Posts by Cassius

The full video may explain this but if someone doesn't want to watch that Wikipedia says that Aristarchus' calculations led him to conclude that the sun was 18-20 times larger than the moon. It's not clear to me whether he had a size for the moon or whether he stopped at the relative size.

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Aristarchus also reasoned that as the angular size of the Sun and the Moon were the same, but the distance to the Sun was between 18 and 20 times further than the Moon, the Sun must therefore be 18–20 times larger.

I think that's a very good question and the answer isn't obvious at all.

To me, some of what you're commentin on is a variation of the "psychological hedonism" argument which goes - everyone does what they think brings them pleasure, even pursuing virtue as a stoic, so in essence we're all hedonists and we should just all go have a beer because everyone acts for what they think is their own pleasure.

I personally don't like to argue that way and don't think it's a very attractive or persuasive position to take, but we have differing opinions about it here on the forum. If I recall correctly it appears in the "Living for Pleasure" book too.

To the extent that's what Socrates is talking about, he's seeing through that argument and saying that you shouldn't pursue virtue for the sake of pleasure, because virtue is itself its own reward and any consideration of pleasure tarnishes virtue.

As to this specifically

Quote from ReiWolfWoman

The philosopher’s virtue has to do with the heart and mind, with transcending and mastering fear and desire”

I think that's an accurate statement of the true stoic virtue-based position. They do in fact wish to suppress emotion and desire, and of course I think Epicurus would say to that view that it is against nature and not a good idea to do at all. But the stoics are being consistent - they don't want anything to do with pleasure, even as a reward for being virtuous.

Those are preliminary comments and you may be thinking in a different direction, but part of your comment does remind me of those issues.

Quote from ReiWolfWoman

Or perhaps an argument to be made that Epicurus’s own philosophy does value a higher good in its definition of pleasure, primacy of friendship and his own time spent in self-awareness and philosophical analysis?

Here i think your question and the answer is pretty clear. Epicurus values nothing higher thatn "pleasure," but the key to the analysis is that he has a very wide definition of what pleasure means, to inciude anything whatsoever that we find desirable. So the words that people like to use such as nobility and meaningfulness all come within the term "pleasure." If we feel that something is desirable in body or mind then we do so because it brings us the feeling of pleasure.

Quote from Eikadistes

This is one of the primary differences in the flavors of ancient Epicurean Philosophy versus contemporary Utilitarianism, both being hedonistic, but with different emphases on the happiness of an association of friends versus the collective happiness of the masses

And I would not hesitate to say that this is both (1) an example of regression in philosophy over 2000 years and (2) why I would be cautious about endorsing Bentham or applying the label of "hedonism" to Epicurus overbroadly. Epicurus was firm that there is no supernatural basis for considering everyone the equivalent of a brother and sister, or reason to ignore that in reality many people hate each other. No one wins any points in heaven or anywhere else for getting themselves killed in the name of abstract notions of the brotherhood of all men. Rather, just as almost happened to the Epicurean in Lucian's Alexander story, it is very easy to get oneself killed unnecessarily if you ignore the realities of your context. In the meantime while we work for better contexts it pays to pay attention to the reality of how far your circle of friends really extends.

Quote from ReiWolfWoman

But you seem to be saying that weighing one public work/spectacle against another isn’t clear.

Rather than saying not clear I would say it is always contextually relative and the answer for any individual situation is going to require evaluation of all the facts of that situation. So I would see this as an example where the hypothetical question require a close examination of the details of a given situation.

In this case I follow Lucretius' argument in book one, (1-551) which is if I recall correctly is largely that if matter were infinitely divisible then the universe as a whole would have long since disappeared.

As I see it the fact that a particular theory "works in practice" does not mean that it does not work for some reason outside the theory. And in this case there has obviously been no one who has demonstrated in the real world that matter can be "infinitely" divided.

