As to the work of Steve Patterson outside the video, I can save people some time about where he stands:
Posts by Cassius
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OK i have watched the video and now I have another way of asking my last question:
- Lamar_44 thinks the Patterson video is "good" and useful.
- Martin thinks the Patterson video is a "bad" and a waste of time.
What explains the very different reactions to the video between two people who (by virtue of being here at EpicureaFriends) presumably look at basic issues of reality from a somewhat similar perspective?
Maybe that's just another way of asking the same question, or maybe that's more interesting and more useful for forum purposes than the question presented in the video itself.
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@Lamar_44 I note Martin's comment and as soon as I have time will watch that myself.
What conclusion do you reach based on that video?
The entire question of imagination and thought experiments definitely has interest for some people. If Zeno wants to imagine infinite divisibility and construct hypotheticals based on it, then in a free world he has a right to do that, and if it gives him pleasure then more power to him.
I see that the video starts out asking whether a series of math statements getting increasingly smaller really "equals" zero, and the obvious answer is that of course it doesn't because you're defining the question in a way that doesn't mean exactly the same thing as zero.
Do such experiments have practical uses? Probably so - math has lots of practical uses.
But if the purpose of thought experiments is to confuse other people and make them doubt practical reality, then that is not just innocent fun and games, but harmful to real people.
Where do you see all this going and what benefits derive from exploring the things that people can imagine without first establishing that what they imagine is real?
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LAMAR__44 thank you for your posts in the forum so far. You have asked some good questions that are asked regularly, so I am glad we've had the opportunity to discuss them.
However I note that you have not said much about your own positions or offered much in the way of your own personal agreement or disagreement with Epicurean philosophy.
Can you please elaborate on that?
While asking good questions is helpful, we are not a general philosophy forum, and we do want to make sure our time is being used most productively toward the goals of the site.
Thanks
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Presuming first that we are communicating as to "universe" meaning "the all" and not just "our universe" then I'd go back to the very first part of your first post.
Essentially, it argues that the universe could not be eternal, since this would require an infinite past.
I doubt Epicurus would go much past that without stating that "the universe / the all" must be eternal, because it is inconceivable that there was ever a time in which "the all" did not exist. It certainly appear to us that the we exist, and that it makes no sense to consider that there was ever a time that the all did not exist, so I would rule out of hand any supposition (it would require an infinite number of steps to get here and that's not possible) that conflicts with what all appearances tells us does exist.
I'm sure someone here can probably do better than that for an answer but any fundamental logical paradox like that has to be resolved in the end by relying on the apparences (sensations) which in the end are all we have as contact with reality. The mind can image all sorts of constructions that defy reality, but devotion to what nature has given us is why in the end we go with sensations and not with pure logic that ultimately cannot be reconciled with the senses.
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Of course "arrangement of atoms" is clearly just a shorthand, and calling something "emergence" is just slapping another label on it. But I am wondering if there are others ways to describe the process that help distinguish it from "randomness"
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I think what I am considering is whether it is the best we can do to say that -for example - memory is simply a very precise arrangement of atoms.
Again not implying that it is anything non-natural, but there are many things which clearly CAN be that. I am not sure about memory
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Patrikios I wonder if "emergence" is not part of this answer too. I think it's reasonable to say that if we were taking an atomic reductionist point of view that the "atoms" of our current forms could in fact be reunited in exactly their same positions over the course of infinite time and space. In fact I think some here (including Martin and me perhaps) think that that is logically compelled by the infinite universe/eternal time thesis.
And probably that goes far enough to say that that can/will happen, and since we've had an eternity of time and infinity of space already, it already HAS happened an infinite number of times, and yet we don't remember any past lives, and so that settles the question.
But probably as we work on describing what "emergence" really entails, which is more than just identical atoms "arranged" in identical ways, we might be able to add an additional layer of description to the discussion of it. Maybe just additional explanation of what "combination" or 'arrangement" might imply, but still something additional that would give a greater explanatory power to the discussion and explain why simple "rearrangment" through motion might not be enough to reconstitute the memory that you are referring to.
