Posts by Cassius

I'm not sure whether this link is included in previous posts, but I see that the Athenians have a youtube page where various presentations can be accessed directly:

Happy Birthday to chump! Learn more about chump and say happy birthday on chump's timeline: chump

We'll start this week at line 184 and continue from there

1-184

Nay more, there would be no need for lapse of time for the increase of things upon the meeting of the seed, if they could grow from nothing. For little children would grow suddenly to youths, and at once trees would come forth, leaping from the earth. But of this it is well seen that nothing comes to pass, since all things grow slowly, as is natural, from a fixed seed, and as they grow preserve their kind: so that you can know that each thing grows great, and is fostered out of its own substance.

EpicureanFriends Side-By-Side Lucretius

Multi-column side-by-side Lucretius text comparison tool featuring Munro, Bailey, Dunster, and Condensed editions.

handbook.epicureanfriends.com

Welcome to Episode 323 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
   
This week we start are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective. We are focusing first on what is referred to as Book One, which provides an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and gives us an overview of the philosophical issues being dealt with at the time of Epicurus. This week will will continue in Section 5

Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackam translation here:

• 
  

  

  Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

V.

I entreat you however, said Atticus, I entreat you to go on, Varro. For I am greatly attached to my own countrymen and to their works; and those subjects delight me beyond measure when they are treated in Latin, and in such a manner as you treat them. And what, said I, do you think that I must feel, who have already engaged to display philosophy to our nation? Let us then, said he, continue the subject, since it is agreeable to you.

A threefold system of philosophising, then, was already received from Plato. One, on the subject of life and morals. A second, on nature and abstruse matters. The third, on discussion, and on what is true or false; what is right or wrong in a discourse; what is consistent or inconsistent in forming a decision.

And that first division of the subject, that namely of living well, they sought in nature herself, and said that it was necessary to obey her; and that that chief good to which everything was referred was not to be sought in anything whatever except in nature. And they laid it down that the crowning point of all desirable things, and the chief good, was to have received from nature everything which is requisite for the mind, or the body, or for life. But of the goods of the body, they placed some in the whole, and others in the parts. Health, strength, and beauty in the whole. In the parts, soundness of the senses, and a certain excellence of the individual parts. As in the feet, swiftness; in the hands, strength; in the voice, clearness; in the tongue, a distinct articulation of words. The excellences of the mind they considered those which were suitable to the comprehension of virtue by the disposition. And those they divided under the separate heads of nature and morals. Quickness in learning and memory they attributed to nature; each of which was described as a property of the mind and genius. Under the head of “morals” they classed our studies, and, I may say, our habits, which they formed, partly by a continuity of practice, partly by reason. And in these two things was contained philosophy itself, in which that which is begun and not brought to its completion, is called a sort of advance towards virtue; but that which is brought to completion is virtue, being a sort of perfection of nature and of all things which they place in the mind; the one most excellent thing. These things then are qualities of the mind.

The third division was that of life. And they said that those things which had influence in facilitating the practice of virtue were connected with this division. For virtue is discerned in some good qualities of the mind and body, which are added not so much to nature as to a happy life. They thought that a man was as it were a certain part of the state, and of the whole human race, and that he was connected with other men by a sort of human society. And this is the way in which they deal with the chief and natural good. But they think that everything else is connected with it, either in the way of increasing or of maintaining it; as riches, power, glory, and influence. And thus a threefold division of goods is inferred by them.

Episode 322 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week our episode is entitled: "Epicurean Moral Outrage Against Socrates"

I should also point out that this quotation in post 7 is a long distance from the point where this thread started out, when your advocated "Joy" as the goal ("Neither "ataraxia" nor "not ataraxia", but "Joy as the goal").