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I haven't had time to look at this but may be relevant to Lucretius references:

Thirty previously unpublished verses by Empedocles discovered on a papyrus from Cairo

A papyrus fragment reveals thirty previously unknown verses by the Greek philosopher, allowing us for the first time to read a lost section of the Physica, his…

www.recherche.uliege.be

Quote from ReiWolfWoman

You have all collectively answered this question quite in depth and contemplatively. Would he also consider the financial cost to the government a wise use of its money? Does that depend on the possibility for that money to actually bring Epicurean pleasure to other citizens and people? Or would it’s probable use for something else make space travel more beneficial?

As Joshua indicated the question of what an Epicurean would consider is a wide one. There is no "universal Epicurean" who would follow a single analysis, and when you extrapolate out to a government and taxation and use of tax dollars you're incorporating huge numbers of contextual presumptions.

Probably the presumption that's driving the question is the consideration of "other people" and what is of benefit to them.

Here the conversation usually turns to the general concensus that Epicurean philosophy is not Benthamite Utiltarianism. The idea that there is a "greatest good for the greatest number" might be something an individual Epicurean would choose to adopt, but it's not something that Epicurus discusses as called for by his philosophy.

Epicurus reasons from a point of view of pleasure of the individual, and to the individual's friends because the friends are of value to the individual. How far out that circle of concern extends is going to be contextual. Clearly it can be very wide - Diogenes of Oinoanda specifically mentions strangers and future citizens - but I would say that Epicurus would emphasize the contextuality of it all, as there is no universal duty to humanity in general as an abstration. Epicurus deals with real people in real situations and categorial imperatives or idealism separated from reality is very far from the way he looks at things.

Quote from Matteng

Where every new scientific discovery/ fact makes religion views „weaker“, Epicurean Philosophy becomes more „stronger“ or more convincing because of insisting on evidence and coherence within nature.

Yes all of these discussions are of interest. The dividing line becomes one of appreciating that Epicurus was not ultimately taking positions on the latest developments in experimental theories then or now. It is very easy to confuse people with sweeping statements such as "We now know that there is 'energy' and other 'forces' which are not explicitly referenced in Epicurus' discussion of nature so his viewpoint is obsolete and irrelevant to ours."

Those kinds of statements show that the person making them has little to no appreciation of how Epicurus was actually approaching these issues. Even in his own time Epicurus was dealing with the ever-increasing accumulation of data. We will see that for example when we get to Philodemus' "On Signs." Everyone knew even then that there were parts of the word that they had not seen themselves, and that as a result they had to take a position on what 'knowledge" means to human beings, who always have limited data.

More directly as to physics, taking a position that infinite divisibility of matter is logically impossible, or that the universe as a whole is infinite in space or eternal in time, says nothing about the current state of what our scientists have found to date as to the parts of matter, space, or time that they themselves have to that point examined. Epicurus was talking about logical theory, and not the latest in the unending series of discoveries that is always going on.

Keeping those categories separate and clear is essential to having a practical understanding of the Epicurean approach.

We have a very old discussion of self-evident truth as referenced in the Declaration of Independence here. I am starting this new thread because in the podcast we are about to tackle some very specific issues regarding "truth" where the question of whether there is such a thing as "self-evident truth" will need to be examined again.

I believe we are going to find that the issues here are very separate from that of conclusing that the senses report honestly without opinion that "fire is hot" and "honey is sweet." Statements such as "all men are created equal" or that they "are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights...." are likely conclusions that are very far from what the senses alone perceive.

I expect that this issue will become relevant in discussing either or both of (1) the Stoic view of kataleptic impressions or (2) the Epicurean view of "present impressions of the mind."

So for the moment I am just setting up this thread with this background material from Grok as to how this phrase entered the American Declaration of Independence. it was not in Jefferson's initial draft, and how it entered is unclear.

Joshua has made many skeptical references in our podcast to "natural rights theory," and this concept of "self-evident truths" seems to me to be something to be also very cautious about accepting.

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The phrase "We hold these truths to be self-evident" opens the second paragraph of the U.S. Declaration of Independence (adopted July 4, 1776), which continues: "...that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."

