Today this question is on my mind, regarding the often used negation in Epicurean philosophy (which came up when thinking about the phrase; "absence of pain") ...and of which there are many many concepts presented as a negation.
And I did this search online:
How do we cognate concepts framed in the negative, and can we rephrase concepts in the positive and still keep a correct representation. 
Here is a further article:
Thinking aloud here.
"This is not pleasurable" gives me a notably different impression than "this is painful". "This is not pleasurable" brings to my mind some sort of neutral middleground, which as we know does not exist under the Epicurean framework. Perhaps this explains why people get so hung up on "absence of pain" implying some sort of ascetic nirvana-esque state. Not because of unclearness on Epicurus' part, but because they don't know or don't understand the idea that there is only pleasure and pain, and the way the brain processes negation points them to this non-existent "neutral third state".
Interesting thread!
I thought about this some more, particularly Homer’s use of negation to imply the greatest degree of something. The word “spotless” came to mind.
”The table is clean” = Sure, it’s clean.
“The table is spotless (without ‘spots’)” = Wow, that is one clean table. The pinnacle of cleanliness.
Thus, “absence of pain” is to “spotless” as “pleasure” is to “clean”.
Spotless and clean refer to the same thing - being free from dirt - but the negative form, spotless, implies the highest degree of cleanliness.
Likewise, “absence of pain” and “pleasure” mean the same thing (considering only pleasure and pain exist), but the negative form, “absence of pain”, implies the highest degree of pleasure.
In order to illustrate this use of language, I’ve rewritten the contentious portion of Menoeceus 131 as if it regarded cleanliness rather than pleasure:
When, therefore, we maintain that cleanliness is the end, we do not mean the cleanliness of lazy teenagers — those who mask grime with body spray or shove messes under the bed — as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but rather the absence of filth on the body and of clutter in the home — in other words, spotlessness.
Humorous as this may be, I hope it is helpful in pointing out the effect of linguistic negation. 
Likewise, “absence of pain” and “pleasure” mean the same thing (considering only pleasure and pain exist), but the negative form, “absence of pain”, implies the highest degree of pleasure.
Rolf , thanks for this thoughtful perspective. I understand the “spotless” analogy.
I’m wondering whether “absence of pain”, implies the highest degree of pleasure fits for all persons. Couldn’t the “absence of pain” lead one to simply be in a relaxed, neutral state; with highest degree of pleasure coming from a favorite kinetic pleasure?
I may be missing something in the way you described the analogy.
Likewise, “absence of pain” and “pleasure” mean the same thing (considering only pleasure and pain exist), but the negative form, “absence of pain”, implies the highest degree of pleasure.
Rolf , thanks for this thoughtful perspective. I understand the “spotless” analogy.
I’m wondering whether “absence of pain”, implies the highest degree of pleasure fits for all persons. Couldn’t the “absence of pain” lead one to simply be in a relaxed, neutral state; with highest degree of pleasure coming from a favorite kinetic pleasure?I may be missing something in the way you described the analogy.
This is something I’m still wrapping my head around, so I might not be the best person to ask. That said, according to epicurean philosophy there is no “neutral state”. There is only pleasure and pain. So a complete absence of pain indicates a complete presence of pleasure. The way I understand it, this “absence of pain” is more of an ideal state, a goal, rather than something that we are realistically going to achieve. As far as I’m aware, you could switch out “absence of pain” here with “100% pleasure” and it would mean the same thing. “Absence of pain” is just used to emphasise the completeness of pleasure we should strive for.
I suppose such an ideal state could present itself as a relaxed and tranquil state, but it could just as easily be a moment of ecstatic joy and laughter with friends. Epicurus wasn’t talking about some state of perfect pleasure that lasts forever once achieved, like nirvana or something. Instead, our pleasure and pain levels are constantly fluctuating.
I think Rolfe is right in picking out any reference to a "neutral state" as being something that's not good Epicurean terminology. The references are pretty clear that there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain, and there's no third or neutral condition outside these two. For example:
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- Diogenes Laertius X-34 : ”The internal sensations they say are two, pleasure and pain, which occur to every living creature, and the one is akin to nature and the other alien: by means of these two choice and avoidance are determined.“
- On Ends Book One, 30 : ”Moreover, seeing that if you deprive a man of his senses there is nothing left to him, it is inevitable that nature herself should be the arbiter of what is in accord with or opposed to nature. Now what facts does she grasp or with what facts is her decision to seek or avoid any particular thing concerned, unless the facts of pleasure and pain?
- On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
- On Ends Book One, 39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
As to "with highest degree of pleasure coming from a favorite kinetic pleasure" I think this involves the very good question of switching contexts away from the generalizations, like the highest quantity of pleasure is 100% / 0% pain as in PD03, as well as in these cites (some repetition here) .......
