Posts by Cassius

Welcome to Episode 300 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world.

Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we will commemorate our 300th episode and relate where we have been over the years to where we are now as we dive into the details of Cicero's and Plutarch's criticism against Epicurus. We'll also take up Cicero's third criticism in Section XX, which is that Epicurus has erred in divorcing virtue from "the good."

Quote from Don

Some may object to my saying mortals can never be free from all pain and say something like What's the use of Epicurus' philosophy then.

At least as to me I don't object to it, and I think most everyone here (where we generally have a realistic view of things) will agree. Total absence of pain is pretty obviously a theoretical goal more rather than established fact for any human being at any time. And it's confusion about that which is causing most of the debate and division on what Epicurus was talking about. (And that's most likely why you're concerned that "some may object to [your] saying that" because we can all observe that most of the world is talking as if Epicurus were in fact describing some real condition of total separation from pain.)

Last night in our zoom, Tau Phi offered the analogy that it is understandable that we are always feeling something because we are made up of atoms moving through the void, and the atoms never stop moving, and our sensations as emergent properties of these motions is going to naturally be always responding to internal and external motions so long as we are together and alive.

Similarly, I would expect there is another "physics" analogy on why we should not look to "ecstasy" as the best definition of the highest pleasure.

We talked last night about the "impossibility" of constant ecstasy, and I think we can also analogize that to physics terms. At least theoretically, the "gods" might be able to remain in constant ecstacy, if they so choose, because it's a characteristic of the intermundia (from Lucretius) that it supplies their every need and it is a totally friendly and supportive environment.

Our world, however, is not so constantly supportive. We're constantly buffeted by external and internal motions that would tear us apart literally and figuratively if we did not act to respond to them. A constant state of ecstasy in response to outside influences would not provide a mechanism for us to repair and sustain ourselves in the face of this buffeting. We can't constantly eat fish and drink wine and have sex because given the nature of our world that will lead to dissolution from any number of factors. We *must* take time away from being stimulated so as to exert our own actions to keep us as nearly as possible in constant pleasure, keeping in mind that there are many kinds of pleasures and that some are more productive of repair and regrowth than are others.

While we all recognize the benefits of ecstasy, we also have to keep in mind that we need to pursue other pleasures, and even at times pains, so as to keep our own atoms of body and mind in healthy condition and peak performance.

I think we'll be hearing more from Chump soon. In the meantime, here's what he's now sent me:

Quote

Hello, sorry for the late response I was trying to respond to the post in the welcome thread but I think my activation didn’t work. I have clicked the activation email.

For about me, my personal background is that I am a graduate student studying economics. Past reading that I have done is some of the vatican sayings but I am relatively new to deeper study of Epicurus. I have started reading Dewitt’s book as well as per the suggestion of this forum. Discovery of this forum happened while googling about epicurean groups.

Best

Welcome aboard Chump!

From our zoom discussion last night, here is another way of asking the question:

The average person likely presumes that "the highest pleasure," is what we might call "ecstasy," and Epicurus says something not far from that in U423 (from Plutarch) where Epicurus says that the meaning of good is the near escape from some disaster, which I think most people would consider to name a condition of jubilation at having been delivered from a calamity.

If ecstasy / jubilation is what most people - and even Epicurus - seem to identify as a specific condition of extreme pleasure, then why isn't that also "the highest pleasure?"

That's the normal approach that Cicero and Plutarch think the world will agree with, and they are probably right.

Why should that line of thinking be considered to be incorrect? Why is "Ecstasy" not the highest / greatest pleasure?

Quote from Adrastus

The pleasurability brought about by clearing the mind and setting the Epicurean student on the reasonable approach to life using the Doctrine and other sources of Epicurean philosophy, ought to be, philosophically and teleologically, a distinct state of affairs from the myriad of ideas one could bring to the table about Pleasure and Pain and pathos in general.

Now there is a statement that deserves more comment, because I place that framing squarely within the "heap" / sorities framing. Like grains of sand, there are myriad experiences that can be described as pleasure, and yet "happiness" or "the best life" or "the highest pleasure" is not found in any one of them, any more than "heapness" is found in any particular grain of sand.

It is surely legitimate to talk about heaps as real, and likewise talk about happiness or "the greatest pleasure" as real, and yet the latter (happiness, the highest pleasure) are not found in any one single experience, or set of experiences.