Immediate Derivation (Drafting History): Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration in June 1776 as the primary author for the Committee of Five (which also included John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Robert Livingston, and Roger Sherman). In his original draft, the line read: "We hold these truths to be sacred and undeniable."

Benjamin Franklin (or possibly Jefferson himself, per some scholarly debate) crossed out "sacred and undeniable" and replaced it with "self-evident" during the committee's review of Jefferson's draft. This was one of dozens of edits (Congress made about 86 changes total, shortening the document by roughly a quarte

The change was deliberate and rhetorical: "Sacred and undeniable" carried strong theological/moral weight (anchoring the truths in divine or natural law with religious overtones). "Self-evident" shifted the emphasis to rational, Enlightenment-style certainty—truths so obvious they require no further proof or debate, preempting theological disputes while appealing to reason. Jefferson later described the document not as original invention but as "an expression of the American mind" and "the harmonising sentiments of the day," drawn from shared ideas in conversations, letters, essays, and foundational political philosophy texts.

Jefferson also drew phrasing and structure from his own earlier draft preamble to the Virginia Constitution and, especially, George Mason's Virginia Declaration of Rights (June 1776), which stated that "all men are by nature equally free and independent" and possess inherent rights to "the enjoyment of life and liberty... and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety."

Intellectual OriginsThe phrase and the paragraph as a whole synthesize several strands of Enlightenment (and earlier) thought, but they are not a direct copy from any single source. Jefferson explicitly listed influences including Aristotle, Cicero, John Locke, and Algernon Sidney.

• John Locke (primarily for the content of the truths): Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1689) supplied the core ideas of natural rights (life, liberty, and "estate"/property, which Jefferson adapted to "pursuit of Happiness"), government by consent of the governed, and the right to revolution against tyranny. Locke's state-of-nature theory emphasized original human equality.

  However, Locke defined "self-evident" truths narrowly in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) as purely formal/tautological propositions (e.g., "a man is a man" or "red is not blue")—not substantive moral or political claims like human equality or unalienable rights. The Declaration's usage stretches beyond Locke's epistemology.

• "Self-evident" as a philosophical term (Scottish Enlightenment influence): The specific framing of certain moral/political truths as self-evident (axiomatic, immediately accessible to common prudence without complex demonstration) aligns more closely with the Scottish Common Sense philosophy of Thomas Reid (1710–1796). Reid, in works like Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, treated self-evident truths as first principles implicit in everyday human conduct and discoverable by the faculty of "common sense." These are foundational axioms that prudent people grasp intuitively, countering skepticism (e.g., from David Hume). Reid argued that the same understanding enabling ordinary life also reveals self-evident truths about morality and reality.

  Scottish ideas were widely taught and influential in colonial American colleges and among the Founders. Reid's common-sense realism made republican self-government possible: if ordinary people can discern self-evident truths, they can govern themselves.

• Francis Hutcheson (for unalienable rights): This Scottish philosopher's A System of Moral Philosophy (1755) distinguished unalienable rights (inherent to human nature, e.g., life and liberty) from alienable ones (e.g., property acquired through labor/exchange). This refined Locke's framework and better matches the Declaration's wording.
• Broader roots: The concept of self-evident axioms traces to classical philosophy (e.g., Euclid's geometry or Aristotle's first principles) and natural-law traditions (via Cicero, Aquinas, Hooker, and Sidney). The Declaration presents the truths as a logical syllogism: self-evident premises about equality and rights → purpose of government → right to alter or abolish destructive government.
• In short, the ideas are Lockean natural rights filtered through American revolutionary consensus and Virginia precedents; the rhetorical claim of self-evidence draws on Scottish common-sense epistemology to assert them as undeniable axioms of reason. Jefferson and the Congress packaged widely shared colonial sentiments into a concise, persuasive justification for independence. This phrasing has since influenced global declarations of rights and movements for equality.

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Wow this is great Morgan - thanks for the information! You've got quite a stellar background, and having had dealings with Martin Ferguson Smith is enough to make many of us "envious."

We look forward to your being on the forum and I hope you will let us know about your travels!

