What conclusion would you reach if there were such influence?
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At this meeting Robertbravely attempted to summarize aspects of Philodemus' "On Methods of Inference / On Signs" as to where Philodemus comes down on whether positions can constitute"knowledge" or rise only to "probability."
If i recall correctly Robert thought that Philodemus came down on the side off "probabiiity." I was not able to confirm or deny that.
At this moment I still can't, and firm positions are going to have to wait until we can devote more time to review of that work.
However I don't want to leave the conversation as is without some degree of followup, so here is what Claude says when I asked it to compare the Delacy commentary and the Sedley commentary with the DeLacy translation. I'm going to pursue this much further but here is the summary. Take it for what it is worth, but I will say that the following makes sense to me given my current state of understanding Epicurus.
IX. SUMMARY OF PHILODEMUS' POSITION
Philodemus defends the following set of claims, which together constitute the Epicurean philosophy of knowledge:
- All perceptions are true in the sense of faithfully presenting the appearance that occurs. Error arises only from additional opinion.
- Inference from perception, properly conducted, is genuine knowledge — not merely probable. The properly-made analogical inference carries the same epistemic status as perception itself (Frag. 2).
- The criterion of inconceivability converts inductive inference into claims of necessity. When it is genuinely inconceivable (on the basis of broad empirical observation) that the sign could exist without what it signifies, we have established a necessary connection.
- Non-contestation (ouk antimarturēsis) is a sufficient condition for truth when combined with explanatory power. A theory that conflicts with no phenomenon and explains what needs explaining is genuinely true (for basic physics), not merely probably true.
- The elimination method is not independently valid but derives whatever force it has from the prior work of the similarity method. Stoic deduction is epistemically downstream from Epicurean induction.
- The Stoic pithanon classification is rejected for properly-conducted empirical inference. It may apply to careless or premature inferences; it does not apply to inference conducted with wide and varied observation, correct identification of relevant qualities, and confirmed by non-contestation.
- Degrees of certainty exist within the class of warranted inferences: some inferences are more secure than others, depending on the uniformity and breadth of the evidence. But the existence of more and less secure inferences does not mean that the more secure ones are merely probable.
- The limits of knowledge are real: some things (the parity of the stars) are genuinely unknowable; for celestial phenomena, multiple explanations may all be equally acceptable; for basic physics, uniquely determined truth is achievable.
In short, Philodemus' position is a robust empirical foundationalism: the senses give us infallible access to appearances; properly-made inferences from appearances give us genuine, necessary knowledge of the unperceived world. This is neither scepticism (knowledge is impossible) nor rationalism (knowledge requires a priori foundations). It is a demanding empiricism that claims genuine knowledge of atoms, void, and unperceived objects throughout the universe.
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So friendship is defined as pleasure created when two or more beings cooperate, as it benefits all parties in fulfilling their own needs, but it emerges into something greater? Either weak emergence where we still map it onto satisfying personal pleasure, but we gain pleasure from viewing the other person’s needs as our own, or is it strong emergence where as the value of friendship now is above just the value of pleasure?
I don't think Epicurus would consider "the value of friendship above the value of pleasure"
His wider framework is clearly to divide all feelings into pleasure and pain with only pleasure desirable in and of itself. So I think that observation answers your specific question about ranking - friendship is among the pleasures, not "above" pleasure. (Remembering of course that for Epicurus "pleasure" is an extremely broad term that covers everything in life that is desirable.)
I am not familiar with Epicurus dividing emergence into weaker or stronger - only in the materials we have been qualties that are necessary to the identity of the things vs those that are "events" that can change without the thing itself being destroyed.
Certainly pleasures are not all identical, in that they effect different parts of the body, have different intensities, and different durations. And Epicurus refers to "greater pleasure" in the letter to Menoeceus so it would not be necessary to think of friendship as being more than one of the greater - or perhaps greatest - sources of pleasure.
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something that can’t just be thought of as the sum of its parts but something greater? Like the mind being created by the brain but being above it in a way where you can’t reduce the mind to each neuron in the brain?
This is a subject that we have not explored deeply here at the forum, with Sedley's "Epicurean Anti-Reductionism" only recently being first discussed. References to "both levels (atomic and our world level) being real has been discussed as a result of Sedley's "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism" article mentioned for several years, but even that has not really explored in depth.