And that's why it is necessary to be clear to people that "heap" is a concept rather than a particular "thing," just like happiness and the highest pleasure are not particular "things."

Hello chump! I received your initial email but did not receive anything in response to my request that you tell us more about your background and interest in Epicurus. Please do that here - we look forward to hearing from you.

Welcome chump

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We have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

Quote from Don

That's the point. What they rightly subjectively perceive as blahness isn't the highest pleasure. They are not really free from all pain. I would go so far as to say that none of us are ever going to be at the highest pleasure.

I agree with that.

But ok, where's the disconnect? Torquatus is making these statements very "flatly," He's speaking almost literally "The absence of pain is pleasure - in fact it's the highest pleasure." And I'd say that Epicurus is doing the same thing in the letter to Menoeceus. There's an explanation for the different perspectives, but I don't think we are yet articulating that explanation as Epicurus would.

For the generic man-on-the-street "I feel no pain" doesn't translate into "you are experiencing the height of pleasure" without more explanation that tells them how they are "looking at things" wrong. And leaving out the explanation as Cicero and Plutarch do makes Epicurus looks ridiculous. In the case of Epicurus' letter to Menoeceus I think we can excuse the omission on the grounds that Menoeceus was to all appearances a student, for whom this letter was a summary, and he would be expected to know the full explanation. But for those of us reading Cicero or Plutarch or reading the letter out of context, there's much more to be said.

Quote from Don

"It depends how you look at it" plays into the other person's hands. You've accepted their terms and are agreeing to play by their rules on their turf.

Ok that's why I am thinking that the approach would be controversial, but I am not yet sure that it isn't essentially what Epicurus is saying. Again playing off Joshua's observation, we'd have to deal with the subjectivity of the whole question and whether it is every appropriate to tell someone that what they are feeling is different from what they perceive it to be.

We can definitely dispute about "opinions," but I am not sure that it makes sense to say essentially "if you think about it this current feeling that you perceive as blahness is really the greatest pleasure anyone can experience in life!"

Don I note you did not comment on this:

Quote from Cassius

Would it start with "It depends on how you look at it"?

Would such a start be obvious, or controversial?

Does that mean that you think "it depends on how you look at it" would be incorrect?

In this case we're not talking about physics, where the ultimate questions certainly don't depend on how you look at it. Atoms and void don't exist or not depending on how we look at them.

And we're not really talking about individual feelings of pain and pleasure, which like snow is white honey is sweet are unmistakable.

But in regard to "pleasure" conceptually as the guide of life or "happiness" as the goal, does it in fact depend on how you choose to look at it?

Quote from Don

Nothing. I am in a neutral state, I am feeling neither pleasure nor pain.

Then you are not alive but dead.

Harrrrumph! Well, the absence of pain is not the highest pleasure.

If you are alive, you are *feeling*, experiencing sensations. Someone who is alive is always feeling...

As to especially "then you are not alive but dead" and also "someone who is alive is always feeling," that is not the way most people talk, and Cicero is going to win that argument every day of the week in front of most juries, Greek, Roman, or today. When it's Epicurus' turn to speak, he's going to have to give more explanation than that to satisfy any fair-minded jury.

In a recent zoom meeting TauPhi raised this issue in regard to "the size of the sun is as it appears to be" (and perhaps as to other contexts as well). He said in essence that "sloganeering" can be fun but it is not persuasive.

Not saying that you or Epicurus are sloganeering or not being a fair-minded juror of course, but I think you know what I mean! What we have looks like sloganeering because the enemies of Epicurus have selectively preserved the part they want to keep without the part that explains it.

When people of good faith are being approached with something new, they have to be brought along at the right speed. I'm thinking more along the lines of the way Frances Wright has Epicurus speaking to Zeno in A Few Days In Athens, there needs to be a "wind-up" before the pitch. "If you are alive you are feeling something" and "absence of pain is pleasure" and "absence of pain is in fact the highest pleasure" are smoking-hot fastballs on which most batters are going to strike out.

But we're not trying to deceive the batter and strike him out by throwing it past him. We're trying to telegraph the pitch, and deliver it right over the plate so the batter can hit it out of the park.

Quote from Don

The fact - yes, fact - is that if you are alive, you're feeling something positive or negative. There is no "middle ground" and no "neutral" feeling. "Meh, I'm okay" is still positive, albeit at a low level of intensity.

