Posts by Cassius

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Yes that's right -- we are still talking about Line 136 because we ended up devoting our last regular session to a further discussion of consciousness, and we did not reach 136 at that time.

We'll therefore start with 136 and go as far as time allows, which won't be more than to 1-146 at most!

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1-136

Nor does it pass unnoticed of my mind that it is a hard task in Latin verses to set clearly in the light the dark discoveries of the Greeks, above all when many things must be treated in new words, because of the poverty of our tongue and the newness of the themes; yet your merit and the pleasure of your sweet friendship, for which I hope, urge me to bear the burden of any toil, and lead me on to watch through the calm nights, searching by what words, yea and in what measures, I may avail to spread before your mind a bright light, whereby you may see to the heart of hidden things.

1-146

This terror then, this darkness of the mind, must needs be scattered not by the rays of the sun and the gleaming shafts of day, but by the outer view and the inner law of nature; whose first rule shall take its start for us from this, that nothing is ever begotten of nothing by divine will.

Fear forsooth so constrains all mortal men, because they behold many things come to pass on earth and in the sky, the cause of whose working they can by no means see, and think that a divine power brings them about. Therefore, when we have seen that nothing can be created out of nothing, then more rightly after that shall we discern that for which we search, both whence each thing can be created, and in what way all things come to be without the aid of gods.

Episode 318 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week our episode is entitled: "In the End It Is Pleasure - Not Virtue - That Gives Meaning To A Happy Life."

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This is exactly the kind of conversation I'd like to have here to help us prepare for when we record the summary, so this is a fine place for it. I may need to ask you to be a little more clear as to what you are saying however. I picked out this sentence as potentially the focus (?)

Quote from DaveT

Now, can we not agree that those four virtues are the necessary, and I mean necessary, virtues we each need to pursue in order to find happiness as Epicurus defined it?

When you say "those" are you saying that when you are living in a particular culture that defines virtue in a particular way, that it is necessary for happiness to comply with that culture's view of the virtues? I can certainly see the likelihood that "When in Rome Do As The Romans Do" is a good idea to "keep the peace" with your neighbors. On the other hand if someone objects to the culture strongly enough it's generally possible to go somewhere else.

So that's why it might be good to clarify what you are saying. I think most of us agree that Epicurus clearly held that virtue is a requirement for happy living, and that the real issue is what is meant by "virtue." Complying with the majority's definition is clearly one method of defining virtue, but of course Epicurus himself moved several times and I don't get the impression at all that Epicurus simply deferred to the majority on the key issues of life on which he considered clarity was essential to happiness (such as to death or as to the gods).

So I apologize that perhaps i am overlooking the obvious intent of what you are saying, but could you restate your ultimate conclusion or question?

I am going to be trying to review the text from a couple of different perspectives, and to assist in that I've prepared a text-to-speech edition which I can listen to while traveling or at other opportunities.

At this stage I have done only minimal review of the output and I am sure there are transcription and processing errors. I will update this as I have the opportunity but if anyone else decides to watch / listen and wants to submit notes as to errors with time stamps where they occur, that will be much appreciated. I will incorporate any suggestions into the text which is going to remain online here.

This was generated using a "Pseudo-Joshua" text to speech engine, so if you think you recognize the voice that's why! Unfortunately due to limitations in my technical ability while it's listenable it's far from "good." The engine has particular difficulty with long complex sentences, and "long complex sentences" is Cicero's middle name. However for the time being it's better than nothing!

As I write this on January 30 we are planning to proceed with Episode 319 as an opening introduction to Cicero's Academic Questions. I note however that in Episode 318 we read and commented to the end of Tusculan Disputations, but we did not attempt to provide an overview of the full book. We'll need some time to put together notes and thoughts before we devote an episode to that, and the purpose of this thread is to make some notes to get us ready. As a start, here is an outline of what we need to summarize in one final Tusculan Disputations episode. Everyone should feel free to make comments in this thread as the following outline is a pretty good summary of some very major issues:

Epicurean Answers To Tusculan Questions

I. Book One: On Death

A. The basic question posed by the student: Is death an evil?

B. Cicero's proposed answer from the Academic Skeptic/Stoic perspective: Death is not an evil because either the soul survives death and continues to exist (perhaps in a better state), or death brings complete annihilation of consciousness, in which case there is no sensation and therefore no capacity for misery.

