Phaedrus concerns the idea of the ideal speaker or rhetor. This person is someone who knows both the truth and the soul of their audience. Effective rhetoric is not just about delivering a persuasive speech but also about understanding the nature of the soul and the specific needs of the audience.
5. The Role of Philosophy:
   • The dialogue ultimately suggests that philosophy is the highest form of knowledge and the true goal of love is to lead one’s soul toward wisdom and the contemplation of the Forms, especially the Form of Beauty.

In short, Phaedrus explores the intersection of love, rhetoric, and the soul, arguing that both love and rhetoric, when properly understood and applied, can guide individuals toward higher understanding and truth.

I scanned Phaedrus -- it covers lots of ground but only a portion is about the soul.

In finishing it I was surprised to see this statement right at the very end, which I seem to remember Epicurus flatly contradicts (according to Diogenes Laertius, I think):

PHAEDRUS to SOCRATES (after Socrates offers a parting prayer to the gods):

"Ask the same for me, for friends should have all things in common."

Edit - Yes - very early in DLX:

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[11] Indeed, he says, they were satisfied with half a pint of wine, and for the most part drank water. He adds that Epicurus did not recommend them to put their belongings into a common stock, as did Pythagoras, who said that ‘Friends have all in common.’ For to do so implied distrust: and distrust could not go with friendship. Epicurus himself says in his letters that he was content with nothing but water and a bit of bread.

As to Epicurus on the eternality of atoms in motion, we have:

Diogenes Laertius 43 (Hicks): "The atoms are in continual motion through all eternity. Some of them rebound to a considerable distance from each other, while others merely oscillate in one place when they chance to have got entangled or to be enclosed by a mass of other atoms shaped for entangling.

Here are some references in Herodotus and Lucretius where it is stated that atoms are eternally in motion on their own, rather than set in motion by an outside force. Collision is a source of motion as well, but "weight" is separate and is an inherent property of atoms.

Herodotus

44 - For on the one hand the nature of the void which separates each atom by itself brings this about, as it is not able to afford resistance, and on the other hand the hardness which belongs to the atoms makes them recoil after collision to as great a distance as the interlacing permits separation after the collision. And these motions have no beginning, since the atoms and the void are the cause.

Scholium to 44 - Hicks - This is because each atom is separated from the rest by void, which is incapable of offering any resistance to the rebound; while it is the solidity of the atom which makes it rebound after a collision, however short the distance to which it rebounds, when it finds itself imprisoned in a mass of entangling atoms. Of all this there is no beginning, since both atoms and void exist from everlasting. [He says below that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size, and weight. But that colour varies with the arrangement of the atoms he states in his “Twelve Rudiments”; further, that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom has ever been seen by our sense.]

54 - Bailey - Moreover, we must suppose that the atoms do not possess any of the qualities belonging to perceptible things, except shape, weight, and size, and all that necessarily goes with shape.

76 - ,,, Furthermore, the motions of the heavenly bodies and their turnings and eclipses and risings and settings, and kindred phenomena to these, must not be thought to be due to any being who controls and ordains or has ordained them and at the same time enjoys perfect bliss together with immortality

Lucretiius

1-628 - And again, if nature, the creatress, had been used to constrain all things to be dissolved into their least parts, then she could not again renew aught of them, for the reason that things which are not enlarged by any parts, have not those powers which must belong to creative matter, the diverse fastenings, weights, blows, meetings, movements, by which all things are carried on.

1-984 - Moreover, if all the space in the whole universe were shut in on all sides, and were created with borders determined, and had been bounded, then the store of matter would have flowed together with solid weight from all sides to the bottom, nor could anything be carried on beneath the canopy of the sky, nor would there be sky at all, nor the light of the sun, since in truth all matter would lie idle piled together by sinking down from limitless time. But as it is, no rest, we may be sure, has been granted to the bodies of the first-beginnings, because there is no bottom at all, whither they may, as it were, flow together, and make their resting-place. All things are for ever carried on in ceaseless movement from all sides, and bodies of matter, are even stirred up and supplied from beneath out of limitless space.

1-1067: But empty error has commended these false ideas to fools, because they embrace and hold a theory with twisted reasoning. For there can be no centre, since the universe is created infinite. Nor, if indeed there were a centre, could anything at all rest there any more for that, rather than be driven away for some far different reason: for all room and space, which we call void, must through centre or not-centre give place alike to heavy bodies, wherever their motions tend. Nor is there any place, to which when bodies have come, they can lose the force of their weight and stand still in the void; nor must aught that is void support anything, but rather hasten to give place, as its own nature desires. It cannot be then that things can be held together in union in such a way, constrained by a yearning for the centre.