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- On Ends Book One, 38 : Therefore Epicurus refused to allow that there is any middle term between pain and pleasure; what was thought by some to be a middle term, the absence of all pain, was not only itself pleasure, but the highest pleasure possible. Surely any one who is conscious of his own condition must needs be either in a state of pleasure or in a state of pain. Epicurus thinks that the highest degree of pleasure is defined by the removal of all pain, so that pleasure may afterwards exhibit diversities and differences but is incapable of increase or extension.“
- On Ends Book One, 39 : For if that were the only pleasure which tickled the senses, as it were, if I may say so, and which overflowed and penetrated them with a certain agreeable feeling, then even a hand could not be content with freedom from pain without some pleasing motion of pleasure. But if the highest pleasure is, as Epicurus asserts, to be free from pain, then, O Chrysippus, the first admission was correctly made to you, that the hand, when it was in that condition, was in want of nothing; but the second admission was not equally correct, that if pleasure were a good it would wish for it. For it would not wish for it for this reason, inasmuch as whatever is free from pain is in pleasure.
On Ends Book One, 56 : By this time so much at least is plain, that the intensest pleasure or the intensest annoyance felt in the mind exerts more influence on the happiness or wretchedness of life than either feeling, when present for an equal space of time in the body. We refuse to believe, however, that when pleasure is removed, grief instantly ensues, excepting when perchance pain has taken the place of the pleasure; but we think on the contrary that we experience joy on the passing away of pains, even though none of that kind of pleasure which stirs the senses has taken their place; and from this it may be understood how great a pleasure it is to be without pain. [57] But as we are elated by the blessings to which we look forward, so we delight in those which we call to memory. Fools however are tormented by the recollection of misfortunes; wise men rejoice in keeping fresh the thankful recollection of their past blessings. Now it is in the power of our wills to bury our adversity in almost unbroken forgetfulness, and to agreeably and sweetly remind ourselves of our prosperity. But when we look with penetration and concentration of thought upon things that are past, then, if those things are bad, grief usually ensues, if good, joy.
... to switching to the context of whether it is possible to point to particular people at particular times experiencing particular things and say "There, that's an example of what I am talking about!"
I think that's where Patrikos would be correct in pointing to a particular example of a person experiencing some favorite kinetic pleasure without any feeling of mental or bodily pain at the same time. Here we can look back at Torquatus saying repeatedly to Cicero that if you're not experiencing pain then you're experiencing pleasure, and in fact if you represent to me that you are not experiencing any mental or physical pain at all, then what you're telling me is that you're experiencing 100% pleasure, and that's as much pleasure as anyone can experience.
As stated in PD09 pleasures vary in intensity, duration, and parts of the body affected (including the mind) so all experiences of 100% pleasure are not the same for each person, except and only in the respect that if they are 100% for that person then they can't be any better - it's impossible to go past 100%.
I think the main confusion is coming in because people want to compare the experiences of different people when they are "feeling no pain" and they want to say that the particular experiences - though likely involving very different activities - are exactly the same in every respect. As if everyone experiencing 100% pleasure is in some kind of state of euphoria at the right hand of god or something.
It seems to me that that confusion arises from false ideas taught by religion, and that if you start at the beginning of Epicurean philosophy about the nature of the universe, the absence of supernatural gods, the falsity of absolute standards of virtue, and the knowledge that pleasure and pain are feelings given by nature and not concepts or particulars (those are created in our minds) then this problem doesn't trip you up.
When you recognize that the universe is not "designed" and that the atoms and void work together infinite ways over eternal time, and that nature never creates only a single thing of a kind, then you don't even have the expectation that everyone's experiences, pleasurable or painful, are going to be the same.
So Patrikios, who is older like me, due to our age can look upon some experiences as the best we could even hope for, while Rolfe who I understand is much younger, can look aghast at the things that might be 100% pleasing to old guys, and yet there is no philosophical problem. That's why "he who counsels the young man to live well, but the old man to make a good end, is foolish, not merely because of the desirability of life, but also because it is the same training which teaches to live well and to die well."
I think it's really good to talk about this because it's a huge stumbling block to people seeing how practical Epicurean philosophy is for everyone. It's particularly a problem for those who want to see Epicurean philosophy grow because our current demographics probably skew toward the nursing home set. 
There's no reason at all that that has to be the case, and if the ancient world had understood Epicurus that way the philosophy would never have been as successful as it was. As Torquatus said we should be ashamed that we did not learn as early as when we were children what Epicurus was teaching. Epicurean philosophy is at least as appropriate for young energetic and active people as it is for those who are slowing down, and it's not telling everyone to slow down. A lot of us need to stop procrastinating on what's really valuable to us in life and speed up!