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Quote
Essentially, it argues that the universe could not be eternal
QuoteThis point is consistent with Epicurean physics, which teaches that each kósmos is temporary.
And I agree with Eikadistes there Lamar_44. Eikadistes is using what is apparently the current terminology. I use the terminology I grew up with - "universe means everything - the all." As I read it we end up in the same place.
I'm speaking personally here, but I disagree with this on the premise of Karl Popper's delineation between verification versus falsifiability. Verification says that we have to experimentally verify things for statements to be true.
This is a recurring theme of some recent discussions here. Call it a matter of terminology or whatever, but I (and I think Epicurus and those who followed him on canonics did so) maintain that it is ridiculous to assert that before you can "know" something you must have "been there done that yourself."
But, here again, it might be better not to use ancient categories to organize the concepts we derive from modern observations.
And I would say that it also would be better not to let modern observations cause us to lose sight of ancient categories when those categories still serve a useful purpose and those categories are not comprehensively contradicted by those modern observations.
For example I would say that just because the observable universe appears to be expanding, that does not compel us to conclude that the universe as a whole is not infinite in size or eternal in time. Some disagree, but I think those conclusions remain logically persuasive. And if you say "no the universe is neither eternal nor infinite" then the practical result is not "truth," (which the "no" chorus does not advocate for anyway) but the opening of the door to the presumption that 'god' is what existed before the universe (it if came into being at some point) or outside the universe (if the universe is not infinite in size).
Again, not everyone here agrees with my point of view on that, but (1) as far as I can tell that is what Epicurus held, and (2) the position that Epicurus held is of far greater understandability and practical benefit for non-specialists than the unending and unverifiable speculation that many want to substitute in its place.
If someone disagrees with my reading of Epicurus, please be sure to correct me.
Thanks to Eikadistes for an excellent post.
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It appears for some reason that this thread was closed in error, as I don't see another one treating the same article by Sedley. It's directly relevant to issues of knowledge and probability so I am bumping it for reference in current discussions.
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Sound to me like that's a variation of the Zeno argument that you cannot move or walk across the room because there are infinite steps in between.
Someone else ( Joshua ) probably can state the response better than me, but Epicurus rejects the argument that matter is infinitely divisible so as to make motion impossible, and that presumably would apply to this question as well.
As to conceptualizing infinity that's an excellent question too. I presume part of the answer there is that it would be more difficult to conceptualize an END to space or number of atoms than it would be to conceptualize unlimited amounts of both. That's the argument that is stated at length in Lucretius Book One at 968 in more detail (including the javvelin argument) than is included in the letter the Herodotus.
Again as with your other question I think you're touching on something where we have at least some relevant information in Philodemus' "On Signs," this time under the heading of "inconceivability."
EpicureanFriends Side-By-Side LucretiusMulti-column side-by-side Lucretius text comparison tool featuring Munro, Bailey, Dunster, and Condensed editions.handbook.epicureanfriends.com -
Perhaps it’s that we wouldn’t feel a continuation of existence like we do now,
Perhaps Tau Phi's post mentions this (haven't read it yet) but your specific question is addressed by Lucretius. His answer is as you indicate, that our exact atoms could reassemble in the future, but that we would have no memory of it so it would not be us in actuality.
I think your question of why the memory would not reassemble is also a good one, but as I understand Lucretius his answer is that we would not expect that because human experience is indeed that we now have no memory of past lives, so we would not expect that past experience to change. That's an issue that bleeds over into Epicurean canonics in general and Phildemus' On Signs in particular, as a question of when we have enough information to infer that we are confident of the answer. I would expect this to be one of those times.