Morgan has sent some additional information:

Hello Cassius,

Apologies for missing this email, I will now give a few details about me…

I’m retired, officially, but a writer and interested in pursuing an interest in Epicurus and Epicureanism that has been long held.

I came to the subject via conversations with Professor Martin Ferguson Smith, a name you will recognise I’m sure in relation to Oenoenda and his rather marvellous prose translation of Lucretius.

I was previously in television and radio as a producer and had a notion to make something around the inscription. That has not yet happened and I’m now out of the TV game so I’m unlikely to be able to make it a reality with my contacts. But my interest goes on. I’m planning a trip in September that will take me from the site in Oenoenda to Samos, perhaps via Rhodes, to Telos, Lesbos, and Lampsacus amongst other sites of interest…you’ll recognise also the trajectory. I guess you could say that it’s the life of Epicurus that interests me, but that would only be half the story. I’m also interested in the afterlife of Epicureanism, via Rome and the various commentators right up to Philodemus and the scrolls.

Two stories in one, and as a former journalist with only a self-taught education in classical literature and ancient Greek philosophy, you can no doubt imagine the learning curve. What will I do with what I learn? I’ve yet to decide if I can add anything of value to the public record, though a book is attractive, but personal satisfaction is top of my list.

I’m the recipient of a now ancient Emmy award, I’ve published a memoir which my name will throw up in a Google search - Shaun Deeney - and I’ve written, voiced and produced podcasts - I don’t like the term, I think of these recordings more as stories told - and my last project, not published as a book is called ‘Me and Michel’, a bicycle journey with Michel de Montaigne as my ‘companion’. I’ve recently taken down my personal website as it was getting tired, but I think these works might still be floating about Spotify/Apple etc.

Is that enough? An amateur abroad with a fascinating subject to explore sums it up. Why Epicurus? You know the answer to that, but if I were to put it into words it would be his courage and lucidity and simplicity, a quiet revolutionary in his own times, a voice not sufficiently heard in our own rather trying times with madmen and religious wars and fake news encouraging us to believe in anything but the power of our own minds to find a route to ataraxia.

Thanks to Joshua for his post which I did not previously see.

As to the "fourth criteria" we have this earlier thread which explains the DeWitt position. Again, I'm by no means saying it is ridiculous to talk about the present impressions of the mind. The issue is what rank to give it and how to consider it, and clearly Epicurus himself did not consider there to be four criteria - his were the sensations, anticipations and feelings. To talk of "four criteria" is to presumptively take a position on an issue that is not at all settled in that direction, and which in fact is not the way Epicurus himself spoke. This is the hazard I was referring to earlier. Someone new to Epicurus and reading about "four criteria" as if it were a given that that was Epicurus' approach is going to be immediately misled.

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Thoughts On The Alleged "Fourth Leg of the Canon"

I don't have time for a long post but I wanted to start this topic with a couple of general thoughts which are prompted by our recent discussions of images in book four of Lucretius, plus the articles from the Encyclopedia Brittanica (thanks Nate) as to the development of skepticism within the Academy, as well as the Stoic/Academic interplay involving how the Stoics attempted to remain dogmatic. Let me particularly highlight this paragraph:

[…]

Now as to the Epicureans, here is the primary…

Cassius

May 3, 2021 at 8:49 AM

Also while this topic is on my mind:

it's always important to be clear here as to exactly what we are talking about. When some hear"innovation" or "Updates" they are thinking about "let's talk about applying Epicurean ethics and ideas to modern situations.

And of course that's what we want to do.

That relates to another point:

We are running a discussion forum that caters to nonspecialists, and (to be honest) people who have a generally middle class Americans/ European worldview and are focused on wanting to live happier lives. We do have many people from whom English is not their first language, and we welcome anyone sincerely interested in Epicurus, but we are definitely not catering to a specialist/academic orientation that likes to pursue every rabbit as far down a trail as they can go. People on the forum see "latest posts" and if we get too far off into specifics that are not of general interest, then then adversely impacts the mission of the forum.

So that in itself is a very significant factor in theorizing about "innovations" in core ideas.