I think the answer to your question is probably what your wrote that I have quoted above. For example water is something that most of us probably consider very much more than "the sum of its parts" (atoms of hydrogen and oxygen) . But it would be essential to keep in mind the emphatic limitation that consideration of the emergent quality never crosses over into a "supernatural" quality that implies the existence of an otherworldly intelligence.
This is a great question and no doubt discussion of it will be scattered throughout the forum in the future. Pleasure as discussed in this thread is absolutely one part of the question, as is determinism. For now the original and probably wider discussions are probably focused in these threads:
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My first reaction would be 'both' - given that the context seems to be that he is considering things for which we are responsible , and everything that you're listing seems to be at least somewhat arising from our own choices.
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I am likely to eventually break this out into a discussion of its own, but in this episode of the podcast Joshua brings up the question of "doxa" vs "episteme." From wikipedia:
Doxa (Ancient Greek: δόξα; from verb δοκεῖν, dokein, 'to appear, to seem, to think, to accept')[1] is a common belief or popular opinion. In classical rhetoric, doxa is contrasted with episteme ('knowledge').
We're having many simultaneous discussions about these issues right now, and it seems to me to be a good idea to try to be as clear as possible on what Epicurus considered to be "knowledge" vs what he considered to be "opinion."
"Knowledge" is a term to me that seems pretty clear, but probably "opinion" needs clarification as to whether "opinion" (as a word standing alone) is always to be viewed with suspicion, (probably yes?) while "knowledge" (as a word standing alone) implies something much more firm.
So that's something that needs to be clarified, but after that, the big issue is deciding what Epicurus held to be "known" and therefore relied upon with confidence vs "opinion" in which probability might be the best that can be said for it.
Specifically, as examples, did Epicurus hold PD01 and PD02 as written to be "knowledge" or some lesser standard, better described as "opinion."
Clearly Epicurus held many things mentioned in the letter to Pythocles to be open to numbers of possibilities, so as to those mostly astronomical issues I'd say those are "opinion."
But what about the affirmative statements in PD01, PD02? We'll also want to consider the many affirmative statements made in the letter to Menoeceus, and the most general of statements in Herodotus, but we ought not bite off more than can be chewed too quickly.
Were the positions stated in PD01 and PD02 considered by Epicurus to be "known" (knowledge)? Would he have admitted any aspect of them to be only "probably" true?
EDIT: It will presumably be important to incorporate as primary sources:
- What Lucretius says about this topic in Book 4 (a very long section but especially here
- What Diogenes of Oinoanda has to say about this in Fragment 5.
Fr. 5 [Others do not] explicitly [stigmatise] natural science as unnecessary, being ashamed to acknowledge [this], but use another means of discarding it. For, when they assert that things are inapprehensible, what else are they saying than that there is no need for us to pursue natural science? After all, who will choose to seek what he can never find? Now Aristotle and those who hold the same Peripatetic views as Aristotle say that nothing is scientifically knowable, because things are continually in flux and, on account of the rapidity of the flux, evade our apprehension. We on the other hand acknowledge their flux, but not its being so rapid that the nature of each thing [is] at no time apprehensible by sense-perception. And indeed [in no way would the upholders of] the view under discussion have been able to say (and this is just what they do [maintain] that [at one time] this is [white] and this black, while [at another time] neither this is [white nor] that black, [if] they had not had [previous] knowledge of the nature of both white and black.
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So regardless of the rest of the implications, one of the basic questions is apparently: Did Epicurus number friendship as being among the virtues? (Or considered under the category name "virtue.")
I am inclined to agree with the excerpts Don posted to the effect that the answer is "Yes." ("Yes - friendship is a virtue.")
Does anyone (TauPhi perhaps?) disagree with that?
I am presuming Don that you do agree?
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Welcome to Episode 328 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
This week we start are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective. We are focusing first on what is referred to as Book One, which provides an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and gives us an overview of the philosophical issues being dealt with at the time of Epicurus. This week will focus on the ending of Section 8.Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackam translation here:QuoteVIII.
The third part of philosophy, which is next in order, being conversant about reason and discussion, was thus handled by both schools. They said that, although it originated in the senses, still the power of judging of the truth was not in the senses. They insisted upon it that intellect was the judge of things. They thought that the only thing deserving of belief, because it alone discerned that which was always simple and uniform, and which perceived its real character. This they call idea, having already received this name from Plato; and we properly entitle it species.