2-80 - If you think that the first-beginnings of things can stay still, and by staying still beget new movements in things, you stray very far away from true reasoning. For since they wander through the void, it must needs be that all the first-beginnings of things move on either by their own weight or sometimes by the blow of another. For when quickly, again and again, they have met and clashed together, it comes to pass that they leap asunder at once this way and that; for indeed it is not strange, since they are most hard with solid heavy bodies, and nothing bars them from behind. And the more you perceive all the bodies of matter tossing about, bring it to mind that there is no lowest point in the whole universe, nor have the first-bodies any place where they may come to rest, since I have shown in many words, and it has been proved by true reasoning, that space spreads out without bound or limit, immeasurable towards every quarter everywhere. And since that is certain, no rest, we may be sure, is allowed to the first-bodies moving through the deep void, but rather plied with unceasing, diverse motion, some when they have dashed together leap back at great space apart, others too are thrust but a short way from the blow.

2-284 - Wherefore in the seeds too you must needs allow likewise that there is another cause of motion besides blows and weights, whence comes this power born in us, since we see that nothing can come to pass from nothing. For weight prevents all things coming to pass by blows, as by some force without. But that the very mind feels not some necessity within in doing all things, and is not constrained like a conquered thing to bear and suffer, this is brought about by the tiny swerve of the first-beginnings in no determined direction of place and at no determined time.

2-294 - Nor was the store of matter ever more closely packed nor again set at larger distances apart. For neither does anything come to increase it nor pass away from it. Wherefore the bodies of the first-beginnings in the ages past moved with the same motion as now, and hereafter will be borne on for ever in the same way; such things as have been wont to come to being will be brought to birth under the same law, will exist and grow and be strong and lusty, inasmuch as is granted to each by the ordinances of nature. Nor can any force change the sum of things; for neither is there anything outside, into which any kind of matter may escape from the universe, nor whence new forces can arise and burst into the universe and change the whole nature of things and alter its motions.

2-308 - Herein we need not wonder why it is that, when all the first-beginnings of things are in motion, yet the whole seems to stand wholly at rest, except when anything starts moving with its entire body. For all the nature of the first-bodies lies far away from our senses, below their purview; wherefore, since you cannot reach to look upon them, they must needs steal away their motions from you too; above all, since such things as we can look upon, yet often hide their motions, when withdrawn from us on some distant spot.

3-31 - And since I have shown of what kind are the beginnings of all things, with what diverse shapes they differ, and how of their own accord they fly on, impelled by everlasting motion, and in what manner each several thing can be created out of them; next after this it seems that the nature of the mind and the soul must now be displayed in my verses, and the old fear of Acheron driven headlong away, which utterly confounds the life of men from the very root, clouding all things with the blackness of death, and suffering no pleasure to be pure and unalloyed.

3-262 - For the first-beginnings course to and fro among themselves with the motions of first-beginnings, so that no single one can be put apart, nor can its powers be set in play divided from others by empty space, but they are, as it were, the many forces of a single body. Even as in the flesh of any living creature anywhere there is smell and a certain heat and savour, and yet of all these is made up the bulk of a single body. Thus heat and air and the hidden power of wind mingled create one nature together with that nimble force, which sends among them from itself the beginning of motion, whence the motion that brings sensation first arises throughout the flesh. For right deep within this nature lies hid far below, nor is there anything further beneath than this in our bodies, and it is moreover the very soul of the whole soul.

5-416 - But by what means that gathering together of matter established earth and sky and the depths of ocean, and the courses of sun and moon, I will set forth, in order. For in very truth not by design did the first-beginnings of things place themselves each in their order with foreseeing mind, nor indeed did they make compact what movements each should start; but because many first-beginnings of things in many ways, driven on by blows from time everlasting until now, and moved by their own weight, have been wont to be borne on, and to unite in every way and essay everything that they might create, meeting one with another, therefore it comes to pass that scattered abroad through a great age, as they try meetings and motions of every kind, at last those come together, which, suddenly cast together, become often the beginnings of great things, of earth, sea and sky, and the race of living things.