That's because katastematic pleasure specifically does not include joy. As I cited above from Diogenes Laertius:

And Epicurus in the work on Choice speaks as follows: ‘Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but Joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion. '

If you believe that joy and exultation are an integral part of the Epicurean goal of life, then you specifically one would NOT limit the goal to only one kind of pleasure ("katastematic pleasure") as is implied in parenthetic construction in the sentence:

"the pursuit of pleasure is the path to eustatheia and happiness (katastematic pleasure or pleasurable state) (underline added)

The part you have quoted there Kalosyni will be read by some people be circular or worse. It does not specifically identify what "happiness" is apart from pleasure. Further, in equating happiness to "katastematic pleasure" in that last sentence, the part you quoted will be erroneously read by some to exclude "kinetic pleasure." That is a terrible misreading of the full picture, which is that ALL feeling that is not painful constitutes pleasure, and that a life of happiness is nothing more than a life of pleasure.

A more focused explanation of the issue of how to view the happy state in relation to pleasure can be found in Sedley's Epicurean vs Cyreniac Happiness, and through reading what Torquatus has to say about the issue in On Ends.

File

David Sedley - Epicurean vs Cyreniac Happiness

Eudaimonia, happiness, is a property of a whole life, not of some portion of it. (Link to Article at the Academia.edu website.)

Cassius

February 23, 2025 at 6:48 AM

Quote from Matteng

To be a pure egoist let you live painfully. To be pure altruist let you live painfully.

i strongly agree with this.

Quote from Kalosyni

I would like to propose a third way..."Joy as the goal" as I think that this puts a better spin on what is meant by "pleasure" in Epicurean philosophy...and I think it also leads to greater motivation to "get off one's bum" and make effort toward a good life. I do seem to remember that there is at least one reference to joy in the extant texts, but will need to track that down.

I agree that it is important to emphasize joy, and the failure to do so is a big problem in modern Epicurean discussion.

However, from Diogenes Laertius:

And Epicurus in the work on Choice speaks as follows: ‘Freedom from trouble in the mind and from pain in the body are static pleasures, but Joy and exultation are considered as active pleasures involving motion. '

Joy falls within pleasure, not the other way around. I'd say what you are describing is one of many ways to explain that pleasure has many facets, but "joy" cannot replace "pleasure" as the global term. There are many types of pleasure which are also an important part of the goal but which do not fall within "joy."

EpicureanFriends Side-By-Side Diogenes Laertius Ten

Welcome MCTIMKAT!

He tells me --

As I approach my 70th birthday, I have been reviewing my life up to this milestone point, and in so doing have developed a strong desire to consolidate the experiences of those years into a coherent philosophy of living to guide me through whatever years remain. While I don't think cherry-picking this or that element from the various philosophical schools in order to piece together an amalgam that suits me is wise, I do think that I need to assemble a coherent and compatible framework that I can follow with confidence that it is the one most beneficial to me. I enjoyed looking through your materials and resources, and know they will help me in that endeavor.

Welcome mctimkat

There is one last step to complete your registration:

All new registrants must post a response to this message here in this welcome thread (we do this in order to minimize spam registrations).

You must post your response within 24 hours, or your account will be subject to deletion.

Please say "Hello" by introducing yourself, tell us what prompted your interest in Epicureanism and which particular aspects of Epicureanism most interest you, and/or post a question.

This forum is the place for students of Epicurus to coordinate their studies and work together to promote the philosophy of Epicurus. Please remember that all posting here is subject to our Community Standards and associated Terms of Use. Please be sure to read that document to understand our ground rules.

Please understand that the leaders of this forum are well aware that many fans of Epicurus may have sincerely-held views of what Epicurus taught that are incompatible with the purposes and standards of this forum. This forum is dedicated exclusively to the study and support of people who are committed to classical Epicurean views. As a result, this forum is not for people who seek to mix and match Epicurean views with positions that are inherently inconsistent with the core teachings of Epicurus.

All of us who are here have arrived at our respect for Epicurus after long journeys through other philosophies, and we do not demand of others what we were not able to do ourselves. Epicurean philosophy is very different from most other philosophies, and it takes time to understand how deep those differences really are. That's why we have membership levels here at the forum which allow for new participants to discuss and develop their own learning, but it's also why we have standards that will lead in some cases to arguments being limited, and even participants being removed, when the purposes of the community require it. Epicurean philosophy is not inherently democratic, or committed to unlimited free speech, or devoted to any other form of organization other than the pursuit of truth and happy living through pleasure as explained in the principles of Epicurean philosophy.