EpicureanFriends Side-By-Side LucretiusMulti-column side-by-side Lucretius text comparison tool featuring Munro, Bailey, Dunster, and Condensed editions.handbook.epicureanfriends.com3-843
And even if the nature of mind and the power of soul has feeling, after it has been rent asunder from our body, yet it is naught to us, who are made one by the mating and marriage of body and soul. Nor, if time should gather together our substance after our decease and bring it back again as it is now placed, if once more the light of life should be vouchsafed to us, yet, even were that done, it would not concern us at all, when once the remembrance of our former selves were snapped in twain. And even now we care not at all for the selves that we once were, not at all are we touched by any torturing pain for them. For when you look back over all the lapse of immeasurable time that now is gone, and think how manifold are the motions of matter, you could easily believe this too, that these same seeds, whereof we now are made, have often been placed in the same order as they are now; and yet we cannot recall that in our mind’s memory; for in between lies a break in life, and all the motions have wandered everywhere far astray from sense.
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Given that many of our recent discussions have focused on identifying the Epicurean position as to knowledge, and whether "probability" is the best we can do on any topic, I've produced using Claude an initial outline of the analysis of Philodemus made by DeLacy and Sedley. The current result seems to me to accord with my prior reading from both sources, and this outline brings the sources and references together in a much tighter presentation that we've had available before.
Just to be clear, it is a primary goal of EpicureanFriends.com to produce accurate and understandable material to help new people develop a general level of understanding of Epicurus. Even after ten years of online activity, we've previously only scratched the surface of review of this work by Philodemus, despite the fact that it clearly and firmly addresses one of the most controversial aspects of Epicurean philosophy. These are issues we are grappling with now on the Lucretius Today Podcast, and we're going to turn even more directly to them when we finish Academic Questions and move directly to this book.
if you have an absolutist rejection of all use of AI in philosophical work, you certainly are under no obligation to read any of all of this document. If, on the other hand, you're in tune with the urgency and desirability of using any tool possible to better understand Epicurean philosophy and explain it to others, then I welcome your review of this summary and your suggestions for improving it. Please post those in the thread linked below.
The full version of the current analysis outline at EpicurusToday.com:
Philodemus - On Methods of Inference - Outline and Analysis
Forum thread for discussion, comments, suggestions:
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Robert I have completed my first review of the full Claude summary, and it appears to me to be excellent. For ease of followup I would appreciate further comments on this topic being made over there so we can keep most of the discussion in the Philodemus subsection:
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I have asked ClaudaAI to take the DeLacy translation and commentary, as well as Sedley's essay On Signs, and produce a detailed outline and analysis of the work based on those two authorities. After reviewing the result it looks pretty good to me, and extremely useful.
Given it's length and easier presentation in markdown format than here, I'll link it first (where it is easier to read). The full text follows after the link. Given the duplicate effort in maintaining two copies I will probably update the epicurustoday.com version more frequently, so I advise referring to that one. (especially since at the moment the forum version is irritatingly converting some punctuation to smiley faces!)
Epicurean Canonics - The World We Experience Is the Only Real WorldA comprehensive analysis of Epicurean theory of knowledge, from the criteria of truth and the De Signis debate to anti-reductionism and the refutation of all…epicurustoday.comEDIT -- As of 4/7/26 I have already made significant revisions to the document, and I see that it's not going to be feasible to maintain two copies at least until the revisions begin to slow. Please refer to the version at EpicurusToday.com for the latest version.
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What conclusion would you reach if there were such influence?
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At this meeting Robertbravely attempted to summarize aspects of Philodemus' "On Methods of Inference / On Signs" as to where Philodemus comes down on whether positions can constitute"knowledge" or rise only to "probability."
If i recall correctly Robert thought that Philodemus came down on the side off "probabiiity." I was not able to confirm or deny that.
At this moment I still can't, and firm positions are going to have to wait until we can devote more time to review of that work.
However I don't want to leave the conversation as is without some degree of followup, so here is what Claude says when I asked it to compare the Delacy commentary and the Sedley commentary with the DeLacy translation. I'm going to pursue this much further but here is the summary. Take it for what it is worth, but I will say that the following makes sense to me given my current state of understanding Epicurus.
IX. SUMMARY OF PHILODEMUS' POSITION
Philodemus defends the following set of claims, which together constitute the Epicurean philosophy of knowledge:
- All perceptions are true in the sense of faithfully presenting the appearance that occurs. Error arises only from additional opinion.
- Inference from perception, properly conducted, is genuine knowledge — not merely probable. The properly-made analogical inference carries the same epistemic status as perception itself (Frag. 2).
- The criterion of inconceivability converts inductive inference into claims of necessity. When it is genuinely inconceivable (on the basis of broad empirical observation) that the sign could exist without what it signifies, we have established a necessary connection.
- Non-contestation (ouk antimarturēsis) is a sufficient condition for truth when combined with explanatory power. A theory that conflicts with no phenomenon and explains what needs explaining is genuinely true (for basic physics), not merely probably true.
- The elimination method is not independently valid but derives whatever force it has from the prior work of the similarity method. Stoic deduction is epistemically downstream from Epicurean induction.
- The Stoic pithanon classification is rejected for properly-conducted empirical inference. It may apply to careless or premature inferences; it does not apply to inference conducted with wide and varied observation, correct identification of relevant qualities, and confirmed by non-contestation.
- Degrees of certainty exist within the class of warranted inferences: some inferences are more secure than others, depending on the uniformity and breadth of the evidence. But the existence of more and less secure inferences does not mean that the more secure ones are merely probable.
- The limits of knowledge are real: some things (the parity of the stars) are genuinely unknowable; for celestial phenomena, multiple explanations may all be equally acceptable; for basic physics, uniquely determined truth is achievable.
In short, Philodemus' position is a robust empirical foundationalism: the senses give us infallible access to appearances; properly-made inferences from appearances give us genuine, necessary knowledge of the unperceived world. This is neither scepticism (knowledge is impossible) nor rationalism (knowledge requires a priori foundations). It is a demanding empiricism that claims genuine knowledge of atoms, void, and unperceived objects throughout the universe.
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So friendship is defined as pleasure created when two or more beings cooperate, as it benefits all parties in fulfilling their own needs, but it emerges into something greater? Either weak emergence where we still map it onto satisfying personal pleasure, but we gain pleasure from viewing the other person’s needs as our own, or is it strong emergence where as the value of friendship now is above just the value of pleasure?
I don't think Epicurus would consider "the value of friendship above the value of pleasure"
His wider framework is clearly to divide all feelings into pleasure and pain with only pleasure desirable in and of itself. So I think that observation answers your specific question about ranking - friendship is among the pleasures, not "above" pleasure. (Remembering of course that for Epicurus "pleasure" is an extremely broad term that covers everything in life that is desirable.)
I am not familiar with Epicurus dividing emergence into weaker or stronger - only in the materials we have been qualties that are necessary to the identity of the things vs those that are "events" that can change without the thing itself being destroyed.
Certainly pleasures are not all identical, in that they effect different parts of the body, have different intensities, and different durations. And Epicurus refers to "greater pleasure" in the letter to Menoeceus so it would not be necessary to think of friendship as being more than one of the greater - or perhaps greatest - sources of pleasure.
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something that can’t just be thought of as the sum of its parts but something greater? Like the mind being created by the brain but being above it in a way where you can’t reduce the mind to each neuron in the brain?
This is a subject that we have not explored deeply here at the forum, with Sedley's "Epicurean Anti-Reductionism" only recently being first discussed. References to "both levels (atomic and our world level) being real has been discussed as a result of Sedley's "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism" article mentioned for several years, but even that has not really explored in depth.
I think the answer to your question is probably what your wrote that I have quoted above. For example water is something that most of us probably consider very much more than "the sum of its parts" (atoms of hydrogen and oxygen) . But it would be essential to keep in mind the emphatic limitation that consideration of the emergent quality never crosses over into a "supernatural" quality that implies the existence of an otherworldly intelligence.
This is a great question and no doubt discussion of it will be scattered throughout the forum in the future. Pleasure as discussed in this thread is absolutely one part of the question, as is determinism. For now the original and probably wider discussions are probably focused in these threads:
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