AETIUS has this:

1.23 On Motion

§1 Pythagoras Plato: motion is a difference or alteration in matter qua matter. This is the shared definition of every (form of) motion.
§2 Aristotle: (motion is) entelechy of the movable.
§3 Democritus: (there is) one kind of motion, that which (occurs) through vibration.
§4 Epicurus (says there are) two kinds of motion, that which (occurs) perpendicularly and that which (occurs) through deviation.
[a lemma on three kinds of motion seems to have fallen out]
§5 But there are some who introduce a fourth kind, that which (occurs) substantially, i.e. that which (occurs) in terms of coming to be.
§6 Yet others add intellectual (motion) as well, so in fact they have advanced up to the (number) five.
§7 Diodorus Cronus (says that) things have moved to some extent, but that nothing is moving (sc. in actuality).
§8 Heraclitus removed rest and standing still from the whole of things, for this belongs to corpses; to everlasting things he assigned everlasting motion and to perishable things (he assigned) perishable (motion).
§9 Herophilus (says that there is) motion that is observable by reason and (there is) motion that is sense-perceptible. (P5,S8)
§10 (But) Asclepiades declared that all motion is sense-perceptible. (S9)

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So "entelechy" is the way Aristotle seeks to preserve Plato's forms and suggests that they are "essences' within a thing, rather than in some higher dimension.

Entelechy | Definition, Example, Aristotle, & Leibniz | Britannica

Entelechy, that which realizes or makes actual what is otherwise merely potential. The concept is intimately connected with Aristotle’s distinction between…

www.britannica.com

entelechy, (from Greek entelecheia), in philosophy, that which realizes or makes actual what is otherwise merely potential. The concept is intimately connected with Aristotle’s distinction between matter and form, or the potential and the actual. He analyzed each thing into the stuff or elements of which it is composed and the form which makes it what it is (see hylomorphism). The mere stuff or matter is not yet the real thing: it needs a certain form or essence or function to complete it. Matter and form, however, are never separated; they can only be distinguished. Thus, in the case of a living organism, for example, the sheer matter of the organism (viewed only as a synthesis of inorganic substances) can be distinguished from a certain form or function or inner activity, without which it would not be a living organism at all, and this “soul” or “vital function” is what Aristotle in his De anima (On the Soul ) called the entelechy (or first entelechy) of the living organism. Similarly, rational activity is what makes human beings human and distinguishes them from other animals.

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The link to hylomorphism is very interesting, and contains this:

Opposed to hylomorphism are atomism, mechanism, and dynamism, all of which deny the intrinsic composition of metaphysical principles in bodies and recognize only physical principles, such as corpuscles, pure mathematical extension, or forces and energies. These theories agree also in denying the hylomorphist’s claim that intrinsic change can occur in the ultimate realities of which the physical world is composed and, further, in reducing the phenomenon of becoming to a simple local movement or to purely accidental changes of a single selfsame reality.

Joshua if you could add here that section from Aristotle that you quoted in today's episode I would appreciate it.

This is the part that caught my attention - a potential huge difference between Epicurus and Democritus. Cicero's earlier reference to Democritus seems to read this ("soul and mind are, he says, one and the same thing, and this thing must be one of the primary and indivisible bodies,") as indicating that Democritus thought that there are primary and indivisible soul/mind atoms, rather than that, as Epicurus thought, souls/minds are non-primary things that are composed of indivisible atoms. Given this translation, Cicero's reading might well be a fair reading of Democritus:

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Some thinkers, accepting both premisses, viz. that the soul is both originative of movement and cognitive, have compounded it of both and declared the soul to be a self-moving number.

As to the nature and number of the first principles opinions differ. The difference is greatest between those who regard them as corporeal and those who regard them as incorporeal, and from both dissent those who make a blend and draw their principles from both sources. The number of principles is also in dispute; some admit one only, others assert several. There is a consequent diversity in their several accounts of soul; they assume, naturally enough, that what is in its own nature originative of movement must be among what is primordial. That has led some to regard it as fire, for fire is the subtlest of the elements and nearest to incorporeality; further, in the most primary sense, fire both is moved and originates movement in all the others.

Democritus has expressed himself more ingeniously than the rest on the grounds for ascribing each of these two characters to soul; soul and mind are, he says, one and the same thing, and this thing must be one of the primary and indivisible bodies, and its power of originating movement must be due to its fineness of grain and the shape of its atoms; he says that of all the shapes the spherical is the most mobile, and that this is the shape of the particles of fire and mind.

Episode 275 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. Today's episode is entitled: "Does Motion Prove The Existence of God and The Divinity Of the Soul?"

Patrikios check here: RE: Prolepsis / Anticipations As Epicurus' Answer to the MENO Problem