Posts by Cassius

To those reading along I would amplify what Daniel has said about 1000 times. He's approaching the subject as it is generally approached nowadays - sort of clinically. Yes indeed if you define 1 as "courage" and 2 as "justice" and "complete happiness" as "courage + justice" then you are completely happy if you have 1 and 2. You could likewise define 1 as oranges and 2 as bananas and complete happiness as "orange + bananas" and if you have 1 + 2 you have complete happiness. And if you're stupid enough to do that you'll never miss, because 1 + 2 are defined as equaling 3.

But isn't it clear that this is nonsensical? It SHOULD be clear, but when you start the chain with "everyone wants happiness" and you don't make CLEAR what you mean by happiness then you can draw every sucker into the world into your trap, and that is exactly what Stoicism does.

There are many good people who get taken in by Stoicism, and I am all in favor of treating them diplomatically, because most of us ourselves were one in thrall of their slights of hand - just as many today are taken in by religion.

Stoicism in the hands of the innocent is a tragedy, but in the hands of those who should know better, it's one of the worst crimes in the history of the world. Pythagoras and Socrates and Plato and others in their line set all this in motion, and the Stoics simply abstracted it further to an absurd extreme. Their line deserves the full blame for what has happened as a result.

Epicurus points the way out of that trap, and his answer is by going back to the beginning of their denunciation of the senses. When you use them properly to look at nature and see that NATURE is supreme (not prime movers, divine fire, or universal intelligence) then you see the way out of the trap is really very simple.

Don't go down this false path in the first place, and if you're already trapped in it retrace your steps as quickly as you can. Nature through the senses, anticipations, and feelings can lead you out of this trap, but looking to "Nature" alone isn't good enough. The Stoics and Aristotle alike both claim to look to Nature. It's only when you reject the idea that you or your chosen idol are over Nature and smarter than Nature that you are in tune with what Epicurus was teaching.

c

Very good!

Matteng here is another example of that problem of granting false presumptions, this from Plato's Phaedo:

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[100b] “There is nothing new,” he said, “in what I am about to tell you; but only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous discussion and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied my thoughts, and I shall have to go back to those familiar words which are in the mouth of everyone, and first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove [100c] the immortality of the psūkhē.”

Cebes said, “You may proceed at once with the proof, as I readily grant you this.”

Hell, no, Socrates!

I do NOT grant you that there is an "absolute" beauty and goodness and greatness!

Read onward from there, and you see what a trap you are drawn into by accepting these initial premises:

Plato, Phaedo, trans. Jowett - The Center for Hellenic Studies

Translated by Benjamin Jowett Adapted by Gregory Nagy, Miriam Carlisle, and Soo-Young Kim Persons of the Dialogue Phaedo, who is the narrator of the dialogue…

chs.harvard.edu

And you have to smile - or want to strangle Plato - at the audacity of statements such as this:

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Echecrates
Yes, Phaedo; and I don’t wonder at their assenting. Anyone who has the least sense will acknowledge the wonderful clearness of Socrates’ reasoning.

So the most relevant section comes near the end, when Socrates feels challenged by the argument that the soul might be longer-lasting than the body, but still might not exist forever. The main part starts with this opening:

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“Then I will tell you,” said Socrates. “When I was young, Cebes, I had a prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called Natural Science; this appeared to me to have lofty aims, as being the science which has to do with the causes of things, and which teaches why a thing is, and is created and destroyed; [96b] and I was always agitating myself with the consideration of such questions as these: Is the growth of animals the result of some decay which the hot and cold principle contracts, as some have said? Is the blood the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire? or perhaps nothing of this sort – but the brain may be the originating power of the perceptions of hearing and sight and smell, and memory and opinion may come from them, and science may be based on memory and opinion when no longer in motion, but at rest. And then I went on to examine the decay of them, [96c] and then to the things of the sky above and the earth below, and at last I concluded that I was wholly incapable of these inquiries, as I will satisfactorily prove to you. For I was fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind to things that I had seemed to myself, and also to others, to know quite well; and I forgot what I had before thought to be self-evident, that the growth of man is the result of eating and drinking; [96d] for when by the digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and whenever there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes larger and the small man greater. Was not that a reasonable notion?”