1. Major points cited by Cicero in favor of this position:

• If the soul is immortal, death liberates it to contemplate truth and ascend to celestial regions
• If death brings total extinction, there is no feeling or consciousness remaining to experience evil
• The insignificance of earthly pleasures we lose makes death less fearful
• Many historical figures would have been better off dying earlier, avoiding greater evils
• Fear of death stems from superstition about underworld punishments, which are merely myths

C. The answer to the question as provided by Epicurus as Cicero presents it: "When we exist, death is not present; when death is present, we do not exist." Therefore death is nothing to us, since when death arrives we no longer have any sensation or existence to be affected by it.

1. Major points cited by Cicero in opposition to Epicurus:

• If death is truly nothing, why does Epicurus spend so much effort discussing and preparing for it?
• The Epicurean position seems to make the preparation for death unnecessary
• Epicurus's emphasis on pleasure makes his dismissal of death as "nothing" seem inconsistent
• The teaching appears to trivialize death rather than addressing it philosophically
• Epicurus relies too heavily on the annihilation view without considering soul immortality

D. The Correct Epicurean response to this question:

1. Death ends all sensation, so there is literally nothing to fear about the state of being dead
2. The "symmetry argument": we didn't suffer before birth, so why fear non-existence after death?
3. Fearing death interferes with present happiness, which is the actual evil
4. Understanding the nature of the soul (as atomic and mortal) eliminates superstitious fears
5. A life well-lived according to nature's limits makes death acceptable whenever it comes

II. Book Two: On Physical Pain

A. The basic question posed by the student: Is pain the greatest of all evils?

B. Cicero's proposed answer from the Academic Skeptic/Stoic perspective: Pain is not the greatest evil (infamy is worse) and can be overcome through fortitude, patience, and mental strength. The wise person's virtue enables them to endure physical suffering without losing happiness.

1. Major points cited by Cicero in favor of this position:

• Avoiding infamy is more important than avoiding pain (student admits this)
• Historical examples show brave individuals enduring extreme pain for noble causes
• Mental attitude significantly affects how pain is experienced
• Training in virtue builds capacity to resist pain
• If pain were the greatest evil, no one could be happy, since anyone might experience it

C. The answer to the question as provided by Epicurus (as Cicero presents it): Epicurus claims the wise person under torture can say "How little I regard it!" and be happy even while being burned or tortured. Pain is managed by the maxims: "If severe, it is short; if long-lasting, it is bearable."

1. Major points cited by Cicero in opposition to Epicurus:

• This seems absurd coming from one who calls pain the greatest evil
• It's inconsistent to define good as pleasure yet claim happiness under torture
• If pain is the supreme evil, the wise person should do anything to avoid it, including shameful acts
• Epicurus's position makes happiness impossible since anyone can experience pain
• The claim that severe pain is always brief is empirically false

D. The Correct Epicurean response to this question:

1. Mental pleasures can be used to counterbalance physical pains - memory of past and anticipation of future goods
2. The wise person's understanding of nature provides mental pleasure that outweighs bodily distress
3. Severe pains are typically brief; chronic pains are usually bearable and allow for happiness
4. There are many other sources of pleasure - including friendship, philosophical inquiry, and other pleasures that are generally readily available, which can provide pleasures that sustain happiness through pain
5. There are many practical paths for making sure that our actions generate more pleasure than pain

III. Book Three: On Mental Pain

A. The basic question posed by the student: How can mental distress and grief be alleviated?

B. Cicero's proposed answer from the Academic Skeptic/Stoic perspective: Grief is an irrational "disease of the soul" caused by false judgment that something bad has occurred. It should be eliminated entirely through reason, recognition that misfortunes are common to humanity, and understanding that grieving accomplishes nothing.

1. Major points cited by Cicero in favor of this position:

• Grief can be postponed in times of danger, showing it's under rational control
• Grief is often performed for social expectations rather than genuine feeling
• Understanding that misfortune is universal helps put personal loss in perspective
• Anticipating possible calamities prepares the mind and reduces their impact
• The truly wise person recognizes that only vice is worth grieving over

C. The answer to the question as provided by Epicurus (as Cicero presents it): The cure for grief is to call the mind away from dwelling on troubles and redirect it toward contemplating pleasures and good things.

1. Major points cited by Cicero in opposition to Epicurus:

• This is mere distraction therapy, not genuine philosophical cure
• It doesn't address the root causes of grief in false judgments
• The approach is inconsistent with Epicurean hedonism if we can't agree on what is truly good
• It treats symptoms rather than correcting underlying beliefs
• The Epicurean therapy lacks the systematic rigor of Stoic approaches

D. The Correct Epicurean response to this question:

1. Grief arises mostly from false opinions about goods and evils - correcting these false opinions greatly reduces suffering
2. Memory of past pleasures and anticipation of future goods counterbalances mental pain
3. Learning to pursue pleasure rationally reduces occasions for grief
4. Friendship is generally readily available and provides both immediate comfort and long-term resilience against grief
5. Recognizing that many supposed goods (wealth, status) are not what is important in life liberates us from grief over the times they are not available.

