Also Daniel, in regard to Godfrey's comment, have you sorted out in your mind whether you are primarily Epicurean or primarily "Utilitarian"? An outline of your thinking would help sort out the tension between the different labeling.
Best Way to Introduce Teachings?
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Daniel that is a good start on an outline.
How do you perceive that Utilitarianism differs from Epicurus?
In my case, I know of no positions that are central to "Utilitarianism" other than the saw "the greatest good for the greatest number" that -- without a position on physics and epistemology, is hard to pin down as meaning anything in particular. -
Wow that's a lot of information on utilitarianism, in a good way. I need to read what you've written more carefully as I'm only vaguely familiar with utilitarianism.
Regarding Epicureanism, I think that the best way to understand the overall ideas is by using the three categories of the Canon, Physics, and Ethics. As I understand it, this is the original framework. Part of outlining is fitting your categories into these categories: nature into Physics for example. To me, it's of primary importance to understand that pleasure is one of the three aspects of the Canon as that explains why it is the greatest good. So you need to understand the Canon to distinguish pleasure from good ol' hedonism.
Cassius has some excellent one sheet breakdowns on the forum, also his Elemental Epicureanism and Ante Oculus are quite helpful if you focus on the instructional parts before diving into all of the source material. Hiram's book Tending the Epicurean Garden is also helpful, and if you haven't seen it he has a self study course at
http://societyofepicurus.com/self-guided-study-curriculum/.
There's also DeWitt, although it's pretty expensive and (at least for me) takes a while to give it a proper reading.
It's a big challenge to zoom in to the core of the philosophy. That's where the Canon/ Physics/ Ethics structure is so valuable and from there you can explain the various ideas much more clearly. Not that I'm an expert by any means, but that's what has allowed me to get a grip on the philosophy. Now when I read new material or re-read material I feel like I understand it more clearly instead of getting overwhelmed.
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Daniel I agree with Godfrey, and would add this as a summary point:
You wrote --
"Central to Utilitarianism:- Principle of Maximal Utility: "the greatest happiness for the greatest number", love others as much as yourself
- Consequentialism: Actions are central to morality, morality of action = results of action and tendencies of results from action
- Impartiality: Don't use bias - value others' interests equally.
- Commensurability: Sum consequences of actions to determine whether its good or bad."
I think what I am reading is that you are very focused on the conclusions of the Utilitarian ethics. But to any Utilitarian who asserted these positions to me, I would ask this:
WHY?
WHY should the greatest happiness for the greatest number be considered a good goal?
WHY should I love others as much as yourself ? (Which in general I do fully reject
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WHY should I not be biased and value random people's interest as high as my own?
WHY should the SUM consequences determine whether something is good or bad? Why not just the consequences that effect me and my family and friends? Why should I care at all about someone who is neither a family nor a friend nor has any contact with me and them? By what standard is anything good or bad?
Also of those are deep philosophical questions that will vary depending on whether there is a heaven or hell, whether there is a god handing out rules, whether there is some ideal set of regulations somewhere to which I should conform, and on and on....with questions
of epistemology also (how do I know any of this is true? how do I know that there is a truth?)I don't know that "Utilitarianism" answers any of those questions for us, does it?
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Daniel, a key difference between the two philosophies that jumped out at me now that I've read your above post more carefully is the concept of moral responsibility. Specifically: "it is everyone’s moral responsibility to increase the pleasure of every person (including themself) while relieving their pain."
To the best of my understanding, moral responsibility is excluded from Epicureanism. In it's place is PD5: "It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly, [nor again to live a life of prudence, honor, and Justice] without living pleasantly. And the man who does not possess the pleasant life, is not living prudently and honorably and justly, [and the man who does not possess the virtuous life], cannot possibly live pleasantly."
So as Epicureans we try to live prudently, honorably and justly because living this way minimizes our pain and maximizes our pleasure. There is no moral responsibility to anybody else involved. The end result may possibly be the same, but the intention is entirely different. This might seem reprehensible to a Utilitarian, but to an Epicurean it provides clarity, and with clarity, freedom.
