The Use of Negation in Epicurean Philosophy Concepts

For the record, I don't think the kinetic/katastematic distinction is the most paramount issue to be resolved in Epicurean philosophy. I do, however, believe it needs to be addressed. As with all things Epicurus, the loss of ancient texts from actual Epicureans is problematic. We have that whole "through a glass darkly" issue in trying to get at what the school itself thought.

On rereading (okay, skimming through) Nikolsky, I find that argument less and less compelling. That paper, to my reading, seems to be implying Epicurus didn't use the distinction between kinetic/katastematic. This simply seems to blatantly contradict the quotation from Epicurus himself in Choices and Avoidances cited in DL X.136.

I remain intrigued by Gosling and Taylor.

We've had some knock-down-drag-out threads on this. I was reading a good long one from 2023! There is no one consensus among long time forum members that I can see. That doesn't make us rivals! Just means this is a thorny issue with multiple possible perspectives. This seems a good a place as any to rejoin that discussion, because Kalosyni 's question about negation follows right on from Epicurus' use of a-taraxia and a-ponia.

Really interesting discussion, thanks everyone. I’ll be sure to check out Nikolsky and later G&T, though I feel I should first get a broad understanding of the philosophy via Austin and DeWitt.

That said, I’m not sure I quite see the point at issue here. Pleasures vary in duration, intensity, and location. Of course I would prefer a katastematic pleasure. More sustainable, longer lasting pleasure. It’s like asking someone if they want $1000 now or $100 per month for 2 years. It’s a matter of prudence.

At the same time, I don’t think that turns such pleasures into a specific goal. The goal is still just pleasure generally. I forget who said this, perhaps it was an older forum post, but getting wrapped up trying to define pleasure and pain sort of takes away from the whole “pleasure and pain are our inherent, instinctively knowable guides” thing. I do understand that it’s important to discuss this stuff though - I find myself especially interested in hearing criticisms and flawed takes on Epicureanism. It helps me to understand what is *not* Epicureanism. I suppose you could say I’m not just looking for an understanding of epicurean philosophy, but an absence of misunderstanding.

Cassius Would you be able to sum up this flawed view of katastematic pleasure that mainstream academia purports?

Quote from Rolf

Would you be able to sum up this flawed view of katastematic pleasure that mainstream academia purports?

For me, the mainstream academic and frankly broad public general position seems to boil down to:

• Epicurus goal was ataraxia, ie serenity.
• That's similar to Buddhism, Stoicism, et al.
• We'll dismiss Epicurus since "he's basically saying the same thing as these other philosophies."

Now, there are some great academics and lay proponents of Epicurus out there (Looking at you, Austin and Sedley!), but that's my take above on the general vibe of the hoi polloi.

Don's summary of the issue is excellent. I would only add that in addition to the conclusion that there's no reason to read Epicurus because he's the same as Buddhism and Stoicism, you of course add on the huge baggage of why one should not choose to pursue Buddhism or Stoicism.

Quote from Rolf

That said, I’m not sure I quite see the point at issue here. Pleasures vary in duration, intensity, and location. Of course I would prefer a katastematic pleasure. More sustainable, longer lasting pleasure. It’s like asking someone if they want $1000 now or $100 per month for 2 years. It’s a matter of prudence.

Yes, that statement illustrates how confusing this question can be. The issue is that when most people (excluding those who see it like Don does) talk about katastematic pleasure, they are not simply referring to "any pleasure that is sustainable and longer lasting." And they are not talking about katastematic pleasure as "one of many kinds of pleasure." The point I am arguing against is that many people explicitly or implicitly state that katastematic pleasure, which they equate with "ataraxia" or "freedom from pain" is the ultimate goal of Epicurean pleasure, rather than the much wider term "pleasure," which includes katastemic pleasure, but also includes kinetic pleasure.

Of course at this point we're already down the road of glazing over peoples' eyes because they understandably aren't sure what "katastematic" and "kinetic" means, so they default to thinking that it means "ataraxia" which is also highly ambiguous or just "absence of pain" which means nothing standing alone any more than it would be to say "absence of elephants." "Absence of....." doesn't tell you anything unless you have a conceptual framework that there are only two possibilities, and that the only other possibility is pleasure. But the people I am arguing against rarely explain that, because their whole issue is that they don't want to accept the common understanding of "pleasure" in the first place, because that would draw a bright red line between Epicurus and Buddhism and Stoicism.