IV. Book Four: On Strong Emotions

A. The basic question posed by the student: How should we understand and manage all the perturbations of the soul (emotions/passions)?

B. Cicero's proposed answer from the Academic Skeptic/Stoic perspective: All passions are diseases of the soul arising from false judgments about good and evil. They fall into four categories: grief, fear, excessive joy, and immoderate desire. All should be eliminated entirely through recognizing that only virtue is good and only vice is evil.

1. Major points cited by Cicero in favor of this position:

• Emotions are based on false beliefs about what constitutes good and evil
• Systematic classification reveals the cognitive structure underlying all passions
• Complete elimination of passions leads to true tranquility (apatheia)
• The passionless state allows reason to guide all actions
• Only by viewing virtue as the sole good can one achieve immunity from emotional disturbance

C. The answer to the question as provided by Epicurus (as Cicero presents it): Some emotions and desires are natural and necessary, others natural but unnecessary, still others neither natural nor necessary. Only the vain and empty desires should be eliminated.

1. Major points in opposition to Epicurus:

• This doesn't go far enough in controlling the passions
• The distinction between types of desires is unclear and subjective
• Allowing "natural" emotions still leaves one vulnerable to disturbance
• The Epicurean approach is too permissive and insufficiently rigorous
• Their emphasis on pleasure actually encourages certain passions

D. The Correct Epicurean response to this question:

1. Mental pleasure and pain are not false beliefs but are provided by Nature as guidance for how to live.
2. Limitless and unnecessary pleasures are not required for happiness and in fact produce more pain than plesaure
3. The pursuit of desires without limit (such as for unlimited wealth, power, fame) will bring more pain pleasure and can easily be eliminated
4. Proper understanding of nature's limits allows us to eliminate excessive fear and desire while still pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain rationally toward the true goal of pleasure.
5. The goal of life is happiness through a predominance of pleasure over pain, not complete elimination of all disturbance and feeling, which are in fact provided by Nature and required for happy living.

V. Book Five: Is Virtue Sufficient for Happiness?

A. The basic question posed by the student: Is virtue the only true good, and alone sufficient to produce a happy life, or are there other goods (health, wealth, etc.) which are also necessary?

B. Cicero's proposed answer from the Academic Skeptic/Stoic perspective: Virtue is entirely sufficient for happiness under all circumstances. The wise person is happy even in poverty, exile, blindness, pain, and torture. Happiness depends solely on character, not external circumstances, and virtue is the only true good.

1. Major points cited by Cicero in favor of this position:

• If happiness required external goods, virtue would be discredited as insufficient
• Historical examples show virtuous people happy despite terrible circumstances
• Vice produces misery; therefore virtue (its opposite) must produce happiness
• External goods are indifferent - neither truly good nor evil
• The wise person's happiness is invulnerable to fortune's changes

C. The answer to the question as provided by Epicurus (as Cicero presents it): Pleasure is the supreme good and the goal of life. The wise person is nearly always happy because they can maintain mental pleasure even under adversity, but in this Epicurus is inconsistent because he claims the wise person is always happy while making pleasure depend on circumstances.

1. Major points cited by Cicero in opposition to Epicurus:

• Epicurus makes happiness too dependent on external circumstances and fortune
• How can one be happy under torture if pleasure is the good?
• The claim contradicts Epicurus's own definition of good as pleasure
• It's inconsistent to say pain is the greatest evil yet the wise person is happy in pain
• The Epicurean position lacks the logical rigor of the Stoic view

D. The Correct Epicurean response to this question:

1. Prudence (practical wisdom) is the greatest virtue and enables the wise person to be happy in nearly all circumstances
2. Mental/spiritual pleasures (friendship, philosophy, memory) far outweigh bodily pleasures or pains
3. The wise person's happiness is secure because he can be confident that he will always be able to obtain pleasures that will outweigh pains, and in the event that pain becomes overwhelming, such pain can be ended by death.
4. A true understanding of the nature of things allows us to see that many of our worst fears (such as about death of capricious gods) are false suppositions, that it is readily possible to secure a life of happiness in which pleasure predominates over pain, and that we need not live forever to experience a happy life.
5. Understanding that the goal of life is happiness through pleasure allows us to see that virtue is necessary for happiness, but that understanding what virtue means is essential, in that virtue is not a set of absolute that is the same for all people in all places and at all times, but that virtue is contextual and is in fact whatever conduct that in practice leads to living happily.