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Excellent excellent point Godfrey! for there to be "moral responsibility," philosophically speaking there has to be some source of that force --- either a creating god giving orders, or a realm of ideal forms such as Plato suggested.
That is core Epicureanism - NEITHER of those exist! But the question of their existence determines the answer to every question, because if they DO exist then they certainly would be controlling. The issue of whether they do or do not exist cannot be put aside - it must be answered FIRST (through Epicurean physics and epistemology) -
Outlining
Fitting categories into Canon, Physics, and Ethics is an excellent idea! Thank you.
If we could summarize those three categories and continue with summarizes and links to the categories within them.
Thanks for the advice and links. I need to find the time to go through all of that material (and more).
I definitely don't know enough to summarize those categories, but hopefully the idea and/or task will benefit others.
Differences between Epicureanism and Utilitarianism
I thought Epicureanism was hedonistic.
It talks about pleasures and pains, but I guess it never fully encapsulates hedonism.
No pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but the things which produce certain pleasures entail disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves.
Principal Doctrines, 8 ; Vatican Sayings, 50
All desires that do not lead to pain when they remain unsatisfied are unnecessary...
I see philosophers frequently call Epicureanism hedonistic. For example, Henry Sidgwick refers to Epicureanism as "egoistic hedonism" (while utilitarianism is "universalistic hedonism"). Are these philosophers oversimplifying or misspeaking?
I thought Epicureanism emphasized a moral responsibility to make one's self happy:
So we must exercise ourselves in the things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed towards attaining it.
Letter to Menoeceus
My interpretation of PD5 (which may be wrong) is it is an example of Epicureanism promoting consequentialism. A natural consequence of not living prudently, honorably, and justly is to not live pleasantly. I don't see how PD5 talks about responsibility - just how it gives a very important lesson.
Moral Responsibility
In utilitarianism, the "force" driving the principle of maximal utility is education and sentiments:
education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter 2
moral associations which are wholly of artificial creation, when intellectual culture goes on, yield by degrees to the dissolving force of analysis: and if the feeling of duty, when associated with utility, would appear equally arbitrary; if there were no leading department of our nature, no powerful class of sentiments, with which that association would harmonise, which would make us feel it congenial, and incline us not only to foster it in others (for which we have abundant interested motives), but also to cherish it in ourselves; if there were not, in short, a natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality, it might well happen that this association also, even after it had been implanted by education, might be analysed away
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter 3
Cassius I assume, you are going to criticize enforcing ethical beliefs using "education and opinion".
Before you do, see my opinion on emotion driving moral responsibility below and know the "force" I mention next applies to utilitarianism.The "force" I thought was driving moral responsibility in Epicureanism was hedonism and natural consequences:
[Happiness] has not, by this alone, proved itself to be the sole criterion [of morality]. To do that, it would seem, by the same rule, necessary to show, not only that people desire happiness, but that they never desire anything else. Now it is palpable that they do desire things which, in common language, are decidedly distinguished from happiness. They desire, for example, virtue, and the absence of vice, no less really than pleasure and the absence of pain
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter 4
During all [the existence of humanity], mankind [has] been learning by experience the tendencies of actions; on which experience all the prudence, as well as all the morality of life, are dependent.
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Chapter 2
Personally, I believe moral responsibility is driven by emotion. The "forces" I mentioned above simply drive or manipulate emotion.
I focus heavily on ethics - believing it to be the most important part of philosophy. That's just my opinion, though.
There are plenty of non-ethical or practical parts of utilitarianism. Impartiality helps one to become "the man who best knows how to meet external threats[, who] makes into one family all the creatures he can" (PD39). Commensurability helps one make better choices, as such to "pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them" (Letter to Menoeceus).
Thanks for the conversations, guys. This has been great for my learning and understanding of Epicureanism.
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Daniel:
As to "It talks about pleasures and pains, but I guess it never fully encapsulates hedonism." The issue is really "What is hedonism"? The word has no obvious clear meaning -- "Pleasurism," if that is the obvious meaning, and is ambiguous and unclear; Epicurus set out a full and detailed set of beliefs, but "hedonism" is a word to which there is no definite meaning -- that's the main issue."That's just my opinion, though." <<< That's really the issue. Epicurus and most Greeks start with the more basic question of "What is the good?" and they look for ways to logically prove that something is "the highest good" before they launch off in pursuit of it, You'll see that in the opening to "On Ends."