So many commentators package this question into the view that katastematic pleasure is the only really desirable pleasure, and that the only reason we care about kinetic pleasures is so that we can obtain katastematic pleasure. They argue that once we have katasatematic pleasure we no longer have need of kinetic pleasure, and they'll cite this part of the letter to Menoeceus: "For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure."

And indeed if you are the normal man on the street today and take that statement at face value, it DOES sound Buddhist or Stoic or worse. The problem only gets resolved when you take into account Epicurus's many statements about pleasure in the rest of the philosophy, including the fact that (as with gods) Epicurus is giving a very unusual meaning to a term that everyone else uses differently. But no man-on-the-street has the experience to be able to do that, so they run in the opposite direction. Which in my view is exactly the goal of the perps I am referring to, because their goal is to remain smugly happy in their eclectic blends of Buddism and Stoicism without worry that anyone will ever see that Epicurus was arguing against their position, not in favor of it.

Gosling and Taylor exhaustively go through many examples of the contradictions that the standard view of katastematic pleasure causes, G&T conclude that these contradictions do not mean that katastematic pleasure is somehow the ultimate goal of Epicurean philosophy: they conclude that Epicurus saw pleasure as a unified thing, and that katastematic pleasure is only one sort of pleasure. And that's where Nikolsky picks up and points out that in the centuries between Epicurus and Cicero (and additional time after that to Diogenes Laertius) people like Carneades - in their fetish to categorize things - placed an emphasis on this division that is not mentioned by the true believers like Lucretius and Diogenes of Oinoanda or to my recollection Philodemus either, and thus was not of major significance to Epicurus himself.

But it's become the hallmark of discussion of Epicurus in the modern world because when accepted in the way it is often discussed, it turns much of the philosophy upside down and makes much of the rest of it self-contradictory.

Quote from Cassius

"For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure."

Hmm, I do find myself struggling to reconcile this one. Could you help me break it down?

Does my understanding of the value/importance of katastematic pleasure sound correct to you?

I started on that in the the prior post but deleted it because i was getting too long.

In summary, my view of that is that Epicurus is speaking conceptually as to the nature of the goal.

The essential premise that is unstated here but which is present in PD03 and recorded at length by Cicero in Torquatus' explanation of Epicurean ethics, there are only two feelings, pleasure and pain, and when you don't have pain you have pleasure. All this is reinforced immediately in the letter by the following:

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129] And for this cause we call pleasure the beginning and end of the blessed life. For we recognize pleasure as the first good innate in us, and from pleasure we begin every act of choice and avoidance, and to pleasure we return again, using the feeling as the standard by which we judge every good. And since pleasure is the first good and natural to us, for this very reason we do not choose every pleasure, but sometimes we pass over many pleasures, when greater discomfort accrues to us as the result of them: and similarly we think many pains better than pleasures, since a greater pleasure comes to us when we have endured pains for a long time. Every pleasure then because of its natural kinship to us is good, yet not every pleasure is to be chosen: even as every pain also is an evil, yet not all are always of a nature to be avoided.

It's my view that Epicurus expected Menoeceus or any other student of his reading the letter to understand the wider context of there being only two feelings. Unfortunately, people today don't know the context, so they don't understand how saying "absence of pain" is the equivalent of saying "pleasure."

To me that context resolves the part of the passage that is arguably the worst if not understood. "When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure."

When you know that "absence of pleasure" means "pain" just like "absence of pain" means pleasure, you realize that he's just stating the obvious. When you have pain, that means there's a gap in your goal of life that needs to be filled with pleasure. When you have no pain, that means there is no gap in your goal of life, because your life is already filled with pleasure. At that point, you have no further need for more pleasure, because your life is already filled with pleasure. This does not deprecate pleasure but emphasizes that pleasure is the only thing that really counts.

You'll also see here on the forum lots of discussion of "the limit of pleasure" as referenced in PD03 and in reference to an argument by Plato, who alleged that because pleasure has no limit then it cannot be the ultimate good.

By showing that pleasure does have a limit, and thus there is a state which can be described as "the best," Epicurus refute's Plato's argument. When you think about it, it's obvious that the best state of pleasure is 100% pleasure. At that point, you have no need, or ability to experience, anything more.