1. I read this a long time ago and was not impressed, but that was so long ago I may well have failed to appreciate its significance. Seems like this has come up a number of times and we need to find a good source for the text and start a new thread on it. If I recall correctly I saw it originally on a Marxism page, but that page seems to be gone.

Quote from DaveT

PPS Also, I recently read that Karl Marx's doctoral dissertation some time in the 1840s was a comparison of Democritus' and Epicurus' atomism, finding Epicurus' teaching was consistent with the Young Hegalians philosophical views which he favored.

2

Quote from DaveT

Can I conclude that Prof Nail's essay under consideration here is not relevant to whether Lucretius ignored Epicurus' atomism? I think the answer is that it is not.

I may be losing the thread of the discussion in my mind but if what you mean is that the Nail essay does not provide a good argument that Lucretius was deviating from Epicurus, I think you're correct that in my mind it doesn't.

Quote from DaveT

So, back to the thrust of my question above: Why should anyone dwell on whether Lucretius interpreted Epicurus wrongly or indeed intentionally declined to include Epicurus’ atomism?

This is a very good question and being able to answer it thoroughly is what this forum is all about.

There are many aspects to it beyond those relating to whether Lucretius intentionally or accidentally deviated from Epicurus. That's important in itself, but it's not nearly as important as addressing what you wrote here:

Quote from DaveT

I don’t see why one must believe Epicurus was right about atoms and their movement to be adherents to his ethics, canonics, etc.

What does it mean in this context to say that Epicurus was "right" or "wrong" about atoms?" I would argue that questions such as whether photons are considered to be particles with mass or waves or whether matter and energy are interchangeable" does not render Epicurus’ belief in eternally unchanging elemental particles. People can argue all day about new discoveries about details of atoms but if they remain at that level of analysis they are totally missing Epicurus' point.

The issue is not establishing the exact specifications of what we call molecules or atoms or subatomic particles. Epicurus never claimed either to do that or to explain the mechanism of the swerve. What he did claim is that it is incorrect to speculate that things can be divided infinitely because that creates a logical impossibility.

If infinite divisibilty were accepted, you'd have no mechanism for establishing that anything is or could be eternal and therefore reliable. You would have no foundation for a natural universe rather than a completely arbitrary supernatural one. You'd have no basis for having confidence in any conclusion whatsoever. It's possible to argue all day about the difference between "confidence" and "certainty," and say that all you need is "probability." That's a very old argument and what we'll be taking it up in discussing the "Academic Questions" discussed by Cicero.

Epicurus was not a particle physicist and made no claims to be doing anything more than providing a rational basis for a non-supernatural universe. Neither Epicurus nor Lucretius nor any other Epicurean took up careers in splitting atoms or building atomic bombs, because engineering and technical innovation is secondary to having a rational theory for living life in the here and now.

The issue is not that of being willing and able to accept and incorporate new observational discoveries. That's been going on for thousands of years and will always continue. The issue is the logical and conceptual one of whether ANY number of observational discoveries can ever be sufficient to allow us to conclude that the universe is natural and not supernatural. Or do we always have to hedge our bets and never escape the doubt that when we die we'll be tortured forever in hell?

It's at that level that I would maintain even today that Epicurus was absolutely right about his important conclusions. He was right as to "atomism" that the universe ultimately has a natural and eternal material basis. He was right as to "canonics" that knowledge is possible and radical skepticism is a fraudulent impossibility. He was right as to "ethics" that there are no absolute supernatural rules and that nature provides all the guidance we need if we simply take a wide view of pleasure as all mental and physical experience in life which is desirable.

There's going to be a wide disagreement among individuals on which pleasures to pursue because individual circumstances vary. But if we want to live happily we have to have a framework for making decisions now, that that means that everything in physics is divided between matter and space, everything in ethics is divided between pleasure and pain, and everything in canonics can be divided between true and false.

In each of those three areas you have to look very carefully at what is meant by each word:

• matter vs space
• pleasure vs pain
• true vs false

There's an Epicurean way of looking at each one of those terms and how they relate to each other. This is the analytical framework that David Sedley described in his article "The inferential Basis of Epicurean Ethics."

