While the "big picture" issue of how to present Epicurus was what spurred my additions to this thread, I do think it is probably also worth confirming issues raised in the quoted section which presumed a negative answer:
(1) Would we wish to live indefinitely (or immortally) if we could?
(2) If we did remember past lives and knew that we would return after death, would that be viewed as a good thing.
I would say the answer to (1) is clearly yes, and the answer to (2) is only slightly less clear.
As with any hypothetical the devil is in the details.
Option one is not altogether different than the decisions we already make which influence how long we are going to live. We can eat right and exercise and take care in our activities and live longer, or we can disregard those and say "we don't care" how long we live. So option one is easier to relate to without hedging too much on the details of the hypothetical.
Option two would require more definition of the hypotheticals terms, but I think that too can be viewed relatively simply (as Nietzsche seemed to be doing it). It can be framed simply as if your consciousness could return in the same form as you are now in some future world, would you want that to happen? Given a basic framework of the desirability of life I would say that too is a clear yes.
But I won't be surprised if there is some discussion needed on these.