There's nothing wrong or right intrinsically with wanting "rest," and there's nothing wrong intrinsically with wanting to "seize the day." The choice is a matter of considering your personal circumstances and recognizing that there's no god or ideal form to answer your question, and the best you or anyone can do is as widely and intelligently as possible pursue as much pleasure as you can and avoid as much pain as you can. But we're not just just talking immediate physical stimulation or giggles and jokes, we talking about how we evaluate the fact that we have only a short time to live and how we judge the total results of our actions in all their consequences.
Well said Cassius!
So Patrikios, who is older like me, due to our age can look upon some experiences as the best we could even hope for, while Rolfe who I understand is much younger, can look aghast at the things that might be 100% pleasing to old guys, and yet there is no philosophical problem.
Exactly! This state of 100% pleasure/0% pain could present itself as a peaceful tranquility, sitting out in nature, but it could just as well occur while dancing to loud music with friends.
I’d also like to reiterate that this state (which I view as more of a hypothetical ideal - correct me if I’m off-base) is NOT a one-and-done state you achieve and then live in perfect harmony for the rest of your days. It’s not nirvana. It’s simply a description of the greatest pleasure one can experience. Our pleasure and pain levels are constantly fluctuating as we move through life.
That's the way I see it Rolfe. It is impossible for it to be either "one and done" or "once and ever after in exactly the same condition."
Epicurus could legitimately view the last day of his life as happy or even one of his happiest, given his appreciation for what he had accomplished throughout his life and his present overall circumstances in total. But that appreciation didn't eliminate the presence of his extreme physical pain of his advanced disease that was also present.
It would make no sense for him to have said that he would not have preferred to have the same pleasures but without the accompanying pain. There was no cosmic necessity that he die of kidney disease rather than of old age in his sleep unexpectedly without that pain. The latter would have been preferable.
And he didn't say "Ever since I was 50 and reached a complete understanding of my philosophy I have never felt any pain" or anything like that. He acknowledged his pain but held that his pleasures far outweighed them and that he was happy to be alive to experience that day.
Don any thoughts on this? Maybe you have something to add about the use of negation in ancient Greek language, and the pattern of words that often occurs?
I'm sorry, Kalosyni. This flew under my radar. I don't have any thoughts off the top of my head, but I'm intrigued. I'll share any I might discover. Maybe Bryan or Eikadistes would have thoughts?
That said, great posts here on this thread. Y'all are providing some solid summaries of the "absence of pain" idea.
Rolf For recently joining our little online Garden, your contributions are insightful and greatly appreciated. Glad to have you aboard.
Definitions set boundaries around particular characteristics.
From a certain angle, definitions (or "limits,") can only say what something is not -- and it is "examples" that say what something is.
Consider an ancient scholiast on Dionysius Thrax's Τέχνη Γραμματική (The Art of Grammar):
"And Epíkouros – although he used examples (αἱ ὑπογραφαί) all the time – he shows that limits (οἱ ὅροι) are more valuable, [because he used] limits instead of examples in his work of his natural philosophy lecture: while dividing everything into atom and void by using limits – and while saying that an atom is a solid body having no share of interposition with the void. Void is an intangible nature, that is, untouchable."
And he didn't say "Ever since I was 50 and reached a complete understanding of my philosophy I have never felt any pain" or anything like that. He acknowledged his pain but held that his pleasures far outweighed them and that he was happy to be alive to experience that day.
It's been some time since I read Gosling and Taylor, but if I recall correctly, they consider the understanding of philosophy to be something of a one-and-done pleasure and they call it katastematic. But as you say, that by no means implies an end of pain. Pains and pleasures still come and go (for some reason an image of swirling around comes to mind) but the stable pleasure of correct philosophy can outweigh most, if not all, of the pains.
It's been some time since I read Gosling and Taylor, but if I recall correctly, they consider the understanding of philosophy to be something of a one-and-done pleasure and they call it katastematic.
Unfortunately I cannot outright confirm or deny that statement with a particular cite. Since Rolf is new and is actively engaged in this thread, rather than pass over it let me just say I consider that Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks on Pleasure" to be one of the most exhaustive and best resources these issues involving pleasure.
However it is also very long and detailed and not a quick read. Especially in the katastematic pleasure chapter (which is the inspiration for the Boris Nikolsky article here in the files section of the forum which I highly recommend that Rolfe read first) Gosling and Taylor tend to be so cautious in their wording that it is sometimes hard (at least for me) to be sure what their conclusion really is.