I have several collections of quotes on this as I'm constantly working on a better presentation of them. Here are three:

On Epicurean Views Of Pleasure - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

A second is here: https://wiki.epicureanfriends.com/doku.php/the_norm_is_pleasure_too

And a third:

Article

A Gate To Be Burst: "Absence of Pain"

It is interesting to think about what Lucretius had in mind in Book One of “On The Nature of Things” when he spoke about Epicurus "yearning to be the first to burst through the close-set bolts upon the gates of nature." What kind of gates was he talking about? Who bolted them? How do those gates keep us from Nature?

I can't be sure which gates Lucretius had in mind, but I can suggest one "gate" that is particularly in need of bursting, as it stands directly in the way of a better understanding…

Cassius

February 12, 2024 at 1:26 PM

Might Elayne's article from several years ago be pertinent? She used the term "fancy pleasure" to elucidate the trouble with the common take on katastematic pleasure as I recall.

Yes definitely Godfrey:

Article

On Pain, Pleasure, And Happiness

Brief: The feelings are only two, pleasure and pain—there is no third state such as neutral, and there are no “fancy pleasures” which are different from regular pleasures. Because there is no neutral, reducing pain in life is only possible if there is a corresponding increase in pleasure. The extent of pleasure can be maximized by making sure to attend to all parts of one’s body, including the brain. Happiness is comprised of a pleasurable life. The capacity for pain is a valuable warning system and should not be disabled except in unusual conditions. The experience of pain is to be avoided except when it is chosen for the sake of greater pleasure/ lesser pain over the lifespan. Humans have many shared responses of pain or pleasure to specific experiences, and they also have individual variations. The standard of pleasure in one’s life must be one’s own subjective feelings, not a generic advice. There are many pitfalls to avoid if one desires a happy, pleasure-filled life, such as a false belief in a neutral state, practices which attempt to disable the normal capacity to feel pleasure and pain, and failure to consider the long-term pains and pleasures resulting from actions. In discussing pain and pleasure, Epicureans stick to real life situations, not hypothetical philosophical puzzles.

Elayne

July 15, 2019 at 2:18 PM

To illustrate how this plays out, the quote below is is the way the Epicureanism Wikipedia page as of today starts off.

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Epicureanism is a system of philosophy founded 307 BCE based upon the teachings of Epicurus, an ancient Greek philosopher. Epicurus was an atomist and materialist, following in the steps of Democritus. His materialism led him to religious skepticism and a general attack on superstition and divine intervention. Epicureanism was originally a challenge to Platonism, and its main opponent later became Stoicism. It is a form of hedonism insofar as it declares pleasure to be its sole intrinsic goal. However, the concept that the absence of pain and fear constitutes the greatest pleasure, and its advocacy of a simple life, make it very different from hedonism as colloquially understood.

Following the Cyrenaic philosopher Aristippus, Epicurus believed that the greatest good was to seek modest, sustainable pleasure in the form of a state of ataraxia (tranquility and freedom from fear) and aponia (the absence of bodily pain) through knowledge of the workings of the world and limiting desires. Correspondingly, Epicurus and his followers generally withdrew from politics because it could lead to frustrations and ambitions that would conflict with their pursuit of virtue and peace of mind.^[1]

I would argue that the first paragraph sets the incorrect tone (absence of pain, without more explanation, is the greatest pleasure) that leads to the false conclusions in the second paragraph (that Epicurus advocated withdrawal from engagement with the world in favor of mental contemplation).

The first paragraph fails to explain that there are only two feelings, and that if you are not feeling pain then you are feeling pleasure, and vice versa.

Omission of this premise plants the implication that "absence of pain" does not include the type of ordinary pleasures that normal people consider the term to include, and that this transcendent condition is separate from and takes the place of pleasures as ordinarily understood.

In contrast to Epicurus, who is widening the definition of pleasure to include not only the standard active pleasures, but also all experiences whether active or stable that are not painful, the Wikipedia approach narrows the definition of pleasure.

The Wikipedia viewpoint deprecates joy and delight and standard active pleasures, and leaves behind only the implication that Epicurus was advocating the type of mental detachment that is characteristic of Stoicism, Buddhism, and otherworldly philosophies and religions.