Quote from Matteng

in one of Hirams essays about the 4. criterion of the Canon he mentions rules for Innovations or Updating the Philosophy.

This is one of the basic differences between Hiram's approach and that which I set out to accomplish here in forming EpicureanFriends. Our focus is on understanding the philosophy as it was originally taught, which we are all including me very far from doing, not attempting to account for every "what-about" that has occurred over the last two thousand years.

We inevitably do some of that here and i don't see anything wrong with some amount of discussion on this, and I have a lot of respect for Hiram personally and for his enthusiasm for Epicurus.

However I do want to say that it's likely I'm going to moderate this thread to keep it from getting out of hand and distracting us from our core mission. For an example of how that can happen, we still have on the forum one of our longest threads from many years ago when we attempted (and failed) to hammer out a common approach on how to "organize" our efforts. I encourage people on the forum now to read over that thread because it's a very interesting discussion of how people can be generally on the same team but see game plans very differently.

Those who are really interested in pursuing "Neo-Epicureanism" - which is against one of our most clear site rules, should pursue that at Reddit or some other location. I wish them well in doing so, but this is not the place to pursue that in the way that some would like.

Again I'll say that a general discussion is probably ok. But everyone who wants to talk about some aspect of Physics needing to be updated is in my opinion mainly displaying that they do not yet understand Epicurus' approach to physics, which focuses on ultimate conceptual issues (e.g. infinite divisibility) rather than contemporary opinions on limited data. That is exactly the reason for our rule against pursuing "neo-Epicureanism."

Quote from Matteng

Which basic principles are close to be „timeless“ or “hardcore“ ?

That's what we pursue in discussion about the principles which are listed on the front page as the focus of the work here. We've had much discussion about those in the past and more discussion is welcome.so long of course as it's in the spirit of "this is what Epicurus actually taught" and not something that someone thinks he should have taught.

To some extent that includes the "fourth criteria" of the canon. That in itself is clearly stated by Diogenes Laertius to be something that later Epicureans added, and as Norman DeWitt argues, they added it because they did not understand the circularity that it creates by including in the canon something that is created by our own mental processing of the data from the senses, rather than from automatic functioning without opinion.

That too is something that sincere people disagree on, but as we can see in Torquatus there was already a tendency to water down after he was gone- in terms of the argument for friendship - what Epicurus had taught when he was alive.

I am sure we've had previous discussions on that and we can link to those and pursue them further, because clearly the present impressions of the mind are involved in Epicurean epistemology. But we're already on thin ice when embracing a formulation that Epicurus himself did not embrace.

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I don't mean this post to sound harsh Matteng because I know you are sincere and I know you haven't been involved in our past discussions on these issues. Every so often it's going to be appropriate to air them all out again so people can know where everyone stands. This difference in approaches is why we have at least two separate websites devited to the study of Epicurus in different ways, and in truth there are many more approaches, such as that at the Twentiers website and the website of the Athenian Garden in Greece.

We are all pursuing the study of Epicurus as we see best, and it's my strong opinion that we're all making better progress pursuing out individual threads than we would be if we were constantly "turned off" by the approach of people who are friends but who see things differently.

EDIT: I want to add that I have now seen the recent article by Hiram as to the Fourth Criterion, and he makes very clear in the article itself that there are many questions around the addition of the fourth. So to be clear his article seems to me to do a good job of pointing out the issues involved.

I personally consider the four virtues listed to track what seems pretty much a classical list. The "opposites" seem to me to be more Jefferson's word choice, and I'd certainly question listing "Desire" unless a lot more is understood about what is meant.

Have you read the Torquatus narrative where he discusses Epicurus' view of the virtues?

Cicero's "Torquatus" Presentation of Epicurean Ethics - from "On Ends" - Epicureanfriends.com

www.epicureanfriends.com

I have no ability to add anything to your parsing of the Greek, but I strongly agree with the direction you are going in each of your evaluations.