This analysis provides a framework in which you can have confidence because the alternatives in each category exclude all other possibilities once you see how sweeping they truly are. The details of what "observational scientists" tell you yesterday, today, or tomorrow are not nearly so important as that you have a framework within which to understand them. And that's what Lucian of Samosata was talking about in saying that Epicurus would have been confident that Alexander the Oracle Monger was a fraud, even if Epicurus were not immediately able to ascertain the precise manner in what Alexander was carrying out his trickery.

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That will be of GREAT help! Even just the table of contents indicates what we are up against, as it shows how the book starts in the middle with discussion of opposing schools. Someone who doesn't know that and doesn't already know the Epicurean position is going to be pretty hopelessly confused.


Philodemus - Signs (P. Herc. 1065) - Harris.pdf

Great catches Joshua. This is one of the ways going through Academic Questions and then to Philodemus "On Signs" is going to help us.

E-V-E-R-Y-T-H-i-N-G depends upon this intersection of canonics / epistemology and physics.

Is the universe (1) natural as arising solely through the interplay of atoms moving through void - and nothing else, or (2) is the universe caused by an interplay of a supernatural force projecting itself outward and onto something else?

If (2), then everything depends on study and understanding of that supernatural force, which is impenetrable to the senses, and for which knowledge we must depend on geometry and math and reliance on propositional logical formulas.

All of our discussion of pleasure and pain and natural and necessary desires and everything else involving ethics is out the window if we cannot be confident in answer (1). That;s because answer (2) exposes us to eternal punishment or reward. It should go without saying that eternal punishment and reward totally trumps all local and short-term considerations of pleasure or pain or good and bad or any other word you want to throw at the problem.

Quote

You know our system of natural philosophy, which depends upon the two principles, the efficient cause, and the subject matter out of which the efficient cause forms and produces what it does produce. For we must have recourse to geometry, since, if we do not, in what words will any one be able to enunciate the principles he wishes, or whom will he be able to cause to comprehend those assertions about life, and manners, and desiring and avoiding such and such things?

Those who blew up the Platonic school from within were right to challenge the orthodoxy largely pioneered by Pythagorus but continued by Plato and also Aristotle. Their selection of a prime mover/fantasy god in the sky Option (2) based on speculation with no real sensory evidence makes no sense if we take the evidence of the senses given to us by Nature as what we are going to follow.

Thomas Nail appears to be an example of someone looking to bend the simplicity of atomic nothing-comes-from-nothing physics to allow for the existence and control of supernatural otherworldly forces.

There's no way to stand up to fantasizing except to insist on real evidence given to us by nature as self-evident, and that's what Epicurus' canonics is all about.

It's worth pointing out that there is a healthy skepticism embedded within Epicurean philosophy with which all of us will agree, in that we will challenge conclusions that we believe to be false based on a combination of sensory evidence and deductive reasoning based on that evidence.

But we need to be frank that everyone is not going to be willing to go along with Epicurus for the full ride. Frances Wright herself was not willing to go along with Epicurus and make deductive conclusions about the implications of nothing coming from nothing and nature never creating only a single thing of a kind.

Cicero does an excellent job of lending respectability to arguments that we can never go any further than to say that some things are "probable" and some are not. Other than those of us who were taught to have faith in "GOD" and say that if God said it, it must be true, all the rest of us have had it beaten into our heads to "never say never" and to avoid "dogmatism" as the worst sin possible.

That's what we're going to explore next on the podcast -- how to understand what the professionals disparage as "dogmatism" in Epicurean philosophy in the way that Epicurus himself understood it.

And maybe for those who are least comfortable with getting anywhere near confidence about anything, we can point out that it's here that the rubber meets the road. You can't have it both ways. Either you're going to heaven or hell after you die, and you damn well better live accordingly, or your not. Most of us here who study Epicurus are comfortable saying that the answer is "not."

And core to that position is that we stick with what Epicurus clearly had to say about the "uncuttable" nature of matter moving through the void, and stop trying to invest it Nail-like with mysterious properties that open the door to a supernatural realm.

Ha - the correction backtracks from what Godfrey praised but his point still stands that it's a good way of talking about gods

That's very helpful additional research Patrikios - thank you!

I have prepared an outline for our use in keeping track of where we are and where we are going as we go through Academic Questions. I am crossposting the current version into the Academic Questions thread here, but that version will fall out of date fairly soon.

I'll continue to make revisions as we go through the episodes and update the final version here at EpicurusToday.

The following is an outline I have prepared for our use in the upcoming series of Lucretius Today podcasts devoted to exploring Epicurean Canonics through Cicero's Academic Questions. The following version of this outline is going to be updated so over time please refer to it in its final location here.