“Yes,” said Cebes, “I think so.”

“Well; but let me tell you something more. There was a time when I thought that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well; and when I saw a great man standing by a little one I fancied that one was taller than the other by a head; [96e] or one horse would appear to be greater than another horse: and still more clearly did I seem to perceive that ten is two more than eight, and that two cubits are more than one, because two is twice one.”

“And what is now your notion of such matters?” said Cebes.

“I should be far enough from imagining,” he replied, “that I knew the cause of any of them, indeed I should, for I cannot satisfy myself that when one is added to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes two, [97a] or that the two units added together make two by reason of the addition. For I cannot understand how, when separated from the other, each of them was one and not two, and now, when they are brought together, the mere juxtaposition of them can be the cause of their becoming two: nor can I understand how the division of one is the way to make two; for then a different cause [97b] would produce the same effect—as in the former instance the addition and juxtaposition of one to one was the cause of two, in this the separation and subtraction of one from the other would be the cause. Nor am I any longer satisfied that I understand the reason why one or anything else either is generated or destroyed or is at all, but I have in my mind some confused notion of another method, and can never admit this.

Anyone who wants to defend Socrates needs to be sure they have read the full Phaedo. Here's more of a taste of what Epicurus must have considered to be poison worse than hemlock. This is Socrates speaking, There is much more, and worse.

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[66b] “And when they consider all this, must not true philosophers make a reflection, of which they will speak to one another in such words as these: ‘We have found,’ they will say, ‘a path of speculation which seems to bring us and the argument to the conclusion that while we are in the body, and while the psūkhē is mingled with this mass of evil, our desire will not be satisfied, and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food; [66c] and also is liable to diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after truth: and by filling us so full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies, and idols, and every sort of folly, prevents our ever having, as people say, so much as a thought. For whence come wars, and fighting, and factions? Whence but from the body and the lusts of the body? For wars are occasioned by the love of money, [66d] and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body; and in consequence of all these things the time which ought to be given to philosophy is lost. Moreover, if there is time and an inclination toward philosophy, yet the body introduces a turmoil and confusion and fear into the course of speculation, and hinders us from seeing the truth: and all experience shows that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body, [66e] and the psūkhē in itself must behold all things in themselves: then I suppose that we shall attain that which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers, and that is wisdom, not while we live, but after death, as the argument indicates [sēmainein]; for if while in company with the body the psūkhē cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things seems to follow—either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not till then, [67a] the psūkhē will be in itself alone and without the body. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible concern or interest in the body, and are not saturated with the bodily nature, but remain pure until the hour when the god himself is pleased to release us. And then the foolishness of the body will be cleared away and we shall be pure and hold converse with other pure psūkhai, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere; and this is surely the light of truth. [67b] For no impure thing is allowed to approach the pure.’ These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of wisdom cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You will agree with me in that?”

“Certainly, Socrates.”

That is exactly my reaction Don. And i am sorely embarrassed that this forum has been going for some fifteen years without my recognizing this adequately.

Mea maxima culpa!

For me, this places a lot of what I've been reading about Epicurus in a very new light. No wonder he reacted the way he did.

Matteng that is why I am finding the material we are covering on the podcast now so valuable. I too was attracted to Stoicism (many years ago now) and for a long time I favored it. But as I look back now I see that i should have immediately tried to question what exactly they thought their goal to be. The word "happiness" is interpreted in too many ways to accept it at face value as a goal without an understanding of what the person using the word means. Same goes for Epicurean philosophy, and Lucian makes that point too - that this problem applies to all schools. Socrates is wrong - it IS possible to be clear, and to clearly communicate something positive that you have confidence is true. But just like people use different languages, even within the same language different people use different words in different ways. Epicurus is right that it is essential to be clear, and the only way to do that in conceptual matters is to cite numbers of examples and to explain the entire concept in understandable words.