One way you can be assured of your time here will be productive is to tell us a little about yourself and your background in reading Epicurean texts. It would also be helpful if you could tell us how you found this forum, and any particular areas of interest that you already have.

You can also check out our Getting Started page for ideas on how to use this website.

We have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.

"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt

The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.

"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"

"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky

The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."

Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section

Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section

The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation

A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright

Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus

Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)

"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.

It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.

And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.

(If you have any questions regarding the usage of the forum or finding info, please post any questions in this thread).

Welcome to the forum!

To those reading along I would amplify what Daniel has said about 1000 times. He's approaching the subject as it is generally approached nowadays - sort of clinically. Yes indeed if you define 1 as "courage" and 2 as "justice" and "complete happiness" as "courage + justice" then you are completely happy if you have 1 and 2. You could likewise define 1 as oranges and 2 as bananas and complete happiness as "orange + bananas" and if you have 1 + 2 you have complete happiness. And if you're stupid enough to do that you'll never miss, because 1 + 2 are defined as equaling 3.

But isn't it clear that this is nonsensical? It SHOULD be clear, but when you start the chain with "everyone wants happiness" and you don't make CLEAR what you mean by happiness then you can draw every sucker into the world into your trap, and that is exactly what Stoicism does.

There are many good people who get taken in by Stoicism, and I am all in favor of treating them diplomatically, because most of us ourselves were one in thrall of their slights of hand - just as many today are taken in by religion.

Stoicism in the hands of the innocent is a tragedy, but in the hands of those who should know better, it's one of the worst crimes in the history of the world. Pythagoras and Socrates and Plato and others in their line set all this in motion, and the Stoics simply abstracted it further to an absurd extreme. Their line deserves the full blame for what has happened as a result.

Epicurus points the way out of that trap, and his answer is by going back to the beginning of their denunciation of the senses. When you use them properly to look at nature and see that NATURE is supreme (not prime movers, divine fire, or universal intelligence) then you see the way out of the trap is really very simple.

Don't go down this false path in the first place, and if you're already trapped in it retrace your steps as quickly as you can. Nature through the senses, anticipations, and feelings can lead you out of this trap, but looking to "Nature" alone isn't good enough. The Stoics and Aristotle alike both claim to look to Nature. It's only when you reject the idea that you or your chosen idol are over Nature and smarter than Nature that you are in tune with what Epicurus was teaching.

c

Very good!

Matteng here is another example of that problem of granting false presumptions, this from Plato's Phaedo:

Quote

[100b] “There is nothing new,” he said, “in what I am about to tell you; but only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous discussion and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied my thoughts, and I shall have to go back to those familiar words which are in the mouth of everyone, and first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove [100c] the immortality of the psūkhē.”

Cebes said, “You may proceed at once with the proof, as I readily grant you this.”

Hell, no, Socrates!

I do NOT grant you that there is an "absolute" beauty and goodness and greatness!

Read onward from there, and you see what a trap you are drawn into by accepting these initial premises:

Plato, Phaedo, trans. Jowett - The Center for Hellenic Studies

Translated by Benjamin Jowett Adapted by Gregory Nagy, Miriam Carlisle, and Soo-Young Kim Persons of the Dialogue Phaedo, who is the narrator of the dialogue…

chs.harvard.edu

And you have to smile - or want to strangle Plato - at the audacity of statements such as this:

Quote

Echecrates
Yes, Phaedo; and I don’t wonder at their assenting. Anyone who has the least sense will acknowledge the wonderful clearness of Socrates’ reasoning.