Lucretius Today Series - "Exploring Epicurean Canonics Through Cicero's Academic Questions"

The Title Of This Series of Episodes Could Also Be: “The Question of Skepticism vs Truth, How It Destroyed Plato’s Academy And Plagues Humanity Even Today, And How Epicurus Answers The Problem.”

“Academic Questions” is a turn-off name for a book, but the issues discussed in it are critically important to everything else. it’s not particularly long but it provides an overview of the issues that led to Aristotle breaking away from Plato’s school and for many further divisions thereafter.

Throughout this discussion we are going to us the word “dogmatic” as meaning “holding that truth is possible.” This is not to be taken negatively as the word is used today. “Snow is white” and “Honey is sweet” are examples of a dogmatic statements. If you want to argue about those you’re in the wrong place and you will not be invited to participate in the following discussion unless and until you adopt a more reasonable non-contradictory position.

• PD22. We must consider both the real purpose, and all the evidence of direct perception, to which we always refer the conclusions of opinion; otherwise, all will be full of doubt and confusion.
• PD23. If you fight against all sensations, you will have no standard by which to judge even those of them which you say are false.
• Lucretius 4:469-521. Now, if someone thinks that nothing is known, one thing he doesn’t know is whether that can be known, since he admits to knowing nothing. I shall therefore not bother to argue my case against this man who has himself stood with his own head in his footprints. And anyway, even allowing that he knows this, I’ll still ask him: Given that he has never before seen anything true in the world, from where does he get his knowledge of what knowing and not knowing are? What created his preconception of true and false? And what proved to him that doubtful differs from certain? You will find that the preconception of true has its origin in the senses, and that the senses cannot be refuted. For something of greater reliability must be found, something possessing the intrinsic power to convict falsehoods with truths.

Key Points To Be Covered In The Lucretius Today Podcast Review

1. Cicero’s purpose in writing “Academic Questions” was to explain the main controversy that led to the disputes between the schools and to point Cicero’s view of the way to resolve them.
2. The book that comes down to us today apparently went through a number of revisions so it is not in its original complete form. What survives today is incomplete: Book 1 of the later version and substantial portions of the earlier version. As a result, the work does not come down to us in a single, original, complete form, and some structural and doctrinal inconsistencies reflect this compositional history.
3. The sides of the argument are:
   1. Varro speaking for Antiochus of Aschalon. Antiochus presents a reconstructed “Old Academic” position that blends Plato and Aristotle and incorporates some aspects of Stoic epistemology. This view affirms that certain truths can be grasped with certainty via sense-perception with great emphasis on reason and methods such as formal logic and geometry / mathematics.
   2. Cicero speaking for Philo of Larissa, representing the New Academy. Philo embraced much more skeptical view of truth. This view denies that certainty is attainable, even by the use of the Stoic criterion of the kataleptic impression, and maintains instead that judgments must be guided by what is probabile or verisimile (persuasive or likely). Even formal reasoning cannot guarantee certainty on this account.
   3. Atticus does not advocate a systematic philosophical position but helps structure the dialogue and prompt for clarifications.

Outline Of The Argument

BOOK I

I. Cicero Introduces The Topic And Gives The Method To Be Followed

Acad. I.1–12

• Cicero explains why the question of how to obtain knowledge (epistemology) is the foundational philosophical problem.
• Cicero justifies the Academic method by presenting opposing views without dogmatic commitment.
• Cicero emphasizes inquiry (quaerere) rather than assent (adsensus).

II. Cicero Relates the History Of The Academy

Acad. I.13–18

• Cicero says Plato aimed at truth through reasoned inquiry.
• Cicero says that the early Academy was engaged in serious investigation and not argument for the sake of argument.
• Cicero explains how this background led to later disagreements over certainty.

III. Varro Explains Antiochus’ Account of the “Old Academy”

Acad. I.19–29

• Varro introduces Antiochus’ reconstruction of Academic doctrine.
• Varro claims that Plato and Aristotle shared a fundamentally dogmatic epistemology.
• Varo says that knowledge is possible and this position was historically affirmed by the Academy.

IV. Varro Provides A Defense of The Possibility Of Cognitive Certainty

Acad. I.30–41

• Varoi argues that the senses, when sound and processed rationally, are capable of grasping truth.
• Varro argues that Reason confirms, organizes, and corrects the senses.
• Varro says that the wise man can assent securely to what is known.