"I will start then in the manner approved by the author of the system himself, by settling what are the essence and qualities of the thing that is the object of our inquiry; not that I suppose you to be ignorant of it, but because this is the logical method of procedure. We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else. This Epicurus finds in pleasure; pleasure he holds to be the Chief Good, pain the Chief Evil. This he sets out to prove as follows: Every animal, as soon as it is born, seeks for pleasure, and delights in it as the Chief Good, while it recoils from pain as the Chief Evil, and so far as possible avoids it. This it does as long as it remains unperverted, at the prompting of Nature's own unbiased and honest verdict.
Hence Epicurus refuses to admit any necessity for argument or discussion to prove that pleasure is desirable and pain to be avoided. These facts, be thinks, are perceived by the senses, as that fire is hot, snow white, honey sweet, none of which things need be proved by elaborate argument: it is enough merely to draw attention to them. (For there is a difference, he holds, between formal syllogistic proof of a thing and a mere notice or reminder: the former is the method for discovering abstruse and recondite truths, the latter for indicating facts that are obvious and evident.) Strip mankind of sensation, and nothing remains; it follows that Nature herself is the judge of that which is in accordance with or contrary to nature. What does Nature perceive or what does she judge of, beside pleasure and pain, to guide her actions of desire and of avoidance?"
So in this kind of chain of reasoning the Epicureans first start off and ask: "We are inquiring, then, what is the final and ultimate Good, which as all philosophers are agreed must be of such a nature as to be the End to which all other things are means, while it is not itself a means to anything else." They give the answer "pleasure" (which is a feeling) and as proof they say "that is what all animals do at birth before there is any possibility of corruption." They also point out as a second proof that absent feeling of some kind, the organism is dead. And they point out that we know these things by feeling alone -- in the same way we know that sugar is sweet, so there is no possibility of mistaken opinion corrupting our conclusion. (Thus "logic" is deprecated as subsidiary to the canonical faculties - 5 senses, anticipations, and feeling - which operate automatically and without opinion.)Be sure to note here that in this "canon of truth," "truth" is not something give by god or as an ideal form -- all truth is something that is "true to us" or "true to a normal human being in those same circumstances." "Truth" is not something that floats in the air (Platonic ideal forms) or given by god (religious revelation) or existing as "essences" within the things around us (Aristotle). None of those alternative means of knowledge are true, according to Epicurus. The only "truth" is that which is real to us through our sensations/anticipations/feelings.
As to "hedonism" there is no accepted "author" or authority who can answer such questions or tell us what the "right answer according to Utilitarianism" is. Of course i might be fair to say that "Utilitarianism is what Jeremy Bentham said it is" but I doubt that you mean it that way; you are thinking there is an accepted definition and I don't think there is.
Now maybe Bentham defined "the greatest good of the greatest number" as the ultimate good of Utlitarianism. If so, we would need to look to see exactly how he stated that, but even if he said that, he's not advanced the ball at all because he has not defined "good." If we are asking "what is the ultimate good?" then to answer "the greatest good of the greatest number" is circular or even nonsensical. I am pretty sure that Bentham has not said "good = pleasure" but I am not an expert on Bentham or how he might have defined "good."
That's the kind of analysis Daniel that I am suggesting needs to be made. You'll find that Epicurus had a very clear set of principles which you can outline, and based on the answers you can line up basic positions on "What am I? (physics)" "What is the good?"(ethics) and "How do I know it with confidence?"(epistemology / canonics). You can basically do that with Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics as well, but the answers are much different.
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To clarify regarding PD5, my point was that PD5 doesn't talk about responsibility, moral or otherwise. Guess I wasn't very clear! Regarding consequentialism, I'm not familiar with that so I can't really comment.
And thank you for the conversation as well! I too find it a great way to clarify my understanding.
Beyond that, ditto what Cassius said. But he said it better than I can!