But to get back to the current material on the podcasts, this is why Stoicism was not accepted - not just by the Epicureans - but also by the majority of the Academy. Both Aristotle and the regular heirs of Plato understood that there is more subtlety involved in the word "Virtue" than just things that are under one's own control. The Stoics talk today as if they ruled the roost in the ancient world, but we can read Cicero and see plainly that both Aristotle and the New Academy saw the problems with Stoicism. I am no fan of Carneades, but he seems to have directed at least as much, and probably more, of his fire at the Stoics than at the Epicureans. Aristotle has significant similarities with Epicurus as to certain views of pleasure, and even Socrates and Plato can be found to say occasional good things about pleasure. The distinguishing mark of Stoicism seems to be that they elevated the worship of Logic and Reason to an extreme that even Socrates and Aristotle and maybe even Plato himself would not have agreed with.

I perceive that everyone does not hold that Hermotimus dialog in the same esteem that I do, but if you haven't read the whole thing I highly recommend it. In my view it does an excellent job of making this point - that logical consistency is a dangerous trap if you start off at the beginning with premises that are not properly evaluated.

Even the introduction to the Epicurus Reader starts off with something similar, presuming that "Everyone wants to be happy." In a way that is true, and i say things like that myself sometime, but we're here to be clear about philosophy and how to pursue it, and in serious discussion the meaning of the word "happy" is NOT something to be taken for granted.

This week we will pick up at Lucretius line 174, and we will talk further about Dave's question as to Lucretius' use of the word "seeds"

EpicureanFriends Side-By-Side Lucretius

Multi-column side-by-side Lucretius text comparison tool featuring Munro, Bailey, Dunster, and Condensed editions.

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Going back to the recent question in which the Stoic article was cited, I want to add this:

Quote from Matteng

The main point is that when you desire no things outside of your control ( like life, health … ) you encounter no „unhappiness“ or when you desire only Virtue you get „complete“ happiness.

Again, the entire discussion in the article gets off to a bad start by failing to be clear what is meant by happiness. But even within the general framework of "control" there are huge problems. OF COURSE I want life. OF COURSE I want health. And indeed those things are not guaranteed, and they are therefore not totally within my control. But unlike a Stoic I am not going to cry about it and revolt against Nature. Nature gives us life and health on the contingency that we act properly to secure it and keep it. It would be insane to discard life and health simply because I don't have total control over keeping it.

This entire logic game set forth in the article is exactly the same kind of nonsense that Lucian complains about in Hermotimus. OF COURSE if you exclude as a value anything that you don't have total control over, then you'll never fail in your values. "Expect the worst and you'll never be disappointed" is a logical consistency but it's also an unnatural and insane way to live life.

Stoicism is a reduction ad absurdem of certain trends in Socratic/Platonic thought that even Aristotle, who failed to reject the "prime mover" argument, could not accept. I wouldn't waste my time debating them unless and until one of them (who wouldn't be faithful to Stoicism if they did so) set forth a reasonable explanation of their terms of what life and happiness really entail. Divine fire and loving Fate and pursuing virtue in and for itself are pure nonsense. You're not going to reach a reasonable and acceptable set of conclusions when you start off with such a false foundation, no matter how logically consistent you might be at any single step along the way.

Matt there is something else I want to add. I see that you are going through a long sequence of statements about Stoicism and analyzing the logic of them. Anytime I get confronted with a long intricate chain argument, I always remember this from Lucian's Hermotimus:

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Perhaps an illustration will make my meaning clearer: when one of those audacious poets affirms that there was once a three-headed and six-handed man, if you accept that quietly without questioning its possibility, he will proceed to fill in the picture consistently—six eyes and ears, three voices talking at once, three mouths eating, and thirty fingers instead of our poor ten all told; if he has to fight, three of his hands will have a buckler, wicker targe, or shield apiece, while of the other three one swings an axe, another hurls a spear, and the third wields a sword. It is too late to carp at these details, when they come; they are consistent with the beginning; it was about that that the question ought to have been raised whether it was to be accepted and passed as true. Once grant that, and the rest comes flooding in, irresistible, hardly now susceptible of doubt, because it is consistent and accordant with your initial admissions.