V. Varro Criticizes Academic Skepticism

Acad. I.42–46

• Varro argues that Skepticism makes philosophy and life impossible.
• Varro argues that if nothing can be known, inquiry loses purpose.
• Varro says that Antiochus restored stability to philosophy.

VI. Cicero States His Initial Skeptical Reservations To The Possibility of Affirming Anything As True

Acad. I.47–49

• Cicero expresses admiration for the coherence of Antiochus’ system.
• But Cicero then raises doubts about whether certainty has actually been demonstrated.
• Cicero begins his argument for skepticism.

BOOK II

VII. Cicero Presents And Argue The Skeptical Position That True Knowledge Is Impossible

Acad. II.1–12

• Cicero restates the problem of knowledge in sharper form.
• Cicero focuses on the Stoic criterion of truth as the real target of his opposition.
• Cicero argues that Skepticism is not nihilism.

VIII. Cicero Attacks the Stoic Claim Of The Truth of “Kataleptic Impression”

Acad. II.13–32

• Cicero argues that no perception is so clear that it could not be false.
• Cicero argues that illusions, dreams, madness, and error undermine certainty.
• Cicero argues that the Stoic criterion of truth collapses under scrutiny.

IX. Cicero Asserts That Reason Itself Is Fallible

Acad. II.33–42

• Cicero says that logical inference and reasoning depend on premises drawn from perception.
• Cicero argues that memory and inference are equally fallible.
• Cicero argues that even disciplines like geometry rely on assumptions not immune to doubt.

X. Cicero Presents the Argument In Favor Of “Probability” Based on Carneadeas and Philo

Acad. II.43–60

• Cicero asserts that probability (probabile / verisimile) is the practical way to approach every issue.
• Cicero argues that degrees of plausibility allow rational discrimination without certainty.
• Cicero argues that the wise man gives his assent only cautiously, proportioned to evidence.

XI. Cicero Replies To The Argument That Skepticism Leads To “Inaction” (He Denies That It Is Impossible To Actually Live As A Skeptic)

Acad. II.61–67

• Cicero says that Skepticism does not prevent action.
• Cicero argues that ordinary life already proceeds on appearances, not certainty.
• Cicero asserts that rational agency requires judgment, not infallibility.

XII. Cicero Takes Sides With Carneades and Philo (The Academic Skeptics) And Criticizes Antiochus

Acad. II.68–78

• Cicero says that Antiochus offers reassurance but overreaches on the question of whether knowledge is possible.
• Cicero argues that skepticism preserves intellectual integrity while allowing action.
• Cicero argues that dogmatism mistakes psychological confidence for knowledge.

XIII. Cicero Gives His Closing Argument For Academic Skepticism

Acad. II.79–88 (end)

• Cicero aligns himself with the skeptical Academy in method and rejects the claim that knowledge is possible.
• Cicero says that philosophy is best practiced as disciplined inquiry without premature assent.
• Cicero claims that the highest philosophical virtue is restraint in judgment.

Good comments and they iliustrate why phrased it the way I did 🙂

Please vote and then explain.

Key Excerpts From "The inferential Foundations of Epicurean Ethics"

• This article makes important points about how Epicurus’ position that there are only two feelings (Pleasure and Pain) parallels his argument that there are only two ultimate constituents of the Universe (Atoms and Void)
• The article is divided in the following sections:
  • Outline of Epicurean Ethics
  • The Physics-Ethics Analogy
  • The Basic Division
  • The Division Defended
  • The Division’s Exhaustiveness
  • The Epicurean Good Life
  • The Instrumentality of Virtue - Epilogue
• After largely skipping over the first section we’ll take a closer look at the details of each section of the argument.
• All of these points are of course only my opinion. I highly recommend reading the whole article so you can judge for yourself

1. Outline of Epicurean Ethics

I find this section to be a disappointing start. Much of it is a good standard standard summary of Epicurean ethics. Unfortunately it is written from the point of view of those who assert the importance of the katastematic / kinetic distinction and that Epicurus’s ultimate goal was not “Pleasure” but “Katastematic Pleasure.” I believe this error manifests itself here, where Sedley states that “Katastematic pleasure is abence of pain” rather than “Pleasure is the absence of pain.”

This position causes Seldey to deprecate kinetic pleasures as if the only reason we require them is to produce katastematic pleasure. The obvious problems with this position cause Sedley to have to acknowledge that Epicurus does “apparently” consider kinetic pleasures a part of the good life.