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OK those are good quotes from Bentham on pleasure and pain. Do you know how he then reaches "greatest good for greatest number" from that, however? I am not aware of a way to do that other than reference to some Ideal which i think Epicurus would say does not exist, because strictly speaking there are many people whom we have no contact with, or are even our enemies, such that what is good for the "greatest number" would have no necessary relationship to us purely on the basis of number.
As to this:
"all truth is something that is 'true to us' or 'true to a normal human being in those same circumstances.'"
I absolutely agree. I believe this is called "universality"? The mormons call it "eternal truth" - a truth which is eternally true, no matter the circumstance, time, etc.
I do not think your conclusion there is correct, and in fact it would be quite the opposite. I think Epicurus' point is that there is NO "eternal truth" apart from the nature / properties of the atoms, so "universal truth" that is true for everyone at all times is an impossibility, especially in the field of ethics.
However I am not sure we are together. Do you agree with what I have said in this post about there being NO eternal truth (especially in ethics) or no? -
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"once the general happiness is recognised as the ethical standard
Yes this is exactly what is in contention and is not self- evident. Many people do not recognize "the general happiness" as the ethical standard, and if he is simply asserting it without some kind of proof then he is without foundation.
As to truth that applies to all places, times, and circumstances and it truly universal (throughout the infinite and eternal universe) I think we are far from being able to establish anything in those terms, especially in the field of ethics. The life of the "gods" is different from the life of "men" because of their circumstances, not because there is a universal force which makes it so. It is certainly possible to generalize within a certain set of facts, such as "all humans eventually die" and "death is nothing to us" but those general observations are based on experience rather than a force which would allow us to say that such and such "always must" be the case. That is the difference between reasoning by observation, while keeping in mind the limits of observation, vs attempting to call into existence "universal principles" which exist only in our minds and have no true existence outside our minds.
Diogenes Laertius: "They [Epicureans] affirm that .... there are two kinds of inquiry, the one concerned with things, the other with nothing but words."
Letter to Herodotus: "In the first place, Herodotus, you must understand what it is that words denote, in order that by reference to this we may be in a position to test opinions, inquiries, or problems, so that our proofs may not run on untested ad infinitum, nor the terms we use be empty of meaning. For the primary signification of every term employed must be clearly seen, and ought to need no proving; this being necessary, if we are to have something to which the point at issue or the problem or the opinion before us can be referred.
Someone wanting to research into this question could refer to Philodemus' "On Methods of Inference" for a part of the Epicurean argument on this.
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As far as observations and consequences, it seems to me that that is so clearly of importance to be unquestionable. In fact, seeing your cites, it seems to me that probably Frances Wright incorporated some of that in her discussion of causation in A Few Days in Athens. And those influences shouldn't be surprising since she dedicated her work to Jeremy Bentham (and so she certainly shared your enthusiasm for at least some of that work).
As to holding the happiness of the entire world as equal to that of my own and my family and friends, that's equally clear - but in the reverse -- most people do not hold to that opinion at all except an abstract ideal that they know does not comport with reality. In fact, that seems to me to be much more of an artifact of Christianity or some other type of universalist religion than something that I observe to be true.
I guess you could say that because I believe in observations and in observing the consequences of actions in the real world, I could never hold the happiness of every member of the entire human race in abstract as entitled to my equal concern as the happiness of my family and friends. And of course taken to its logical conclusion, the happiness of the "greatest number" FAR outweighs the happiness of myself and my friends, in quantity.Which is why Daniel, with all due respect to you, I have always found the idea of "the greatest good for the greatest number" to be nonsense, or worse. It seems to me that it's a prescription for the worst kind of totalitarian despotism which could only work by a small elite deciding what the "greatest good of the greatest number" is by fiat, and then enforcing that (by force) on everyone else.
But regardless of whether I am right or wrong on that, the most important part is that I do observe that not everyone agrees with that formula. So to subject ourselves to that formula while the great bulk of humanity rejects it seems to me to be foolhardy at best. But since I am sure that the originators of Utilitarianism were no fools, just like the founders of Abrahamism were no fools, I feel sure that they had another agenda -- likely the same agenda as the Abrahamists. And I think these same observations are why you won't see any sense of "greatest good of the greatest number" in Epicurus at all. You find emphasis on personal pleasure and the pleasure of your friends (which really derives from the first) but you find little if any reference to the rest of the world in abstract, except to note that some people cannot be made friends and must be treated with distance, or as enemies.