So the most relevant section comes near the end, when Socrates feels challenged by the argument that the soul might be longer-lasting than the body, but still might not exist forever. The main part starts with this opening:

Quote

“Then I will tell you,” said Socrates. “When I was young, Cebes, I had a prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called Natural Science; this appeared to me to have lofty aims, as being the science which has to do with the causes of things, and which teaches why a thing is, and is created and destroyed; [96b] and I was always agitating myself with the consideration of such questions as these: Is the growth of animals the result of some decay which the hot and cold principle contracts, as some have said? Is the blood the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire? or perhaps nothing of this sort – but the brain may be the originating power of the perceptions of hearing and sight and smell, and memory and opinion may come from them, and science may be based on memory and opinion when no longer in motion, but at rest. And then I went on to examine the decay of them, [96c] and then to the things of the sky above and the earth below, and at last I concluded that I was wholly incapable of these inquiries, as I will satisfactorily prove to you. For I was fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind to things that I had seemed to myself, and also to others, to know quite well; and I forgot what I had before thought to be self-evident, that the growth of man is the result of eating and drinking; [96d] for when by the digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and whenever there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes larger and the small man greater. Was not that a reasonable notion?”

“Yes,” said Cebes, “I think so.”

“Well; but let me tell you something more. There was a time when I thought that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well; and when I saw a great man standing by a little one I fancied that one was taller than the other by a head; [96e] or one horse would appear to be greater than another horse: and still more clearly did I seem to perceive that ten is two more than eight, and that two cubits are more than one, because two is twice one.”

“And what is now your notion of such matters?” said Cebes.

“I should be far enough from imagining,” he replied, “that I knew the cause of any of them, indeed I should, for I cannot satisfy myself that when one is added to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes two, [97a] or that the two units added together make two by reason of the addition. For I cannot understand how, when separated from the other, each of them was one and not two, and now, when they are brought together, the mere juxtaposition of them can be the cause of their becoming two: nor can I understand how the division of one is the way to make two; for then a different cause [97b] would produce the same effect—as in the former instance the addition and juxtaposition of one to one was the cause of two, in this the separation and subtraction of one from the other would be the cause. Nor am I any longer satisfied that I understand the reason why one or anything else either is generated or destroyed or is at all, but I have in my mind some confused notion of another method, and can never admit this.

Anyone who wants to defend Socrates needs to be sure they have read the full Phaedo. Here's more of a taste of what Epicurus must have considered to be poison worse than hemlock. This is Socrates speaking, There is much more, and worse.

Quote

[66b] “And when they consider all this, must not true philosophers make a reflection, of which they will speak to one another in such words as these: ‘We have found,’ they will say, ‘a path of speculation which seems to bring us and the argument to the conclusion that while we are in the body, and while the psūkhē is mingled with this mass of evil, our desire will not be satisfied, and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food; [66c] and also is liable to diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after truth: and by filling us so full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies, and idols, and every sort of folly, prevents our ever having, as people say, so much as a thought. For whence come wars, and fighting, and factions? Whence but from the body and the lusts of the body? For wars are occasioned by the love of money, [66d] and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body; and in consequence of all these things the time which ought to be given to philosophy is lost. Moreover, if there is time and an inclination toward philosophy, yet the body introduces a turmoil and confusion and fear into the course of speculation, and hinders us from seeing the truth: and all experience shows that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body, [66e] and the psūkhē in itself must behold all things in themselves: then I suppose that we shall attain that which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers, and that is wisdom, not while we live, but after death, as the argument indicates [sēmainein]; for if while in company with the body the psūkhē cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things seems to follow—either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not till then, [67a] the psūkhē will be in itself alone and without the body. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible concern or interest in the body, and are not saturated with the bodily nature, but remain pure until the hour when the god himself is pleased to release us. And then the foolishness of the body will be cleared away and we shall be pure and hold converse with other pure psūkhai, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere; and this is surely the light of truth. [67b] For no impure thing is allowed to approach the pure.’ These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of wisdom cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You will agree with me in that?”

“Certainly, Socrates.”

That is exactly my reaction Don. And i am sorely embarrassed that this forum has been going for some fifteen years without my recognizing this adequately.

Mea maxima culpa!

For me, this places a lot of what I've been reading about Epicurus in a very new light. No wonder he reacted the way he did.