Maybe what I am saying is so obvious that it doesn't need to be said.

I'm looking for "what would Epicurus have said himself if he had been present with Cicero or Plutarch and been allowed to speak further beyond what Torquatus was allowed to say, or beyond what Cicero or Plutarch quoted of him.

When Cicero/Plutarch said "everyone knows that there is a state between pain and pleasure where we aren't feeling much of anything," and "everyone knows that absence of pain is certainly not the height of pleasure," what's the first thing out of Epicurus' mouth?

Would it start with "It depends on how you look at it"?

Would such a start be obvious, or controversial?

Don -- Yes that circle represents another model. Like any other model I would expect that the author of the model would say that it is grounded in reality, so I would say the original question remains.

For example, all of those headings around the circumference are labels that the model-writer has assigned based on his or her experience. Would it be any less legitimate to assign them differently?

So the question that I underlies the whole discussion is: What is the authority or foundation of this or any other model?

Are both Epicurus' model (with no middle ground) and the majority model (with a middle ground) equally legitimate in terms of evidence, differing only in conceptual labelling?

Epicurus obviously thought that it made sense to use a model in which there is no middle ground. Plato, Cicero, et al. prefer a model in which there is a middle ground. Is there really a difference in real-world evidence that says that one model conforms with reality more than does the other?

Now obviously I think the Epicurean model provides a far superior method of analysis. By affirming that there is a bright line between pleasure and pain you can make everything fall on one side or the other and see much more clearly that even non-stimulated situations are pleasure or pain. But i also think it is important to state that this is a model that our minds need to comprehend, and not leave it to speculation that there might be some kind of natural law or evidence or force that compels us to say that this model is "true to the evidence" while the other model is "false to the evidence."

As Joshua stated several times in the episode, I think Epicurus and we agree that pleasure and pain are highly subjective, even in terms of likes and dislikes as to food. So who are we to say to Cicero "No you wrong - when you're not in stimulative pain or pleasure, you must still use the same terms (pain or pleasure) to describe the condition that you are in."

Cicero and Plutarch are leaving out that what Epicurus is not saying "You're missing the obvious - when you think you are in neutral you are the same as if you're eating the best steak of your life!"

Instead, what Epicurus is doing is stating a conceptual framework that allows us to analyze the full problem more productively. Epicurus isn't exactly saying to the world: "No, when you're not being stimulated one way or the other, you may not realize it, but you're still being stimulated." The world says that's not true because they know the difference between numbness and eating the best steak they've ever had.

What seems to be in issue is labeling rather than evidence. And what we're arguing about with Cicero as to what to label is what constitutes a healthy state of peak performance of mind and body.

The problem facing us is that the view that "all you have to do is remove pain and you are in the greatest pleasure possible." That's being taken by some as a statement that you can reach the highest pleasure possible by numbing your mind and body as with a drug.

I think we're saying pretty much the opposite - that you want your mind and body to be MORE sensitive to what's going on in them and whether they are healthy or not. In the case of Chrysippus' hand the assertion is that the hand is in its normal operating condition, which in the case of the limited abilities of a hand a statement of peak condition. In the case of the mind, however, the mind isn't in peak condition unless it understands how the universe operates,that we aren't subject to supernatural gods or punishment/reward by supernatural forces after death, and that we can have the confident expectation of remaining in that condition.

That latter condition of the mind is the opposite of "emptying" or "numbing" the mind so as to allegedly automatically achieve its peak pleasure. That peak performance of the mind is going to require understanding of the nature of things (as listed above) which requires intellectual effort.

And it seems to me that in order to explain the model it is helpful to make clear that what we're talking about isn't that the general public has defective senses, but rather what they are missing is a conceptual model that is required for the proper understanding of the best life.

Yes, Happy Birthday Bryan! Thank you for all that you do!

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One of the things I included in both episodes 298 and 299 was that I thought that lucretius' description of the pleasure that comes from knowing that we are free from the ills that so many others are subject to is probably a good example of this "non-moving" type of pleasure, and that seems consistent with what you've suggested above. But I don't know anything about how to explain "katastematic" so that this type of pleasure jumps easily to mind as being associated with that word. It's a mental viewpoint that you can hold unshakeably and isn't subject to being shaken very easily (or at all) but I'd like to see a word picture that can be associated with "katastematic" that serves as a better analogy as to why this is so.