That is just your case; your love-yearning would not allow you to look into the facts at each entrance, and so you are dragged on by consistency; it never occurs to you that a thing may be self- consistent and yet false; if a man says twice five is seven, and you take his word for it without checking the sum, he will naturally deduce that four times five is fourteen, and so on ad libitum. This is the way that weird geometry proceeds: it sets before beginners certain strange assumptions, and insists on their granting the existence of inconceivable things, such as points having no parts, lines without breadth, and so on, builds on these rotten foundations a superstructure equally rotten, and pretends to go on to a demonstration which is true, though it starts from premises which are false.

Just so you, when you have granted the principles of any school, believe in the deductions from them, and take their consistency, false as it is, for a guarantee of truth. Then with some of you, hope travels through, and you die before you have seen the truth and detected your deceivers, while the rest, disillusioned too late, will not turn back for shame: what, confess at their years that they have been abused with toys all this time? so they hold on desperately, putting the best face upon it and making all the converts they can, to have the consolation of good company in their deception; they are well aware that to speak out is to sacrifice the respect and superiority and honor they are accustomed to; so they will not do it if it may be helped, knowing the height from which they will fall to the common level. Just a few are found with the courage to say they were deluded, and warn other aspirants. Meeting such a one, call him a good man, a true and an honest; nay, call him philosopher, if you will; to my mind, the name is his or no one's; the rest either have no knowledge of the truth, though they think they have, or else have knowledge and hide it, shamefaced cowards clinging to reputation.

So while I am fine if others here want to go through the details of Stoic chain reasoning, my own recommendation is to follow what Lucian advises:

Start with their fundamental presumptions and don't get drawn into an argument about self-consistency. The Stoics are very good about drawing up self-consistent arguments that are absolute nonsense when you examine their premises. Whatever good there might be in examining whether an issue is under your control or not (and indeed there may be some good in that) their overall use of the argument poisons any benefit from traveling very far down their road.

I wouldn't advise traveling a step with them beyond those steps in which you are sure you agree.

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Th 1) Everyone wants happiness.

i would say from the very first sentence you are not defining what happiness means, so that it would be unproductive to evaluate anything after that starting point without more specifity.

Phaedo 99c–100a - Loeb (Jowett) from Archive.org, page 367 of the PDF version.

Welcome to Episode 322 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
   
This week we start are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective. We are focusing first on what is referred to as Book One, which provides an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and gives us an overview of the philosophical issues being dealt with at the time of Epicurus. This week will will continue in Section 2 and our focus will include a statement by Varro in praise of Socrates, and possible Epicurean responses to it.

We'll also look at Socrates' "Second Sailing" and the major topics contained in the Mark Riley Article "The Epicurean Criticism of Socrates"

File

Riley - The Epicurean Criticism of Socrates

Details of the Epicurean Criticism of Socrates for his character and method of teaching.

Cassius

January 10, 2018 at 4:17 PM

Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackam translation here:

• 
  

  

  Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Complete Show transcript is here:

Episode 321 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week our episode is entitled: "The Epicurean Criticism of Socrates For Denouncing Natural Science"

Current Link to Cosmos Episode 7 - Backbone of the Night - Attacking the Socratic/Platonic abandonment of the study of Nature (mentioned in this episode of the podcast)

Carl Sagan Cosmos Episode 7 - The Backbone of Night - Greek subtitles, ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΟΙ ΥΠΟΤΙΤΛΟΙ

Cosmos: A Personal Voyage is a thirteen-part television series written by Carl Sagan, Ann Druyan, and Steven Soter, with Sagan as presenter. It was…

odysee.com

This will deserve its own thread - Socrates' "Second Sailing" and its implications from the Epicurean perspective.