Matteng that is why I am finding the material we are covering on the podcast now so valuable. I too was attracted to Stoicism (many years ago now) and for a long time I favored it. But as I look back now I see that i should have immediately tried to question what exactly they thought their goal to be. The word "happiness" is interpreted in too many ways to accept it at face value as a goal without an understanding of what the person using the word means. Same goes for Epicurean philosophy, and Lucian makes that point too - that this problem applies to all schools. Socrates is wrong - it IS possible to be clear, and to clearly communicate something positive that you have confidence is true. But just like people use different languages, even within the same language different people use different words in different ways. Epicurus is right that it is essential to be clear, and the only way to do that in conceptual matters is to cite numbers of examples and to explain the entire concept in understandable words.

But to get back to the current material on the podcasts, this is why Stoicism was not accepted - not just by the Epicureans - but also by the majority of the Academy. Both Aristotle and the regular heirs of Plato understood that there is more subtlety involved in the word "Virtue" than just things that are under one's own control. The Stoics talk today as if they ruled the roost in the ancient world, but we can read Cicero and see plainly that both Aristotle and the New Academy saw the problems with Stoicism. I am no fan of Carneades, but he seems to have directed at least as much, and probably more, of his fire at the Stoics than at the Epicureans. Aristotle has significant similarities with Epicurus as to certain views of pleasure, and even Socrates and Plato can be found to say occasional good things about pleasure. The distinguishing mark of Stoicism seems to be that they elevated the worship of Logic and Reason to an extreme that even Socrates and Aristotle and maybe even Plato himself would not have agreed with.

I perceive that everyone does not hold that Hermotimus dialog in the same esteem that I do, but if you haven't read the whole thing I highly recommend it. In my view it does an excellent job of making this point - that logical consistency is a dangerous trap if you start off at the beginning with premises that are not properly evaluated.

Even the introduction to the Epicurus Reader starts off with something similar, presuming that "Everyone wants to be happy." In a way that is true, and i say things like that myself sometime, but we're here to be clear about philosophy and how to pursue it, and in serious discussion the meaning of the word "happy" is NOT something to be taken for granted.

This week we will pick up at Lucretius line 174, and we will talk further about Dave's question as to Lucretius' use of the word "seeds"

EpicureanFriends Side-By-Side Lucretius

Multi-column side-by-side Lucretius text comparison tool featuring Munro, Bailey, Dunster, and Condensed editions.

handbook.epicureanfriends.com

Going back to the recent question in which the Stoic article was cited, I want to add this:

Quote from Matteng

The main point is that when you desire no things outside of your control ( like life, health … ) you encounter no „unhappiness“ or when you desire only Virtue you get „complete“ happiness.

Again, the entire discussion in the article gets off to a bad start by failing to be clear what is meant by happiness. But even within the general framework of "control" there are huge problems. OF COURSE I want life. OF COURSE I want health. And indeed those things are not guaranteed, and they are therefore not totally within my control. But unlike a Stoic I am not going to cry about it and revolt against Nature. Nature gives us life and health on the contingency that we act properly to secure it and keep it. It would be insane to discard life and health simply because I don't have total control over keeping it.

This entire logic game set forth in the article is exactly the same kind of nonsense that Lucian complains about in Hermotimus. OF COURSE if you exclude as a value anything that you don't have total control over, then you'll never fail in your values. "Expect the worst and you'll never be disappointed" is a logical consistency but it's also an unnatural and insane way to live life.

Stoicism is a reduction ad absurdem of certain trends in Socratic/Platonic thought that even Aristotle, who failed to reject the "prime mover" argument, could not accept. I wouldn't waste my time debating them unless and until one of them (who wouldn't be faithful to Stoicism if they did so) set forth a reasonable explanation of their terms of what life and happiness really entail. Divine fire and loving Fate and pursuing virtue in and for itself are pure nonsense. You're not going to reach a reasonable and acceptable set of conclusions when you start off with such a false foundation, no matter how logically consistent you might be at any single step along the way.