It seems to me that they were especially cautious in their wording of the katatestematic discussion, likely because they were aware that they were disagreeing with the powers-that-be in the academic world who take the majority view that Epicurus identified the true goal as ataraxia and ataraxia to be a katastematic pleasure. It is clear that G&T's chapter disagrees with that viewpoint, and Emily Austin states in a footnote in her book that she agrees with G&T's position. G&T also inspired Nikolsky to write his article "Epicurus On Pleasure," but not because G&T stated their conclusion in revolutionary flag-waving terms.
Even thought it's immediately apparent that "katestematic pleasure" has all sorts of issues even describing, the issues can also subtle, and it takes considerable time to understand why the issue is important. But it is very important because getting caught up in amorphous and exotic thoughts that can seem to be implied by the term "katastematic pleasure" is (in my view) the best way to turn any normal person into a useless ivory-tower jellyfish and make them run from Epicurus as fast as they can. And that's the reason why I think that viewpoint is so favored by many, especially by those who can otherwise hardly find it in themselves to utter the word "pleasure."
I would highly recommend to Rolfe or anyone else who has the time (but not early in their reading!!) that they should eventually read the G&T book. If someone is new and simply has to get to the bottom of that issue, read the Nikolsky article as it is much shorter and more clear in its conclusions.
The main danger is to energetic people (either younger like Rolfe or motivated at any age) who pick up from conventional articles praising katastematic pleasure and think it is the true goal of Epicurus. Most of them will sense immediately that there are all sorts of issues and contradictions in it, and they will think that if Epicurus thought that then he is worthless to them, just as they should reject all forms of otherworldy Buddhism / Stoicism / nothingness / ivory tower detachment.
There are very legitimate ways of making sense of what Diogenes Laertius has to say about katastematic pleasure, and Boris Nikolsky offers explanations as do Don and others here. I think Emily Austin made a very good decision to confine it to a footnote in her book and not get distracted by it. There's a time and place for fighting it out on this issue, and we do that here in the forum if you dig into prior discussions, but representing katastematic pleasure to new people as the real goal of Epicurus is the best way to send normal healthy people running away from Epicurean philosophy.
and ataraxia to be a katastematic pleasure
For the record, ataraxia IS one of Epicurus' examples of a katastemaric pleasures.
"ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται."
Epicurus says in his work On Choice are : "Peace of mind (ataraxia) and freedom from pain (aponia) are pleasures pertaining to a state or condition (katastēmarikai eisin hēdonai); joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity." (my translation)
Yes, Don thanks, that is a comment by Diogenes Laertius, who is consistent with Cicero and Athenaeus (if Nikolsky's comments below are correct). To make it easier on those who have not read Nikolsky's full article, here is his abstract explaining how he takes the clues set out by Gosling & Taylor and then explains how these three men may have come to make their commentary. For those who can go down the rabbit hole without being distracted and turned off, it's a fascinating subject.
G&T really do a great job of tracking down all aspects of "The Greeks on Pleasure" from the earliest days, through Epicurus, and through the original and later uses of these terms. I've read it all through once, but can't say I have a command of it at all. It's a bear to try to dive in and then come up for air.
QuoteABSTRACT
The paper deals with the question of the attribution to Epicurus of the classification of pleasures into 'kinetic' and 'static'. This classification, usually regarded as authentic, confronts us with a number of problems and contradictions. Besides, it is only mentioned in a few sources that are not the most reliable. Following Gosling and Taylor, I believe that the authenticity of the classification may be called in question.The analysis of the ancient evidence concerning Epicurus' concept of pleasure is made according to the following principle: first, I consider the sources that do not mention the distinction between 'kinetic' and 'static' pleasures, and only then do I compare them with the other group of texts which comprises reports by Cicero, Diogenes Laertius and Athenaeus. From the former group of texts there emerges a concept of pleasure as a single and not twofold notion, while such terms as 'motion' and 'state' describe not two different phenomena but only two characteristics of the same phenomenon. On the other hand, the reports comprising the latter group appear to derive from one and the same doxographical tradition, and to be connected with the classification of ethical docrines put forward by the Middle Academy and known as the divisio Carneadea. In conclusion, I argue that the idea of Epicurus' classification of pleasures is based on a misinterpretation of Epicurus' concept in Academic doxography, which tended to contrapose it to doctrines of other schools, above all to the Cyrenaics' views.
For me, a way that is is much more useful than kinetic-katastematic in thinking about various pleasures is in terms of intensity, duration and location. This can be found in the PDs, although not without some effort. Another practical way to examine particular pleasures and pains is to look at whether you can expect them to result in net pleasure or net pain, and act accordingly.
Yes, Don thanks, that is a comment by Diogenes Laertius, who is consistent with Cicero and Athenaeus (if Nikolsky's comments below are correct).
It's not a comment by Diogenes; it's a quote from Epicurus' own work.