But they thought that all the senses were dull and slow, and that they did not by any means perceive those things which appeared subjected to the senses; which were either so small as to be unable to come under the notice of sense, or so moveable and rapid that none of them was ever one consistent thing, nor even the same thing, because everything was in a continual state of transition and disappearance. And therefore they called all this division of things one resting wholly on opinion. But they thought that science had no existence anywhere except in the notions and reasonings of the mind; on which account they approved of the definitions of things, and employed them on everything which was brought under discussion. The explanation of words also was approved of — that is to say, the explanation of the cause why everything was named as it was; and that they called etymology. Afterwards they used arguments, and, as it were, marks of things, for the proof and conclusion of what they wished to have explained; in which the whole system of dialectics — that is to say, of an oration brought to its conclusion by ratiocination, was handed down. And to this there was added, as a kind of second part, the oratorical power of speaking, which consists in developing a continued discourse, composed in a manner adapted to produce conviction.
It occurs to me to add here that in some of our physics discussions recently we have had reason to focus on the importance of "emergence" or "emergent qualities" to the nature of the way things are.
Probably friendship and love and the issues you are talking about have an analogy there.
At the beginning of any relationship there are simple and direct interactions, but over time those deepen and expand and something emerges that is far different from what was present at the beginning.
For example there's a world of difference between buying a hamburger at a counter and living together for decades, raising a family, etc. And yet the latter type of relationship can emerge from the former, and it is completely proper to consider both of relationships as true and real and proper, and in no way is one less real or conflicting with the other.
This entire issue of emergence is the path by which we escape the false idea of intelligent design, arbitrary gods, and eternal punishment after death. i don't know that we have record of it being applied in exactly that way but it would be surprising if this example of pleasure weren't related to the way Epicurus analyzed the universe as a whole -- as emerging from simpler starting points.
These week we will continue around section 1:305 of Lucretius and explore further the implications of the invisibility of atoms and how we can have confidence in something that is not visible. This week we go over Lucretius' specific examples of how we reach this conclusion by analogy.
EpicureanFriends Side-By-Side LucretiusMulti-column side-by-side Lucretius text comparison tool featuring Munro, Bailey, Dunster, and Condensed editions.handbook.epicureanfriends.comJust a little more on this (admittedly largely repeating what I already wrote, but for emphasis):
This isn’t me arguing against hedonism,
Consistent with what I wrote about above - there's no problem here in arguing against "hedonism." - I will help you in fact, given that I think it's a poor idea to talk about Epicurean philosophy as "hedonism" in any but very limited circumstances. Those who try to pursue or promote "hedonism" outside the framework of Epicurean philosophy -- especially the wider meaning of "pleasure" that Epicurus uses - do have the problems you are concerned about.
It would appear that somewhere you've picked up that there is in fact a "paradox of hedonism" and that's why I titled the new thread that way. No doubt you're right that a lot of people talk that way on Reddit and elsewhere, but there's no reason to accept the terminology of anti-Epicurean thought here at EpicureanFriends.com. It's no paradox - there's a straightforward way of addressing the question.
Lamar you have asked a very good question and I set it up as a separate thread here:
If you have any problems getting access to post in it please let me know.
Good to have you Lamar.
Couple of points:
1 - This is why I don't care to refer to "hedonism" very often. Epicurean philosophy gets placed into that box with certain other groups, but Epicurus is far more subtle than most, and so "hedonism" gets used as a way to dismiss what Epicurus had to say.
2 - You're basically asking the "friendship" question which is discussed by Torquatus in Cicero's On Ends at the following link. I recommend you read through the full Torquatus section to get a feel for the general approach to all such ethical questions, but friendship in particular starts at 65:
EpicureanFriends Side-By-Side Torquatus
Torquatus himself doesn't take the most aggressive approach, but the most straightforward is the most logical: There is no need to cower in the face of claims that "altruism" or "putting others first" is a categorial imperative. Nature gives us only feelings of pleasure and pain. We take an interest and desire anything only because it brings us pleasure. Once we value a friend or lover highly enough, it brings us pleasure to see their interests fulfilled even if certain interests of ours suffer. And that goes so far that we will at times even die for a friend.
So i wouldn't trouble myself at ALL thinking that you need to live by "hedonism." The standard that applies here at Epicureanfriends and that Epicurus taught is not "hedonism" at all but the entire core of Epicurean philosophy. The fact that you are concerned about this shows that you haven't explored these issues enough -- which is absolutely fine.
but doing this inside of relationships seems to make them feel shallow and transactional, at least for me.