Quote from Cassius

Yes definitely Godfrey:

Article

On Pain, Pleasure, And Happiness

Brief: The feelings are only two, pleasure and pain—there is no third state such as neutral, and there are no “fancy pleasures” which are different from regular pleasures. Because there is no neutral, reducing pain in life is only possible if there is a corresponding increase in pleasure. The extent of pleasure can be maximized by making sure to attend to all parts of one’s body, including the brain. Happiness is comprised of a pleasurable life. The capacity for pain is a valuable warning system and should not be disabled except in unusual conditions. The experience of pain is to be avoided except when it is chosen for the sake of greater pleasure/ lesser pain over the lifespan. Humans have many shared responses of pain or pleasure to specific experiences, and they also have individual variations. The standard of pleasure in one’s life must be one’s own subjective feelings, not a generic advice. There are many pitfalls to avoid if one desires a happy, pleasure-filled life, such as a false belief in a neutral state, practices which attempt to disable the normal capacity to feel pleasure and pain, and failure to consider the long-term pains and pleasures resulting from actions. In discussing pain and pleasure, Epicureans stick to real life situations, not hypothetical philosophical puzzles.

Elayne

July 15, 2019 at 2:18 PM

Reading this now - immensely helpful. Perhaps it would be good to consolidate these particularly useful posts/articles somewhere on the site? There's so much good stuff on here but it feels a bit scattered.

Quote from Rolf

There's so much good stuff on here but it feels a bit scattered.

Yes that's definitely a problem. Right now there are buttons and links to places where certain things are featured, but it's a bear trying to make decisions on how to prioritize.

In most sections of site, such as the "Articles," there is a "Featured" aspect where we try to highlight the most important entries in that section.

It's an ongoing battle to try to improve this. This is why, at present, the "front page" of the site contains a lot of text, rather than being more airy and white-space-filled like some designs. I'm trying to make that front page the place that you can't really get past without being exposed to the core ideas.

Intensity, location, duration

Quote from Kalosyni

The usual cognition of the word "pleasure" and which has been with me most of my life until encountering Epicurean philosophy, seems like it has almost an eternal "prolepsis" of being bodily sensation and a kind of movement/active state, (and pain being a sensation that is more than just a mild discomfort). In my mind this leaves out the state of "feeling satisfied" (and therefore not needing anything to be different than it is).

I think part of it is learning to become more aware of one's feelings, along with gratitude and appreciation. While in the past, before encountering Epicurean philosophy, I might have dismissed a state of "mere" satiety as a bland neutral state, I can now see that this is a pleasure in itself. This in particular has been a great boon to me, as it's helped me to gain a far more positive perspective on both my own life and life in general, by realising how much pleasure there really is.

Quote from Kalosyni

On some level I am still having a hard time being able to integrate the idea of only two feelings: pleasure and pain.

And this is why Cicero is so vocal in complaining about Epicurus' references to pleasure. Cicero is capitalizing on the fact that Epicurus is clearly using non-standard terminology, but Cicero isn't explaining that and only allows Torquatus to explain it briefly.

But understanding that this is a conceptual division that makes sense, even though it is non-standard, is the only way to make sense of the passages we find difficult, like the passage from Menoeceus we're discussing. This is why we've cited DeWitt's summary of this issue so often. Cicero is right that Epicurus is speaking about pleasure in a manner many people find confusing. But just as with 'gods,' there's a better way to look at both gods and pleasure. The name "god" can be used to describe something(s) that really do exist, but not supernaturally. The name "Pleasure" can also be used to describe something extremely important to human life, but the word as most people use it is being used too narrowly:

Quote from “Epicurus And His Philosophy” page 240 - Norman DeWitt (emphasis added)

Quote

“The extension of the name of pleasure to this normal state of being was the major innovation of the new hedonism. It was in the negative form, freedom from pain of body and distress of mind, that it drew the most persistent and vigorous condemnation from adversaries. The contention was that the application of the name of pleasure to this state was unjustified on the ground that two different things were thereby being denominated by one name. Cicero made a great to-do over this argument, but it is really superficial and captious. The fact that the name of pleasure was not customarily applied to the normal or static state did not alter the fact that the name ought to be applied to it; nor that reason justified the application; nor that human beings would be the happier for so reasoning and believing.

Quote from Rolf

I think part of it is learning to become more aware of one's feelings, along with gratitude and appreciation. While in the past, before encountering Epicurean philosophy, I might have dismissed a state of "mere" satiety as a bland neutral state, I can now see that this is a pleasure in itself. This in particular has been a great boon to me, as it's helped me to gain a far more positive perspective on both my own life and life in general, by realising how much pleasure there really is.