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It looks like you've already answered your question about moral responsibility. I'd like to add that it appears to me, on the basis of this discussion, that Utilitarianism is an attempt to "improve" upon Epicureanism by adding to it. As an Epicurean, to me the additions seek to bring together ideas which do not belong together. I had thought that there would be more in common between the two philosophies but they actually seem quite divergent.
Regarding the greatest good for the greatest number, there's a rather famous short story by Ursula LeGuin that I recommend reading. It's titled " The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas" and I believe you can find a free copy online. It's an interesting take on the idea.
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As to holding the happiness of the entire world as equal to that of my own and my family and friends, that's equally clear - but in the reverse -- most people do not hold to that opinion at all except an abstract ideal that they know does not comport with reality.
Which is why Daniel, with all due respect to you, I have always found the idea of "the greatest good for the greatest number" to be nonsense, or worse.
That makes sense.
It is an abstract ideal - driven by emotions rather than nature.
I'd like to add that it appears to me, on the basis of this discussion, that Utilitarianism is an attempt to "improve" upon Epicureanism by adding to it. . . .
I had thought that there would be more in common between the two philosophies but they actually seem quite divergent.
As I have mentioned before, I believe utilitarianism is an extension to Epicureanism. I hadn't realized how much original doctrine had been changed, but it seems the vast majority of the changes have been in ethics and views on deities/superstition.
There is much they have in common - we have just been discussing what major differences they have. I think there is far more common than not.
In fact, that seems to me to be much more of an artifact of Christianity or some other type of universalist religion than something that I observe to be true.
the additions seek to bring together ideas which do not belong together
There is a theory utilitarianism started as a way to combine the most common beliefs of Christianity in a way which did not involve a god - a secular way to unite quarreling Christians.
I see the reasoning for this, but I think it is incorrect. Jeremy Bentham despised religion. For example, from 1809 to 1823, he spent exhaustive efforts criticizing religious beliefs - even the idea of religion itself.
In my mind, the ideas fit together perfectly. If one places "greats happiness for the greatest number" at the center and asks, "How does X in utilitarianism help achieve that?", the answer (if you understand the concept X well enough) is usually very clear.
It seems to me that it's a prescription for the worst kind of totalitarian despotism which could only work by a small elite deciding what the "greatest good of the greatest number" is by fiat, and then enforcing that (by force) on everyone else.
there's a rather famous short story by Ursula LeGuin that I recommend reading. It's titled " The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas"
Neither of those cases would truly create "the greatest happiness for the greatest number".
If the totalitarian despotism did truly make everyone happier, then it would be fine - it would be an exchange of freedom for happiness. However, a slave society would not be fine since the suffering of the slaves would be far greater than the suffering of the small elite.
In "The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas", the small child being tortured is acceptable since it magically saves and improves numerous lives at the expense of one (a common trend - martyrs, revolutionaries, etc.). In reality, those exchanges are much less emotion-jerking than the story makes it out to be. A different example, food drives require numerous people to donate to help a few, increasing total happiness, yet aren't seen as evil. Torturing people almost always causes more pain than it saves or produces pleasure. Even the case of sadism (taking pleasure in seeing others in pain), the pleasure of sadism is brief and low-level compared to the long and terrible pain of torture. Also, I think it is worth adding, any argument primarily reinforced by magical powers is very weak when there is such emphasis on basing arguments and principles on nature and the real world.
Before deciding I was a utilitarian, I explored both of these criticisms. My perspectives on these are below and in this thread: Criticisms against Principle of Maximal Utility
Hypothetical Acceptance of Unequal Distribution of Happiness: Are slave societies justifiable?
Utilitarianism focuses on total happiness – not individual happiness. Focusing on total happiness does not account for an uneven distributions of happiness. What if slavery increases total happiness most?