Not to psychologize in your personal situation, but most people pick up this idea from society and general culture, and that's the kind of cultural conditioning that Epicurus warns against when it doesn't make sense when compared to Nature. There is no cosmic or transcental duty of one human being to another human being - bonds of friendship and affection form naturally from community of interest, not because some ideal form exists that compels us in that direction. Examples of this is the discussion of "justice" in the last ten of the Principal Doctrines, and in the discussion of the development of civilization in Lucretius Book 5.
None of us get a deeper understanding of Epicurus without study, and the more we rely on wikipedia or superficial treatments of "hedonism" the more we have to unlearn.
And there's no more complete statement of all this in the ancient record than the full presentation by Torquatus in On Ends.
Glad to have you with us.
Lamar -- Welcome -- please post here as to the subject of the topic and we'll create a full thread in the appropriate place later as needed. Thanks.
Lamar tells us:
Hi, I’ve been interested in Epicureanism for a while and have been reading
the forums at Epicureanfriends for a while now, but I wanted to create a
post on something that I believe hasn’t been touched on which is why I’m
creating an account today.Welcome LAMAR__44 !
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We have found over the years that there are a number of key texts and references which most all serious students of Epicurus will want to read and evaluate for themselves. Those include the following.
"Epicurus and His Philosophy" by Norman DeWitt
The Biography of Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius. This includes the surviving letters of Epicurus, including those to Herodotus, Pythocles, and Menoeceus.
"On The Nature of Things" - by Lucretius (a poetic abridgement of Epicurus' "On Nature"
"Epicurus on Pleasure" - By Boris Nikolsky
The chapters on Epicurus in Gosling and Taylor's "The Greeks On Pleasure."
Cicero's "On Ends" - Torquatus Section
Cicero's "On The Nature of the Gods" - Velleius Section
The Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda - Martin Ferguson Smith translation
A Few Days In Athens" - Frances Wright
Lucian Core Texts on Epicurus: (1) Alexander the Oracle-Monger, (2) Hermotimus
Philodemus "On Methods of Inference" (De Lacy version, including his appendix on relationship of Epicurean canon to Aristotle and other Greeks)
"The Greeks on Pleasure" -Gosling & Taylor Sections on Epicurus, especially the section on katastematic and kinetic pleasure which explains why ultimately this distinction was not of great significance to Epicurus.
It is by no means essential or required that you have read these texts before participating in the forum, but your understanding of Epicurus will be much enhanced the more of these you have read. Feel free to join in on one or more of our conversation threads under various topics found throughout the forum, where you can to ask questions or to add in any of your insights as you study the Epicurean philosophy.
And time has also indicated to us that if you can find the time to read one book which will best explain classical Epicurean philosophy, as opposed to most modern "eclectic" interpretations of Epicurus, that book is Norman DeWitt's Epicurus And His Philosophy.
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Welcome to the forum!
s his insistence that all pleasure and pain is found in bodily sensation as Torquatus says.
i think this is a misreading if from it you conclude that Epicurus is deprecating mental experience that is not painful as not being pleasure. Everything about us ultimately arises through the body as we do not exist without it. That means anything mental cannot be separated from the body or presumed to exist without the body. Cicero and the antiEpcureans were taking just the position that you are summarizing, but the thrust of Torquatus' defense of Epicurus is that this is not correct. All mental and bodiily experience that is not painful counts as pleasure because there are only two feelings.
Curious for other opinions on this, is he an update on Epicurus crude hedonism for a more developed one or is he kind of mixing Epicureanism with other concerns or rather orthodox?
I see Diogenes of Oinoanda as completely orthodox and consistent with Lucretius' tone as to sympathy for "hearts in darkness." And of course Epicurus' whole career and school-building was outward-facing.
And I don't know what you would mean in referring to Epicurus' "crude hedonism" unless that's coming from the viewpoint of a Ciceronian or modern dismissal of pleasure there as "crude." And it's the Ciceronian and modern viewpoint that I would dismiss as "crude."
This episode is now up. As I reflect post-editing I regret that we didn't give more examples from Sedley's article about emergence (downward or otherwise) but that's a deep subject on its own and one we'll return to in the future. There's a lot more research and reading to be done on discussion in recent years on this topic, including llustrations that are probably much more dramatic than my "water vs H20" example.
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