Thread

An Analogy That Should Live Forever In Infamy Along With His Ridiculous "Cave" Analogy - Socrates' "Second Sailing"

Carl Sagan's "Backbone of the Night" episode has me wanting to pursue further the condemnation of Socrates and Plato for deprecating the study of natural philosophy. Here's some initial research into a term apparently that is a key part of that terrible turn of philosophy:

What was Socrates' "second sailing"?

Socrates' "second sailing" (in Greek: deuteros plous, δεύτερος πλοῦς) is a famous metaphor and methodological turning point described in Plato's Phaedo (around 99c–d). It occurs during…

Cassius

February 19, 2026 at 1:52 PM

Carl Sagan's "Backbone of the Night" episode has me wanting to pursue further the condemnation of Socrates and Plato for deprecating the study of natural philosophy. Here's some initial research into a term apparently that is a key part of that terrible turn of philosophy:

What was Socrates' "second sailing"?

Socrates' "second sailing" (in Greek: deuteros plous, δεύτερος πλοῦς) is a famous metaphor and methodological turning point described in Plato's Phaedo (around 99c–d). It occurs during Socrates' intellectual autobiography, where he recounts his early disillusionment with natural philosophy (the "inquiry into nature," or physis historia) and his subsequent shift in approach.The phrase draws from an ancient Greek proverb: when the wind fails during a sea voyage (the "first sailing," relying on sails), one resorts to the "second sailing" by taking to the oars — in other words, the next best or fallback method when the preferred/direct one doesn't work.Context and MeaningIn the Phaedo, Socrates explains that he initially pursued explanations for natural phenomena (causes of generation, growth, decay, etc.) through direct empirical investigation of physical processes — examining things themselves (erga, deeds/works, or material realities) in the manner of the pre-Socratic natural philosophers (like Anaxagoras). He hoped to discover the ultimate cause, especially the good as an ordering principle.This approach disappointed him: it either led to mechanistic, material explanations that ignored purpose/teleology or failed to deliver satisfactory answers about causation and the good. Disillusioned and fearing he might go blind (metaphorically) by staring directly at things, Socrates decided on a new path:He would take refuge in arguments, reason, discourse, or accounts (logoi) — "fleeing into the logoi" (eis tous logous kataphugonta) — and examine the truth of beings (tōn ontōn tēn alētheian) through them instead.This "second sailing" is thus Socrates' famous turn from direct, physical/sensory investigation of the world to investigating reality through reasoned discourse, definitions, and ultimately the hypothesis of the Forms (the intelligible, eternal realities like Beauty itself, Equality itself, etc.).Key Implications

• It is "second best" only in a provisional sense (as a safer, more reliable method after the failure of the first), but for Plato/Socrates it becomes the philosophically superior path.
• It leads directly into the theory of Forms as explanatory causes: beautiful things are beautiful because they participate in the Form of Beauty, etc. (the "safe" hypothesis Socrates adopts at 100a ff.).
• This shift is foundational for much of Plato's metaphysics and epistemology — moving from the visible realm to the intelligible, from becoming to being.

In short, the "second sailing" marks Socrates' decisive turn to rational, conceptual inquiry (dialectic and the Forms) as the proper way to seek truth and causes, after abandoning the inadequate direct study of nature. It's one of the clearest articulations in Plato of why philosophy must prioritize logos over mere empirical observation.