I can see why kinetic gets tagged easily with motion, and the intuitive opposite of motion is "at rest" or "not moving" but as you say there's work to be done on making this more clear.

Quote from Don

But I've never liked the static or rest analogies. Off the top of my head, I'd be more readily drawn to a clear blue sky, free of clouds, and the night sky awash with various stars, planets, the moon. Still workshopping this

I agree that eventually the goal is to state specific examples of the type of pleasure that is meant. And I think the examples you are giving are correct. But I'm concerned that you and I reach the same conclusions but only after years of looking at the question, and I think that it would be desirable to put some meat on the bones of "katastematic" that would make that journey easier for people who first approach the question. Right now we might as well call it 'abracadabra pleasure' or "gibberish pleasura" instead of katastematic pleasure and extremely few would be any less confused by the term. And that seems to me a large part of the reason that so many are getting away with describing katastematic pleasure as the "real pleasure" that is what Epicurus was really after, instead of only one slice of a larger pie that constitutes the full meaning of "pleasure."

Also, if the car analogy works, that would suggest that a "ship at sea" vs a "ship in port" analogy would also work. If that one works, I'd say (or hope) that people would be less likely to think that "a ship in port" is superior to or could take the place of "a ship at sea" because most people would intuitively understand that sailing at sea is the real reason for having a ship in in the first place, and therefore at least as important as being in port, though both are natural parts of the life of a ship.

Quote from Don

To answer your question, I see katastematic pleasure as that which results, at least in part, from the weeding out of fear of the gods and death. Once those are truly rooted out - not just intellectually but viscerally - they don't come back. Without those fears and anxieties, the mind can remain untroubled. That's katastematic pleasure. A firm state of being.

Kinetic pleasure are all the pleasures that arise in the moment, from pleasant memories to drinking with friends to eating food.

That's the nutshell.

Yes, in this case I worded the question the way I did for a purpose, and added what seems to me to be the very understandable, and in this case likely correct interpretation of the specific phrases.

You're describing in your answer kinetic pleasure and katastematic pleasure but to my mind it's more important first to convey what kinetic and katastematic mean, so that there is no implication that the entire term is some kind of made up jargon that only Epicurus understood.

Kinetic is a word that has meaning in Greek just like katastematic. Is it not of first importance to understand what they mean separately before combining them with pleasure?

That's what the proposed summary does, and it seems to me that it's likely correct. Starting at that point would avoid the ambiguity that arises in talking about which attributes of a thing are primary, which are secondary, etc.

In this case, I do agree that "a firm state of being" is probably the primary sense of katastematic, and something surrounding "motion" is probably the primary sense of kinetic.

And I also agree that "that which results, at least in part, from the weeding out of fear of the gods and death" makes up a major component of what's being referenced as katastematic.

But with the word katastematic, in contrast with kinetic, we're using a word that has no clear English analog. With kinetic we can grasp intuitively why Cicero describes the pleasures as those that "move" us. But there's no equivalent point of reference with "katastematic" to keep people from going off into any wild tangent that they might personally want to entertain as to what it means.

I'd say Grok's proposal of an analogy makes considerable sense. A car in motion versus a car parked in a garage. That's a down to earth example that - if valid - makes clear that we're talking about easily understandable concepts, and not just using a term that makes "absence of pain" even more difficult to understand.

And with that as background, I'd say that there's no direct and necessary relationship between absence of pain and "katastematic pleasure." I'd say the relationship that's important is that pleasure is the opposite of pain, so there's either pleasure or pain, not one of the other. Katastematic and kinetic are two types of pleasure, but "absence of pain" can arise from the presence of any kind of moving or continuous pleasures.

Right now, as 90%+ of the world is talking about it, they are saying or implying that absence of pain according to Epicurus is katastematic pleasure, when they should be saying simply that absence of pain is pleasure.

I know you're not doing that yourself, Don, I'm just pointing out that this confusion has very damaging consequences, and we need better ways to clear up this confusion. And probably that better way involves finding ways to de-mystify the word "katastematic."

I've added this one to substack here:

Was Epicurus Right That There Are Only Two Feelings - Pleasure And Pain?

If so, why? Today we address that question in Episode 299 of the Lucretius Today podcast.

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