It’s not the purposes of this presentation to argue this issue in detail, but it is important to note that Sedley’s position conflicts with Gosling & Taylor, who take the position in their detailed treatise “The Greeks On Pleasure” that Epicurus was focused on “Pleasure” as the goal. They argue that any attention to distinguishing kinetic and katastematic pleasure was at best secondary, and that katastematic pleasures are not inherently more important than kinetic ones. The Gosling & Taylor position was expanded at length by Boris Nikolsky in his article “Epicurus On Pleasure.” Emily Austin took sides with Gosling & Taylor in her footnote eight in Chapter 4 of “Living for Pleasure”:

Quote

[!quote] This is a non-specialist text, so I have chosen not to wade into the dispute about katastematic and kinetic pleasures in the body of the text. A specialist will recognize that I am adopting a view roughly in line with Gosling and Taylor (1982) and Arenson (2019). On my reading, katastematic pleasures are sensory pleasures that issue from confidence in one’s ability to satisfy one’s necessary desires and an awareness of one’s healthy psychological functioning; choice-worthy kinetic pleasures are the various pleasures consistent with maintaining healthy functioning, and those pleasures vary, but do not increase healthy psychological functioning. (emphasis added)

From here we can move on to the reason that his article is so helpful.

2. The Physics - Ethics Analogy

A. The Foundations of Epicurean Physics and Epicurean Ethics Are Analogous

B. In Physics, The Senses Tell Us There Are Bodies And Space

In physics Epicurus starts off with positions which he can argue to be self evident: that there are bodies and there is space within which the bodies move.

Epicurus does not attempt to discuss the underlying specific natures of atoms and void until he first establishes that these are the two categories that exclusively exist - that these are the sole constituents of the universe.

C. Where Does This Same Procedure Exist? Not In Menoeceus, But in Torquatus’ Presentation in Cicero’s On Ends Book One.

The letter to Menoeceus is a straightforward listing of doctrine, not argument.

We see that the ethics argument follows the pattern of the physics argument because Torquatus explicitly tells us that Epicurus’ argument starts with the establishment of the two possibilities - pleasure and pain.

3. The Basic Division

The Good Is Pleasure and The Evil Is Pain

Epicurus places the summum bonum in pleasure and the summum mallum in pain.

This is not a logical argument based on words but an appeal to the perceptions of the senses.

In His Argument To Establish “Pleasure” As The Goal, Epicurus Specifies Nothing At All About How Individual Creatures Conduct Their Pursuit of Pleasure

4. The Division Defended

Explaining Why Torquatus Says That Later Epicureans Differed As To How To interpret Epicurus’ Arguments In Light Of His Position That No Argument Is Needed To Establish Pleasure As the Good.

5. The Division’s Exhaustiveness

Any Feeling Which Is Not Painful Is Ipso Facto Pleasant And Vice Versa

6. The Epicurean Good Life

Three Parallel Stages Of Argument

Summum Bonum Means Simply “The Good”

7. The Instrumentality Of Virtue

8. Epilogue

Epicurus’ first focus is on establishing that in physics everything divides into bodies and void, while in ethics the duality is pleasure and pain.

In Physics It is both correct to say that (1) at the highest level of analysis everything is composed of matter and void and (2) the things we see around us differ vastly in all sorts of details in the way they affect us.

Seeing that everything from a physical perspective resolves into either matter or void is essential to understanding that there is no third supernatural nature. But as essential as that is as a starting point, you then have to figure out how the atoms and void combine in different ways to form different things if you’re going to work with physics successfully to see that everything happens naturally.

Seeing that everything from an ethical perspective resolves into either pleasure or pain is essential to understanding that there is no third middle or neutral state and no good and evil outside of pleasure and pain. But as essential as that is as a starting point, you then have to figure out how the pleasures and pains work together in different ways to produce different results if you’re going to work with ethics successfully to live happily.

Welcome to Episode 319 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
   
Last week we completed our series on Cicero's "Tusculan Disputations," and this week we start a new series that will help us with canonics / epistemology. We will eventually move to Philodemus' "On Signs" / "On Methods of Inference," and when we do we will refer to David Sedley's article on "On Signs," and the appendix in the translation prepared by Philip Lacey, both of which are very good but difficult.

To get us acclimated to the issues, we need a little more Cicero from his work "Academic Questions." This is much shorter than On Ends and Tusculan Disputations but gives us an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and shows how Aristotle and the Stoics (and Epicurus) responded to those controversies.

Once we get that overview we'll be prepared to tackle Philodemus and get a deeper explanation of the Epicurean view. This wee will will start with a general introduction and get into Section 1.

Out text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackam translation here:

Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive