Posts by Cassius

I know that PD06 has translation issues, but In this discussion of deception both it (especially in Bailey's preferred reading) and other statements about the result being what matters probably has a bearing on Epicurus' attitude toward deception and other actions that some presume to be "always" bad.

PD06. In order that men might not fear one another, there was a natural benefit to be had from government and kingship, provided that they are able to bring about this result. PD06: The translation given is by Mensch. Formerly we used Eugene O’Connor from “The Essential Epicurus": "Whatever you can provide yourself with to secure protection from men is a natural good.” Bailey: “To secure protection from men anything is a natural good by which you may be able to attain this end.” New Greek Version: “In order to obtain security from other people, there was (always) the natural good of sovereignty and kingship, through which (someone) once could have accomplished this.” This version is up for review given that the Greek for sovereignty and kingship clearly appears in the text but is emended out by Usener and others. See the discussion of PD06 for further detail.

Listening to the first part of that reminds me that PENELOPE is also using deception to put off the suitors - but of course only an extreme Stoic would fault her for that?

The role of deception here and how to evaluate it is clearly critical --- and I'd presume that Epicurus would NOT take the position that deception (or any other vice the Stoics would presume to be bad) is "always" bad.

Quote from Lowri834

n case anyone wants some background on The Odyssey, also mentions the lying…

That British accent really adds a lot - and the humor too!

This below is going to be far from authoritative but the citations give a place to start answering the question: How did the ancient Greeks view Odysseus? Hero, or deceiver? Give me ancient quotations with citations to back up your answer.

As to the Stoics in particular:

Quote from Bryan

Homer’s Odysseus is, first and foremost, a liar. His truth is whatever benefits him.

Yes this is very fascinating to me and the reason that I've never been certain what is really going on here.

That gets at specifically the issues I want to know about:

Did the ANCIENT GREEKS see Odysseus as first and foremost a liar? Or did they approve of his willingness to use deception against enemies? I suspect that the Stoics would have disapproved due to their absolutist approach to morality, but they came much later, and I don't know that for a fact as to the Greeks as a whole, who I suspect would not have shared that view. Were the Greeks in general embarrassed by the use of the Trojan horse? I don't get that impression.

I have this general impression that the ancient Greeks considered Odysseus in general to be a hero. In fact I can't believe I'm writing that that might NOT be the case. Yes, like the gods, subject to making mistakes or being arbitrary and capricious - but still a hero.

I don't think we can get to the bottom of that without knowing what the ancient authorities had to say about Odysseus. Did they condemn him or praise him or both?

But the way you phrased that Bryan is key -- did they see him as FIRST AND FOREMOST a liar?

I have updated this thread title and added Youtube links (into post 1 above) to the TV Miniseries production starring Armand Assante, Isabella Rossellini, Vanessa Williams, and many others.

We can certainly discuss the differences between this and the new Christopher Nolan version as well, as that too would be interesting.

But this older version gives us probably a more "standard" version of the story for those of us who have not read Homer in decades - if at all.

Another issue would be considering Epicurus' view of Homer's writing and plot from Epicurus' view of a character like Odysseus. What aspects of Odysseus' character would Epicurus find admirable, and which not?

I just finished watching the Miniseries version for the first time and I have a couple of preliminary comments:

1. This story gives us a lot of material to understand what Epicurus was fighting against in terms of the majority Greek view of the gods and their intervention in human life.
2. It also gives us a picture of a Greek hero who might have understood that the gods were powerful and needed to be humored to a degree, but who also took whatever steps he could to fight back against their intereference in his life.
3. Seems like half or more of the story is Odysseus being confronted with goddesses or kings who offered him immortality and a life of relaxed total pleasure, but that Odysseus rejected this time and time again because he loved his home and family more. Rather than calling this attitude "duty over pleasure" I would say it is more fair to say that he chose specific mental pleasures of devotion to his own country and family over other bodily/sensual sensual pleasures that were not particularly his own. And he was choosing them not because the gods told him to -- in fact often in opposition to them - but because he himself chose them. These episodes speak volumes about Greek attitudes toward pleasure -- not that pleasure is to be rejected in general, but that some pleasures are more pleasurable than others. The idea that the Greeks of Epicurus; time would have perceived "tranquility" or "calmness" INSTEAD OF or OVER pleasure as the best way of life is ridiculous.

Much more likely is that the majority of Greeks and Romans shared Cicero's formulation -- "a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures."

Cicero, In defense of Publius Sestius, 10.23: “He {Publius Clodius} praised those most who are said to be above all others the teachers and eulogists of pleasure {the Epicureans}. … He added that these same men were quite right in saying that the wise do everything for their own interests; that no sane man should engage in public affairs; that nothing was preferable to a life of tranquility crammed full of pleasures. But those who said that men should aim at an honorable position, should consult the public interest, should think of duty throughout life not of self-interest, should face danger for their country, receive wounds, welcome death – these he called visionaries and madmen.” Note: Here is a link to Perseus where the Latin and translation of this can be compared. The Latin is: “nihil esse praestabilius otiosa vita, plena et conferta voluptatibus.” See also here for word translations.

Update On This Thread -- I have split this quotation and subsequent responses so we can focus on it with greater focus.

Clearly Diogenes Laertius and Torquatus make statements to the effect that "the wise man is always happy."

Nevertheless Epicurus did not eliminate his kidney pains by arraying against those of his friends and his philosophy. And Torquatus said that the wise man will have more cause for joy than for vexation -- meaning that even though we have more pleasure than pain we still have pain.

So does calling someone "happy" mean that he takes no action to further reduce or eliminate the remaining pains. Is there some better label than "happy" for someone who has more pleasures than pain but is nevertheless focused on taking action to eliminate remaining pains - and even angry about it?

I think those questions are entailed in the original quote and deserve special attention.

Note - the last several posts in this thread are not as focused on the original point as the earlier ones. However they are still relevant: because if "tranquility" is your absolute priority, and you have 51% pleasure 49% pains, why would you take any further action to eliminate them; why be angry and be motivated to fix about the remaining pains? How does the rhetoric of "the wise man always have more reason for joy than for vexation" interplay with not being reconciled to a sick society?

Dehorting -- that's a new one for me, but traces right back to the latin as opposite of exhort - which isn't so archaic!

Dehorting is the present participle/gerund of the rare/archaic verb "dehort".MeaningTo dehort = to strongly advise against something, to dissuade, or to urge someone not to do a particular action.

merriam-webster.com

It is essentially the opposite of "exhort" (which means to strongly encourage or urge someone to do something).Examples

• "His friends tried to dehort him from quitting his job impulsively."
• "The coach was dehorting the team from using risky plays."
• "Parents often dehort their children from dangerous habits."

Notes

• It's a formal, literary, or somewhat obsolete word derived from Latin dehortārī ("to dissuade").
• You won't see it in everyday modern English very often — "dissuade," "discourage," or "advise against" are the common replacements.
• It occasionally appears in older literature, philosophical texts (e.g., Hobbes), or as a deliberate stylistic choice for its precision.

So this is from Metrodorus and not Epicurus himself? Seems to me I hear this attributed to Epicurus so if it is not that is a misunderstanding that needs correcting.

TO PYTHOCLES:
Sent. Vat. LI (= Pap. Berol. 16369, col. II) [20]
You tell me that the stimulus of the flesh makes you too prone to the pleasures of love. Provided that you do not break the laws or good customs and do not distress any of your neighbours or do harm to your body or squander your pittance, you may indulge your inclination as you please. Yet it is impossible not to come up against one or other of these barriers: for the pleasures of love never profited a man and he is lucky if they do him no harm.

From Tau Phi's collection of works of Metrodorus:

PHILODEMUS, On Anger, col. XLV [7]

In fact, Epicurus makes clear in his First Appellations both that the sage “will experience rage” and (will experience it) “in moderation,” and Metrodorus, if he says “the rage of the wise man” in its proper sense, shows also that he feels it “very briefly.”

Tau Phi I have a question here - is this "dehorting" a typo?

PLUTARCH, Against Colotes, 34, 1127 d [5]
If those who abolish laws, governments, and polices of men subvert
and destroy human life, and if Metrodorus and Epicurus do this, by
dehorting and withdrawing their friends from concerning themselves
in public affairs, by hating those who intermeddle in them, by reviling
the first most wise lawgivers, and by advising contempt of the laws
provided there is no fear and danger of the whip punishment.

The following quote from Tau Phi's recent collection of quotations by or about Metrodorus is relevant to this topic of whether all things that have a beginning must have an end. It's also relevant to DeWitt's point that for Epicurus the gods are not supernaturally immortal, but as they too are compounded of atoms and therefore void they must act to maintain their existence.

PHILODEMUS, On Piety, fr. 122 [17]

Metrodorus too finds a defence in saying in On Gods and further in On Change that that which has no share of the void endures, but that every compound is destructible.

The following quote from Tau Phi's recent collection of quotations by or about Metrodorus is relevant to this topic of whether all things that have a beginning must have an end. It's also relevant to DeWitt's point that for Epicurus the gods are not supernaturally immortal, but as they too are compounded of atoms and therefore void they must act to maintain their existence.

PHILODEMUS, On Piety, fr. 122 [17]

Metrodorus too finds a defence in saying in On Gods and further in On Change that that which has no share of the void endures, but that every compound is destructible.

From Tau Phi's recent collection on the works of Metrodorus I want to add this here under a list of quotes relevant to emergence.

It is pretty confusingly worded, or confusingly translated, or both, but it seems to me to be pretty clearly talking about a mixture of canonics (thinking to establish their own senses by destroying those of others) and emergence (seeing that one is affected by one quality and faculty of it, and another by another.)

PLUTARCH, Against Colotes, 5, 1109 c [5]

And as for these symmetries and proportions of the pores, or little passages in the organs of the senses, about which they talk so much, and those different mixtures of seeds, which, they say, being dispersed through all savors, odors, and colors, move the senses of different persons to perceive different qualities, do they not manifestly drive them to this, that things are no more of one nature than another? For to pacify those who think the sense is deceived and lies because they see contrary events and passions in such as use the same objects, and to solve this objection, they teach,—that when almost everything was confused and mixed up together, since it has been arranged by Nature that one thing shall fit another thing, it was not the contact or the apprehension of the same quality nor were all parts affected in the same way by what was influencing them. But those only coalesced with anything to which they had a characteristic, symmetrical in a corresponding proportion; so that they are in error so obstinately to insist that a thing is either good or bad, white or not white, thinking to establish their own senses by destroying those of others; whereas they ought neither to combat the senses,—because they all touch some quality, each one drawing from this confused mixture, as from a living and large fountain, what is suitable and convenient,—nor to pronounce of the whole, by touching only the parts, nor to think that all ought to be affected after one and the same manner by the same thing, seeing that one is affected by one quality and faculty of it, and another by another. Let us investigate who those men are which bring in this opinion that things are not more of one quality than another, if they are not those who affirm that every sensible object is a mixture, compounded of all sorts of qualities, like a mixture of new wine fermenting, and who confess that all their rules are lost and their faculty of judging quite gone, if they admit any sensible object that is pure and simple, and do not make each one thing to be many?

Here is one of the many useful quotes here that we need to be able to find very often. Lately it seems like every mention of Epicurus is accompanied by the assertion that he lived on bread and water (they like to throw in ....and a little cheese) when in truth nothing could be further from the truth or make less sense for Epicurus to have done. What does make sense, here as Seneca says, is that at intervals Epicurus would test his ability to remain happy while eating little, much as we might train through exercises of any sort to be at the top of our games in anything we do.

SENECA, Epist. ad Luc, 18, 9 [11]

Even Epicurus, the teacher of pleasure, used to observe stated intervals, during which he satisfied his hunger in niggardly fashion; he wished to see whether he thereby fell short of full and complete happiness, and, if so, by what amount he fell short, and whether this amount was worth purchasing at the price of great effort. At any rate, he makes such a statement in the well known letter written to Polyaenus in the archonship of Charinus. Indeed, he boasts that he himself lived on less than a penny, but that Metrodorus, whose progress was not yet so great, needed a whole penny.

Outstanding Tau Phi thank you! I'm setting this up in the files section now and will post the link below.

File

The Life And Works of Metrodorus of Lampsacus

Tau Phi's Collection of the Works of Metrodorus.

Cassius

July 21, 2026 at 9:49 PM

Quote from wbernys

i want to know if Cassius finds this acceptable or in line with new policy.

I have no problem at all with anything that you wrote as being consistent with the policy. As you state in your last paragraph it is difficult and controversial to decide which pleasures are actially kinetic and katastematic in the first place. On the other hand evaluating the "duration" of a particular pleasure is relatively easy, and that's why I strongly encourge discussion of these issues to be in English.

But the key point is that whatever those two words meant to Epicurus, it's clear that he embraced both of them as part of a happy life, with "a life of happiness being a life of pleasure." The problem comes only when people start qualifying "a life of happiness is a life of pleasure" by modifying it to say "a life of happiness is a life of _______ pleasure" or worse yet - "a life of happines s is a life of tranqulity" or "a life of happines is a life of ataraxia" or any other formulation that implies that some concept other than pleasure is actually the supreme good. The worst aspect of the problem is when people become convinced that a particular activity or condition is "katastematic" and they elevate their interpretation of that particular activity or conditon to being what Epicurus "really meant" instead of the broader word pleasure.

Even the experts cannot agree among themselves exactly what function these words are performing, and even using English words to describe them as stable, restful, or enduring doesn't solve the problem. "Studying nature" as Epicurus emphasized as key to his own happiness seems very arguably to be a pleasure of action ("studying"), as are those pleasures that he arrayed against his pains in his last days.

It's true that all this may be more of a "rhetorical" point than anything else. The real objective of all of this is to emphasize the "promotion" and "teaching" function of Epicureanfriends. The policy is intended to make sure that the clarity of the objective being pleasure is not lost by substituting something else as the "supreme good." That was the original intent of the "Not NeoEpicurean But Epicurean" statement when we drafted it over ten years ago. We've included that statement somewhere on the front page and in every welcome point to every new member for as far back as I can remember, but it's clear that not everyone is reading it or taking it to heart. That's what the recent postings are intended to help fix.

But in sum William -- to repeat my response to your question -- what you've written seems fine to me.

Welcome to Episode 343 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.

This week we are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective, which gives us an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and helps us understand Epicurus' position on the same issues. This week will continue in Section 11 of Book Two.

Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackham translation here: Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Episode 343 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week our episode is entitled: "In The Search For Knowledge, Is 'Probable' Good Enough?"

Glad to have you!