1 - Certainly we are going to sometimes break the law - that's inherent in the full analysis of how justice is contextual andchanges over time. When something becomes unjust, you aren't going to wait for the next procedural permission-granting to consider the situation unjust and act on that consideration. Sure you have to take into consideration who has power and how they may punish you, but we're talking philosophy and justice, and there's no cosmic enforcement mechanism that would convert "the law" into something any more than it is - a social structure among living people.

2 - Certainly Epicurus would not consider "all sins to be equal" such that stealing a DVD when you are six years old leads to a life of torment.

Any readings which would go in the opposite direction from your thoughts would be highly suspect.

This week we pick up with more on the void at line 346 of book one.

EpicureanFriends Side-By-Side Lucretius

Multi-column side-by-side Lucretius text comparison tool featuring Munro, Bailey, Dunster, and Condensed editions.

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Welcome to Episode 330 of Lucretius Today. This is a podcast dedicated to the poet Lucretius, who wrote "On The Nature of Things," the most complete presentation of Epicurean philosophy left to us from the ancient world. Each week we walk you through the Epicurean texts, and we discuss how Epicurean philosophy can apply to you today. If you find the Epicurean worldview attractive, we invite you to join us in the study of Epicurus at EpicureanFriends.com, where we discuss this and all of our podcast episodes.
   
This week we start are continuing our series reviewing Cicero's "Academic Questions" from an Epicurean perspective. We are focusing first on what is referred to as Book One, which provides an overview of the issues that split Plato's Academy and gives us an overview of the philosophical issues being dealt with at the time of Epicurus. This week will focus on the ending of Section 10.

Our text will come from
Cicero - Academic Questions - Yonge We'll likely stick with Yonge primarily, but we'll also refer to the Rackam translation here:

• Cicero On Nature Of Gods Academica Loeb Rackham : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

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X.

Zeno, then, was not at all a man like Theophrastus, to cut through the sinews of virtue; but, on the other hand, he was one who placed everything which could have any effect in producing a happy life in virtue alone, and who reckoned nothing else a good at all, and who called that honorable which was single in its nature, and the sole and only good. But as for all other things, although they were neither good nor bad, he divided them, calling some according to, and others contrary to nature. There were others which he looked upon as placed between these two classes, and which he called intermediate. Those which were according to nature, he taught his disciples, deserved to be taken, and to be considered worthy of a certain esteem. To those which were contrary to nature, he assigned a contrary character; and those of the intermediate class he left as neutrals, and attributed to them no importance whatever. But of those which he said ought to be taken, he considered some worthy of a higher estimation and others of a less.

Those which were worthy of a higher esteem, he called preferred; those which were only worthy of a lower degree, he called rejected. And as he had altered all these things, not so much in fact as in name, so too he defined some actions as intermediate, lying between good deeds and sins, between duty and a violation of duty; — classing things done rightly as good actions, and things done wrongly (that is to say, sins) as bad actions. And several duties, whether discharged or neglected, he considered of an intermediate character, as I have already said. And whereas his predecessors had not placed every virtue in reason, but had said that some virtues were perfected by nature, or by habit, he placed them all in reason; and while they thought that those kinds of virtues which I have mentioned above could be separated, he asserted that that could not be done in any manner, and affirmed that not only the practice of virtue (which was the doctrine of his predecessors), but the very disposition to it, was intrinsically beautiful; and that virtue could not possibly be present to any one without his continually practising it.

And while they did not entirely remove all perturbation of mind from man, (for they admitted that man did by nature grieve, and desire, and fear, and become elated by joy,) but only contracted it, and reduced it to narrow bounds; he maintained that the wise man was wholly free from all these diseases as they might be called. And as the ancients said that those perturbations were natural, and devoid of reason, and placed desire in one part of the mind and reason in another, he did not agree with them either; for he thought that all perturbations were voluntary, and were admitted by the judgment of the opinion, and that a certain unrestrained intemperance was the mother of all of them. And this is nearly what he laid down about morals.

Episode 329 of the Lucretius Today Podcast is now available. This week our episode is entitled: "Cracks In The Academy On Ideal Forms and Virtue Lead To The Emergence of Aristotle, The Stoics,And Epicurus"