Any action which is legitimately helpful is good under utilitarianism. Most criticisms concerning this concept are centered on unhelpful actions, which no one should approve of. For example, a slave society would never actually produce more happiness than a free society, therefore utilitarianism would never endorse it and would always oppose it.
Slavery causes more pain than pleasure as it always hurts the slave more than it benefits their masters. It also slows their country's progress towards greater happiness. John Stuart Mill teaches a sacrifice is only good if it succeeds in generating more overall happiness: "The utilitarian morality does recognise in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted" (Utilitarianism, Chapter 2). Slavery is not a good sacrifice and never will be.
Robert Nozick's Utility Monster: What if One Person Loves Something more than Others? Can They Take Away Others' Property?
Utility Monster
Theoretically, a person (a "utility monster") who loves resources of any kind with such exceedingly gargantuan love could justify taking resources from all other people. After all, those resources would create more utility if the utility monster used them than if anyone else used them. Note: this argument applies to all consequentialist ethics which focus on maximizing a variable.
The most common response to this is: why is that such a bad thing? Nozick never explains why a utility monster would be a bad thing, he just creates a bad-sounding scenario with no point.
Examining why one would think the utility monster is bad, it is easy to see it built purely on emotion (it is simply demonizing some scenario) and fails entirely if put into any realistic scenario. One such realistic scenario could be numerous people across the world donating their resources to help those in Africa and other impoverished nations. This is good as the impoverished enjoy the resources more than those donating the resources. The impoverished would be similar to utility monsters, who take resources from numerous others for their own pleasure. While in theory, this sounds bad, it clearly is not as it helps the impoverished greatly while requiring only relatively minor sacrifices from those who donated the resources.
Additionally, a utility monster which always gains immense pleasure from taking resources from others and never decreases in the pleasure they gain would never exist in reality. While there may be some who gain immense pleasure from resources, diminishing marginal utility (a concept from economics) would cause the pleasure generated to decrease until it is equal to the pleasure it would generate for everyone else – making it unnecessary to sacrifice to give resources to what used to be the utility monster. To give an example for this, if a poor, hungry, homeless person lived in a wealthy country, the wealthy should help the person as the person would appreciate the resources far more than the wealthy. As the person is cared for, diminishing marginal utility would take effect and the benefit they would gain from the wealthy's donations would decrease until it would no longer be worth donating to the person (since the person would be well taken care of). The point when the donations stop would likely be when the person is nearing the wealthy's own standard of living.
Sadism
If a terrible person gains more pleasure from causing suffering than pain is generated, then their destructive actions could be justified under utilitarianism. Would not their acts of torture and mayhem produce more pleasure than pain overall?
Sadistic pleasures could never justify the pain it inflicts. Sadistic pleasure is low level and temporary while the pain inflicted is not (see teachings on higher pleasures below).
Additionally, the pleasure gained would never in reality be more than the pain inflicted. Justifying such pain would require unrealistically massive benefits, which would never be obtainable. Sacrifice is only justified if it brings a net positive change in utility and making up for great or widespread pain would require enormous and long-lasting benefits – which sadism will never bring. Not to mention, decreases in utility are never justified under utilitarianism, thus sadistic acts are never justified as they cannot generate more overall utility.
But what if a very depressed or guilt-ridden person wants a sadist to torture them to death? I think the question becomes: what benefit would their death bring compared to therapy treatment or some other alternative? If the person is a dangerous criminal who cannot stop hurting others and thinks being tortured to death is a just punishment, then perhaps execution of some kind (electric chair, harvest for organs, etc.) is the best choice. I believe it would be very unlikely for the best option to be handing the person to a sadist. (If execution still sounds immoral, then please see the "Distastefulness" section.) If the person may learn to contribute to society, then therapy treatment is better as it makes them happier and enables them to make society happier.
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Regarding the greatest good for the greatest number, there's a rather famous short story by Ursula LeGuin that I recommend reading. It's titled " The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas" and I believe you can find a free copy online. It's an interesting take on the idea.
Is it a book? Do I not also remember that Spock said something to the same effect in that movie where he "died" in the vacuum chamber?