Quote from Phaedo

“Then I heard someone who had a book of Anaxagoras, as he said, [97c] out of which he read that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was quite delighted at the notion of this, which appeared admirable, and I said to myself: If mind is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the best place; and I argued that if anyone desired to find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must find out what state of being or suffering or doing was best for that thing, [97d] and therefore a man had only to consider the best for himself and others, and then he would also know the worse, for that the same science comprised both. And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, and I imagined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round; [97e] and then he would further explain the cause and the necessity of this, and would teach me the nature of the best and show that this was best; and if he said that the earth was in the center, he would explain that this position was the best, and I should be satisfied if this were shown to me, [98a] and not want any other sort of cause. And I thought that I would then go and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and that he would explain to me their comparative swiftness, and their returnings and various states, and how their several affections, active and passive, were all for the best. For I could not imagine that when he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would give any other account of their being as they are, except that this was best; [98b] and I thought when he had explained to me in detail the cause of each and the cause of all, he would go on to explain to me what was best for each and what was best for all. I had hopes which I would not have sold for much, and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could in my eagerness to know the better and the worse.

“What hopes I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind [98c] or any other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities. I might compare him to a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavored to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have ligaments which divide them, [98d] and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which contains them; and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture: that is what he would say, and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, [98e] forgetting to mention the true cause, which is that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence; [99a] for I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone off to Megara or Boeotia—by the dog of Egypt they would, if they had been guided only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen as the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and running away, to undergo any punishment which the State inflicts. There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this. It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them, [99b] and that this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking and misnaming. And thus one man makes a vortex all round and steadies the earth by the sky; another gives the air as a support to the earth, which is a sort of broad trough. [99c] Any power which in disposing them as they are disposes them for the best never enters into their minds, nor do they imagine that there is the power of a daimōn in that; they rather expect to find another Atlas of the world who is stronger and more everlasting and more containing than the good is, and are clearly of opinion that the obligatory and containing power of the good is as nothing; and yet this is the principle which I would want to learn if anyone would teach me. But as I have failed either to discover myself or to learn of anyone else, [99d] the nature of the best, I will exhibit to you, if you like, what I have found to be the second best mode of inquiring into the cause.”

“I should very much like to hear that,” he replied.

Socrates proceeded: “I thought that as I had failed in the contemplation of true existence, I ought to be careful that I did not lose the eye of my psūkhē; as people may injure their bodily eye by observing and gazing on the sun during an eclipse, unless they take the precaution of only looking at the image reflected in the water, [99e] or in some similar medium. That occurred to me, and I was afraid that my psūkhē might be blinded altogether if I looked at things with my eyes or tried by the help of the senses to apprehend them. And I thought that I had better have recourse to ideas, and seek in them the truth of existence. I dare say that the simile [100a] is not perfect—for I am very far from admitting that he who contemplates existence through the medium of ideas sees them only as an image, any more than he who sees them in their working and effects. However, this was the method which I adopted: I first assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then I affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating to the cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded as untrue. But I should like to explain my meaning clearly, as I do not think that you understand me.”

Quote from Matteng

The main point is that when you desire no things outside of your control ( like life, health … ) you encounter no „unhappiness“ or when you desire only Virtue you get „complete“ happiness.I'd start by saying that their definition of "happiness" is absolute BS. No issues of control are even relevant until you forthrightly start with a clear explanation of what "happiness," means without the BS "virtue" overlay.

It appears that many Stoics are comfortable saying that they have no concerns about life and health. For my part I'd say that unless you have life and at least some degree of health, no happiness is possible.

This is an unbridgeable divide. The Stoics can go their way and I'll go mine.

I have now expanded the old comparison chart we had on the forum through the use of Claude AI to include columns for the Socratics and the Aristotelians. For the new additions I haven't checked each of the sources that that are listed for each point on the chart, but the issue summaries themselves appear to be a very good start.

This chart is something that we've needed for a very long time, and we need to bring our Epicurean expertise to improving it beyond what is possible through AI alone. It appears to me that Claude has already to some extent picked up from the material I already had on Epicurus and the Stoics a general tone of comparison that is valid, but I invite comments and suggestions on improving both the summaries and the citations. We need to edit these observations from an Epicurean perspective to help make sure that the divisions are highlighted as starkly and clearly as possible.

Epicurus vs Other Major Philosophies - Epicureanfriends.com

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