I think you're going in the right direction, but in addition to this you'll want to consider closely what DeWitt has to say about terminology around page 240 of his book. You'll also see the issues illustrated most clearly when you look closely at Torquatus' argument with Cicero in books one and especially two of "On Ends."

It's going to take time to go through all the texts and evidence. There's no shortcut, and this is why there's such a problem in talking about Epicurus to people who aren't really interested in the details but only want to "have a good time." Those people hear "pleasure" and like Pavlov's dog they are programmed to hear nothing except "sex, drugs, and rock'n'roll." Yes, those are included, but they are not the full picture.

But in the end I think you'll see that Gosling and Taylor were right in striking back against the orthodoxy, and why DeWitt's quote on page 240 is also correct.

I suppose, at least in my early understanding, that Epicurus indeed used the words 'pleasure' and 'pain' as conceptual markers rather than literal interpretations. His 'pleasure' seems to point more toward an inner tranquility - a state of peace rather than momentary delight. In that light, certain pains might be endured for the sake of greater inner peace, if they lead to that deep serenity. I wonder if Mildred Lisette Norman, the Peace Pilgrim, reached that state. Could she be seen as a modern figure who attained the god-like state that Epicurus spoke of?

Quote from vlasalv

I suppose, at least in my early understanding, that Epicurus indeed used the words 'pleasure' and 'pain' as conceptual markers rather than literal interpretations. His 'pleasure' seems to point more toward an inner tranquility - a state of peace rather than momentary delight. In that light, certain pains might be endured for the sake of greater inner peace, if they lead to that deep serenity. I wonder if Mildred Lisette Norman, the Peace Pilgrim, reached that state. Could she be seen as a modern figure who attained the god-like state that Epicurus spoke of?

Hey Vlas, welcome to the forum! I'm sure others will be able to explain this better, but the equating of "pleasure" with "a tranquil state" is a common pitfall in the understanding of Epicurean philosophy. When Epicurus says pleasure, he means pleasure. This includes pleasure of all kinds: The "state of peace" and the "momentary delight". The goal of Epicureanism is very much pleasure, complete pleasure, and not some kind of detached nirvana-esque state of serenity - no "god-like state", at least not in any typical understanding of the term.

Which Is It? Is "Ataraxia" Or "Pleasure" The Ultimate Epicurean Goal? - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

This might be a good place to start!

Quote from vlasalv

In that light, certain pains might be endured for the sake of greater inner peace, if they lead to that deep serenity.

There's definitely a lot to think about in coming to terms with what Epicurus means by the word pleasure, but just as with "gods," Epicurus did not change the word, just made its use more precise.

The danger in giving up the word "pleasure" and substituting "peace" or anything else in its place is that the result is to narrow the definition and to imply that what people ordinarily think of as pleasure is not part of the goal, and that danger is present whether the word one chooses is "peace" or "tranquility" or "absence of pain" or anything else. The ancient writers were very clear in stating that Epicurus was held to be an advocate of "pleasure," and that words like tranquility or peace fall within pleasure, not the other way around. As Epicurus is reported to have said, he would not know what the good is were it not for pleasures that we all understand to be pleasures. For example:

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Athenaeus, Deipnosophists, XII p. 546E: "Not only Aristippus and his followers, but also Epicurus and his welcomed kinetic pleasure; I will mention what follows, to avoid speaking of the “storms” {of passion} and the “delicacies” which Epicurus often cites, and the “stimuli” which he mentions in his On the End-Goal. For he says “For I at least do not even know what I should conceive the good to be, if I eliminate the pleasures of taste, and eliminate the pleasures of sex, and eliminate the pleasures of listening, and eliminate the pleasant motions caused in our vision by a visible form."

Quote from Cassius

The danger in giving up the word "pleasure" and substituting "peace" or anything else in its place is that the result is to narrow the definition and to imply that what people ordinarily think of as pleasure is not part of the goal, and that danger is present whether the word one chooses is "peace" or "tranquility" or "absence of pain" or anything else. The ancient writers were very clear in stating that Epicurus was held to be an advocate of "pleasure," and that words like tranquility or peace fall within pleasure, not the other way around.

Then one might say: 'When my glass is unwaveringly full, I dwell in peaceful pleasure.' Understanding 'glass' as the body/mind in the most purely materialistic way?

That could be called bliss!